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Abstract: 
The Blended Separation of Powers and 
the Organisation of Party Groups:  
The Case of English Local Government 
 
 
In the Local Government Act 2000, central government 
mandated a change in political arrangements within English 
local authorities. Through introducing a blended separation 
of powers to the majority of local authorities, with a leader, 
cabinet and overview and scrutiny committees, the 
legislation moved the constitutional structure from a form 
of assembly government to a Westminster-style split 
between decision-makers and those who scrutinise those 
choices. 
 
One of the goals was to remove the party group grip on 
decision-making. Given the evidence of the strength of 
groups in authorities (Maud 1967, Widdicombe 1986, Copus 
1999a) there are questions but no clear answers about how 
group behaviour has changed since this legislation (OPDM, 
2002, Ashworth 2003, Copus & Leach, 2004, ELGNCE, 2004, 
2006).  
 
This research assesses the impact of the change on major 
political parties. Due to the shift in the institutional 
environments, this thesis uses a rational choice 
institutionalist approach to consider how the legislation has 
affected groups; through assessing methods used to satisfice 
their goals. Using a mixed-methods approach incorporating 
survey research and case studies, the research has 
discovered that despite the reform to remove group 
influence, the legislation served to make local government 
more prone to domination by party groups.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Research Outline 
In the Local Government Act 2000, central government mandated a change in political 
arrangements within English local authorities. Through introducing a blended separation of 
powers to the majority of local authorities, with a leader, cabinet and overview and scrutiny 
committees, the legislation moved the constitutional structure of the majority of local 
government from a form of assembly government, where councillors sat as collective 
decision-makers, to a Westminster-style split between those who make decisions and those 
who scrutinise those choices. 
 
One of the goals of the legislation was to remove the party group grip on decision-making. 
Given the evidence of the strength of party groups in local authorities (Maud 1967, 
Widdicombe 1986, Copus 1999a, Copus & Leach, 2004) there are questions but no clear 
answers about how group behaviour has changed since this legislation (OPDM, 2002, 
Ashworth 2003, ELGNCE, 2004, 2006).  
 
This research assesses the impact of the institutional change on the main political parties in 
local government. Due to the shift in the institutional environments for party groups, this 
thesis uses a rational choice institutionalist approach to consider how the separation of powers 
has affected the behaviour of party groups. Using a mixed methods approach incorporating 
major survey research and case studies, the research has discovered that despite the reform to 
remove group influence on decision-making, the legislation served to make local government 
more, rather than less, prone to domination by party groups. 
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The inspiration for this work came from Copus’ and Leach’s (2004) study of the introduction 
of the overview and scrutiny function on the operation of local party groups. It has been the 
only research which evaluated how party groups had responded to the introduction of a 
blended separation of powers and gave details of how and why councils would tend towards 
one rather than another model. Through thirty-four case study authorities, they posited four 
models of increasing intensity of party control over the overview and scrutiny function; the 
party as ‘a partner, [minimal party control over overview and scrutiny] arbitrator, filter and 
Leviathan [maximal party control over overview and scrutiny]’ (Copus & Leach, 2004, 
p.339). The differences between each of these four proposed models are explained with four 
factors;  
 
‘...the degree of group coherence in public; the readiness to impose a whip and use 
disciplinary mechanisms, the number of group meetings and the balance between open 
deliberation and closed decision-making.’ 
 (2004, p 339) 
 
Copus and Leach (2004) considered that there were certain predictors that would affect how 
parties would react and hypothesised models that the parties would collect around as a result 
of the change in institutional environment. For example, the different political parties have 
developed in distinctive ways and thus their constituent members would behave in dissimilar 
ways; such as the Labour ‘corporatist perspective [where] the group is entitled to loyalty, as it 
is a mechanism which implements the policies supported by the electorate’ (2004, p. 339), the 
Conservative’s ‘individual freedom [chastened by] individual responsibility implying 
obligation to accept decisions’ (2004, p.339) and the Liberal Democrat’s recognition of 
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‘collective, rather than individual political endeavour, which brings political success’ (2004, 
p.339). 
 
More importantly, as each party necessarily commanded some form of cohesion for at least 
some points in time, Copus and Leach (2004) looked to other factors which would affect the 
model to which parties would tend. For example, the political composition of the authority 
was seen as a major factor in determining how groups would operate, where party discipline 
was likely to be tight and restrictive in competitive authorities where the control of authority 
could feasibly change hands (2004, p.348) compared to the reverse situation where an 
opposition could not challenge because it was ‘weak or divided’ (2004, p.348). Another 
variable raised was the level of intra-party factionalisation; where groups would be more 
likely to control its members where cohesion was not naturally forthcoming and the reverse 
situation where cohesion came naturally. 
 
Whilst the Copus and Leach (2004) explanation of party reactions to the transition from the 
committee-system to a separation of the executive and non-executive was useful in answering 
some of the questions about the differing levels of political party group control over the non-
executive function, the route by which it arrived there was inadequate; basing differences in 
party group approaches to the split on arbitrary structural differences. Whilst it may have been 
true that ‘effective scrutiny was most likely in a situation where the majority or dominant 
group operates a ‘group as partner’ philosophy’ (2004. p.351) and ‘effective scrutiny was 
least likely in a situation where the majority (or dominant) group operates a ‘group as 
Leviathan’ philosophy’ (2004. p.351); the fundamental hypothesis that a rational party group 
could be anything other than the described Leviathan model could and should be contested.  
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One of the key failures in the mostly advisory, practitioner-directed literature on the changes 
in constitutional arrangements arising in the Act is that they fail to acknowledge why the party 
behaves as it does in the political local government arena and how and why it gets to a 
behavioural place in the first instance, instead relying on explaining conditions where party 
behaviour may be different. Thus the intrinsic worth of this literature as a key to unlock 
general party behaviour is low. The Local Government Act 2000 legislated for a 
constitutional change in local government yet since the introduction there has been no 
comparison with other movements in constitutional form which have occurred directly 
preceding or throughout this time (France and Israel and Sub-national in North Rhine-
Westphalia, Bergen, Oslo) relating to how parties may have reacted to changes in institutional 
environments. Viewing groups as unitary collective actors, local party groups may accede and 
possess goals in the same way that national parties may do so and equivalently they aim to 
fulfil these goals. For example local parties may seek to achieve policy, office or votes (Strøm, 
1999) in the same manner as national parties. Whilst the local parties differ in their functions 
and the way that they may formulate and achieve goals set for themselves, with or without 
national party interference, the way that they go about this may be no different to those of 
their central equivalent. If national party X seeks to achieve election to control the 
government, what makes the component local party X different when it seeks to control the 
authority? 
 
The literature about the introduction of an executive with an overview and scrutiny function, 
assessed in Chapter Five, disregards the similarities between constitutional shifts at a national 
/ sub-national level and subsequent changes in the behaviour of parties and ignores the 
dominant state-level arguments that parties may be actors who possess goals as part of the 
reason for their existence. If legislation is enacted which confronts the operating space of the 
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local parties and forces submission to the institutional change of multiple arenas of 
representation, it demands immediate reaction from parties. Moving from a government-by-
assembly represented by the committee system to the relatively open and more difficult 
environment of a rudimentary organisational separation is one of these threats which directly 
impinges upon a party’s ability to satisfice their goals. The explanation of the reactions of the 
parties to this change, whereby goals are made more satisficable, is the chief subject of this 
research. In order to answer the foremost question about why Copus and Leach (2004) found 
that most groups did seem to tend around the Leviathan model, it is crucial to take another 
route beyond structural heuristics and one that looks squarely to other examples, including 
that of the theories of party at a state and sub-national level, in order to begin to uncover the 
potential reactions of local parties in English local government. 
 
This thesis picks up the life of local parties almost ten years after what could be considered 
the most profound exogenous shock for local groups since the upheaval provided by the Local 
Government Act in 1972. In doing so, the research examines how local groups adapted to 
changes in the operating environments and whether party entrenchment in local government 
had survived an attack to its core with the introduction of the legislation, which sought, either 
directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, to cleave the power of the local party 
group with a separation of powers. By offering local government a constitutional menu of 
either a change to a Westminster-type blended separation of powers or a clearly delineated 
separation of powers engendered by an elected mayor, central government looked to change 
political arrangements in such a way to provide some semblance of a ‘formal political 
executive’ (Stoker, 2004, p.126). 
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The Research of Change: The party group in a new institutional environment 
This research takes the movement to a cabinet, leader and scrutiny constitution for the 
majority of English local government as a shift in an institutional environment from assembly 
government (the committee system) to the institutional environment of a Westminster-type 
blended separation of powers, where an executive is indirectly elected from within the 
‘legislature.’ With this shift came a new set of challenges for political parties who continued 
to face objectives such as policy, office or votes (Strøm 1990, Strøm & Müller 1999) which 
sustained the very existence of their organisations. In order to fulfil these goals, the party 
groups may have needed to adapt their behaviour(s) in order to continue to accomplish their 
objectives.  
 
Unusually in the research of local politics, this thesis takes national party organisation 
theories as plausible blueprints with which to view local groups. Despite the glaringly obvious 
differences between the two; the subjugation, dependence (being component of) and the 
exceptionally diverse functions, the ‘party group’ as an organisation retains goals, however 
small in scope, broadly parallel in direction with parties at across all tiers of government. The 
EU-level European Socialists could possess the same ambition to win a majority as the UK 
Labour Party, who could equally possess the same ambition as the Labour group at Wigan 
Council. Fundamentally, whilst functions vary, ambitions can be constants. When looking at 
a constitutional shift potentially affecting the satiation of objectives for party groups, the 
actions taken as a result of the change could be analogous. 
 
As such, this research takes its inspiration from the family of rational choice institutionalists 
such as Samuels and Shugart (2006, 2010) who explored the impact of the separation of 
powers on intra-party organisation. Whilst focusing primarily on the introductions of various 
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Latin American presidential systems, the ‘neo-madisonian theoretical framework’ of which 
they speak is tangential but relevant to this research of the operation of party groups in 
parliamentarism. Given that the choice for local authorities was between a form of 
parliamentarism (leader, cabinet and scrutiny) and presidentialism (an elected mayoral 
system), the very choice made by the majority of local government could be explained 
through the defence of the party group as a unit. 
 
As a starting point, James Madison argued that politicians’ often ‘selfish motivation [was] 
inevitable and therefore sought to harness it for the greater good [through] establishing a 
system of institutions that structure and checks that ambition’ (Carroll and Shugart, 2007, 
p.52). To simplify, Madison’s vision for a clearly delineated separation of powers1 sought to 
offer a population two independent ‘agents’ of which the population were ‘principal,’ in this 
way ‘ambition was a check to ambition and prevented an emergence of a hierarchical 
relationship between the executive and legislature that [Madison] believed led to oppression’ 
(Carroll and Shugart, 2007, p.54). Pared down for clarity, the introduction of a cabinet / 
scrutiny model in local government created parliamentarism, the very institution for which 
Madison reserved his ire, which involved one agent (an indirectly elected executive) with one 
principal (the legislature) with hierarchical relationships enabling the tyranny of the party 
group. 
 
This tyranny of the ‘party’ permitted within parliamentarism does not split party groups in the 
way that a formal separation ‘divides [...] the dual agents of the electorate’ (Shugart and 
Carroll, 2007, p.55) and ‘breaks parties into two separate branches’ (Samuels & Shugart, 
                                                            
1  Engendered, very roughly, in the U.S separation of powers or the elected mayoral system of the Local 
Government Act 2000. 
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2010) and thus creates relatively unitary groups with common purpose. The success of the 
party as a whole is an individual and collective goal; if the group’s goals are not met, 
everybody is at risk of losing out, but if everyone attains for the same goals, everybody wins. 
Thus the parliamentarism invoked by the Local Government Act 2000 facilitated the 
perpetuation of a ‘singular party’ because: 
 
‘...there is unity of origin, because one branch of government originates from within 
the other. Separation of origin characterizes presidential systems, and unity of origin 
characterizes parliamentary systems.’ 
(Samuels & Shugart, 2006, p.9) 
 
This separation of origin and survival in presidentialism is important because it guarantees 
‘relatively greater political independence for members of each branch’ (Samuels & Shugart, 
2006, p.11). In the blended separation of powers with the cabinet / scrutiny split, shared goals 
and a common purpose restrict the ability for political independence. Speaking against the 
group is speaking against the common purpose and could result in the party failing to achieve 
its goal and the individual and the group being elected out of office. Whilst the blended 
separation of powers builds incentives for individuals to desire to please the party group (i.e. 
seeking promotion to higher ranks of the party), the introduction of an evidence-based 
‘overview and scrutiny’ function was an affront to this cohesion. 
 
In order to solve Olson’s (1965) dilemma of collection action in parliamentary systems where 
the logical supposition of collective unity for collective goals was unlikely in large groups, 
there was a need to delegate to a leader or ‘agent’ to ensure that the group would follow the 
common objectives of the organisation without free-riding.  
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‘If the members of some group have a common interest or objective, and they would 
all be better off if that objective were achieved, it [had] been thought to follow 
logically that the individuals in that group would, if they were rational and self-
interested, act to achieve that objective.’  
(Olson, 1965, p.1) 
 
In institutional environments where party groups are unable to coerce a line on an issue (i.e. 
presidentialism) this can lead to individual legislators focusing their legislative behaviour 
toward their own desires (self-interest: whether altruistic (policy issues) and / or concerned 
with re-election / re-selection). Cox and McCubbins (2007) use Olson’s (1965) collective 
action dilemma to highlight the difficulty of protecting the party group in presidentialist 
systems:  
 
‘...because individual reputations are essentially private goods, it is not difficult to 
explain why legislators undertake activities such as pork barrelling and casework that 
enhance their own reputations. In contrast, the party's reputation is a public good for 
all legislators in the party. [Thus] it means that party reputations may receive less 
attention than they deserve.’ 
(Cox & McCubbins, 2007, p.113) 
 
Whilst Cox and McCubbins’ (1993, 2007) work was related to the U.S House of 
Representatives, Döring (1995) argues that their ‘reasoning and findings have a far more 
universal theoretical significance’ (1995, p.39) as the ‘basic dilemma of collective choice 
applies to [legislatures]’ (1995, p.40). For example, in parliamentary systems with a blended 
separation of powers, there should be a lower likelihood of legislators acting according to 
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particularistic concerns as ‘a legislature is likely to act as a firm engaged in team production 
to produce laws [...] not as a market [as in the U.S.]’ (Döring 1995, p.42). Through having an 
executive or ‘agent delegate’ elected from and within the legislature under the blended 
separation of powers, it would ‘solve collective action problems [by] protecting the party 
reputation and thus maintaining the value of the party label’ (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, 
p.35) in a way that could be impossible under a clearly delineated separation of powers in the 
U.S. Agents would be able to resolve the problems of collective action by ‘imposing 
discipline or other sanctions on individual politicians whose behaviour threatens the party’s 
collective image [and] rewarding politicians whose behaviour helps the group’ (Samuels and 
Shugart, 2010, p. 35). In this way, the principal (the legislature) must be willing to protect the 
image of the group (such as censoring criticism, shielding deficiencies and subsuming 
individual grievances) for the common purpose of achieving what they, as an organisation, set 
out to do in respect to policy, office or votes (Strøm, 1990). In more technical Olsonian terms, 
the failure of automatic intra-party group cohesion is natural due to the economic ‘free-rider’ 
objection and the subsequent need of an indirectly elected executive as ‘agent’ of the party to 
create a Pareto optimal point: ‘a feature of all collective action from a purely rational 
perspective is that outcomes are not Pareto optimal. Everyone would be better off if there 
were some way to coerce contributions’ (Shepsle, 2006, p.31). Unlike in presidentialism, the 
power of the principal to remove the agent (as Heseltine to Thatcher - Samuels and Shugart, 
2010, p.3) ensures that the agent serves the principal well and will not, customarily, overstep 
authority in relation to group-agreed goals.  However, with the introduction of the Local 
Government Act 2000, it was the delegated responsibility of the group leader to protect the 
party brand through necessary means (organisational discipline), within arenas where the 
ambitions could be under threat (e.g. O&S), for the purposes of protecting the group’s 
objectives of policy, office or votes (Strøm 1990, Strøm & Müller 1999). 
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This thesis thus seeks to explore whether the blended separation of powers (parliamentarism) 
introduced within the Act, which was instituted in order to reduce the group-dominated, 
opaque decision-making in local government, actually served to make local government more 
susceptible to the domination of the group because of the incentives it created to breed ‘a 
relationship of symbiotic mutual dependence between branches of government’ (Samuels & 
Shugart, 2010, p.37). Given the need to protect the party brand in order to protect group 
ambitions, it could follow that there would be active steps taken by the agents to control non-
executive functions such as ‘overview and scrutiny.’ 
 
Perspectives on Parties 
Before developing the theoretical approach of this thesis project (Chapter Two), it is essential 
to look at other perspectives on parties, their organisation and behaviour and how the chosen 
theoretical approach fits within the wider party literature. The following is an exploration of 
the current academic thought on political parties, from a literature in excess of ‘11,500 titles’ 
(Caramani & Hug, 1998, p.498). Whilst it cannot be possible to encompass an abridgment of 
the entire sub-discipline, the following discussion assesses how research on political parties 
has progressed. 
 
Approaching  Political Parties 
Political parties exist, by definition, as ‘basic institutions for the translation of mass 
preferences into public policy’ (Key 1961, p.433). Sartori (1976), one of the leading scholars 
of political parties, argued that parties not only translated or expressed preferences, they 
‘channelled [...] and reflected public opinion’ (2005, p.25) and further ‘shaped and indeed 
manipulated, opinion’ (2005, p.25). Others, such as structural functionalists Almond and 
Powell (1966) offered a more sympathetic assertion that political parties would be ‘greatly 
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shaped by the culture in which they must operate’ (1966, p.127) such as the ‘nature of the 
traditional political orientations, the general conditions and issues of salience in the national 
environment and the performance of other agencies of socialization’ (1966, p.124). Across 
Western systems, democracy is inextricably linked to the operation of party organisations, 
since these aggregators and controllers of the channels of preferences have often been the 
chief actors in state decision-making. To speak of democracy without mention of parties 
would be to evade the central concerns of political scientists since the 1950s (Duverger 1954, 
Neumann 1956, Downs 1957). As Robertson posits: 
 
‘To talk [...] about democracy, is to talk about a system of competitive political parties. 
Unless one chooses to reject the representative model that has been the staple of the 
theory and practice of democracy since the French Revolution, one must come to 
terms with political parties.’  
(Robertson 1976, p.1) 
 
Political Party Cleavages  
Sociological research by Lipset & Rokkan (1967) argued that European parties developed as 
results of historic cleavages which existed in societies and thus reflected conflict and 
disagreement. Firstly in the UK these were the religious cleavages which divided people in 
the nineteenth century and earlier; ‘Tories generally hostile to Catholic emancipation and 
radical Whigs, the party of freedom of conscience and religious toleration, in favour’ (Webb 
2000, p.41). Secondly, the most important of these cleavages to the UK had been the social 
class cleavage ‘emanating from the process of industrialisation [...] based on the tensions 
between owners (and senior controllers) of capital and their employees’ (Webb 2000, p.43). 
Rather than being a dynamic changing party landscape, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) posited that 
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European party systems essentially reflected a ‘freeze’ that occurred in the 1920s as the ‘party 
systems of the 1960s reflect[ed], with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of 
the 1920s’ (1967, p.50).  
 
However ‘class’ was not the only factor to divide a nation but ‘other components of life 
chances [did] not divide the population into two huge camps of privileged and oppressed’ 
(Lipset & Rokkan 1967, p. 69). The party system could thus be seen as a ‘democratic 
translation of the class struggle, postulating national unity beneath the divisions of class’ 
(MacIver 1947, p.217). The Labour Party which developed in the 1920s in the UK was the 
catalyst for the revelation of this cleavage, given the ‘discovery by the urban workers that 
they could secure better conditions of services by combinations amongst themselves (Jennings 
1961, p.237). From the post-war period through to the 1970s, this era of two-party 
competition under the class cleavage was especially relevant, where elections were fought 
with strong partisan identification based on differences in social class. This was true at both 
national and local level: 
 
‘In so far as community identification is more important than nationwide class 
considerations, one would expect national party labels to have little meaning in local 
politics... This is not the case in Britain.’ 
(Rose 1974, p.16)  
 
Local councils often reflected the social class of their electorate, where working-class areas 
were often represented by Labour councillors and more affluent areas by Conservatives; 
‘Labour strongholds of East London and South Wales or the Conservative seaside towns of 
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southern England’ (Gyford 1976, p.89). Fundamentally, at this time, the ‘class’ division 
between the two parties was clear-cut enough to reflect types of people: 
 
‘...divisions between Labour and Conservative members [were] not merely a political 
or even an occupational division, but a social one too... each group inhabiting its own 
world and only coming together on the council.’ 
(Jones 1969, p.147) 
 
Rose and McAllister (1986) argued that party competition at this time of two-party rivalry 
was effectively moot, as parties only aimed to maximise their own electoral base and getting 
‘their people’ out to vote: 
 
‘To say that parties compete is an exaggeration, for each party is not so much seeking 
to win the votes from those committed to its opponent as it is seeking to mobilize the 
maximum vote from electors already predisposed in its favour by their social position.’ 
(Rose & McAllister 1986, p.11) 
 
However during the 1970s, the range of political parties gave the electorate a ‘moderate 
pluralism’ (Webb 2000, p.8), moving away from the two-party divide over social class. As 
such the levels of partisan alignment started to fall, to the extent that a majority of voters did 
not cast their ballot according to their class: ‘the Labour vote among manual workers suffered 
the greater haemorrhage, falling from a high of 69 per cent in 1966 to 42 per cent in 1983 - 
the non-manual Conservative vote too is a less predictable electoral force than it was in the 
1960s’ (Scarborough 1986, p.219-220). Whether due to geographic or social mobility, the 
influence of class as a proxy for party was becoming less important: 'the boundaries of the 
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traditional social bases of the two major parties are being blurred and, as they have come to 
be seen as less significant, they have become easier to transgress' (Sarlvik & Crewe 1983, p. 
337). Given the distance from the origins of the parties, Flanagan and Dalton (1984) argued 
that ‘voters who are two or three generations removed from the issue conflicts which 
precipitated the original alignments should show little further commitment to these issues as 
they are resolved or lose their relevance (Flanagan & Dalton 1984, p.10). More recently, at 
the 1997 election of New Labour, only 45% of the electorate cast their vote according to 
reference of social class (Webb 2000, p.54, Table 2.3) and the party won with the support of a 
‘middle class’ vote, demonstrating that parties were at least seeking to cater for more than one 
social position and moving beyond Rose & McAllister’s (1986) interpretation of competition. 
 
Whilst the explanations of the opening up of the party landscape in the UK since the 1970s 
included partisan realignment (Dunleavy’s (1979) self-interested voting reflecting preferences 
of party on the basis of ‘pay-offs’) or partisan dealignment (Rose and McAllister’s (1986, 
p.99) class blurring) amongst other interpretations, the outcome of the move away from strict 
class-based party segmentation has been a reopening of party competition for votes at both a 
national and local level. 
 
Slow Death of the Political Party? 
Postmaterialist Populace 
Research has argued that there has been a decline in the importance of parties, as institutions, 
because of changes in society. Crotty (1984) argued that ‘society is changing, a new 
technology of politics has arisen [and] an evolving electorate is placing new and 
unaccustomed demands on the party agencies’ (1984, p.v). This change in society had led to 
an increasing proportion of the electorate basing their voting behaviour on best guesses about 
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the potential resolution of ‘valence issues’ rather than any predesigned partisanship: 
‘Valenced partisanship’ is continually updated as voters acquire new information, react to 
events and continuously make judgements about the competence of parties, governments and 
leaders’ (Denver 2005, p.295). This was likely a result of an increasingly educated populace 
whose ‘postmaterialist values [have] conflicted with the traditional ideologies of many 
parties and [...] given rise new social movements, single-issue groups and unconventional 
forms of involvement’ (Montero & Gunther 2003, p.7). This move towards an increasingly 
post-partisan world has led parties into a position where their core voters could not be relied 
upon to deliver them to win elections. Stoker (2006, 2010) argued that this was not only a 
problem in relation to political parties but more generally across membership organisations. 
 
‘Political parties, lobby organisations and even protest movements have lost their 
roles as mass membership institutions and have atrophied into organisations 
dominated by professional activists and reduced most citizens into passive recipients 
of messages or short-term calls for action.’  
(Stoker 2010, p. 56) 
 
The election of Barack Obama through cross-partisan micro-donations or the single-donor 
finance of the oligarchic Forza Italia! party shattered traditional assumptions about party 
organisation and demonstrated the shifting expectations of democracy. Crouch (2000) argued 
that due to partisan dealignment, party leaders were often faced with ‘casting around for votes 
in the pool of the general electorate [because] their loyal electorate was too small’ (Crouch 
2000, p.50). The trade-off then existed in satisfying both their organisational support (i.e. 
financial contributors) and their remaining activists (likely staunchly ideological), whilst 
trying to appeal to potential voters. Using the activist example, the more policies are aimed at 
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a median voter, the more voters they may appeal to but the more activists they may sacrifice. 
Equally the more policies are attuned to the activists, the fewer voters they may appeal to but 
with a greater activist mobilisation. Modern parties in the UK are thus much more complex 
balancing acts than the comparatively concrete partisanships of the social cleavages. However 
the extent to which political parties have suffered as a result is virtually negligible:  
 
‘[Parties] have been forced to undertake considerable efforts to adapt to the changing 
conditions of political competition [...] But in no instance has [it] led to the 
disappearance of parties and/or their replacement by other types of organisations 
(interest groups or social movements) or institutionalized practices (direct 
democracy).’ 
(Montero & Gunther 2003, p. 9) 
 
The retention of the two-and-a-half-partism in the UK dominated by the large institutionalised 
parties is evident up to the present day, in some way indicative of Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) 
conclusion of a ‘frozen’ party system based, in small part, on the social cleavages present in 
society. In opinion polling since the 2010 UK general election, these three parties continue to 
reflect almost all voting intentions. As Strøm & Müller (1999) highlight, in reference to the 
alleged demise of party organisations; ‘though political parties may no longer command the 
loyalties they once did, they are still critical to democratic government’ (1999, p.3). 
 
Impotence of the Political Party? 
Whilst the party has remained a feature of almost all modern democracies, the extent to which 
they actually control decision-making has been up for debate. Fiorina (1987) questioned how 
parties continued to play their part in decision-making in a complex patchwork of other strong 
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institutions: ‘we must consider the real possibility that parties are not the central institutions 
of, the necessary condition for, or the working mechanism of liberal democracy’ (Fiorina 
1987, p.271). Katz (1986) defined some conditions relating to what should be considered an 
actual ‘party government,’ including: 
 
 ‘1) Government decisions are made by elected party officials or by those under their 
control, 2) Government policy is decided within political parties, 3) These parties act 
cohesively to enact and implement this policy, 4) Public officials are recruited through 
political parties and 5) Public officials are held accountable through political parties.’ 
(Svåsand & Strøm 1997, p.3) 
 
Whilst very few democracies ‘satisfy these conditions fully, [...] none violates all of them all 
of the time’ (Svåsand & Strøm 1997, p. 3). However, in terms of functions of parties in 
modern democracies, it can be seen that they have, at the least, ‘lost control of some political 
activities, or functions, that they previously performed’ (Svåsand & Strøm 1997, p. 5). In the 
UK, Skelcher (2000) argues that the state has become ‘congested,’ where non-government 
actors had evolved to deliver decisions outside of the traditional democratic framework: 
 
‘[The Congested State] denotes an environment in which [there are] high levels of 
organisational fragmentation [and] plural modes of governance reflecting the shift 
from primary to secondary governmental bodies.’ 
(Skelcher 2000, p.12) 
 
Given the ‘flowering of collaborative activity [with] substantial institutional growth around 
the established structures of democratic government’ (Skelcher 2000, p.3) the responsibilities 
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of parties-in-government are limited through the delegation to other agencies. This reduction 
in control of government (both central and local) in favour of secondary (quangos) or tertiary 
institutions (partnerships) has ensured that decision-making and ‘determining the future shape 
of our communities and regions’ (Skelcher 2000, p.17) is taken away from the control of the 
party actors. The rate of this transformation has been accelerated in the UK because of its 
‘emphasis on cross-cutting issues and joined-up government’ (Skelcher 2000, p.16).  
 
In a more focused local context, democratic government is ‘just one of a multiplicity of bodies 
involved in local service delivery (Wilson and Game 2006, p.143) where the terrain has 
shifted towards ‘local governance: a complex mosaic of organisations, none of which are 
directly elected’ (Wilson and Game 2006, p.141). Compounded with the central government 
continuation of ‘privatising many local council functions’ (Crouch 2000, p57) and local 
government being at the mercy of ‘powers being [...] absorbed into the central state (Crouch 
2000, p.57), it is essential to ask: whither the responsibilities of the local political parties in 
this changing landscape? 
 
Further relating to Katz’s (1986) definition of party government, the tradition of patronage 
‘spoils’ (appointments to non-governmental organisations) gained as a result of parties 
winning elections had come under attack, considerably reducing party roles in most cases. For 
example, the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments was created in 1995 to 
provide a defence against ‘cronyism, unaccountable ministerial patronage and the absence of 
checks and balances’ (Flinders 2009, p.556). Quite why parties in the UK (Conservatives at 
first, strengthened by Labour) sought to quell their own spoils system was up for speculation; 
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‘The creation of OCPA was a rational act for an outgoing executive that was keen to 
utilize a scandal of its own making to constrain the appointment powers of its 
successor.’ 
(Flinders 2009, p.566) 
 
A less cynical interpretation was that ‘depoliticisation, through the creation of various 
appointments commissions is viewed as a rational response to the public’s lack of faith in 
politicians’ (Flinders 2009, p.567). Either route, parties had intentionally limited their 
functions and moved away from ‘total’ party government, with the introduction of a mix of 
powerful non-governmental agencies combined with limited powers to control the 
appointments. Whether an example of Machiavellian delegation, to absolve party brands or 
genuinely trying to ‘re-establish conventional political relationships with apathetic social 
groups’ (Flinders 2009, p.567), parties are much less essential than they have been in state 
decision-making. 
 
However, even despite the societal changes that could have occurred combined with the 
transfers of party functions to external agents and thus the decline in ‘spoils’ for political 
parties, these organisations continue to be vitally important mechanisms for delivering the 
preferences of an electorate, and, if anything, competition for votes has intensified given the 
parties need to adapt to ever-shifting environments. As Mair (1997) highlighted: 
 
‘Parties continue to survive. The old parties [...] before Rokkan elaborated his 
freezing proposition are still around today. And, despite the challenges from new 
parties, new social movements, most of them still remain in powerful dominant 
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positions. [...] Thirty years on, these self-same parties still continue to dominate mass 
politics. Nowadays [...] they are even older still...’ 
(Mair 1997, p.90) 
 
Local Political Parties in England 
Beyond national debates about the relevance of parties, the membership of local parties has 
raised questions about the relevance of local parties in general. For example, the membership 
of the three main parties had ‘fallen from around 3.2 million in 1964 to a little over 0.5 
million in 2005’ (Wilks-Heeg 2010, p.383).  More significantly, the number of party activists 
has significantly fallen; with a reduction in the amount of time spent by party members 
‘contacting fellow party members [...] campaigning for the party [...] representing their party 
[and] giving money to their party’ (Seyd & Whiteley 2004, p.358). This decline in local 
activism was common across all three parties with 11% of Labour party members reporting 
less time spent on activist activity, 17% of Conservative members and 26% of Liberal 
Democrats (Seyd & Whiteley 2004, p.359 & Table 2). Wilks-Heeg (2010) reported that given 
the lack of significant comparative empirical data there was a danger ‘of contrasting current 
trends with a mythical golden age’ (2010, p.385) of party activism but it had been argued that 
local activism was ‘moribund [due to] the morale of members [being] at an unquestionable 
low (Cruddas & Harris 2006, p.4). An example from Birmingham showed that the pool of 
candidates for elections formed the main activist base for local elections, rather than regular 
members: ‘Much of the work was done by candidates themselves [...] Around twelve people 
including the MP and workers in his office are keeping it afloat’ (Coulson 2005, p.153).  
 
However, despite the decline in local party activism, which could be explained either from the 
demand-side ‘leaders now have less need for members (Seyd & Whiteley 2004, p.358) due to 
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technology or supply-side; where people have less time to contribute or more avenues for 
activism outside mainstream parties (Seyd & Whiteley 2004, p.357), it is the case that the 
contestation of seats in local government has increased: ‘local parties have become more 
active in local elections over the past three decades (Wilks-Heeg 2010, p.388). Whereas at 
one time local elections often had a number of candidates running unopposed (almost 30% of 
seats in 1979 (Rallings & Thrasher 2003, p.xiv)), it would be extremely unlikely (barring 
some rural authorities) for this to happen in authorities today. Given this level of contestation, 
it is thus unsurprising that the main parties have ‘struggled to recruit sufficient candidates for 
such elections’ (Wilks-Heeg 2010, p.382), which could be indicative of how seriously local 
democracy is taken by a population: an ‘important indicator of the vitality of local democracy 
is the number of candidates willing to fight for council seats (Rallings & Thrasher 1999, p.67). 
However relating to actual political competition in England, there continue to be seriously 
fought contests between the three major parties in most authorities, to the point where ‘only 4% 
of local authorities are in control by Independents [with] over half of these in Scotland and 
Wales’ (Leach 2006, p.13). 
 
Another criticism levelled at local parties is a more general one, that the theatre of local 
government electoral politics is ‘second-order,’ a term coined by Reif & Schmitt (1980), 
where local elections are seen as ways to punish incumbent central parties rather than based 
on anything local councillors actually do (Newton 1976, p.7, 17, 223). Whilst it could be 
argued that elections might appear to track the popularity of central parties, local evidence 
suggests that electorates do track ‘reactions to a range of local concerns: taxation levels, the 
policies of the ruling group, variations in political style and presentation, local media 
coverage and candidates personal qualities’ (Copus 2004, p.39). Rather than being ‘freak or 
maverick results’ (Wilson & Game 2006, p.245) which don’t follow national trends, local 
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elections are likely to be ‘the visible and perfectly rational products of voters’ recognition 
[that] a local councillor and council [was] carrying out local politics and providing local 
services’ (Wilson & Game 2006, p.246). This would go some way to explain why local 
parties do actively compete for control of councils rather than resting on the behaviour of a 
central party. Despite all the discussion of a death of the main parties in local government ‘the 
three main parties have increased their stranglehold on local elections’ (Wilks-Heeg 2010, 
p.389) and independent and small-party councillors only take up a fraction of seats in local 
government (10% - Mellow-Facer 2006, p.23).  
 
Theories of Party and Party Behaviour 
Although party behaviour began to be examined more thoroughly in the 1950s (Duverger 
1954, Neumann 1956, Downs 1957) since early party theorists (Ostrogorsky 1902), it is 
within the context of the alleged demise of political parties that the majority of studies of 
party behaviour have taken place. This continuing focus on the behaviour of these 
organisations highlights the importance that scholars have placed on parties within political 
science. Whether assessing the behaviour of these actors within and outside of institutions, 
regardless of responsibilities or societal change, their intrinsic fascination as organisations of 
motivated individuals lends perspective to how political scientists ought to approach 
democracy, the impact of institutions on behaviour and political representation. 
 
The Structural-Functionalist Approach 
In respect to the studies of the behaviour of parties as organisations, there have been four 
distinct approaches to creating theories of political parties. The first, chronologically, had 
been the structural-functionalist approach to parties (Almond 1966 (above)) which sought to 
look for shared traits of organisations: ‘attention has focused upon what parties do, what 
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function, what role, or what purpose is served by parties, or what contribution is made by 
parties’ (Scarrow 1967, p.770). This approach involved a relatively fixed interpretation of 
political parties and an ‘[attempt] to establish a universalistic framework for the analysis of 
politics in general’ (Montero & Gunther 2003, p.13). However, the approach was admonished 
for its relatively simplistic analyses which were ‘anti-cumulative [...] static, ethnocentric and 
[with] a tendency to stress [...] stability and the functionality of institutions over conflict and 
change’ (Montero & Gunther 2003, p.13). Lowi (1967) argued that what structural-
functionalist approaches to political parties lacked was a concept of change and innovation:  
 
‘In a free and dynamic society there is no status quo, only a set of moving conditions 
which may or may not exist in equilibrium. Innovation is a continuing requirement of 
such a system.’ 
(Lowi 1963, p.581) 
 
Classificatory Approach 
An approach to parties which has spanned from the 1950s to the present day is the inductive 
classificatory approach, where theorists have examined behaviour in relation to inter-party 
competition, intra-party organisation, relationship to the state or populace using categories to 
present their conclusions. From Duverger’s (1954) elicitation of cadre and mass parties, 
Neumann’s (1956) parties of individual representation, Kirchheimer’s (1966) catch-all party, 
Poguntke’s (1987) new politics party, Panebianco’s (1988) electoral professional party and 
Katz and Mair’s (1995) cartel parties, to name some of the major works, there has been a 
plethora of work on the categorisation of parties into various classes. Whilst useful in 
determining characteristics, their applications for scholars are limited: ‘categories devised to 
characterize parties in one time or place may not be suitable to differentiate them in another’ 
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(Wolinetz 2002, p.137). Furthermore, Wolinetz (2002) argues that most of these models were 
founded on Western European party systems and are thus limited in relevance beyond these 
institutions. A more significant objection pointed towards these classificatory theories is that 
they were: 
 
‘...gross oversimplifications of party characteristics [with] unwarranted assumptions 
of commonalities [...] amongst [varied] parties [with] inappropriate labels [attached] 
to parties whose organisational, ideological or strategic characteristics differ 
significantly from the original prototype’  
(Montero & Gunther 2003, p.19-20). 
 
These approaches offered descriptive accounts of isolated incidences but were often 
‘imprecise and posited a uni-directional pattern of change’ (Wolinetz 2002, p.159). More 
significantly, some theories were excessively deterministic in stating that their own 
classification was the inevitable ‘tending’ type to which others would naturally gravitate. 
 
Pure Rational Choice and Behavioralism  
The third approach to parties was arguably the most contested approach due to its quest for a 
universal theory of human behaviour based on economic or behavioural assumptions about 
individuals. Downs (1957) was the leading proponent of the rational choice, economic 
assessment of the behaviour of parties but was followed by other scholars, working primarily 
with the U.S. party system (Riker 1962). In essence the theory was built on the premise that 
political behaviour was uncomplicated: 
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‘[Politicians] act solely in order to attain the income, prestige and power which 
comes from being in office. [...] Their only goal is to reap the rewards of office. [...] 
Parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order 
to formulate policies.’ 
(Downs 1957, p.28) 
 
The significant problem with Downs’ theory of party was down to the rudimentary 
perspective of behaviour or the ‘simple assumptions of party and voter objectives [which] 
failed to generate any single, coherent theory of competitive party behaviour’ (Strøm 1990, 
p.565). Whilst the results of the work were useful in generating theory about specific 
intentions in ultra-competitive party systems (i.e. those fostering self-interest - 50/50 two-
partism), the intentions ascribed to politicians and parties failed to acknowledge the 
possibility for other aims and objectives (i.e. altruism / policy-seeking) in a world which is 
complex and full of ‘ad-hoc explanations’ (Strøm 1990, p.565). 
 
In general, behavioralism and rational choice theories often took situations that could have 
been considered perfectly valid at a micro-level outside of an institution to be naturally the 
case at a macro-level within an institution, therefore the theories were reductivist in scope, as 
described by March and Olsen (1984): 
 
‘1) ...the preferences and powers of the actors are exogenous to the political system, 
depending on their positions in the social and economic system. [...] 2) ... collective 
behavior is best understood as stemming from the (possibly intricate) interweaving of 
behavior understandable at a lower level of aggregation.’ 
(March & Olsen, 1984, p. 735) 
27 
 
In essence, behavioralism took its foundation as seeking ‘to understand empirical regularities 
by appealing to the properties and behavior of individuals [who were the] fundamental 
building blocks [...] Political results were simply the aggregation of individual actions’ 
(Shepsle, 1989, p.133). Equally, the later rational-choice theorists were guilty of ’abstract 
conjectures which are modelled so stripped down, so uncomplicated and so unambiguously 
specified, that in many uses it is hard to think of analogous political situations’ (Dunleavy, 
1991, p.1). Green and Shapiro’s (1994) wounding critique of the rational-choice family was 
the sharpest proponent of these criticisms of ‘an ambition to come up with a universal theory 
of politics [whilst] failing to account for the evidence’ (Green & Shapiro, 1994, p.202-203). 
These criticisms were built upon the rational choice tendency to ‘rest on a relatively simplistic 
image of human motivation which may miss many of its important dimensions [...] which are 
frequently arbitrary or unsupported by data’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.950-951).  
 
Rational Choice Institutionalism  
The fourth theoretical approach to parties was effectively a comprehensive overhaul of 
rational choice theory into a ‘soft rational choice approach [...] acknowledging that the 
reduction of parties to individual candidates in their models of electoral competition had 
weakened empirical analyses of parties’ (Montero & Gunther 2003, p.13). Statements of what 
was ‘rational’ for politicians to do based on rigid assumptions about why politicians exist 
were more reflective of observed behaviour, rather than suppositions. Rational-choice 
institutionalist Kaare Strøm (1990, 1999) argued that objectives of parties (and component 
politicians) were more complex and included concerns beyond Downsian self-aggrandisement. 
Furthermore, institutions themselves would contextualise and constrain the actions of parties 
and thus provide indicators to how parties might act.  Strøm (1990, 1999) developed a rational 
choice institutionalist theory of party competition on the basis of: 
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‘...treating parties as endogenous variables whose organizational, ideological and 
institutional characteristics are conditioned by the strategies pursued by party leaders 
(functioning as rational actors) and by the various contexts of the political systems 
within which they act.’  
(Montero & Gunther 2003, p.17) 
 
According to Strøm (1990, 1999) there existed a trade-off between three mutually exclusive 
objectives; policy, office or votes, which motivated organisations. Even if a party was only 
motivated by policy pay-offs (rather than Downsian self-aggrandisement) it would still seek 
to achieve the objective through appropriate organisation. Each of these goals could be 
preferenced in certain contexts, by specific parties at a particular time or circumstance. Strøm 
(1990) factored both a broader interpretation of what it is ‘rational’ to do with the complexity 
of how institutions may mould the behaviour of party leaders and parties themselves. 
 
Reconciling rational choice within the context of complex institutions took many forms. 
Shepsle’s (1979) rational choice institutionalist study of the U.S congress showed that instead 
of there being no ‘unhappy conclusion [...] that in politics there were typically no equilibria 
(Shepsle, 1989, p.136), there could be: 
 
‘...structure-induced equilibria [...] All was not flux, final outcomes were not 
arbitrary [...] Outcomes appeared to track the preferences of distinguished actors 
upon whom institutional structure and procedure conferred disproportionate agenda 
power. [...] The concept of SIE [was] based on the idea that an institutional process, 
described by its rules, can be graphed as an extensive form game.’ 
(Shepsle, 1989, p. 136-7) 
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Leading RCI advocate Elinor Ostrom (1991) argued that institutions were essentially the 
missing part of rational choice theories and provided the framework for analysis of behaviour: 
 
’To be rule-governed, the rational individual must know the rules of the games in 
which choices are made and how to participate in the crafting of rules to constitute 
better games. [...] History, institutions, and cultural traditions will play a more 
significant role in the evolution of rational choice theories in the future than they have 
in the past’  
(Ostrom, 1991, p.242) 
 
The use of rational-choice institutionalism to explore party behaviour is a growing literature 
(Cox, G,W & McCubbins 1993, Strøm, 1990, Strøm & Müller 1999, Samuels & Shugart, 
2006, 2010) and demonstrates a reconciliation between the prior desire to create universalistic 
theories based on pure economic theory with more focused theories of parties, based on 
empirical evidence of behaviour, within institutions which undoubtedly shape behaviours. 
Whilst the rational-choice institutionalist approach possesses some important flaws (see 
further below), the thesis chooses this perspective as the suitable lens for an assessment of 
local party behaviour. 
 
A RCI Approach to Local Party Groups 
This research is firmly rooted within the rational choice institutionalist (RCI) family: 
focusing on the observation of the ‘natural’ self-regarding behaviour of actors (local groups) 
given a fundamental change of strictures and structures in place (‘committee system’ to the 
‘blended separation of powers.’) Whilst not looking to acquire an answer to the question of 
why the institution was imposed upon local government or what were the consequences for 
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local accountability or democracy-at-large, the research does want to explore the impact of 
the new institution on party groups as organisations. This thesis possesses a singular focus on 
the consequences of the institutional environment on the behaviour of local groups.   
 
The legislation, through shifting the institution in the first place, offered political science a 
‘new modelling problem [...] once change had occurred (Peters, 2005, p.61). In this manner, 
the research follows the work of Samuels and Shugart (2006, 2010) in respect to treating the 
separation of powers as an institutional environment in which parties operate, subject to the 
incentives and constraints built into the structures. In their work, they explored the impact of 
institutional environment changes on the party group at national levels (Samuels & Shugart, 
2010). This research combines this type of approach, as a number of party-focused rational 
choice institutionalists do, with Strøm’s (1990) theory of competitive political parties. In this 
way, RCI considers that expected and actual behaviours of actors within institutions can be 
theorised and measured. Thus discovering the expected and actual behaviour of local party 
groups as a result of the change in institutional environment is the primary ambition. As 
Diermeier and Krehbiel (2003) highlight: 
 
‘The crucial link between institutions (as contextual constraints) and outcomes (as 
consequences of collective choice) is behaviour. While the line between institutions 
and behaviour is not always easy to draw, it is well worth the effort to draw this line 
as sharply as possible.’ 
 (Diermeier and Krehbiel, 2003, p.126) 
 
In this research, ‘the exogenous constraints, or [...] exogenously given game form’ (Shepsle, 
2006, p.24) was provided by the legislation, which had imposed a roadblock for the resolution 
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of the Olsonian (1965) collective action problem of operating as a singular party group to 
achieve objectives. Through creating executives and non-executives, the legislation, primarily 
the introduction of the overview and scrutiny function (as intended to be evidence based and 
not party based), confronted groups (majority or opposition) with a new ‘game-form’ within 
which to achieve their objectives. The research of this thesis explores party behaviour(s) and 
whether groups overcame this collective action obstruction through the techniques outlined at 
the end of Chapter Three. 
 
Chief amongst concerns about rational-choice theories are that firstly, they often seek 
universal theories of behaviour and secondly, often do not consider empirical work to be 
central to their efforts (e.g. looking to explain X as a result of Y, as a universal rule of 
behaviour, without empirical work to substantiate these claims). In answering these criticisms, 
it will be essential to see how this research will differ from the literature tainted with these 
problems. In response to the first of these objections, whilst rational-choice has now taken 
institutions to its heart as a suitable lens through which to view behaviour, the ‘individual’ as 
a unit and his/her associated behaviours are still considered important: 
 
‘..the individualist will hold onto its belief that individuals cannot be taken out of such 
explanations [...] their actions are the cause of social change [...] which does not 
contradict that actions are shaped or structurally suggested by the [...] institutions in 
which individuals are placed.’ 
(Dowding, 1994, p.110) 
 
More importantly, the common criticism of rational-choice theories focuses upon its 
assumptions relating to self-interested behaviour, despite the fact that people ‘are not always 
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egoistically maximising’ (Dowding, 1994, 112), is almost moot, given that the ‘worth of 
rational choice models is not whether they correctly explain some particular outcomes but the 
questions that they generate about it’ (Dowding, 1994, p.112). In relation to this research of 
local party groups, it will be possible to ‘make some predictions about what may happen [...] 
given [particular] behavioural assumptions’ (Dowding, 1994, p.114). It is not to say that 
everyone will follow these sets of behavioural assumptions, but at the least, these can be 
identified, separated and generate further questions.  
 
Relating to the second criticism of the lack of empirical work, it is inherently difficult to 
generate data relating to rational-choice theories such as incentives, motivations and actions. 
Especially at state-level, it is intrinsically problematic to not only access the actors within the 
institution that one is looking to explain, but also to assess the situation through potentially 
sensitive data. Samuels & Shugart (2010) took ‘quasi-experimental cases to explore the 
impact of imposing a separation of origin / survival on party organization and behaviour’ 
(2010, p.163) but this essentially necessitated a post-hoc evaluation based on assumptions of 
what might have happened. 
 
However assessing the motivations, goals and ambitions of individuals and groups in local 
government is potentially much easier. For example, a sitting Prime Minister may be unlikely 
to report that her party intends to maintain office for as long as possible and to do so she will 
ensure the members of her group will not criticise policies. In English local government, 
however, the lack of significant consequences of the revelations of the party group enables 
members to be more open about intentions and motivations. Whilst there would still be 
sensitivities relating to how much empirical evidence could be gathered from local groups, 
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given the hidden behaviours of actors, the unequivocal fact that motivations and ambitions 
could be explored in this way, separates this study from a substantial portion of RCI research.  
 
Whilst this research does not necessarily seek to add to the rational-choice institutionalist 
approach in such a way to modify future approaches, the research provides an important 
modelling problem, assessing changing behaviours given shifting environments. Local parties 
could even serve as rough proxies to central parties. There exists precedent for this ‘local 
empiricism for lessons at national’ approach to party group behaviour in Hanna Bäck’s (2003, 
2008) recent RCI work on coalition formation in Swedish local government as crucial 
information for national theorists. If it were to be established that local groups were similar to 
central parties, in relation to ambitions and behaviour, the conclusions of this research could 
have some use in demonstrating how the institutional change of moving from an assembly 
government to a blended separation of powers would affect the behaviour of parties across 
other institutions at different tiers. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
The second chapter of this thesis develops and expounds the theoretical approach for this 
research and how it can be used to harness conclusions about the introduction of the 
legislation. Subsequent to this, research questions are hypothesised for empirical testing in the 
mixed-methods research for this project. The third chapter addresses the institutional 
environment of the ‘blended separation of powers’ and how it has developed as a construct to 
control the human condition; from early political thought through to its operation in 
contemporary political structures. This chapter evaluates how the configuration of institutions 
can and do influence the organisational behaviours of component actors (e.g. party groups). 
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The fourth chapter of the thesis explores the English local government context and how it 
differs from other tiers of government and institutional environments. The chapter considers 
central government’s intentions relating to the Local Government Act 2000 and thus assesses 
the expected and actual early outcomes of the legislation. The fifth chapter of the thesis 
presents justifications for the methods used in this mixed-methods project; including detail on 
the usefulness of a survey of O&S councillors and an analysis of how case study research can 
assist the research goals along. The chapter also presents a critical assessment of research 
conducted within local government since the Act (specifically relating to groups) and whether 
it has been sufficient in explaining what could have happened as a result. 
 
The sixth and seventh chapters present the results of the quantitative and qualitative research 
respectively, according to the variables developed in the Chapter Two. The eighth chapter 
combines the results of the both sets of empirical data and presents typologies of behaviour 
that build and improve upon Copus’ and Leach’s (2004) interpretation of political parties in 
England local government. The closing ninth chapter provides an evaluation of the research 
and concludes that the blended separation of powers engendered within the Local 
Government Act 2000 served to make local government more, rather than less, prone to 
domination by party groups. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Approach 
Policy, Office & Vote-Seeking: A Model for Local Government? 
Strøm’s (1990) theory of competitive political parties is general and extensive enough to 
apply to non-national political arenas and is thus a suitable lens through which to view some 
elements of the research in this project. Strøm’s (1990) assertion that groups are faced with a 
trade-off of three reasons for their existence, such as whether to maximise votes at an election, 
attain the benefits and advantages of office-holding or having an input in policy making, 
could hold true across many different types of arena. As a result, the theory could be used to 
assess how party groups may make decisions, given the possible trade-offs, in arenas such as 
those brought about by the Local Government Act 2000. Given that local groups do mirror the 
controls of national party groups (whipping, group meetings), the difference between the two 
as ‘goal-based organisations’ may be negligibly small. The following is an exploration of 
Strøm’s (1990) seminal theory. 
 
Parties and ‘Vote-Seeking’ 
Strøm (1990) began with an examination of the merits of Downs’ An Economic Theory of 
Democracy (1957), which gave the definition of a political party as ‘a team of men seeking to 
control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election‟ (1957, p.25). 
By a ‘team’ of people, Downs implied that the political party would be constituted with 
‘members [who] agree on all their goals instead of on just part of them‟ (1957, p.25) and 
would be singularly ‘rational, […] their goals can be viewed as a single, consistent 
preference-ordering‟ (1957, p.26).  
 
Despite the difficulty of treating a party group as a singular unit, Downs relies on the axiom 
of self-interest, where men or women are believed to act in their own rational self-interest in 
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order to gain office and it’s ingredients of ‘income, prestige and power‟ (1957, p. 28). Downs’ 
hypothesis was that ‘parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win 
elections in order to formulate policies‟ (1957, p. 28) Given this self-interest axiom of 
political parties it would be difficult to see how the social benefit of a party’s policies would 
ever emerge but Down’s acknowledges that the ‘social functions [of a government] are 
usually the by-products, and the private ambitions the ends, of human action‟ (1957, p.29). 
Because each party member desires and is motivated by the trio of ‘income, prestige and 
power‟ (1957, p. 28) and none of these are necessarily as available or fruitful without access 
to government office, the political party, as its main endeavour, seeks to ‘manipulate its 
policies and actions in whatever way it believes will gain it the most votes without violating 
constitutional rules‟ (1957, p.31). Essentially vote-maximisation in Downs’ model was 
believed to be the party’s raison d'être. 
 
The rational behaviour by the groups is built on the foundation that rational people, in Downs’ 
case; possessing near perfect information, would vote for the party that seeks to improve or 
guarantee his or her utility income; ‘rational men are not interested in policies per se but in 
their own utility incomes‟ (1957, p.42). Theoretically, an incumbent government providing an 
electorate with a low stream of utility income is less preferable, in the view of a rational 
electorate, to a party offering policies which seem to increase the likelihood of higher utility 
incomes in the future. When the policies of both parties, in a simplified two-party system, are 
essentially the same or the differences are so unintelligible that the perceived differences in 
utility incomes are aliquantulus, the rational voter may then rate the historic performance of 
each party ‘to estimate the gain he will get from voting for one party instead of the other‟ 
(1957, p.22). 
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Clearly Downs admitted that this model was an abstraction rather than a reality as the premise 
rested on the impossibility of voters possessing perfect information and parties operating 
solely under the banner of the self-interest axiom and thus disregarding ideology to a 
considerable extent. The catch-all extent of vote-maximisation theory was also flawed by 
Downs’ own admission that rational party behaviour makes rational voter behaviour 
somewhat impossible. For example, Downs admits that it is rational for parties to ‘becloud 
their policies in a fog of ambiguity‟ (1957, p.136) because each party would like to maintain 
the possibility of winning over ‘the middle of the scale where most voters are massed (1957, 
p.135) which inevitably leads to an ‘enormous overlapping of moderate policies‟ (1957, 
p.135). This inherent ambiguity of policies in a simplified two-party system leads the voter 
into a more difficult selection as utility income benefits cannot be separated and analysed if 
each party markets a number of matching ambiguous claims in an effort to win over voters. It 
is at this stage that the voter is forced to use irrational, heuristic decision-making, 
acknowledged by Downs as variables such as ‘personalities of the candidate, traditional 
family voting patterns, loyalty to party heroes‟ (1957, p.136); thus the model falls apart.  
 
Riker (1962) attempted to modify Downs’ model by introducing what was known as the ‘size 
principle;’ where parties are believed to not necessarily want to maximise votes in total but 
are thought to aim ‘to increase votes only up to the size of a minimum winning coalition‟ 
(1962, p. 100). This was seen as a rational strategy for parties who retained the axiom of self-
interest (obtaining office) whilst acknowledging that every vote was not necessarily needed 
for its principal goal. In this respect, Riker argued that the parties in this model would then 
have an ‘incentive to develop an ideology‟ (1962, p.100) and thus lose „an absolute incentive 
to becloud‟ (1962, p.100). The parties would then be free to ‘present the voters with an 
artistically devised mixture of ambiguity and clarity which are varied in amounts according 
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to the degree of information available‟ (1962, p.100). Another important element excluded is 
that of members and activists. If two parties offer the same types of policies intended to catch-
all voters then it would be difficult to inspire members and activists, often ideologically 
driven, to work for the party and thus mobilise voters. As Robertson (1976) highlights, it may 
be rational to pick one party over another at the voting booth if there is any difference in what 
they are offering but ‘it may very well not be worth working for it‟ (1976, p. 32). Therefore 
there may be a trade off between how many activists can be recruited and how near a party 
can get to a vote maximising equilibria.  
 
Despite the pure vote-seeking model, described by Roemer as a model of ‘opportunistic 
politics […] of competing candidates‟ (2001, p.27), strongly representing the American 
electoral system of X vs. Y, Strøm (1990) argues that it could equally be applicable in other 
arena such as Westminster where two parties ‘with a large expected vote (close to 50%) [...] 
resemble two party systems in their pursuit of votes‟ (Strøm, 1990, p. 592). In this sense, it 
would make rational sense for both parties (of similar support) to vote-maximise. Typically, 
however, it was argued that this type of vote-seeking would only be a characteristic of parties 
who possessed relatively ‘unaccountable leaders and low degrees of intra-party democracy‟ 
(Strøm, 1990, p.592), which would allow for ‘moderate policies‟ (Downs, 1957, p.135) and 
thus not require activists (who typically harbour less centripetal demands) to such an extent 
due to operating ‘capital intensive[ly]’ (Strøm, 1990, p.592). Strøm’s (1990, p.592) theory 
suggested that the British Conservative Party may fit this vote-seeking model at times; though 
clearly subsequent to his theory, it could be argued that the Labour Party also operated similar 
tactics with the shift to New Labour.  In terms of English local government, there are 
authorities across the country routinely split by two parties (frequently Conservative / Labour 
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but increasingly more Conservative / Lib Dem or Labour / Lib Dem) creating similar 
conditions where vote-maximising would be and is a suitable strategy for party groups. 
 
Parties and ‘Office Seeking’ 
As an alternative method of explaining political party group competition, Riker’s (1962) 
criticism of Down’s vote-maximisation model led to the ‘size principle’ of parties seeking 
only to win a minimum winning coalition, resulting in the formulation of another party 
behavioural type; the office-seeking party. In this model, a party is seen to view the reward of 
obtaining office alone as valuable and therefore aims to ‘maximise its control of elected 
office, often operationally defined in terms of government portfolios‟ (Strøm, 1990, pg 567). 
Therefore rather than aim to become elected as a government for the purposes of 
implementing a policy agenda, the office-seeking party simply aims to maximise its numbers 
in an administration for the benefits that it would confer.  
 
Primarily, the model has developed out of the study of coalition formation, where office-
seeking parties would often join an administration for the sole aim of being in office with 
benefits such as ‘politically discretionary governmental and sub-governmental appointments‟ 
(Strøm, 1990, p. 567). Parties seeking to obtain office as a sole ambition, such as minor 
parties seeking a cabinet position, are more than likely to want to achieve a ‘pivotal 
membership in a government coalition [which has] more value than nonpivotal membership‟ 
(Budge & Laver 1986, p.491). In this respect, their unrivalled ability to collapse a majority 
coalition can give a small party a wholly disproportionate influence over government matters. 
Budge and Laver (1986) rank important roles such as ‘a vote at cabinet meetings [and] the 
portfolios of Finance, External Affairs and Internal Affairs‟ (1986, p.491) as high payoffs for 
office-seeking parties. 
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An example from the multi-party democracies of Western Europe is the Irish Fianna Fáil 
party which Marsh and Mitchell (1999) contend represents a type of office-seeking party. 
Historically it had been evident in Ireland that being in control of government was an 
‘electoral liability […] [where] government parties lost votes at the next election, with a net 
average of -3.5%‟ (1999, p. 38). Given proportional representation where it is likely that a 
single party will not easily achieve a majority in the Dáil Éireann, the largest party, Fianna 
Fáil, often became the largest party but without a majority. Given that holding office in 
Ireland ‘incurs an electoral cost is not to say that parties are unwilling to pay it‟ (1999, p. 39) 
and Fianna Fáil ‘has […] always gone into government when it could, irrespective of 
electoral considerations‟ (1999, p. 39). Therefore regardless of whether the party would have 
a minority or majority government, Fianna Fáil has always entered into government when it 
was possible to do so, even going as far as negotiating coalition deals which were proven to 
be more of an electoral liability than a single-party government (1999, p. 40 – Table 2.2). 
Given that there were some occasions where Fianna Fáil were willing to give up some 
‘immediate office payoffs in the knowledge that it would return after the next election and 
claim all of the prizes‟ (1999, p. 40) it was argued more generally that for Fianna Fáil there 
was ‘no conscious trade-off between votes and office [and] the office motivation always wins‟ 
(1999, p.40). 
 
The inherent weakness of the model of office-seeking parties is that the type cannot explain 
party groups who decide to forgo the benefits of office for a number of reasons. For example 
a party may choose to opt out of a governing coalition because of a disagreement over a 
policy in a contentious two-dimensional space, such as the example of Iceland regarding 
building a NATO / US base, where such examples of fundamental disagreements has led to 
‘only two Icelandic coalitions in the post-war period [lasting] the full term‟ (Grímsson, 1982, 
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p.177) and in Germany, where parties have left governing coalitions but ‘the government 
majority in the Bundestag was in no way jeopardised by the withdrawal of coalition partners‟ 
(Norpoth, 1982, p. 27). Purely office-seeking parties would not dissolve a governing coalition 
to sit in opposition as the very essence of the model is characterised by the sole ambition of 
attaining or maintaining office.  Furthermore, minority governments, in general, pose a major 
obstacle to the explanatory role of the office-seeking party as a minoritarian government 
suffers a high risk of losing office due to the potential impasse in policy implementation. Why, 
therefore, do minority governments not form majority coalitions? Is this, as Strøm (1984) 
suggests due to the minority government taking into account ‘the role of prospective elections‟ 
(1984, p.223) that will turn their minority into a majority, or is this because parties outside the 
governing coalition view opposition status as a route that can offer higher payoffs that far 
outweigh those of holding office (1984, p. 223)? The mere fact that post-1945 until 1982, 
thirty-five percent (1984, p.201) of all governments in Western parliamentary democracies 
were minoritarian goes some way to reduce the explanatory value of pure office-seeking 
parties, but the type of behaviour is important to consider.  
 
In local government terms, a party group, motivated by achieving positions which offered a 
SRA (special responsibility allowance) could be sought after for their intrinsic value. Rather 
than purely motivated for pecuniary gains for their own sake, this could be to reinvest in 
electoral battles. There are also authorities in local government which naturally tend towards 
‘no overall control,’ which could lead to parties solely focused on making up part of an 
administration rather than attempting to take a majority of seats. Another reason to office-seek 
in local government is due to the functional difference between those in administration and 
opposition, thus in order to guarantee direct influence, any office might be pursued above all; 
‘the greater the office benefit differential between government and opposition relative to the 
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policy influence differential, the greater the propensity of political parties toward office-
seeking behaviour‟ (Strøm, 1990, p.589).1 
 
Parties and ‘Policy Seeking’ 
The third general model of party behaviour is that of the policy-seeking party; which seeks to 
influence policy rather than office or votes per se. The model is paregal
2
 to the office-seeking 
model of party behaviour in respect to a failure of both; to allow coalitions of any party to 
come together. For example, in the office-seeking model coalitions would be expected to form 
between parties from widely different ideological perspectives; such as coalitions between left 
and right. Policy-based coalition theory, however, ‘assumes that coalitions are made by 
parties that are congenial in policy terms‟ (Strøm & Müller, 1999, p. 7). Thus the policy 
seeking party is one that is expected to be ‘issue-oriented and, quite simply, give priority to 
their policies‟ (Wolinetz, 2002, p.150). 
 
Furthermore, a policy-seeking party may not want to reap the rewards of office but merely 
have an influence over a government’s agenda; such as an allocation of voting rights in a 
government or by appealing to extra-institutional bodies to push their agenda. Other examples 
of how policy-seeking parties achieve an input include; being a party outside of a governing 
coalition and being large enough to be ‘pivotal in legislative votes’ and therefore ‘bring down 
the government and thus wield as much power over executive policy outputs as if they were 
sitting at the cabinet table‟ (Budge & Laver, 1986, p. 497) From the other side, a policy-
seeking party could hold inordinate control over minority governments which rely on the 
support of others to pass legislation and therefore due to the possibility of ‘logrolling deals 
                                                            
1 However, there would be considerably more party focus towards office-seeking in elected-mayoral authorities, 
in order to take control of the powerful executive role. 
2 ‘an equal [...] a match’ (OED 2010) 
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[resulting in] policy packages located well away from the centre [of the policy space]‟ 
(Budge & Laver, 1986. p. 498) a policy-seeking party could push through its own agenda 
without attaining office. Examples of pure policy-seeking parties, like the office-seeking party, 
are rare because of the interrelation between office-seekers and policy-seekers. Would policy-
seekers not value office benefits at all and would office-seekers enter office without any 
policy motivation at all? Examples could include small activist-intensive parties with high 
levels of intra-party democracy and permeable recruitment structures where ‘higher-level 
officers and candidates are recruited from lower levels within the party‟ (Strøm, 1990, p. 
593); meaning that policy preferences are typically not centripetal. Kirchheimer (1966, p.187) 
notes that parties such the South Tyrolean People's Party or parties that had a restricted 
ideology such as the Dutch Calvinists were never likely to be catch-all parties who aimed to 
vote-maximise by proffering policies to win over an electorate; instead their ‘raison-d‟etre 
[was] the defence of a specific clientele or the lobbying for a limited reform clearly 
delineated to allow for a restricted appeal‟ (1966, p.188). Another more modern and striking 
example is the Dutch ‘Party for the Animals’ which claims that it is a testimonial party 
(Beginselpartij) that exists for the purposes of ‘[making] their faith witnessed‟ (De PvdD, 
2006, online). 
 
‘De PvdD is een getuigenispartij en daar is niets mis mee’ 
(trans. ‘The PvdD is a testimony party and there is nothing wrong with that.’)  
(De PvdD, 2006, online) 
 
In English local government, parties who sought to deliver only a selection of particularistic 
policies, such as single-issue groups, who might never achieve a majority due to geographic 
concerns (e.g. Anyvillage Against Monorail), might seek to influence policy alone.  
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Difficulties of Strøm’s Theory 
Strøm (1990) acknowledges the weaknesses of each of the party behaviour types such as 
treating each goal (e.g. vote-seeking) as a static choice at a specific time without giving any 
credence to ‘conditioning of past events, as well as […] the anticipation of future benefits‟ 
(1990, p.569). For example, assumed vote-maximising parties who seek to win elections are 
short-termist in the sense that once the party has won office there are usually electoral costs 
associated with incumbency, ergo a vote-maximising party in time frame ‘t’ is vote-
maximising in the short-term period of ‘t’ alone. Furthermore, Strøm acknowledges the 
conceptual stretch that allows the models to view all parties as unitary collective actors. This 
is clearly more than debateable across parties that might give control precedence to a specific 
set of powerful elites or those parties that have a high level of intra-party democracy or a 
multiplicity of factions with differing goals to those of other groups of the party. Importantly, 
the operating institutional environment for parties, such as the type of separation of powers 
(see above: Samuels and Shugart, 2006) and types of electoral rewards also significantly 
affect each of the party behaviour types and whether parties can be viewed as single units. In 
the case of the ‘blended’ separation, unitary action is encouraged due to collective 
responsibility (see below), thus it is somewhat easier to view parties as unitary collective 
actors. 
 
Despite the drawbacks of each ‘type,’ Strøm acknowledges the usefulness of having the three 
goals despite the arrant oversimplification of ‘party’ conduct and therefore argues that their 
usefulness is in ‘the deductive results they generate‟ (1990, p. 570). Strøm considers that 
there is a conscious trade-off between each of the objectives, principally because the goals 
(policy, office, votes) are mostly ‘independent, mutually conflicting forms of behaviour in 
which political parties can engage‟ (1990, p. 571). Algebraically, Strøm identified that parties 
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give varying amounts of credence to each of these activities; B = w1V + w2O + w3P (1990, 
p.571) (where B (behaviour) is the location in the behavioural space and w1 to w3 are 
coefficients indicating the weight of each type of behaviour.) The resulting graphical 
representation is replicated below. 
 
Fig 2.1: Policy, Office, Votes Trade-Off 
Wolinetz (2002) argues that Strøm’s schematization is useful in the sense that unlike previous 
classificatory approaches the behavioural traits noted by Strøm can ‘reflect facets of parties‟ 
or factions‟ behaviour and preferences, and can also be related to party structure and 
organisation‟ (2002, p. 149).  Using ‘goal orientation’ as a comparator between state and 
local level, given that Strøm’s condition that ‘there must be spoils for parties to be spoils 
orientated‟ (Strøm, 1990, p. 570) is fulfilled within both institutional settings, combined with 
analogous organisational controls to promote cohesion, the theory of competitive political 
parties could be transposed onto the competition between parties in English local government.  
 
The Local Government Act 2000: The ‘Parliamentary Blend’ Separation of Powers 
Given that local parties could possess objectives, an introduction of a new institutional 
environment creates problems in resolving these ambitions under a new framework. In a 
blended separation of powers, local groups within a two-party, vote-maximising strategy 
might focus their attentions on ensuring that there was zero possibility of councillors affecting 
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their electoral concerns and thus intra-party discipline could be imposed to the extent that 
there would be no tolerance relating to deviance from the party line. Office-seeking parties, 
operating under the blended separation of powers, could ensure that any posts allocated as 
part of a negotiation were either utilised for further office goals or maintenance of the post.  
Alternatively, office-seeking parties attempting to maintain office as part of a coalition 
agreement might agree with the larger partner to work with (vote with) the largest group 
regarding policy or the budget, thus non-office holding councillors would have their hands 
bound to the maintenance of the coalition agreement.  Under the same institutional 
environment, policy-seeking groups could insist that all councillors remained compliant in 
sustaining the party’s drive for their core policy issues. Essentially, given the introduction of 
overview and scrutiny, where public criticism could fracture the party, the existence of 
group objectives may encourage leaders of parties to impose restrictions on the abilities of 
their members. Party leaders of groups possess some controls over their component 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary party. This relationship does not change when a party 
moves from power to opposition or opposition to power. Thus the party leadership has charge 
over rules and regulations such as candidate selection, party exclusion, party deselection, 
promotion to higher ranks, cabinet role allocation and in certain constitutional settings; the 
right to announce an election if the party is in administration.  
 
In structural terms, voters essentially delegate to two agents under a presidential system (the 
president and congress) whereas in a parliamentary system, the voter has one agent; 
parliament (where executive election is indirect.) The separation of powers in the Presidential 
system is thus seen, by Samuels and Shugart (2006), as transactional as the two agencies 
elected by citizens must ‘subsequently transact with each other to get anything done, even if 
the president and the legislative majority come from the same party‟ (Samuels & Shugart, 
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2006, p.10). The single-agency of the parliamentary separation of powers is thus not a series 
of exchanges and compromises and is far more hierarchical; ‘the parliamentary majority 
becomes a principal in its relationship with the prime minister‟ (2006, p.10). 
 
Under this hierarchical relationship that exists between an indirectly elected executive and the 
legislature, given Samuels and Shugart’s (2006) assumption that politicians are necessarily 
ambitious; incorporating ‘legislative re-election, climbing the ranks of party hierarchy, 
seeking a cabinet portfolio, pursuit […] of the prime ministership or pursuit of policy goals‟ 
(2006, p.14-15), individual politicians who want to achieve these goals realise that ‘political 
parties provide ambitious individuals with collective benefits that would not accrue in their 
absence‟ (2006, p. 12). As a result, it is essential that individual politicians accept the 
hierarchical chain of command and the ‘binding of one‟s hands to the group [and] compelling 
investment in the public good‟ (2006, p.13). The investment in the ‘public good,’ the party’s 
‘united public offering,’ is necessary because of the lack of a separation of origin in 
parliamentary systems as both an executive and legislature are chosen in the same election for 
the same purpose. Politicians (or party candidates for election) realise that the party itself 
provides the key to electoral success; ‘Politicians thus form parties because they come to 
regard a collective good, their party‟s public reputation or “brand name” as critical to their 
individual success‟ (2006, p.12). Under a parliamentary system, a legislature and executive 
are prone to support each other more closely because they both carry the party brand and thus 
‘use’ the brand for their personal ambition (not solely re-election, but possibilities of policy 
input or associated office benefits). If individual MPs choose to revolt, the party can be 
fractured and the brand would be adversely affected because of this. Essentially Samuels and 
Shugart refer to the underproduction of the public good by individual MPs as ‘free riding‟ 
(2006, p.7). 
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„In a parliamentary system, because survival is mutually dependent, the party and the 
prime minister have greater incentives to support each other. In presidential systems, 
the separation of survival makes intra-party negotiation over such differences more 
difficult: a party may choose to accept presidential proposals, or it may choose to 
ignore or resist them.‟ 
(Samuels & Shugart, 2006, p.25) 
 
Where individual councillors underproduce the public good of the party brand, party leaders 
in a blended separation of powers have the capability to corral the production of the 
‘public good’ through imposing constraints on individuals. 
 
Determinants which Intensify Objectives 
Whilst all parties would possess goals and the achievement of these would be imperative, 
Strøm uses his analysis to formulate conclusions about how behaviour might differ in certain 
circumstances. For example, Strøm argues that the ‘greater degree of electoral 
competitiveness [...] the more parties will pursue votes [and] the greater the certainty that 
votes will be accurately translated into legislative weights, the more value parties will place 
on electoral objectives‟ (Strøm, 1990, p.588). The most competitive environments in local 
government would be authorities which could feasibly be controlled by a few parties. These 
competitive authorities would intensify the need to achieve party electoral objectives and thus 
lead to more intensive protective behaviour and thus potentially more control over members. 
 
Another of Strøm’s conclusions (with Müller) was that the ‘location of a particular party in 
policy space has a clear effect on its opportunity sets [...] Pivotal parties have a better chance 
of maximising their office and policy goals‟ (Strøm & Muller 1999, p.291) and thus will tend 
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to focus upon achieving these objectives more intensely. This evidence came from work 
based on the German FDP and the Christian Democrats in the Netherlands (1999, p.291) and 
could suggest that the centripetal parties of English local government (i.e. Liberal Democrats) 
would have more of an incentive to follow their policy or office goals more intently than 
those parties whose ideological constraints do not permit coalitions to such an extent (local 
Labour / Conservative parties – based on the Dutch Labour Party or the Italian Democratic 
Party for the left (1999, p.291)). 
 
The third conclusion of the determinants of party behaviour, relevant to local parties in 
English local government, related to the levels of factionalism within groups. Given the 
theory’s reliance on treating the group as a unitary actor, it has not been established how 
factions would affect the group being able to act as a singular entity in pursuing its goals. 
Strøm & Müller (1999) argue that an excessively factionalised group would be more difficult 
to consider as acting as a unitary organisation given ‘threat of desertion’ (1999, p.294) 
because a faction’s power ‘rests in their capacity to influence the implementation of party 
strategy’ (1999, p.294).  
 
However they argue that some parties which are factionalised may indeed be thought of as a 
unitary actor if the party group ‘adopts a strategy that satisfies all factions and thus is the 
party‟s lowest common denominator‟ (Strøm & Müller 1999, p.294). For example, if factions 
exist (such as an old Labour, New Labour), the Labour party might seek to protect only the 
common goals amongst both sets of councillors (i.e. at least protecting votes if not advancing 
policy and thus subsuming grievances under one banner). However, parties which are 
significantly factionalised with exceptionally diverse goals would be an obstacle to viewing 
groups as unitary actors with a common purpose and the parties will ‘face difficulties in 
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implementing [their] strategies‟ (1999, p.294). In this sense ‘factions imply constraints‟ (1999, 
p.295) on group control. In an English local government setting, the functions do not 
necessarily breed exceptionally factionalised parties on most issues, but will undeniably exist, 
just as disagreements, in general, exist amongst groups. However the piquancy of irresolvable 
factions is not pervasive and when making an appearance, organisations such as Labour’s 
NEC often step in to mediate disputes (Chapter Four; Walsall / Hackney). 
 
Norway Case: Institutional Change at Bergen & Oslo Councils 
There is precedent to believe that both group competition in local government and limited 
functions do lead to parties seeking to protect their objectives in the same way that national 
party theorists consider state-level groups to do so. For example, Bergen and Oslo City 
Council undertook a parallel transformation to a Westminster separation of powers in the 
same year as the Local Government Act 2000, with the only dissimilarity being PR elections. 
The result of the introduction of the blended structure was a perpetuation of a staunchly 
competitive party system. In an interview with a non-executive administration party member 
who was vice-chair of a committee at Bergen, it was reported that there were informal but 
strict coalition rules to prevent deviance in committees. For example, the coalition held group 
meetings before committees to formulate and hold a line and the administration parties 
discouraged criticism in these committees: 
  
„We don‟t need to co-operate with the left side of politics. [...] [the administration] 
have already decided it and you wouldn’t be very popular if you turned it upside 
down, if you wanted to do something else. [...] We have consulting meetings two days 
prior to the committee meeting when we also meet those who are responsible [for the 
decisions]. If you would like to do changes, we could of course do it, but then we 
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would have to tell him at that meeting prior to the committee. [...] I have complained 
to him because I don‟t agree [...] or I think it is a bad case or whatever and that‟s 
quite OK if I tell him before the official meeting. But I cannot do it in the [committee] 
meeting. [...] Yes, we don’t criticise in public. We leave that to the opposition! 
(Respondent laughs) [...] They are not in office, it’s not their politics.‟ 
(Interview with Høyre administration party member, Bergen City Council, 2009) 
 
Thus despite the limited functions of sub-national government, the competitiveness of parties 
can remain strong and comparable with the central tier, thus the relevance of Strøm’s theory 
could be fruitful when exploring the reactions to constitutional change in local government. 
With an introduction of a separation of powers in Bergen, the committees that were intended 
for evidence-based deliberation were, instead, strictly controlled arenas to maintain group 
lines and protect electoral objectives. With the introduction of O&S in English local 
authorities, do party aims and objectives ensure that non-executive deliberation happens in a 
similar controlled way? 
 
Measuring Party Behaviour 
It is important to discuss the fundamental basis of how, why and if parties do actually change 
and how this can be observed. Harmel and Janda (1994) developed a theory of party change 
that uses the identification, attainment or failure to achieve goals as a major reason in 
explaining changes in political parties (1994, p. 259). One of the major premises of the theory 
is that each political party has a number of goals, but essentially one primary goal such as 
Strøm’s policy, office, vote goal trade-off; one of the goals is usually always preferred to the 
other two. Secondly, the most ‘dramatic and broadest changes will occur only when the party 
has experienced an external shock‟ (1994, p. 265) that has occurred outside the party and not 
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under its direct control. Lastly the way in which parties react to these external shocks differs 
according to which goal they ultimately aimed for; for example electoral defeat would be a 
serious external shock to vote-maximising parties, the demise of the Soviet Union would have 
been an external shock to policy-seeking communist parties and changes to the potential 
rewards of office would be an external shock to office-seeking parties.  Harmel and Janda 
(1994) conceptualise three different types of external shocks for political parties such as 
environmental events, for instance a worker strike or war (1994, p. 276), environmental 
modifications, such as a legislative change effecting how parties operate and environmental 
trends such as a series of ongoing changes outside of the party (e.g. gradual trends in 
constituency demographics.) The party reactions to these changing conditions encompasses 
‘all self-imposed changes in party rules, structures, policies, strategies or tactics‟ (1994, p. 
277) but broadly speaking, party reactions correspond to the types of environmental change; a 
party event such as picking a new leadership team, a party modification such as changing 
intra-party regulations or a party trend such as gradually shifting to a new policy space. 
 
In this thesis’ research context there had been an external shock in the form of an 
environmental modification which ‘altered the environment in which the parties operated‟ 
(1994, p.277). The contention of this research is that this environmental modification brought 
about by the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000 would significantly affect how 
party groups were expected to operate and thus considerably alter their ability to achieve their 
primary goals (policy, office, votes). Parties would have been faced with potential options for 
change such as party modification, a party event or gradual party change. As a direct result of 
wanting to maintain performance in achieving their primary goals despite the external shock 
of a change in legislation, this research aims to establish that the groups thought that party 
modifications to retain control of their teleological ends would be an appropriate way to strike 
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against this shock. For example, modifying behaviour to ensure the threat of the public arena 
of evidence-based overview and scrutiny would not impact the party’s fundamental goals.  
 
1. The Shock: Environmental Modification – ‘the blended separation of powers’ 
In the introduction of a blended separation of powers there was a clear affront to the workings 
of the local group’s closed-door system of decision-making in local government. Ninety-five 
percent of English local authorities had determined that the cabinet and leader model, from 
the selection offered in the legislation, was the least affrontive change to their operating 
environment. It is likely that party groups understood that the parliamentary cabinet and 
leader system was the nearest to what had already developed in local government and were 
fully aware that this model ensured that the party would retain control of authorities 
(Stoker 2004, p.127, Copus 1999b, Leach 1999). 
 
More significantly, this change from assembly government to a parliamentary separation of 
powers created a problem for parties because of the new institutional environment it created. 
The introduction of overview and scrutiny committees created a situation where non-
executive majority party members were expected to objectively ‘oversee and scrutinise’ their 
executive party colleagues in a public arena and opposition party groups were mandated to 
constructively work with an administration, which could conflict with their office / votes 
goals. Given that groups have strict standing orders and regulations about what can and 
cannot not be said outside of the privacy of the party group, the ‘theatre of representation‟ 
from which the public and media are, of course, excluded‟ (Copus & Leach, 2004, p.338), the 
introduction of a new transparent, more accountable and public system of government was 
very likely to considerably alter party abilities to achieve their primary goals. Despite natural 
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loyalty inherent in the blended separation of powers, the function confronted party ambitions 
through the sheer possibility of public disunity and ‘free-riding.’ 
 
Highlighting the possibilities of obeying the legislation, a fractured opposition working on 
policy development with non-executive administration party members would inextricably link 
them to administration policies (thus the party might not reap rewards of dissatisfaction with a 
majority party) and public criticism of an administration decision from a non-executive 
administration party member would, for the opposition, be a veritable quarterstaff with which 
to beat the administration. In general terms, under the blended separation of powers it would 
be likely that a vote-seeking party who sought to maintain its administration would find it 
more difficult to maintain votes (and thus office) if intra-party criticism moved from inside to 
outside the group. (i.e. a majority party member could criticise colleagues within a O&S 
setting rather than in private group, costing votes). For parties in opposition the legislation 
would also alter their ability to achieve their primary goals, for example, a policy-seeking 
party on a council may want to impact authority policy through one of the few outlets of 
expression in local government, such as overview and scrutiny, and thus compel its members 
to toe the party policy line on this issue and thus exclude evidence. 
 
2. The Reaction: Party modification – ‘cracking the whip’ 
Given that the new institutional environment resulted in the perpetuation of hierarchical party 
relationships in local party groups (Samuels & Shugart, 2006, 2010), where the ‘agents’ or 
leaders of the party groups had a responsibility to ensure the group worked together for its 
ambition, in combination with the particularistic institutional factors that make local 
government potentially just as (or more so) competitive as its central counterpart, it is the 
argument of this research that local party groups leaders (as ‘agents’ for the ‘principals’) 
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would have attempted to ensure that the group remained in control of decision-making, 
through encouraging cohesion and maintaining discipline within their ranks in resistance to 
the intention of the legislation.  
 
In this sense, group leaders, legitimised by the group, will have actively sought to maintain 
unity and thus make the intended ‘open arena’ of overview and scrutiny difficult, due to the 
unremitting need for the party to achieve its goals. Regardless of the party affiliation or 
historical development, the fundamental requirement for an organisation to fulfil its purpose 
overrides any supposed tendency for individualism.  Essentially, whether central or local, 
parties as organisations of aggregations of preferences will act as aggregated parties. Given 
that the blended separation maintained that speaking against the group was speaking against 
the common purpose, collectivity could be the natural result. Faced with an affrontive 
institution that could jeopardise the achievement of goals, party leaders would have worked 
against the introduction through encouraging party cohesion and utilising discipline.  
Following Strøm’s conclusions, these counteractive actions towards achieving their goals 
would be more intensive in competitive local authorities for vote-seeking, more intensive to 
Liberal Democrats (or pivot parties) when policy or office-seeking and stronger in 
authorities without embedded factionalism. 
 
In order to actually measure this perpetuation of party control in English local government, 
Harmel and Janda (1994, p277) defined a party change for the purposes of their research to 
include all changes relating to ‘party rules, structures, policies, strategies or tactics‟ (1994, 
p.277). However they specifically defined a party modification as something which affects the 
party’s rules and regulations but were unable to research these particular changes in isolation. 
In subsequent empirical work the same authors developed a series of coding procedures in 
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order to track party characteristics in nineteen parties from Europe to the U.S. These were a 
series of „judgemental coding procedures to tap the unofficial story of parties‟ goals, 
organisation, internal distribution of power, strategy / tactics and ideological / issue 
orientation‟ (1995, p.2). Of Harmel, Janda, Tan & Heo’s (1995, p.25) forty-three objects of 
change, the following list of organisational variables are the some of the most important 
dimensions relating to party rules, regulations and thus strategic and tactical changes in 
parties that are important in this research: 
 
Relating to organisational complexity: 
1. Frequency of local meetings 
2. Pervasiveness of organisation 
Variables relating to centralisation of power and distribution of power
3
 
3. Formulating policy 
4. Controlling communications 
5. Administering discipline 
6. Candidate selection 
7. Allocation of public policy positions 
 
The reason for not selecting the more abstract variables, such as the allocation of funds or 
more intangible variables is that, firstly, some elements do not apply to local groups, who are 
themselves constrained by their central party and do not have the power to change certain 
features of their organisation and, secondly, due to the reason that some of the variables put 
‘an overly abstract straitjacket on particular events [and it] runs the risk of losing sight of the 
                                                            
3 Harmel and Janda (1995, p. 25) use the term ‘nationalisation‟ of power which I have replaced with the more 
appropriate ‘centralisation‟ of power. 
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wood for the trees‟ (Bale, 2008, p.272-273). Thus the following selection of variables has 
been amended and chosen to ensure that they apply to the nature of levers available to parties 
in local government.  
 
Relating to organisational complexity 
V1 Local party group meetings 
V2 Pervasiveness of organisation 
Variables relating to the centralisation of power and distribution of power 
V3 Centralisation of policy formulation 
V4 Preclusory discipline 
V5 Cohibition of individual councillor communication 
V6 Administration of castigative discipline 
V7 Allocation of positions 
 
V1: Local Party Group Meetings 
In the local government context, group meetings had been the closed-shop method for both 
majority groups taking decisions and opposition groups to discuss a counterstrategy. The 
introduction of the legislation sought to quell the lack of transparency of this process by 
bringing some of these discussions out of the shadows and into the view of the public, 
through the introduction of the overview and scrutiny process. It is the contention of this 
research that group meetings serve a valuable purpose of aggregating the demands of the 
party and ensuring cohesion is commonplace for the arenas such as full council, where the 
glare of the public spotlight is often focused. If a party is not unified and organised in full 
council, where bloc voting is often required, then the party will fail in its shared goal. 
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Via the same route, shared goals are also put at stake with the introduction of overview and 
scrutiny, where public discussions about policies, issues and services were expected to take 
place. Thus it would be rational for the group to ensure that shared goals and aims were not 
violated in this new public arena. Though implicitly discouraged in the legislation’s guidance, 
groups should find it theoretically rational to organise meetings prior to overview and 
scrutiny, either to remind councillors of their obligations to a particular shared policy goal or 
collectively agree about the topics under discussion and thus develop a party perspective on 
the anticipated outcome. In more technical terms, the reason for devoting time to overview 
and scrutiny would be to ensure that component councillors would not ‘overproduce 
particularistic benefits [...] and under produce collective benefits [...] in an electorally 
inefficient fashion‟ (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, p.125). 
 
Thus the hypothesis relating to party meetings is that the aims of the group would need 
protection from the public arena and group meetings relating to the operation of overview and 
scrutiny would take place. These would happen either directly preceding the committee itself 
or devoting a portion of a regular group meeting to the agenda of upcoming scrutiny 
committees for the specific purpose of discussing the perspective of the party. The null and 
alternative hypotheses are detailed below: 
 
H0: Groups follow the legislation’s intention and do not hold pre-overview and scrutiny 
group meetings or devote time to overview and scrutiny in regular party group meetings 
– as a method to formulate party perspective. 
 
H1: Groups either hold pre-overview and scrutiny group meetings or devote time to 
overview and scrutiny in regular party group meetings – as a method to formulate party 
perspective. 
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V2: Pervasiveness of organisation 
Harmel, Janda, Tan & Heo’s (1995) variables such as the pervasiveness of organisation are 
effectively intangible in a quantifiable sense yet the variable reflects a factor that is 
indispensable to the research. For example, one of the key concerns of the legislation was to 
‘strengthen the role of the councillor‟ (Young & Rao, 1997, p. 227) to ensure that parties 
‘would be less able to operate behind closed doors without debate and review‟ (DETR, 1998a. 
p.30). Thus by the legislation aiming to ensure that the party no longer took a leading role in 
all aspects of the decision-making and requiring that councillors were ‘not merely there either 
always to oppose the executive or to rubber-stamp the executive‟s decisions‟ (DETR, 2000, 
para 3.30), the party was being mandated to diminish its control. 
 
In theoretical terms, the group, as an organisation, would require permeation of most 
councillor activities in order to ensure that agreed collective goals (policy, office, votes) were 
either delivered (i.e. full council) or maintained (i.e. speaking to the media, overview and 
scrutiny). In order to protect the Samuel and Shugart’s (2006) ‘brand‟ or reputation of the 
party, the party’s presence in the councillor’s day-to-day activities would have to be high. 
Thus the hypothesis as a result of the legislation would relate to the permeation of roles of 
O&S: 
 
H0: Groups roll back the pervasiveness of the party in public councillor activities, such 
as the new overview and scrutiny function, following the legislation. 
 
H1: Groups disregard the guidance and ensure the party remains pervasive and 
prevalent in aspects of public councillor activities such as overview and scrutiny. 
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V3: Centralisation of policy formulation 
In reflection on the specifically hierarchical nature of the blended separation of powers, 
where there is an indirectly elected executive (of both the authority and the group), the power 
of the party leadership is conditional on the support of the group itself. However, given the 
need for the leadership to protect party goals and the previously highlighted need for 
individual politicians to accept the hierarchical chain of command and the ‘binding of one‟s 
hands to the group‟ (Samuels and Shugart, 2006, p. 13), the circumstances allow the leader of 
a group to dictate the methods of action which would best secure success or the satisficing of 
party ambitions. Thus it would be expected that when the group formulates policy, there is an 
underlying principle, given that politicians may be individually ambitious (e.g. re-election, 
cabinet positions, wanting bigger policy input), that group members will want to ensure that 
the leadership is followed where necessary. This may be especially relevant in reference to a 
leader’s control over allocation to positions that hold a financial ‘special responsibility 
allowance’ such as cabinet positions or chair or vice-chair positions. 
 
Consequently, even though one of the aims of the legislation was to improve council 
oversight by ensuring that policy development and review was conducted through evidence-
based cross-party deliberation, the party machinery, in a blended institutional environment 
where councillors are not equal, encourages leaders to take a dominant role in party policy 
development. Uniformly there would be an expectation that non-executive councillors (the 
principals) would delegate to the party leader (‘agent‟), in order that overview and scrutiny 
councillors could follow the leaderships’ requirements and thus progress in their career or 
financial objectives.  It makes rational sense for competitive political parties seeking office, 
policy or votes, to allow the leader control over policy as Strøm (1990) argues that ‘when 
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leaders sacrifice organisational power or policy influence, myopic and electorally inefficient 
party behaviour follows‟ (Strøm, 1990, p. 578). 
 
However it is important to restate that the centralisation of policy formulation does not mean 
that the party leadership would be unconstrained, as the power of the leader is conditional on 
the continued support of the group. Thus whilst policy may be centralised for goal-satisficing 
efficiency as a result of the legislation, the leadership must seek agreement for their intentions. 
Thus the null and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H0: Policy development and formulation in groups follows the legislation’s intention and 
is partially delegated
4
 to evidence-based overview and scrutiny. 
 
H1: Policy development and formulation in groups is centralised to the party leadership 
and is not delegated to evidence-based overview and scrutiny. 
 
V4: Preclusory
5
 discipline 
Given the need to protect the party’s aims, whether relating to implementing a particular 
policy for its worth to the party cause or to increase chances at an upcoming election, the need 
to maintain discipline amongst party groups is paramount. In the public arena of overview and 
scrutiny, fractures such as intra-party dissent could be used by the opposition as evidence of 
group divisions. Where the public and media are able attend proceedings, the need for 
maintaining organisational discipline is a concern to groups. As in Chapter Three, the natural 
behaviour of elected members in a blended institutional separation is that they ‘will probably 
be aware of their party as an important constraint on the nature and degree of permissible 
self-interested behaviour‟ (1995, p.321) but to reinforce this, the rational party might be 
expected to organise the party in such a way that prevents self-interested behaviour in public, 
                                                            
4 For the majority party – this would be divided between the party, the cabinet and overview and scrutiny. For 
an opposition party – this would be divided between the party and overview and scrutiny. 
5 Here indicating „preventative of something [...] an event, occurrence, etc.‟ (OED 2010)  
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especially when the stakes are high. Consequently, this variable looks at whipping as both an 
implicit and explicit tool to organise members in such a way to preclude possible deviant 
behaviour that would be detrimental to the goals of the party. If individual politicians choose 
to revolt on a significant issue which is essential for the agreed party’s ends, the organisation 
would be fractured and the party would be adversely affected. 
 
The legislation advised that groups should not use an explicit whip because of the importance 
of the need for evidence-based deliberation, however, the likelihood of this based on the need 
to maintain a unified party should be low given the possibility of deliberating upon issues 
within overview and scrutiny that the wider group will have a perspective on. Given the 
common occurrence of whipping in the committee system, the need for organisational 
discipline would remain unchanged. Previous research (Chapter Five) has looked at the 
occurrence of explicit whipping in relation to overview and scrutiny but has failed to take 
account of the intricacies of mandation upon councillors such as implied, threat-based 
whipping. Given the requirements of the group to stay united on issues which are important 
from a policy, office or votes perspective, party unification through preclusory discipline 
(explicitly or implicitly) would be a common occurrence across all local authorities with party 
groups. The hypotheses relating to the prevalence of preclusory discipline are as follows: 
 
H0: Groups would not use explicit or implicit organisational discipline in relation to 
overview and scrutiny, following the regulations in legislation. 
 
H1: Groups would use explicit or implicit organisational discipline in relation to 
overview and scrutiny, against the regulations in legislation, in order to maintain party 
cohesion on issues of importance to the party. 
 
 
 
63 
 
V5: Cohibition
6
 of individual councillor communication 
The need for the party to maintain its control over its components and act in unity is already 
demonstrated within the developed sets of regulations of party groups, where often there are 
certain types of communications which are completely forbidden (i.e. speak to the group 
leader first - Chapter Four.) Given the introduction of the overview and scrutiny function 
where communication was intended to be unmoderated, the group would take steps to restrain 
and cohibit the actions of individual councillors, if the lack of moderation were to be 
destructive to the party’s goals. The higher the cohibition of councillor communication, the 
less likely the party will be fractured in their approach to policy, scrutiny and performance 
management et al. Vice versa, the lower the cohibition, the more likely the party will suffer as 
a result of their divergence from the party purpose as an aggregator of preferences. 
 
Thus it is rational for a party with goals to moderate the locations in which and the content of 
what councillors may want to communicate in public. Whilst the party group rules of all 
three parties specifically command party groups to ensure that councillor 
communication is moderated (see C4), the explicit exception of ‘overview and scrutiny,’ 
whilst demonstrating a faithful heeding of the legislation, would be unlikely to be 
maintained. Parties looking to protect themselves from potentially destructive deviance could 
brief party representatives about the appropriate outlets for discussing grievances over polices, 
ensuring members do not criticise the group in meetings or ensuring that the media are not 
used to discuss items that the party has agreed upon. For example, it would seem rational to 
prevent a non-executive administration chair of a resource scrutiny committee from widely 
disseminating the results of a cross-party investigation into a cabinet member’s budget 
overspend. Thus as a result of the party’s need to cohibit councillor communication in areas 
                                                            
6 Here meaning ‘restraint, restriction; check, stoppage’ (OED 2010) 
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such as full council, with the media or in public, it seems reasonable that these same arenas 
share the public quality of overview and scrutiny. Thus given the impact of criticism across 
all these authority functions, groups would see the value of restricting councillor 
communication in relation to O&S. The hypotheses are as such: 
 
H0: Groups would follow the guidance of the legislation and not cohibit communication 
in overview and scrutiny. 
 
H1: Groups would cohibit the level of member communication in overview and scrutiny 
– with the aim of protecting the party’s goals. 
 
V6: Administration of castigative discipline 
The variable associated with castigative discipline is an exception amongst the rest because 
the administration of punitive discipline for disregarding preclusory discipline is, and remains, 
relatively low in local government (as in central government) and its proclivity to measure 
party modifications may not be strong. However, as a method to silently threaten compliance 
amongst individual members, its presence as part of group rules and its use according to the 
discretion of the party as a method to stimulate unity, is important to the research. 
 
Given that the party’s interests are best served when there is minimal deviance and the use of 
preclusory discipline is the route to ensure compliance, the only threat that can be given to 
councillors to guarantee that the preclusory discipline will be enforced is that of the threat of 
punishment. In all party rules, the detailing of how to use castigative discipline is left open to 
local party discretion, but the common theme to all three sets of guidance is that formal 
warnings, suspensions, candidate deselections and permanent expulsions can be brought on 
by a various levels of ‘disregard’ for the party (see Chapter 4). 
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Unlike references to preclusory discipline, there are no explicit exemptions from castigative 
discipline relating to councillor actions in overview and scrutiny.
7
 Whilst it is not the 
intention of the research to argue that castigative discipline would become more widespread, 
it is the argument of this research that in order to maintain the imposition of any preclusory 
discipline to maintain party goals (policy, office, votes), which this research argues would 
remain prevalent (see V4), the same level of threat of castigative discipline would be required 
to deliver a similar amount of compliance as that of the committee-system. In clearer terms, 
the weight of threat upon councillors subject to any preclusory discipline would need to 
remain the same, due to the equivalent hierarchical power of the party which is used to 
maintain cohesion. 
 
H0: Groups would not implicitly or explicitly threaten councillors with castigative 
discipline in relation to actions within overview and scrutiny. 
 
H1: Groups would implicitly or explicitly threaten councillors with castigative discipline 
in relation to actions within overview and scrutiny– with the aim of enforcing preclusory 
discipline and thus the party’s goals. 
 
V7: Allocation of positions 
In order to maintain party superiority in decision-making for the achievement of party goals in 
the new institutional environment, the allocation of positions would reflect the parties using 
the willingness of members ‘to be loyal’ for the position, in order to deliver the party’s 
ambitions. Whilst members typically need to be allocated to a committee, parties would 
utilise the right to nominate candidates for committees with an eye to who could be trusted to 
promote the group-agreed cause of the party on the topic, not speak against the party or avoid 
work programmes including controversial issues detrimental to the party. This strategy would 
                                                            
7 Logically, councillors would clearly take exception to (and probably appeal against) any castigative discipline 
administered without the prior use of preclusory discipline. 
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also be relevant to chair positions, vice-chair positions and even ordinary members of the 
committee, depending on the competitiveness of the authority. Rather than self-selection, 
party leaders would take a leading role in placing candidates in roles where the group would 
best reap the rewards of their work for the ‘public good.’ The only exception to these party 
strategies to maintain cohesion could be in respect to ‘veteran mavericks‟ (Hagevi, 2000, 
p.257) or disruptive councillors to whom reverence might be paid from a majority of party 
members and thus may greater influence their appointment to O&S committees. 
 
For majority groups, the easiest way to ensure group influence would be to ensure that all 
overview and scrutiny committee chairs were from the majority party, ensuring that the 
nominations are likely to follow the party line or making certain that any chairs which are 
granted to the opposition are either less important to council decision-making or more 
outward-facing. For opposition groups, the party could desire to allocate positions based on 
expertise to highlight administration ineptness, a willingness to push the views of the wider 
group or on the likelihood that they would not excessively criticise their own party: 
 
H0A: Majority groups would follow the guidance and allocate opposition members to 
chairs of O&S committees.  
 
H1A: Majority groups would disregard the guidance and allocate O&S chairs to the 
administration party.  
 
------------------- 
 
H0B: All groups would allocate committee positions based on expertise and interest to 
reflect the legislation’s intention for evidence-based deliberation. 
 
H1B: All groups would control the nomination process for O&S committees and allocate 
positions based on loyalty to the party cause or to satisfy disruptive elements to prevent 
deviance. 
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Chapter Three: Institutional Environment of the Blended Separation of Powers 
This chapter of the thesis examines the type of separation of powers mandated upon local 
government and thus how the structure could influence the behaviour of actors operating 
within the environment. This chapter assesses the development of the separation of powers (in 
all its forms) as a theoretical construction up to its practical use within contemporary 
government structures, in order to establish whether its theoretical justifications have been 
maintained in practice. 
 
From Hobbes’ ‘Diseased Beast’ to Montesquieu’s ‘Check to Power’ 
 
‘To what Disease in the Naturall Body of man, I may exactly compare this irregularity 
of a Common-wealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that had another man 
growing out of his side, with a head, armes, breast, and stomach, of his own: If he had 
had another man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been 
exact.‟ 
(Hobbes, 2002, p.228) 
 
In the above quotation Hobbes’ (1651) distaste for the division of government (sovereignty) 
went as far as comparing the constitutional structure of a separation of powers to a disease. 
Hobbes believed that there was only room for one sovereign power to guarantee security 
because to split power amongst others would, ‘by opposing one another, divide that power, 
which […] is indivisible; and thereby reduce the multitude into the condition of warre, 
contrary to the end for which all sovereignty is instituted‟ (2002, p.130). Hobbes interprets 
the division of government into a tripartite structure (executive, legislative and judiciary) as a 
fundamental weakening of its force. His argument was that the divisions would intentionally 
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work against each other and thus not form an absolute authority, the absence of which was 
Hobbes’ foremost concern. He argued that the separation of powers would not lead to ‘one 
independent Commonwealth, but three independent factions; nor one representative person, 
but three‟ (2002, p.228), and the powers divided would ‘mutually destroy each other‟ (2002, 
p.225). With a clear separation of powers, there would be no ‘one‟ authority and thus this 
would create uncertainty. In part motivated by the scriptures which validated his theory, the 
account sought to advocate preserving the sovereign as one body which, alone, was capable of 
acting in the common interest and providing a unitary, direct voice to a people. 
 
Locke’s First Treatise (1689) believed that the Hobbesian interpretation of the scriptures for 
the defence of absolute monarchical power was wrong. For example, Locke takes the example 
of the Genesis account of Adam, where previous translations of Hebrew had taken God’s gift 
of giving Adam the ‘dominion over every living thing that moveth on earth‟ (Locke, 2003, p. 
161) to mean that Adam was the absolute ‘monarch of the whole world‟ (2003, p.157). Locke 
argued that this reasoning for an absolute monarchical arrangement was entirely fallacious 
because if it were to be the case, then God had given Adam such powers that ‘Princes might 
eat their subjects too‟ (2003, p.160). Instead, Locke contended that God had given the 
dominion to all people; „…the dominion of the whole Species of Mankind, over the inferior 
Species of Creatures‟ (2003, p.161) because God had given dominion whilst „[speaking] in 
the plural‟ (2003, p.161) and hence the dominion that God had given was ‘not a Private 
dominion [for Adam], but a Dominion in common with the rest of mankind‟ (2003, p.161).   
 
In Locke’s Second Treatise (1689), he argued, in direct opposition to Hobbes, that an absolute 
authority could have no place in civil society, because ‘wherever there are any number of men, 
however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to [a legislature or judiciary], 
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there they are still in the state of Nature‟ (2003, p.325). This important right to appeal ‘upon 
any injury received, or Controversie that may arise’ (2003, p.325) was key to Locke’s 
argument for a separation of powers. To prevent men in the state of nature becoming a ‘slave 
of an absolute prince‟ (2003, p. 327) it was necessary to have in place an ‘establish‟d, settled, 
known Law […] a known and indifferent Judge […] and Power to back and support the 
Sentence when right, and to give it due execution‟ (2003, p.351). These three powers 
described by Locke, as an alternative to an absolute power, came relatively close to a 
contemporary understanding of a clearly delineated separation of powers. There was also 
well-defined reasoning why such a separation of powers was needed in a state, based on 
similar assumptions to Hobbes about the imperfect nature of human behaviour, both within 
and without a state. However, Locke believed that those who were employed to legislate 
could not also be the ones to execute the laws: 
 
„…because it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, 
for the same persons who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands 
the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the 
laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making and execution, to their own 
private advantage.‟ 
(Locke, 2003, p.364) 
 
Locke was also the first to bring up the concept of the separation of powers with the notion of 
accountability and the need for any form of executive power ‘placed anywhere but in a 
person that also has a share in the legislative, [being] visibly subordinate and accountable to 
it‟ (2003, p.368). Locke believed that legislative power was the ‘one supreme power‟ (2003, 
p.366) because not only the legitimacy of it, but also its authority was in the hands of the 
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people who could ‘remove or alter the legislative, when they found that the legislative [had] 
acted contrary to the trust reposed in them‟ (2003, p.367). According to Locke, the critical 
importance of the legislative branch was the perpetual need to moderate the usage of power 
by the executive branch:  
 
„When the legislative hath put the execution of the laws, they make, into other hands, 
they have a power still to resume it out of those hands, when they find cause, and to 
punish for any mall-administration against the laws.‟ 
(Locke, 2003, p.369) 
 
The fundamental justification for Locke’s separation of powers was that mankind was 
naturally imperfect and the human condition was such that it was impossible to prevent a 
person from acting in their own private interests given the opportunity to do so. Any 
collection of authority in one executive was thus liable to lead to an exploitation of said power. 
 
Similarly in De l'esprit des lois (1748), Montesquieu argued that supposed familial traditions 
established by nature were not necessarily to be replicated with unitary sovereigns: 
 
„Some think that nature, having established paternal authority, the most natural 
government was that of a single person. But the example of paternal authority proves 
nothing. For if the power of a father relates to a single government, that of brothers 
after the death of a father, and that of cousin-germans after the decease of brothers, 
refer to a government of many. The political power necessarily comprehends the 
union of several families.‟  
(Montesquieu, 1902, p.6) 
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Hence Montesquieu’s vision of successful governance was one that encompassed a wide 
range of different ‘families’ of actors. Relating to this, Montesquieu expounded the most 
thorough and recognisable version of the thesis of separation of the powers in government. 
Following the judgments of Locke, Montesquieu believed that ‘constant experience [has 
shown that] every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as 
far as it will go’ (1902, p.161), hence there was an continuous need to moderate the usage of 
power: ‘to prevent […] abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power 
should be a check to power’ (1902, p.161). The solution from Montesquieu was a separation 
of powers into ‘the legislative; the executive in regard to matters that depend on the law of 
nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law‟ (1748, p.162). 
Any other combination of these roles, such as combining the powers of the legislative and 
executive, could result in ‘arbitrary control‟ (1902, p.163) and ‘violence and oppression‟ 
(1902, p.163). The fundamental thesis of Montesquieu was that ‘when the legislative and 
executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can 
be no liberty‟ (1902, p.163). 
 
Montesquieu furthered the thesis of separation of powers with detailed requisites that would 
enable the perpetuation of successful governments; such as the need for the legislative body to 
always be assembled, the executive retaining some control over the length of legislative 
assemblies and the need for forbidding the legislative power to arbitrarily indict the executive 
power (1902, p168-170). Pangle (1973) stated that although Montesquieu’s thesis of 
‘preventing oppression in a republic by balancing selfish competitive factions‟ (1973, p.117) 
was not new, it was unquestionably an innovative way to provide a ‘guarantee for personal 
security and the rule of the law‟ (1973, p.117.) 
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These three political philosophers were united on the imperfect human condition but differed 
on whether such innate qualities required regulation with forms of checks and balances to 
counter these faults in humankind. As such, Locke and Montesquieu maintained that there 
should be a formal separation in such a way to temper the control of an unlimited executive, 
because the consequence of the alternative was abuse. The core recommendation of both was 
that of a clearly delineated separation of powers. Hobbes, however, advocated a unitary power 
based on the need for an authority which could be unimpeded, efficient and not countered for 
the benefit of decisive power, which was the surest way to safeguard the citizenry against 
indecision. The fundamental problem was that absolute power would be granted to a singular 
body, whose interests could differ from those it was intended to protect. 
 
The Madisonian Conception of the Separation of Powers 
Following Montesquieu’s formal definitions of the separation of powers, James Madison in 
the Federalist Papers (1788) explored Montesquieu’s vision of a separation of powers in 
relation to a defence of the newly created U.S constitution. Madison believed that the British 
constitution,
1
 to which Montesquieu had referred, represented a situation where the legislative, 
executive and judiciary arms of government undoubtedly overlapped (Madison et al., 2003, 
p.235), which went against Montesquieu’s own statement that when ‘powers are united in the 
same person […] there can be no liberty‟ (2003, p.163).  For example, Madison cited that in 
Britain the executive was a component of the legislative arm, the judiciary was appointed by 
the executive and the legislature had singular power over impeachment (2003, p.235). Hence 
Madison tried to reiterate the Montesquieuian thesis of a true separation of powers by stating 
that Montesquieu did not actually mean that the three arms ‘ought not to have no partial 
                                                 
1 Madison uses the term ‘British constitution’ unlike Montesquieu’s reference to the ‘English constitution’ 
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agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other‟ (2003, p.236), but instead they should 
not ‘possess the whole power of another department‟ (2003, p.236). 
 
The possibility of a tyrannical majority without a separation of powers was a major feature of 
Madison’s argument for its inclusion in the constitution. Madison highlighted many case 
studies of individual states, which although they had stated that a definite Montesquieuian 
separation of powers was essential, had all ‘blended the different powers of government‟ 
(2003, p.238) in different ways. For example, the constitution of Massachusetts allowed the 
executive to have a veto on the legislature and the Senate was able to impeach those of the 
executive and the judiciary (2003, p.237). Madison referred to this typical ‘blending of 
powers’ occurring not only in Massachusetts, but in New York and many others. Madison 
identified the problem in the majority of states: 
 
„The fundamental principle under consideration has been violated by too great a 
mixture, and even an actual consolidation of the different powers; and that in no 
instance has a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the 
separation delineated on paper.‟ 
(Madison, 2003, p.240) 
 
Because of this seemingly pestilential problem of power consolidation in most states, which 
had inexorably led to the alienation of Montesquieuian liberty, Madison believed that the 
‘powers properly belonging to one of the departments, ought not to be directly and 
compleatly administered by either of the other departments‟ (2003, p.240)  nor should either 
of the powers ‘possess directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the 
administration of their respective powers‟ (2003, p.241). Madison considered that because of 
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the ‘encroaching nature‟ (2003, p.241) of power and the likelihood of intentional overlaps it 
was necessary to ‘provide some practical security for each against the invasion of others‟ 
(2003, p.241). According to Madison one of the main problems was that within a separation 
of powers the legislative branch often dominated as it was ‘less susceptible [to] precise limits‟ 
(2003, p.242) and it ‘alone has access to the pockets of the people, and has in some 
Constitutions full discretion, and in all, a prevailing influence over the pecuniary rewards of 
those who fill the other departments‟ (2003, p.242).  Madison went on to cite and agree with 
Thomas Jefferson’s belief that the legislative power had often become an „elective despotism 
[and] the judiciary and executive members were left dependent on the legislative for their 
subsistence in office, and for some of them for their continuance in it‟ (Madison, 2003, p.243 
citing Jefferson, 1781, p.326). Due to this difficulty, Madison believed that the members of 
each branch; ‘…should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of 
the others […] and all appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary 
magistracies, should be drawn from the same fountain of authority; the people‟ (Madison, 
2003, p.251-2). The most important safeguard according to Madison consisted of the 
following: 
 
„…giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional 
means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for 
defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of 
attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.‟ 
(Madison, 2003, p.252) 
 
Madison was somewhat dissatisfied with his enantiopathic conclusion about human nature but 
conceded that ‘experience [had] taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions‟ (2003, 
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p.252) in relation to the application of power and ‘if angels were to govern men, neither 
external nor internal controuls on government would be necessary‟ (2003, p.252). However 
Madison acknowledged that the provision of the necessary defences against human nature, 
ergo, encroachments on power, was an inexact science and it was clearly not possible to ‘give 
to each department an equal power of self defence‟ (2003, p.253). For example, referring 
back to his assertion that the legislative branch would be the most powerful, Madison 
recommended that it should be divided into different parts ‘as little connected with each other, 
as the nature of their common functions, and their common dependence on the society, will 
admit‟ (2003, p.253). Madison also argued that the executive would need to be strengthened 
to counteract the force of the legislative and hence could require an executive veto over 
decisions made by the legislature (2003, p.253).  The central thesis was that it was necessary 
to ‘[contrive] the interior structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts 
may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places‟ 
(2003, p.251). 
 
Given Madison’s concern with pragmatism in ensuring no agency could overpower any other 
‘this approach meant dropping a fetishistic concern with delineating precise boundaries and 
concentrating on the realities of power politics‟ (Bellamy 1996, p.449) with the suggestion of 
actual checks and balances such as vetoes and blocks. As Bellamy (1996) posited ‘Madison‟s 
brilliant solution was to harness factional conflict in a Machiavellian manner so that the 
different groupings checked and balanced each other and were forced to cooperate in 
promoting justice and the general good’ (Bellamy 1996, p.450). Whilst this necessitated a 
view of human nature similar to that of Machiavelli: ‘individual virtue is a weak reed, not to 
be relied upon for very long, if at all’ (Ball 2008, p.xvii) it was, at the least, well-founded on 
empirical evidence from the individual states. 
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An alternative interpretation of Madison was that his concern for preventing factional 
dominance (factional conflict as remedy) was a ‘masterly statement of the theory of economic 
determinism‟ (Beard 1913 (2004), p.15) because ‘the most common and durable source of 
factions has been the [...] unequal distribution of property‟ (2004, p.15). Thus Madison’s 
defence of a separation of powers effectively facilitated the oppression of those without 
capital and ensured that the ‘deck was constitutionally stacked against the working class 
[because] a politically unified and united working class was constitutionally precluded‟ (Ball 
2008, p.xx). Ball (2008, p.xx) cites contemporary rational-choice scholars as the adherents to 
this type of view (such as McGuire 2003). Regardless of the intentions of Madison’s thesis, as 
one of the founding fathers and framers of the U.S. constitution, with the Federalist Papers 
serving to promote the prospects of ratification, Madison had a profound contribution to the 
contemporary separation of powers in the U.S. The extent to which the ratified constitution 
protected against such factions or the tyranny of a majority has been a topic for debate. 
 
In what had been described as legitimated chaos by British scholars: ‘They obey nobody. They 
are responsible to nobody [...] Such a system seems a negation of a system and more akin to 
chaos‟ (Bryce 1909, p.530), there had, in fact, been the development of a party system to 
counter the prevention of factions, soon after the constitution’s introduction: 
 
„A party system [could] overcome the separation of powers by bringing together under 
informal arrangements what the founders were at pains to divide by formal ones.‟ 
(Wilson 1986, p.18) 
 
At the start of the 20
th
 century, party voting in the legislature was commonplace, with ‘90 
percent of the Democrats voting against 90 percent of the Republicans [and] nearly 80 
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percent of votes [with] at least half of the Democrats opposing at least half of the Republicans‟ 
(Wilson 1986, p.19). Despite the cohesion in party voting at various times in U.S. history, it 
has not always been stable and the test of ‘party government’ would be ‘whether [...] party 
voting was strong [enough] that it enabled the president to get his way in Congress by virtue 
of party discipline‟ (Wilson 1986, p.26). Clearly with no ability for mandating cohesion, 
through virtue of an inability to remove those opposing mandation, the executive branch in 
the U.S. is constantly bound to maintaining a congenial relationship with their party in 
Congress, more often than not, with the party leadership: „a strong party leadership in a 
legislature [...] makes it easier for an elected executive to do business with lawmakers‟ 
(Wilson 1986, p.29). Thus party government can exist, but only in serendipitous 
circumstances; a strong party leader in the legislature with an ability to corral cohesion along 
with an amiable relationship with an executive, however only at times when the executive is 
of the same party of the majority in Congress. Whilst Pelosi (D) and Obama (D) recently 
worked together to deliver a possible-conception of ‘party’ government (2008-2010), the mid-
term elections in 2010 resulting in a Republican Congress effectively made any form of 
cohesive ‘party’ government an impossibility.  
 
The Bagehotian Perspective on the Separation of Powers 
In The English Constitution (1867), Bagehot criticised the very essence of the separation of 
powers evident in the U.S presidential system. Bagehot believed that the nature of 
independence between the executive and legislature, both being elected independently by the 
electorate and wholly detached from each other, invariably created deadlock. For example, 
Bagehot believed that the legislature and executive would inevitably clash because ‘if the 
persons who have to do the work are not the same as those who have to make the laws, there 
will be a controversy between two sets of persons‟ (Bagehot, 2001, p.12). According to 
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Bagehot, the continuing operation of government would be extremely difficult because the 
two bodies are ‘sure to quarrel, and the result is sure to satisfy no-one, […] the legislature 
cannot be dissolved by the executive government‟ (2001, p.13) and an executive using a threat 
of resignation (similar to UK) to ‘compel legislation‟ (2001, p.13) would be impossible. 
Bagehot believed that the only route to avoid this impasse would be mutual co-operation and 
persuasion, but he understood that this would often be extremely difficult. Bagehot used an 
example of the process of setting taxes and the communication between the two powers: 
 
„And when the taxes do not yield as they were expected to yield, who is responsible? 
Very likely the secretary of the treasury could not persuade the chairman – very likely 
the chairman [in a legislative committee] could not persuade his committee – very 
likely the committee could not persuade the assembly. Whom, then, can you punish – 
whom can you abolish when the taxes run short?‟ 
(Bagehot, 2001, p.13) 
 
Bagehot summarises that ‘when a difference of opinion arises, the legislature is forced to 
fight the executive, and the executive is forced to fight the legislative; and so very likely they 
contend to the conclusion of their respective terms‟ (2001, p.14). These immovable forces are 
then pitted against one another, often creating a stalemate of relatively equally matched 
powers. The motivation for members of the legislature to become obstructive was clear to 
Bagehot:  
 
„The natural tendency for members of every legislature is to make themselves 
conspicuous. They wish to gratify an ambition laudable or blamable; they wish to 
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promote the measures they think best for the public welfare; they wish to make their 
will felt in great affairs. All these mixed motives urge them to oppose the executive.’  
(Bagehot, 2001, p.16) 
 
The desire for obstructionism in members of the U.S legislature was clearly at odds with their 
impotence in directing any type of executive change, as any debates within the assemblies 
were ‘prologues without a play‟ (2001, p.15). In sharp contrast, Bagehot praised the British 
system, whereby the legislative body was a constant force; ‘it watches, legislates, seats and 
unseats ministries, from day to day. Accordingly, it is a real electoral body‟ (2001, p.17). 
Bagehot eulogised on the value of debates in the legislature, which had to the power to raise 
important issues to government and potentially overthrow ministries; ‘The deciding 
catastrophes of cabinet governments are critical divisions preceded by fine discussions. 
Everything which is worth saying, everything which ought to be said, most certainly will be 
said‟ (2001, p.14). 
 
Another problem with the clearly delineated separation of powers in the U.S was that the 
division of sovereign power led to a situation where decisions were often made by up to three 
bodies and could be impossible to implement; ‘the President can veto laws he does not like. 
But when two thirds of both houses are unanimous […] they can overrule the President‟ 
(2001, p.151). As Hobbes, Bagehot argued that deadlock would result when contradictory 
decisions could result in no decision; ‘…the President wants one course, and has the power to 
prevent any other; the Congress wants another course, and has power to prevent any other. 
The splitting of sovereignty into many parts amount to there being no sovereign.‟ (Bagehot, 
2001, p.153-4). 
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Bagehot contended that the English system, with the executive being from and controlled by 
the houses of the legislature, had an advantage over the U.S system in that no matter what 
issue was under contention, it could always be ‘finally resolved‟ (2001, p.154). The House of 
Commons also had an advantage in that it could almost a guarantee that ‘its decrees [would] 
be executed, for it, and it alone, appointed the executive; it [could] inflict the most severe of 
all penalties on neglect, for it [could] remove the executive‟ (2001, p.154). 
 
Unlike Bagehot, John Stuart Mill (1859) was wary of the strength of the popular assembly 
and warned against the unilateral control of government functions by an inexpert body. Mill 
argued that one of the key roles that the representative body should fulfil is that of 
deliberation; ‘when it is necessary, or important to secure hearing and consideration to many 
conflicting opinions, a deliberative body is indispensable‟ (1998, p.272). Mill compared 
members of a representative body in a Parliament to board members of a company, where the 
non-executives possessed power deriving from the continuous monitoring of the actions of a 
managing director and ‘restraining or removing him in cases of misconduct‟ (1998, p.273). 
Mill argued that the separation of powers from an administration and others, overseeing and 
steering an administration, was essential because ‘as a rule, [administration] is better 
conducted under the responsibility of one‟ (1998, p.272) subject to the advisory direction and 
control from the representative legislature. The rationale behind this was down to the 
specialist nature of executive functions and the notion that the assembly should allow 
members with specific expert skills to conduct these specialised functions. Mill considered 
that it was essential that a representative body understood its limitations and instead of 
attempting to ‘direct an army‟s movements and fight in the ranks‟ (1998, p.271) the body 
should accept that if everyone made decisions there would be ‘inexperience sitting in 
judgement on experience and ignorance on knowledge‟ (1998, p.274). According to Mill, 
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although the actual functions of a representative body could vary widely, the minimum 
requirement should be that the „[executive‟s] functions are such, as to secure to the 
representative body the control of everything in the last resort‟ (1998, p.271), thus those who 
made the decisions would always be accountable for their actions. 
 
The Theory of the Party and the Parliamentary ‘Blended’ Separation of Powers 
Although the party may be dominant in the Westminster system as a result of the blended 
separation of powers, the electoral system allows a populace to give a mandate for that party 
to follow a specific course of action; usually presented in a pre-election manifesto of 
commitments. Hofferbert and Budge define a mandate in terms of a manifesto presented to an 
electorate which is then judged by the populace and thus the winning party has ‘acquired a 
moral right and responsibility to put its programmes into effect‟ (1992, p. 152). Voters who 
dislike the way that the party has conducted itself and its task of delivering the programme 
will then have an opportunity to remove the administration at a subsequent election.   
 
What makes the party in presidential systems weak in contrast to the parliamentary system is 
that politicians have less of an incentive to contribute to the public good such as the reputation 
of the party. Conversely the parliamentary system encourages politicians to act in a way 
compatible with maintaining the collective benefits. For example, Cox and McCubbins (1993) 
note that individual legislators who seek re-election might be tempted to ‘overproduce 
particularistic benefits [...] and under produce collective benefits [...] in an electorally 
inefficient fashion‟ (1993, p.125). As Bagehot claimed, congressional politics can appear to be 
a ‘prologues without a play‟ (2001, p.15) because the separation of electoral origin gives each 
branch of government a freedom of action that is quite absent in parliamentary governments. 
Whilst individual MPs in the parliamentary system are free, to some extent, their ambitions to 
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impact policy, stay in office, achieve promotion to ministerial roles or make a difference in 
their constituency fundamentally requires them to toe a party line. In demanding this 
obedience, the leadership of the parliamentary party then ensures that all members contribute 
to the collective public good of the party’s brand while the members are secure in the 
knowledge that their position and ambition may not be threatened. Whilst conceptually this is 
in reference to parties in government it also applies to parties in opposition whose ‘public 
good’ of the party’s reputation is equally as valuable to their electoral strategy. 
 
The arrangements of the parliamentary parties as organisations are well suited to deal with the 
inevitable predicaments of whether individual MPs should ‘pursue their individual interests, 
or devote resources to the maintenance of the party‟s provision of public goods‟ (Samuels & 
Shugart, 2006, p.13). For example a party can not only expect loyalty to the organisation as 
part of an individual MPs understanding of the lack of a separation of origin in elections but a 
party leadership can also discipline its members to ensure compliance and maintain the party 
reputation and brand. Whilst often used solely as a last resort against members who appear to 
casually dismiss the benefits of party membership that are given to them, discipline is the 
cornerstone of organised parliamentary parties and its overwhelming presence (as Sword of 
Damacles or otherwise) is one of the clearest and most important differences from 
presidential separations of powers.  
 
Parliamentary parties often help their cause by creating arrangements which prevent public 
‘deviant behaviour (Damgaard, 1995, p.312). For example, party leaderships select their own 
ministers based on a range of factors but invariably members could be mostly chosen on the 
basis of whomever could be trusted to speak in line with broader party commitments. 
Elsewhere, across European parliamentary systems, the party typically always has a say in the 
 83 
nomination and appointment of chairs of parliamentary committees; whose fundamental role 
is to oversee and scrutinise the actions and strategies of an administration. For example, 
Damgaard (1995, p.313) reports that in nearly all parliamentary systems, parties effectively 
allocate committee members regardless of whether this is done by direct authority, special 
committees of selection or wider Parliament itself, which inevitably is stacked in favour of a 
governing party.  
 
Arguably the most important tool of the party to compel obedience is the presence of various 
types of ‘whipping,’ where members are essentially mandated to follow a particular course of 
action; usually in terms of voting for or against raised policies but also used to control the 
mention of certain topics in a public arena. Parties tend to allocate a chief whip who then has 
the responsibility to ensure that members are sufficiently aware of the consequences should 
they not act in line with the party. Ultimately, though details of individual party whipping 
procedures are typically secret, it is often accepted that the threat of the whip on a vote is 
more than adequate for a reasonably popular executive to be able to herd their parliamentary 
members through division lobbies.  However, rebellions of parliamentary parties against 
governments undeniably take place, and in some quarters, could be seen to be increasing in 
frequency. As Cowley and Stuart (2003) attest: 
 
„The average revolt under Blair was larger than that by government MPs in any post-
war Conservative government. [...] Around half the back-benchers [...] had shown 
themselves willing (when necessary) to break ranks and vote against the government.‟ 
(Cowley and Stuart 2003a, p.329) 
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More subtle than this were the rebellions of the Conservative parliamentary party (CPP), 
when Cowley and Norton (1999) discovered that despite the Labour party of the 1970s being 
‘far more rebellious than Major's parliamentary party‟ (1999, p.101), the format of rebellion 
of the CPP was more subtle and involved disloyalty in public rather than going against the 
whip on votes: 
 
‘[Rebellion] was manifesting itself more in the form of conversations with journalists 
or appearances in the media rather than in the division lobbies of the [...] Commons. 
The expansion of political coverage has made such dissent more visible than in the 
past.‟ 
(Cowley & Norton 1999, p.102) 
 
Whilst there is no sustained evidence built up to indicate an increasing tendency for MPs in 
parliamentary systems to rebel against whipping and cohesion in more visible ways, the 
evidence clearly points to rebellions being accepted, on occasions, as part and parcel of 
parliamentary systems, where principals disagree with their agent(s). 
 
Parliamentary Select Committees at Westminster 
Given the weight that parties have in parliamentary systems and the increased likelihood of 
individual MPs acting in the interest of collective benefit rather than for any particularistic 
benefits, it is quite unusual that structures within Parliament at Westminster have placed an 
emphasis on consensual cross-party scrutiny of government.  For example, the separation of 
powers in the United Kingdom provides a tangible Millian conception of the thesis, where the 
legislative body takes a deliberative role in policy and provides guidance, advice and strategic 
steering to the executive but also, through the House of Commons, has the control of 
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everything in the last resort.  Formal scrutiny of the executive by non-executives can be 
divided into distinct activities in the House of Commons: debates in the house with ministers, 
official verbal or written questions to ministers, the Public Accounts Committee, departmental 
select committees / topic-based select committees, legislative scrutiny in Public Bill 
committees and informal contacts with ministers (such as letters, emails or meetings). Each of 
these modes of Parliamentary scrutiny may exert different types of pressure on government 
ministers but each ensures that ministers are nominally held to account by Parliament.  
 
One of the most remarkable forms of perscrutation
2
 at Westminster, primarily due to the 
theoretical need for parties to act ‘as unitary actors within and outside of the committee rooms‟ 
(Damgaard, 1995, p.310), involves cross-party working, evidence-taking and deliberation in 
departmental and topic-based select committees. Local authority overview and scrutiny 
committees in the documents preceding the Local Government Act 2000 were explicitly 
linked to the House of Commons select committees and a substantial number of local 
authorities have viewed select committees as a synonymous model of an expiscatory
3
 
committee system. Subsequent guidance has used the format of select committees as a model 
of aspiration. 
 
Cross-party select committees are unique in that their success relies on consensus amongst all 
political parties contributing. When representative of major parties in the Commons, select 
committees exert the type of scrutiny that should impact on government decision-making or 
hold the government to account. The inherent difficultly of effective scrutiny in select 
committees, however, is the ability of members of different political parties to work across 
                                                 
2 Here meaning ‘thorough inquiry or investigation; careful scrutiny or examination’ (OED 2010) 
3 Here meaning a committee ‘tending to „fish out‟ (OED 2010) through investigation. 
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divides and act together for a common aim. As a result of the competing pressures of party 
and consensual examination, select committee investigations have often been reported to have 
been ‘anodyne […] and “consensus was often at the high price of excessive blandness and 
marginality as committees cast around for subjects that will not be too divisive”‟ (Drewry 
cited by Adonis, 1993, p.168). 
 
Against the conflicts visible in the operation of backbench cross-party working, the recent 
growth in the prominence of parliamentary committees has ‘occurred not only in some 
parliaments, but appears to be a global phenomenon‟ (Longley & Davidson 1998, p.2) 
Longley & Davidson (1998) argue that  
 
‘…assertive committees in parliamentary systems potentially threaten the primacy of 
governments, executives and not least, legislative and partisan leaders in the chamber 
[and] active parliamentary committees fit well into „separation of powers systems‟  
(Longley & Davidson, 1998, p.2) 
 
This confrontation is due to the implication that if a cross-party committee tackles an issue 
and subsequently agrees on a position, the fact that non-executive majority party members sit 
within that committee (and in proportionately balanced systems dominate said committee) and 
oppose an executive along with opposition members, the executive could be seen to have lost 
wider confidence on the issue. Whilst this should be the case in some easily fractured 
legislatures across Western Europe where parliamentary systems are clustered, in the United 
Kingdom the relative anodyne investigations combined with the relative anonymity of the 
select committee process amongst the general populace has often meant that committees 
rarely confronted the government with any genuine threat. 
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Particularly in the UK, Weir and Beetham argue that MPs on select committees are ‘inevitably 
selective about the issues they [chose] to examine‟ (1999, p.407). Polidano argued that 
committee investigations at Westminster are ‘marked more often than not by superficiality 
and partisanship‟ (2001, p.253) along with Weir and Beetham (1999) who noted that MPs 
questions are ‘too often self-serving in purpose and amateur in method‟ (1999, p.409) 
Polidano used an example of the 1998 Foreign Affairs select committee inquiry into the 
Sandline Affair where the members of the committee were so persistent in questioning a 
senior civil servant over issues that were being covered by an independent inquiry that the 
‘committee‟s dispassionate quest for „facts, not hearsay‟ had degenerated into an adversarial 
fishing expedition‟ (2001, p. 258) with each side pursuing questioning that would benefit 
themselves, or indeed their party, the most. For the administration members of the 
committee, it was the need to show that ‘the mistakes which [were] being laid at the door of 
the ministers were the fault of officials‟ (2001, p.259) whereas the opposition members were 
looking to ‘trip up officials into admitting ministerial culpability‟ (2001, p.259). Polidano 
argues that in this particular incident, the ‘supposedly bipartisan committee were asking 
naked political questions to a permanent official with the aim of making him a pawn in the 
political game‟ (2001, p.261). Acknowledged by Polidano, the media profile of the case had 
intensified the ‘strong currents and counter-currents of party competition‟ (2001, 263) in the 
committee, which may have encouraged individual MPs to first and foremost contribute to the 
collective public good of the party’s reputation rather than focus on any particularistic gains 
which might have been afforded from real bipartisan scrutiny of the officials. If MPs act 
rationally, given a subscription to the view that politicians may have individual goals such as 
re-election or promotion within the party (for higher office or policy payoffs), then Damgaard 
summarises that ‘they will probably be aware of their party as an important constraint on the 
nature and degree of permissible self-interested behaviour‟ (1995, p.321). 
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Jogerst (1991) argued against the partisanship criticism pointed at the select committee model 
and posited that the party loyalty of administration group backbenchers displayed in the 
Commons and elsewhere would not get in the way of criticising party leaders and their 
policies in select committees (1991, p.21). It was argued that backbenchers, in all work at 
Westminster, ‘proved willing to vote against their own side on more occasions in greater 
numbers and with more effect than has been the case‟ (1991, p.34). Jogerst argued, based on a 
study of panels of MPs, that this was because attaining an executive office role was 
increasingly not now ‘considered the primary goal or duty of many Members of Parliament‟ 
(1991, p.35). Combined with being able to specialise in various topics and hence ‘removing 
them, to a degree, from the dictates of party leaders‟ (1991, p.35) select committee members 
were guaranteed a ‘more active and rewarding participation in the governing process than 
would be possible through years of service as mere loyal party men and women‟ (1991, p.35-
36). 
 
Jogerst’s argument appears quite reasonable given Members of Parliament such as the late 
Gwyneth Dunwoody, chairperson of the Transport Select Committee, who survived a party 
coup, which arose as a result of her reputation as an MP who was willing to interrogate her 
own party’s ministers and their policies in public.  However, whilst Dunwoody fitted 
Jogerst’s model of member independence, the very essence of what was being discussed was 
of principal importance. For example, Damgaard states that if a member of Parliament does 
deviate from an agreed party line, it is only a serious internal party problem ‘provided the 
matter is of some importance‟ (1995, p.317). If a member deviates on a minor policy matter in 
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a public, yet an unlit, relatively pedaneous
4
 arena, then it is unlikely that the party’s public 
reputation (‘public good’) would be affronted by this and thus discipline for the member in 
question is unlikely to be required. In Dunwoody’s case, whilst it was clear that there was a 
certain amount of deviation from the party line, if one looks at a sample of two investigations; 
one on the airport-operator BAA and one on concessionary travel, there are clear differences 
where the public are more heavily involved through the media. As such the BAA committee 
divided on party lines with over twenty four votes divided between Labour (supporting the 
government) and Conservative (opposing the government) members (House of Commons 
Transport Committee, 2008a, p.32) whilst the investigation on public transport was 
unanimously critical of government in over one hundred recommendations (House of 
Commons Transport Committee, 2008b, p.34). Whilst it is a mistake to oversimplify these 
two investigations as representative of work by every committee, it is clear from work 
conducted by Polidano and others that the media consciousness of investigations is, in some 
way, positively correlated with high degrees of party loyalty. 
 
Whilst this is not surprising given the need to protect the party’s image when the media 
spotlight shines, to make Jogerst’s case that the supposed increase in member tergiversation 
and ‘[voting] against their own side on more occasions‟ (1991, p.34) was symptomatic of a 
wider movement towards individual members not wanting to attain executive office and this 
was not now considered their ‘primary goal‟ (1991, p.35) would be fairly myopic and could 
only apply to a few members. Yet conversely it is also difficult to prove that members do 
aspire to promotion, executive office or advancement rather than the more simple explanation 
of loyalty maintained through shared political beliefs. However as Damgaard attests; 
 
                                                 
4 Here meaning ‘petty, unimportant‟ (OED 2010) arena. 
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‘[Parliamentary] party groups play very important roles everywhere. That is not to say 
that committee members are puppet-like party delegates. But rather that their 
behaviour is definitely constrained by their parties.‟ 
(Damgaard, 1995, p.321) 
 
Despite support that members of select committees are, at the least, likely to be constrained at 
Westminster, the evidence is relatively limited due to little wider research about the operation 
of select committees and an absence of a reliable measure of testing partisanship or member 
constriction. Most studies that have focused on the successes of select committees have 
focused on the impact of a committee and whether it has been successful in terms of changing 
government action through recommendations. Russell & Benton (2009) disentangle this 
approach by questioning how to best measure policy impact, for example, examining select 
committee impact through the tool of the ‘implementation of recommendations’ is fraught 
with difficulties: 
 
„Impact may be exaggerated if the committee is echoing recommendations already 
being floated by other interest groups [...] committees [may] tailor their 
recommendations to be more readily acceptable. [...] A focus on recommendations 
may underestimate the degree of impact if the existence of an inquiry leads to a 
change in government policy before the committee reports [or] the „delayed drop 
effect‟ comes into play – where proposals hard to swallow in a particular political 
climate are revived in later years or by new governments.‟ 
(Russell & Benton 2009, p.11-12) 
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However despite the pitfalls, there have been successful attempts at a holistic understanding 
of the contributions of select committees. For example Hindmoor, Larkin & Kennon (2009) 
conducted research showing the positive impact of the Education Select Committee with a 
new approach to assessing the capability of select committees which incorporated measuring 
impact in a more subtle way: ‘influence [...] was measured on the basis of parliamentary time 
devoted to the discussion of committee reports [...] interventions in debates, and influence on 
the media‟ (Russell & Benton 2009, p.13) whilst also examining government action over a 
substantial portion of time (1997-2005). In their empirical work, it was discovered that from 
93 (education-related) policy proposals put forward by government, ‘on twenty occasions 
these policy measures were judged to be identical with or showing significant similarities to 
earlier committee recommendations’ (Hindmoor & Larkin 2010, p.3).  
 
In terms of assessing party group involvement in select committees, there have been even 
fewer studies which deal solely with the partisanship criticism often levelled. However, recent 
research from Hindmoor & Larkin (2010) took a more subtle approach in assessing how 
controlling parties were in the nominations process for committees. It was discovered that 
there was scant evidence (apart from examples in next section) to suggest that rebellious MPs 
were excluded from the function: ‘[there is] little evidence that dissident MPs are either 
systematically excluded from select committees, or, if appointed, subsequently removed from 
them’ (Hindmoor & Larkin 2010, p.10). However, their conclusion was that select committees 
were not important enough to sufficiently worry the parties to want to control the minutiae of 
preventing nominations of the most troublesome MPs (2010, p.10). For example, serious 
rebels in select committees were not that much of a problem for parties who didn’t consider 
the work of the committees very important. However, the exception to which parties would 
concern themselves with might be the chairs of the committees. 
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‘Principals’ turning against the ‘Agents?’: Robin Cook and Dr Tony Wright 
There have been two recent attempts to change the select committee procedures of the House 
of Commons, including from the late Robin Cook and the influential former Public 
Administration Select Committee chair Dr Tony Wright, demonstrating, to various extents, 
how powerful the ‘principal’ could be against the ‘agent’ within the blended separation of 
powers. The first example was when Robin Cook, former Leader of the Commons, supported 
a modernisation programme for the select committees after a failed government coup to oust 
noted ‘veteran maverick‟ (Jensen, 2000) chairs of committees; Gwyneth Dunwoody and 
Donald Anderson. The proposals intended to depoliticise the function by neutralising 
objections against careerist concerns and possible allocations-by-loyalty: 
 
„...introducing payment for their chairs in order to make backbench careers an 
attractive alternative to entering government [and] proposing the [establishment] of 
an independent selection panel to choose committee members. This was designed to 
shift the power to decide which MPs are to sit on select committees away from the 
whips (in effect, from the government) to an all-party committee.‟ 
(Cowley & Stuart, 2003b, p.198) 
 
Cook believed that by trying to remove Gwyneth and Donald, it gave the ‘impression that the 
government was manipulating committee memberships‟ (Power, 2007, p.497). Inevitably the 
plans were defeated in a vote ‘amid suggestions that government whips had actively 
organised against the Leader of the House‟ (Power, 2007, p.498) which turned out to be true 
to some extent: ‘the whipping that did take place was ad hoc and informal or “freelance 
activity” as one member of the whips‟ office put it‟ (Power, 2007, p.299). Unavoidably, this 
incident provided evidence that the party group and its machinists took action over the 
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possibility of losing control of the deliberative function, automatically indicating that there 
was something to be gained by retaining the command of the function. Dr Tony Wright 
succinctly summed up the problem; 
 
‘[Robin Cook] provided MPs with an opportunity to decide on a free vote whether 
they wanted the composition and chairs of select committees chosen by the whips... or 
by themselves, they voted for the former option.‟ 
(Tony Wright MP cited by Power, 2007, p.498) 
 
It wasn’t until much later in 2009 when the Telegraph newspaper published a series of claims 
about the expenses of MPs that a committee was formed relating to ‘Rebuilding the House‟ in 
July 2009: ‘Without the shock of recent events, it is unlikely that this Committee would have 
been established‟ (House of Commons, 2009, p.7). Despite the accepted ‘external shock’ 
genesis of the committee, the recommendations relating to breaking the party group role over 
the select committees were broad in scope and aimed to bring the control of the function back 
to the House of Commons: „It should be for the House and not for the Executive to choose 
which of its Members should scrutinise the Executive‟ (House of Commons, 2009, p.28). As 
such there were a range of recommendations such as the secret ballot of members for the 
chairpersonships of the committees, a change in the method of allocating which party 
received which committee chair and support for a democratic method for groups to select 
members for each committee. After a House vote before the election showing support for the 
plans, the incoming Conservative and Liberal Democrat government accepted the 
recommendations as part of the coalition agreement. In respect to the implementation of the 
recommendations, the early reports cite the possibility of more independence but with the 
retention of concerns that majority party members, even though elected rather than whip-
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appointed, might still be reluctant to express dissatisfaction with government policy. In 
correspondence with Lisa Nandy MP, a member of the Education Select Committee, the new 
arrangements were demonstrating at least some reduction in party group alignment: 
  
„I think the chair being elected by both sides of the House has probably produced 
more independent-minded people. Graham Stuart who chairs the Education 
Committee is relatively loyal to Cameron but is fair and will make sure all members 
get a fair hearing regardless of our views. Elections of members have been interesting 
[...] we have people like John Cryer on Treasury (smart, knowledgeable and popular 
but unlikely to be a favourite with the whips) [...]  I would say generally Tory 
members are more cautious when questioning ministers than we are but that may 
change since we're all relatively new.‟ 
Correspondence with Lisa Nandy MP, Member of Education Select Committee 
 
Parliaments beyond Westminster: The Nordic Experience  
Whilst Westminster is a useful example in this research to explore the operation of groups in a 
particular institutional environment, most European countries operate parliamentary systems 
of government. Despite the presence of closed-list proportional representation in some of the 
Nordic parliaments, these systems provide extreme examples of the behaviour encouraged by 
the blended separation of powers. As Ergun Ozbudun (1970) highlighted in his seminal study 
on party cohesion;  
 
‘A legislator who has contributed to the fall of his party‟s government also loses his 
share in the obvious benefits of executive power for his party. [...] His own electoral 
fortunes would be likely to suffer with his party‟s if the party shows itself so 
uncohesive as to fail to maintain its leadership in office.‟ 
(Ozbudun, 1970, p.356) 
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Beyond the United Kingdom, nowhere is this statement truer than in these Nordic 
parliamentary systems where the electoral environment of proportional representation means 
that no one party can ever usually take full control of a parliament. Due to the multi-partism 
of the majority of Nordic parliaments, negotiated coalitions are overwhelmingly the norm and 
each of the parties’ share of a vote is almost directly in proportion to the amount of influence 
that a party is granted in a governing coalition, thus parties can often seem to act as unitary 
collective actors unified by a desire to take a primary role in the control of government. 
Jensen (2000, p.213) argues that party group control in Nordic parliaments is also high 
because of some other factors beyond merely sharing parliamentary systems, such as the 
electoral system of multi-member constituencies where high district magnitudes indicate 
home districts which are quite detached from their associated representatives. These 
constitutional arrangements make party group cohesion even more intense than in United 
Kingdom experience.  
 
‘[In situations of] a decreasing district magnitude, the home district becomes more 
and more clearly defined to the representative, and a need to cultivate the district is 
likely to emerge.  
(Jensen, 2000, p.212) 
 
As in the quote, in the UK where party group control is already strong, the electoral system 
with single-member districts focuses the attention of the legislator to at least try to meet the 
needs of his or her constituency, which undoubtedly has an impact on how strongly the MP 
aligns with the parliamentary party group. Whereas in the Nordic experience, the choice 
between serving a constituency or serving one’s own party is almost entirely extraneous. As 
an example, in Norway the closed list proportional representation leads to a situation where in 
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all parties (not just those of the left) ‘members are critically dependent on their party 
organisations for renomination‟ (Svasand, Strom & Rasch, 1997, p.94). 
 
It is therefore not surprising that party group cohesion in Nordic parliaments is very high. 
Jensen (2000, p.214) reports Worre’s 1970 study where it was discovered that there was 
evidence for four principal, stringent controls over the actions of Danish parliamentarians 
such as; 
 
„...group members were expected to keep internal party discussions to themselves [...] 
group members were under an obligation to participate in parliamentary roll calls at 
their party‟s request [...] individual members of the group were expected not to take 
political initiatives without authorisation from their party; and – last but not least – 
group members were expected to stick to the party line in parliamentary votes.‟ 
(Jensen, 2000, p.214 reporting Worre, 1970, p.169-170) 
 
By means of quantitative measures of party cohesion from voting in Parliaments, using the 
Rice Index of consensus (RI = ((Yes – No) / (Yes + No)) * 100), Jensen (2000, p.217) reports 
that the average Rice Index score in Denmark is 99.9, Norway 97.5, Iceland 96.9 and Sweden 
96.6. The equivalent practical voting example in Denmark’s Folketinget would mean a single 
party member from the largest party dissenting on one vote every forty votes
5
 or in a 
transposed House of Commons example, a single party member of a parliamentary party 
numbering two-hundred defecting on one vote out of ten. Other quantitative research in the 
Norwegian Storting from Shaffer (1991) discovered that ‘a miniscule 0.2% of all the 
                                                 
5 1 deviant violation from 2000 votes cast based on a party of 50 members in the Folketinget 
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individual votes cast on [...] 402 roll call votes broke with party position‟ (1991, p.65), which 
is the equivalent of 136 rank-breaking votes from  67,938 possible violations. 
 
Such is the control over parliamentary voting, that it is no misnomer to suppose that 
parliamentary committees are influenced by the strong cohesion of Nordic parties. Indeed 
Svasand, Strom and Rasch (1997) note that in Norway ‘party leaders, in conjunction with the 
six-member Board of Presidents, [...] control committee assignments‟ (1997, p.94) and clearly 
there are different levels of reward for parliamentarians such as ‘finance and foreign affairs 
[...] [being] the most attractive committee assignments‟ (1997, p.94). However, Hagevi (2000) 
examined the committee assignment process in each of the Nordic countries and discovered 
that seniority, in terms of the number of parliamentary sessions served, was an important 
variable in a parliamentarian being able to choose his or her committee preferences; 
particularly in the Swedish Riksdag „[parliamentary veterans] tend to get their preferred 
committee assignments irrespective of the degree to which they are loyal towards their 
leaders‟ (2000, p.257). However Hagevi tempered his conclusion with the admission that 
‘veteran mavericks‟ (2000, p.257) could be alone in this situation: 
 
‘Party group leaders enjoy better prospects for promoting party-loyal attitudes when 
assigning newly elected members to committees [...] [and they] actually promote loyal 
MPs among newly elected members in a higher proportion than among parliamentary 
veterans.‟  
(Hagevi, 2000, p.257) 
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Parliaments beyond Westminster: English Local Government  
In moving from a type of assembly government of the local government committee-system to 
a blended separation of powers offered by the Local Government Act 2000, the possibility of 
preventing the Madisonian envisaged tyranny of a single unit should, according to practice, be 
unlikely. A clearly delineated separation of powers, such as that proffered in the elected-
mayor option, would have moved local party groups into Samuels and Shugart’s (2006) intra-
party ‘transactional’ relationships rather than intra-party ‘hierarchical’ relationships. Thus 
the parliamentary institutional arrangement compels elected members of a group to ‘devote 
resources to the maintenance of the party‟s provision of public goods‟ (Samuels and Shugart, 
2006, p.13) and thus could automatically avert possible ‘deviant behaviour‟ (Damgaard, 1995, 
p.312) in respective committee arena. 
 
In similarity to the select committee organisation at Westminster, local overview and scrutiny 
committees combine the roles of being strategic policy working groups and assemblies of 
perscrutation on decisions taken (or to be taken) in a mirror format (ministry and committee 
scrutinising said ministry). In tandem with the select committees, it is not unlikely that 
individual behaviour on these committees is effectively restricted by the need for the 
protection of the party group itself. As Damgaard indicates about European parliamentary 
committees, the replication of the institution in the case of local government will mean that 
councillor actions would ‘definitely [be] constrained by their parties‟ (Damgaard, 1995, 
p.321). With reflection on the extreme cohesion in Nordic systems, parallels and differences 
can be drawn with the world of English local government that could demonstrate that the 
legislation created an environment less like that of Westminster and showing resemblance to 
other European systems. For instance, local authorities across the country have a mixture of 
electoral systems where councils are elected in stages, where ‘a third of [...] authorities have 
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elections by thirds [and] 7 have elections by halves‟ (Game and Wilson, 206, p.228). Thus the 
intensity of some local election cycles, which can often be every year in three years followed 
by a one year gap, reflects the necessity that the party brand will need more routine protection 
when engaging in elections more frequently. For example, a council with seats up in most 
years will almost be constantly waging an electoral battle and groups will need to protect the 
party brand more continuously, thus affecting the activities and behaviour of the parties. 
 
One of the important parallels with non-Westminster systems, such as the Nordic institutions, 
is that the representatives are from mixed-member wards, where each ward ‘returns 1, 2 or 3 
councillors for 4-year terms of office‟ (Game & Wilson, 2006, p.228) with the norm often 
being three councillors per ward. A single-member district at least focuses the attention of a 
legislator to the demands of an electorate, whereas with multi-member wards, there may be 
less of a ‘need to cultivate the district‟ (Jensen, 2000, p.212) and thus the strength of the party 
could outweigh the needs of an electorate. 
 
Furthermore, the most visible difference between Westminster and local authorities is the 
numerical make-up of the respective institutions. For example, the Commons is currently 
composed of 650 members, with the largest party having 306 members. In such large groups 
of elected representatives, the possibility of some party deviants and ‘veteran mavericks‟ 
(Hagevi, 2000, p.257) could be relatively high in a situation where monitoring the activities of 
all members would be exceptionally difficult and where minor deviance is unlikely to 
significantly affect the party brand. However in legislatures with a small number of members 
such as English local governments or in the Nordic states where party groups are often in the 
‘tens’ rather than the ‘hundreds,’ personal relationships amongst members will often be 
stronger and closer and even minor deviation from such small groups of members would be 
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more conspicuous to observers, the public and the party itself. However, given the struggle to 
find sufficient candidates in local government (Wilks-Heeg 2010), parties may be less able to 
avoid the occasional deviant, thus rendering cohesion more difficult. 
 
Summary 
From early modern political philosophers through to contemporary political structures, there 
has been a division over whether innate human imperfection requires appropriate structures to 
constrain the exercise of authority. Given the types of behaviour encouraged in the 
parliamentary blend of powers, the tendency for (efficient) group over (inefficient) individual 
legislator action has always been a chief concern or cherished asset. Given that the Local 
Government Act 2000 offered controlling party groups a choice between restrictions or 
freedom, the very choice of the cabinet/scrutiny model provided evidence that unitary, 
effectively party, decision-making was much preferred. 
 
In terms of the wider debate brought to local authorities, the blended separation of powers, 
whilst typically shorthanded as an introduction of the Westminster blend, does not share a 
number of features with its counterpart despite its equivalent appearance. Nevertheless 
overview and scrutiny committees possess parallel objectives to Commons select committees. 
Whilst it cannot be concluded that the new institutional environment shares more features 
with Nordic parliaments over Westminster or even that the Madisonian / U.S. conception of 
the separation of powers is antonymical,
6
 a comparative and historical assessment shows that 
the implementation of a specifically ‘blended’ separation of powers in any tier or place 
would alter actor motivations and affect behaviour in legislatures. Given the advantages 
that parties are granted within these institutional environments, it could mean that groups in 
                                                 
6 Pertaining to be the opposite. 
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authorities could operate as similar constraints on their members. Hence the legislation, 
despite its intention to remove group-dominated decision-making, may have been more likely 
to create groups prone to dominate councillor activities such as O&S, due to the relationships 
created by the blend. The next chapter assesses how the particularistic institution of local 
government might have affected the introduction of the legislation. 
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Chapter Four: Local Government Institutional Context 
Genesis of Local Parties 
 
„Politics arises in the first instance when one realises that there is no such thing as the 
people – that no single decision can please all people. There are only peoples, with 
contradictory and conflicting ideas and interests.‟ 
(Bell, D & Held, V, 1969, p.177) 
 
Gyford (1976) used the above quote to iterate that local politics surely must exist outside of 
the oft accepted belief that local government was ‘something untainted by problems of 
political power, by the clash of interests or the conflict of social groups‟ (1976, p.9) It was 
argued that those who express the view that local government should exist as a ‘community at 
one with itself, agreed on “what is best for the town” and not riven by the clash of interests‟ 
(1976, p.10) were ‘indulging in a nostalgic love affair with an idyllic interpretation of pre-
Industrial community life‟ (1976, p.11). If there were to be issues with which local people 
agree or disagree upon within a territorial space, it naturally followed that ‘the resolution of 
the consequent disagreements is the stuff of politics‟ (1976, p.12). As a result of the inevitable 
disagreements, aggregators of interests would develop in order to adequately express these 
differences within a sphere of government. In practice, these aggregators of preferences in the 
UK’s sub-national government developed as recognised caucuses in the early nineteenth-
century and subsequently political parties, which advocated interests on behalf of 
communities.  
 
In respect to formal arrangements in the UK, the Municipal Corporations Act 1835 created 
‘78 multi-purpose elected local authorities‟ (Wilson & Game, 2006, p.51) and reformed 
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others with ‘the effect of quickening the pace of local political activity‟ (Gwyn  1962, p.70-71). 
The initial county council elections subsequent to their founding in the Local Government Act 
1888 created a number of ‘party political councils, in which most or all members were elected 
on party labels, [...] recognised in council business‟ (Game and Leach 1989, p.29) with the 
rest being ‘crypto-partisan, with party conflicts beneath the surface‟ (Stewart 2000, p.124).  
From the origins of local government through to the present, there has been a gradual 
movement towards ‘party’ at sub-national level; ‘beginning in the nineteenth century, 
spreading in this century first through the major cities and then, if less evenly, to the shires‟ 
(Young in Widdicombe 1986b, p.81). 
 
In a 1962 Conservative pamphlet, it was posited that the rise of party politics in local 
government was due to the Labour Party ‘approach[ing] local government from a national 
political angle‟ (Block 1962, p.4). Whilst this may be the reason why the national parties 
sought to develop local representation, as way to assist their national goals (e.g. ‘a small 
amount spent at a municipal contest would prove more advantageous than a large amount 
spent on Parliamentary contests‟ (Gwyn 1962, p.70-71), Young (1975) challenged the 
account that it was Labour which started the trend toward politicisation. For example, in 1894 
the London Municipal Society was viewed as ‘municipal handmaiden in a national cause‟ 
(Young 1975 p. 213) with the Conservatives viewing the sub-national as an instrument which 
could lead to success for the wider party with an assumption that success at a local level 
would lead to ‘political benefits accruing [for] the national party‟ (Young 1975, p.213). 
 
However it could be held that the ascendency of Labour as a social movement at the 
beginning of the century brought about ‘an intensification of party conflict, with a greater 
number of contested elections and a greater alignment of party and policy‟ (Stewart 2000, 
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p.125). This often took the form of Labour versus ‘anti-socialists [...] orchestrated by the 
Conservative Party [...] and labelled variously‟ (Wilson & Game 2006, p.304). However, 
politicisation was not necessarily widespread and typically depended upon the scale of 
disagreement: 
 
„Each authority had its own political history and was influenced by its particular 
combination of personality, environment and events, which can mean that the pattern 
of politics at any given moment of time was likely to differ between what appear to be 
similar authorities.‟ 
 (Stewart 2000, p.127)  
 
Where parties did organise, there was structure in their approach to decision-making. George 
Jones (1975) referenced Herbert Morrison’s 1930s guidelines that local Labour groups could 
follow: 
 
‘(i) candidates for the council are selected by local ward parties, (ii) The electoral 
policy is decided by the constituency or borough party (iii) The members of the 
council meet regularly in a party group to decide how they shall act in the council (iv) 
Each committee of the council may hold group meetings of the members of the party to 
plan their action on the committee (v) Leading the party group will be a policy 
committee or an executive committee of the leading members.‟ 
(Jones 1975, p.29) 
 
Subsequent to this creation of a model of party organisation mooted by Morrison, it was 
common that the reaction from other actors was game-theoretical reciprocation: 
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‘Conservatives and other parties [...] used this structure, as a sensible way of organizing their 
members, especially to combat Labour‟ (Jones 1975, p.29). 
 
It was not until much later and the introduction of the Local Government Act 1972 where 
there was ‘the abolition of alderman [which] removed an influential group less involved in 
party activity [and] the introduction of payment of councillors [...] at a rate more generous 
than it later became‟ (Stewart 2000, p.128) when local government started to become 
considerably more party politicised. More importantly, as a cause, was the mandated 
reorganisation of local government involving the abolition of ‘all county boroughs, reduction 
of 58 county councils [...] to 47 [...] and 1250 municipal boroughs, urban and rural [...] 
merg[ing] into 333 district councils‟ (Wilson & Game 2006, p.58). In this respect, previously 
non-party authorities would have merged with party-split authorities, creating more party-
entrenched authorities (e.g. „merging urban and rural politics [...] leading to the more 
assertive politics of the urban areas dominating‟ (Stewart 2000, p.128)). Wilson & Game 
(2006) reported that the percentage of these party-split authorities ‘rose immediately to nearly 
80% in England and Wales‟ (2006, p.303) as a direct result of the Act. The influence of 
national parties was also important, especially with the Conservatives ‘actively encouraging 
local branches to contest elections under the party label rather than to support independents‟ 
(Stewart 2000, p.128). One of the most direct and lasting consequences of the 1972 Act was 
the entrenchment of more widespread party activity. 
 
Local parties have existed and continued their activities despite a lack of constitutional 
protection against central government encroachment (e.g. central government can make 
structural, procedural and functional changes to the sub-national) and their oft common 
subjugation to central party (e.g. some retain control over their local parties.) However across 
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these difficulties, local government provides at least some functional control over local issues, 
sufficient to command a need for an aggregator of interests such as party groups. As Gyford 
(1976) suggests (and generally remains the case): 
 
„Evidence and experience seems to suggest that local authorities do have room to 
manoeuvre within the limits laid down by legislation [...] they have scope for decision-
making about levels and types of expenditure and provision which enables them to 
exercise some degree of autonomous power within their own geographical 
boundaries.‟ 
(Gyford, 1976, p.21) 
 
As such, as long as there is retention of a policy space in local government along with some 
capacity for local group decision-making, there will exist ‘policy politics‟ which brings with it: 
‘partisan, system and patronage politics‟ (both Gyford 1976, p.21). 
 
Political Party Groups in English Local Government 
Today the majority of councillors in England are elected under a party label, predominantly as 
candidates of one of the three major political parties (Conservative, Labour and Liberal 
Democrat). In each authority, party groups are mostly ‘coherent, unified and disciplined 
bloc[s] of councillors, sharing the same political party membership or allegiance‟ (Copus, 
2004, p. 92). Decisions, which should arise formally from open deliberation, arise behind 
closed doors and ‘reflect the outcome of majority party councillors meeting in the party group 
to agree a common line on issues‟ (Leach, 2006, p.130). Regardless of the relative strengths 
of individual party groups, they have been an unyielding fixture in local government and their 
necessity to political survival is perhaps best demonstrated with the fact that even independent 
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candidates have formed ‘faux-party’ groups to consolidate their aims (MIF 2008, Copus, 
Clarke, Bottom 2008). Due to their inveterate power in decision-making, Copus (2004) 
defined the party group as a ‘formalised informality‟ (2004, p.94) which generated power 
through the ‘willingness of councillors, as party affiliates, to sub-ordinate their relationship 
with the electorate to the one that they have with their political party group‟ (2004, p.94) and 
‘provided councillors with a closed and private theatre for representative activity‟ (2004, 
p.94). In a report by the Maud Committee (1967) it was found that group control was replete: 
 
„[P]arties tend to have too much of a stranglehold in day-to-day operation, and 
members follow the party line with a regularity which seems to many observers forced 
and unnatural, and precludes the possibility of creative discussion.’  
(1967, p.8) 
 
The Maud Committee regretted the strength of the political groups that ‘[deterred] 
independent minded people from serving in local authorities‟ (1967, p.145) and were 
‘influential in causing employers, managers and professional workers to leave local 
government and prompt a majority of ex-members to say that the work [could] be better done 
without their influence‟ (1967, p.145). When looking at the element of party politics in a 
comparative context, the committee found that in some other countries there was at least ‘a 
general willingness to find acceptable solutions to awkward problems‟ (1967, p.106) despite 
the similarity that members were ‘nearly all elected on a party ticket’ (1967, p.106) The 
committee also found that there was a reluctance from members to admit to and use the party 
group label, which the Maud Committee attributed to being ‘symptomatic of a guilty feeling 
that party politics [were] inappropriate to local affairs‟ (1967, p.110). 
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Despite the tone of the findings, the Committee stopped well-short of recommending that they 
wanted to remove the party group. At the core of their argument was that party politics did at 
least bring ‘ideological drive, greater coherence, clearer responsibility and more consistency‟ 
(1967, p.8). However, relating to representative democracy, the Committee had a more 
cynical conclusion: 
 
‘[whether] the party group is engaged in vetting recommendations originating in 
committees, or considering a line to be taken in council or in a committee, it is a 
closed organisation which the electorate may not be able to influence. In so far as 
decisions of the group are „binding‟ on the member he can be regarded as a delegate 
of the group or party organisation rather than a representative of his electorate.‟ 
(1967, p. 112-113) 
 
In the subsequent Widdicombe Inquiry into the Conduct of Local Authority Business (1986a), 
there was further evidence that demonstrated the control of the group over decision-making. 
Research found that when voting as a group ‘breaches of solidarity [were] rare occurrences‟ 
(1986a, p.27). Ninety-four percent of respondents from parties in power always or usually 
voted as a bloc in council meetings and eighty-three percent of the same respondents always 
or usually voted as a bloc in committee meetings (1986a, p.28 & 30). Since reorganisation in 
1974, the research concluded that there had been an ‘increasing party-politicisation‟ (1986a, 
p.197), which at the very least meant that ‘the proportion of elected councillors who identified 
with a party [had] increased‟ (1986a, p.197). The research also noted that due to this absolute 
increase in party group labels, there was a developing ‘formal recognition of „party‟ in the 
conduct of local authority business […] with councillors of the same party meeting as a 
recognised group‟ (1986a, p.197). An increase in party group meetings was accompanied by 
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‘tighter group discipline and the production of more comprehensive and detailed party 
manifestos‟ (1986a, p.197) which illuminated the need for the party to possess a ‘tightened 
control over business‟ (1986a, p.197). Almost ninety-three percent of respondents reported 
that as a party member attending group meetings, they were either routinely bound to accept 
the decision of the group or were bound in special circumstances (1986a, p.310). This control 
over the member exerted by the group was further wielded by the lack of officer support and 
policy expertise available at group meetings, as approximately fifty-eight percent of meetings 
were formed of councillors alone (1986a, p. 311.) The lack of external support often meant 
that members were inextricably bound to decisions without contrary evidence.  Highlighting a 
centralisation of control over the party group, the research also discovered that sixty-nine 
percent of authorities reported the existence of ‘inner circle[s] comprised of small group[s] of 
senior councillors‟ (1986a, p.316) within groups. 
 
The Committee noted that the ‘increasing gap between the ideological positions and policy 
preferences‟ (1986a, p.197) of the major political groups resulted in a tendency to; ‘discuss 
national policies and their effect on local government [...] which affected the content – and 
the climate – of council debate‟ (1986a, p.198). Thus the move to bring debate about national 
policy to the local level often disrupted the political culture of the authority and led to groups 
defensively supporting national priorities. This could have resulted in an increase of time-
commitment for councillors as ‘group, committee and council meetings had tended to 
increase in length and in some cases in frequency‟ (1986a, p.198) and a ‘greater attention to 
detail of policy administration on the part of councillors‟ (1986a, p. 198). One of the 
conclusions from the Inquiry was that this level of politicisation was becoming more 
acceptable: 
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‘It was increasingly recognised that the major role of local government nowadays was 
to reflect political priorities. [...] If local politicians were taking their responsibilities 
in this respect more seriously, then this was a healthy development.‟ 
(1986a, p.198) 
 
Although the Inquiry acknowledged that the state-of-affairs was not common across all 
authorities, it was considered that it was part of a wider, concerted effort by party groups in 
the face of electoral competition based on the ‘breakdown in many parts of Britain of the two-
party system‟ (1986a, p.198). The increase in competitiveness meant that it had become 
necessary for the groups to become more involved in regulating member behaviour. 
 
Four years later, Young and Davies (1990) disagreed about the image of a more disciplined 
party organisation being ‘a rising tide, steadily engulfing authority after authority, with 
political organisation bringing in its wake both greater formalisation of political control and 
the risk of polarisation‟ (1990, p.11). For example, it was found that there were differences 
between urban and rural councils, where over eighty percent of councillors in urban councils 
reported they were routinely bound by group decisions compared to roughly fifty-percent in 
rural areas (1990, p.43.) However, the report also recorded the change in the four years since 
Widdicombe and noted that more councillors (overall) were routinely bound by the party 
group in 1989 than in 1985 (1990, p.46). This increase in ‘group mandating’ was particularly 
prevalent in majority parties where up to ninety-two percent of Labour councillors were 
routinely bounded by group decisions (1990, p.46), however, both ‘[major] parties remained 
distinct in the extent to which their members were effectively mandated [but] both had moved 
in the direction of routine mandating’ (1990, p.46). 
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Young and Davies identified that the variable of a councillor ‘never voting with the opposition‟ 
(1990, p.47) was the most useful guide for group discipline, as it implied that members 
refused cooperation for the sake of loyalty. Using this variable, the research found that 
majority councillors in urban areas were the least likely to vote against their own party (1990, 
p48). The variable also showed the distinction between the group control over council 
meetings and committees, and because of the ‘long standing practice of relaxing party 
alignments in committee meetings‟ (1990, p.47), it was found that groups used more discipline 
to regulate members in council meetings than in committee meetings, but this difference was 
not substantial.  
 
Since Widdicombe there had been considerable increases in cohesion in committee meetings, 
especially in Labour authorities where in ‘as many as a third of Labour councils, [majority 
party group] members never voted with the opposition‟ (1990, p.48). Although this trend was 
replicated within Conservative councils the difference was less pronounced. On group 
discipline, Young and Davies concluded that in the short space since Widdicombe there had 
been a ‘sharp increase in partisanship‟ (1990, p.50) that had been evident not only in council 
meetings but in committee meetings, where councillors were ‘abjuring support for opposition 
viewpoints [...] where, traditionally, party differences have generally been put aside‟ (1990, 
p.50). It was reported that this was not just a manifestation of a ‘widening divergence of views 
between councillors of opposing parties, but a tightening of party political organisation‟ 
(1990, p.50). The Widdicombe conclusion of a general increase in party competition creating 
a flurry of competitive behaviour in all groups was dismissed by Young and Davies, although 
it was argued that the trend for tightening the party group organisation was ‘by and large [...] 
a growing intensity of politics in urban areas‟ (1990, p.51). 
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As indicated by research on differences across affiliation (Young & Davies 1990, Copus & 
Leach 2004), there are notionally clear differences which separate the parties’ approach to 
discipline, unity and intra-party organisation. The following assesses how each major party in 
local government has expressed a desire for cohesive behaviour. 
 
Labour Party Group Cohesion 
Due to the historical growth of the organisation, as the ‘party and its local organisations 
existed outside of Parliament and local councils before it existed inside them‟ (Copus 2004, 
p.73), the Labour Party has traditionally placed a ‘great emphasis on group solidarity and 
abiding by collectively agreed decisions while at the same time allowing for debate and 
discussion in reaching those decisions‟ (Leach 2006, p.131). The Labour party has also 
traditionally been portrayed as the principal actor accountable for the politicisation of local 
government in the second half of the twentieth century, believing that ‘public differences of 
opinion [were] signs of „political weakness and embarrassment,‟ or […] „fatal to electoral 
success‟ (Copus 1999c, p.21). 
 
As early as 1952, the Labour Party sought ways of utilising intra-party co-operation to further 
national priorities and policies. For example, Labour were the first party to take advantage of 
using national associations of local authorities as spaces for party group meetings where an 
„[exchanging] of views and discussion of common problems may take place‟ (Labour Party 
Annual Conference 1952, p.168). Although not necessarily successful at first, Gaitskell was a 
strong advocate of their usefulness in regards to intra-party communication and pushed the 
idea as ‘a platform for projecting the party‟s ideas to a wider audience‟ (Gyford and James 
1982, p.26). This issue of national communication between local Labour groups at this stage 
had been an important method of retaining a direct link between local government and 
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ministers and thus discuss issues ‘if not as equals, then at least as fellow members of the same 
party, concerned with common problems‟ (1982, p. 27). The appearance of a robust 
national/local connection within Labour had occurred because local government was 
increasingly being seen as ‘complementary, rather than a potential obstacle, to the 
achievement of broad national policies‟ (Leach 2006, p. 132) and this potentially ‘reinforced 
the sense of solidarity [..] and [fostered] a more highly disciplined and organised practice of 
group politics‟ (Leach 2006, p.132) As a Labour councillor attested; ‘we see ourselves in 
terms of broad national policies as a whole‟ (Gyford and James 1983, p.50). 
 
Due to this level of interaction with the national party, local Labour groups are regulated to a 
considerable extent by the Labour National Executive Committee (NEC) in a largely 
subordinate relationship. Hence where factionalism surfaces at a local level and where a 
dispute is bringing the national party into disrepute, the NEC has effective control over 
groups to supervise resolutions. Copus (1999) notes that the NEC has shown ‘little reticence 
in acting‟ (1999, p.21) and has investigated high profile disputes in Hull, Hackney, Glasgow 
and Walsall (1999, p.21-22). In the majority of cases where intra-group relationships have not 
broken down, there are a complex set of rules, regulations and subsequent disciplinary 
procedures designed to keep groups in order. As Copus highlighted ‘all issues are whip issues‟ 
(1999, p.20) and failure to fall in line often meant that councillors were subjected to either, at 
best, a low-key future on the backbenches or, at worst, deselection or suspension. 
 
In the Labour Party rule book (2008) there are references to expectations of group loyalty and 
detailed regulations of what is required from members. These rules indicate that group 
members are bound to act in the greater interests of the party and to subsume personal beliefs 
and grievances: 
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‘Labour groups shall conduct their business in a comradely fashion, in such a way as 
to maximise participation from all members and to facilitate debate on key policy and 
political matters. […] The content of internal discussion is not for communication 
outside of the party, and internal disputes that are aired in the public domain will be 
subject to disciplinary action.’ 
(Labour Party, 2008, p.55) 
 
As above, the individual member of the group is part of a formal intra-party democracy, 
however, the actual discussions conducted within this group are restricted to this arena alone 
and public exposure of disagreement is prohibited. The following text from the rule book also 
illustrates the Labour’s instructions which intimate that loyalty is expected, even where 
legislation expressly discourages the practice: 
 
„[In] the scrutiny process each member shall form his or her own judgment according 
to the evidence, and not be bound by a group whip. However, the member should 
have regard to their membership of the Labour Party and seek to act in keeping with 
Labour Party policy and values.’ 
(Labour Party, 2008, p.58) 
 
Given that the regulation insists that councillors ‘have regard to their membership,’ there is 
an implication that this should be a method of approaching the work of overview and scrutiny, 
regardless of evidence provided. However, members may automatically form judgments that 
would be similar to other members of their party on the basis of their ‘opt-in’ membership; 
councillors of the same party clearly share some values, motivations and beliefs. 
Counterintuitively the rule alleges that members could disregard party values in overview and 
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scrutiny and hence the regulation actively seeks to prohibit councillors from disagreeing with 
Labour policy in public. 
 
In an interview with Hilary Armstrong, former Minister for Local Government and 
responsible for the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000, there was a sign that 
decision-making within the confines of the group would be preferable for a Labour group 
under the new environments.  
 
„I think if they‟re in power, I think that a good leader is able to work with his whole 
Labour group on how to handle these things more effectively. Because what you 
really want are people who will scrutinise, who will tackle these things very 
carefully...’ 
(Hilary Armstrong MP, former Minister for Local Government, 9
th
 July 2008) 
 
The mention of a leader working with his/her own group on how to ‘handle things more 
effectively’ in order to ‘tackle these things very carefully’ could be interpreted to indicate that 
any criticism directed at the group should be internalised and not made public or, at the least, 
handled with tactful party-mindedness.  
 
Combining the development of the party with its tight multi-level relationships, the strong 
emphasis on party cohesion and collective unity for the sole purpose of impact (whether 
policy or winning elections) has meant that the Labour groups in local government have been 
perceived to be ‘the most highly disciplined and organised of all groups on councils‟ (Leach, 
2006, p.132) 
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Conservative Party Group Cohesion 
Quantitatively, Conservative groups across local government share a number of traits with 
Labour. Young and Davies (1990) research found that since the Widdicombe research in 1985, 
the practice of Conservative groups in local government ‘continued to move towards that of 
the Labour party. In 1989, 50 per cent of Conservative authorities reported that the party 
group decisions were routinely binding on members, against 40 per cent in 1985 (Young & 
Davies, 1990, p.47). The research summarised the difference between the two as ‘[lying] in 
the strength rather than the prevalence, of the expectation that members will abide by group 
decisions‟ (1990, p.47). That being said, the Conservative groups in local government were 
mirroring the increase in cohesion demonstrated by Labour. Conservative councillors in 1989 
were just ‘as partisan in their voting in committee meetings as were Labour councillors 
[when Widdicombe research undertaken]’ (Young & Davies, 1990, p.48). 
 
However, the Conservative party, as it developed as an organisation, differs significantly from 
the other parties. Until quite recently, the Conservative Party was not operated as a national 
body and the term ‘Conservative’ itself was constructed as: „...shorthand term for three 
separate organizations. [...] The National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations, 
[...] Conservative central office, [...] and, the Conservative parliamentary party.‟ (Whiteley, 
Seyd & Richardson 1994, p.20). In respect to this separation of the party, there was a lack of a 
constitution that tied the party’s structures together and thus the ‘party’ only existed as a 
union of organisations. In consequence, up until the preparation of a national Conservative 
constitution in 1998, members could only join their local constituency associations, which 
were affiliated to but not part of the national party. In respect to a formal relationship between 
the national and local branches, unlike the Labour party which had mandated rules, 
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regulations and obligations upon their local components, the Conservative sub-national 
associations were, and still are, relatively autonomous in all aspects of their operation. 
 
„...when the leadership of the National Union attempted to require constituency 
associations to adopt both a new set of model rules and a code of practice and to 
submit an annual return detailing [...] activities, none of these proposals secured [a] 
majority at a meeting of the central council [...] because local representatives were 
suspicious that these changes would lead to centralised control of constituency 
activities.‟ 
(Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson, 1994, p.21) 
 
However, central office had not been averse to trying to encourage the associations to submit 
to versions of how they would like to see their components act before the introduction of the 
constitution. There have been publications of model guidelines for the operation of party 
groups but the ‘adoption of [the] provisions was advisory not compulsory [and] Conservative 
groups did adopt, adapt and ignore [their] contents‟ (Copus, 2004, p.138). Copus (2004) 
argued that any group subscription to the emanations from national party could have been 
‘just as likely to have been accidental or unintentional as it was a ready acceptance of the 
role of the national party in structuring group organisation and activity‟ (2004, p.139). 
 
Local party dismissiveness of central control is not unusual given the development of the 
party and its support of individualism. Since the nineteenth century and the encompassing of 
the „Cobdenite market liberals‟ (Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson, 1994, p.131), sections of the 
membership of the Conservative party have subscribed to individualism in the narrow sense 
of ‘petit-bourgeois concerns over private property and the interests of small businessmen [...] 
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supporting the idea of laissez-faire and reduced government intervention‟ (Whiteley, Seyd & 
Richardson, 1994, p.131) but also in the broader sense of having a ‘distaste for the presence 
of nationally orientated and controlled parties in local affairs‟ (Young 1975 cited by Copus, 
2004, p. 138). The very suggestion of controlling an organisation from outside an organisation 
through ‘domination and subjugation‟ (Copus, 2004, p.138) should be an anathema to most 
Conservative members. 
 
Relating to the operation of the Conservatives, almost counterintuitively in terms of 
subjugation, group leaders are ‘not only expected to give a lead on a certain issue but also a 
strong lead which they expect will be followed‟ (Leach, 2006, p.133). Thus group decision-
making should be more difficult than the supposed comradeliness inherent in Labour groups. 
Unity is often only secured ‘through leaders forming ad hoc or fluid informal coteries of 
supporters [...] including group officers, chairs, informed backbenchers, party chairs and 
agents‟ (Leach, 2006, p. 137). Whilst being mandated to follow group orders might not come 
naturally to Conservatives, as in the Labour party where a high amount of self-subsumption is 
required for the common good, the informal method of decision-making ‘to obtain a sense of 
what the group is thinking‟ (Leach, 2006, p.133) allows unity to become apparent only on the 
basis of what the group ‘would accept and not accept‟ (Leach, 2006, p.133). Thus unity for 
Conservative groups may often be on the basis of the palatability of decisions taken by an 
informal cadre, in contrast to Labour groups using collectivist decision-making irrespective of 
palatability to all. In both cases, cohesion is delivered but through noticeably different routes. 
 
Whilst the Conservative constitution developed in 1998 provided a framework for the 
operation of the party as a whole, it did not provide specific guidance for the relationship 
between constituency associations and groups on local authorities (Conservative Party, 2009). 
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More relevant to this research are the model standing orders for Conservative groups. Unlike 
Labour regulations, the instructions for groups are far more open to interpretation and draw a 
distinction between mandatory and advisory guidance. In tandem with Labour, one of the 
mandatory regulations for Conservative groups stipulates that: 
 
„9.1 Members shall be expected to support decisions taken at group meetings on all 
issues other than matters of conscience and matters specific to their ward: 9.1.1 at 
meetings of the council and its committees, other than at scrutiny or [...] when acting 
in a quasi-judicial capacity. 9.1.2 in their comments to the media and 9.1.3 – at any 
other public meeting.‟ 
(Mabbutt, 2004, p. 8) 
 
Thus the Conservative regulations grant a similar exception to scrutiny when councillors 
should not have to follow the desires of the group meeting. This exemption section is then 
immediately followed by an equivalent expression of the need for internal discussion and an 
almost antithetical (obligatory) strengthening of group control over individual councillor’s 
actions: 
 
„9.2 If a member feels he or she is unable to support a group decision on any issue, 
including a matter of conscience or a matter specific to his or her ward, he or she 
shall discuss the issue with the Group Leader (and/or Chief Whip) before saying 
anything in public.‟ 
(Mabbutt, 2004, p. 8) 
 
120 
 
Thus whilst scrutiny is explicitly unspoken in 9.2, the regulations indicate that councillors are 
not free to express any displeasure with group decisions in public, regardless of arena, without 
first discussing the issue with the leadership. From the scrutiny perspective, bringing together 
both regulations 9.1 and 9.2, councillors should not be forced (whipped) to support group 
decisions in overview and scrutiny (9.1) but if they express disagreement with the group 
decision/line, then this must be discussed with the leader and not raised in public (9.2). To 
further complicate, councillors within Conservative groups are also expected to toe the party 
line when issues have been decided without discussion at a group meeting. Whilst 9.3 is 
advisory, in contrast to the mandatory 9.1 and 9.2, the regulation specifies that it is the ‘group 
leader, in consultation wherever possible with group officers, who shall have discretion to 
decide what the group‟s position shall be‟ (Mabbutt, 2004, p. 8). 
 
The Conservatives also published information packs for prospective and successful local 
candidates. In these documents, produced by the Conservative Councillor’s Association in 
contrast to guidance provided centrally by Labour, advice is given on how councillors can get 
elected and what to do when elected. In the guide for prospective councillors, there is no 
mention of the group as a constraint, yet in the new councillor guide there are explicit 
references to the expected behaviour of successful candidates: 
 
„...if your group is to be effective it is important that you all work together. 
Conservative councillors need to work as a team, recognising the obligation to work 
within the discipline of the Conservative group and, in particular, to vote on the 
group line in policy issues. From time to time, the group will insist that a particular 
policy or line of action be taken by the party.’  
(CCA, 2008, p. 10) 
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Whilst overview and scrutiny is given a technical introduction at the beginning, the guide also 
has a section on ‘How to be an effective backbencher’ which includes a paragraph devoted to 
how to work within a group. It summarises that the councillors should work as a collective for 
the sake of achieving group goals and individual ambitions: 
  
„It is important that your group works together to achieve its collective aims. You will 
get a lot further if you are working with each other, rather than against each other. 
Try to co-ordinate with the group if you intend to [...] speak at a meeting to make sure 
it does not go against something previously said by the group or adversely affect the 
work of another councillor. Don’t forget that what you do also reflects on other 
Conservatives on the council.’ 
(CCA, 2008, p.17) 
 
Thus as far as specific advice on backbencher work is concerned, the Conservatives are more 
explicitly prescriptive than Labour about how to operate as a non-executive. Whilst it is 
evidence of councillor instruction from the local party association, guidance provision does 
not necessarily imply that Conservatives would follow recommendations any more strictly 
than other councillors would follow the prescriptions from their own party. However, the 
regulations provide evidence of instructing councillors of the need to protect goals of the 
party and thus the possible constraints that arise as results of these ambitions. 
 
Liberal Democrat Party Group Cohesion 
Liberal Democrat groups also demonstrate cohesive behaviour in local government as there is 
recognition ‘that collective and cohesive action by their group and currents of local opinion 
are the key to political success‟ (Copus, 1999a, p. 320). Whilst subscribing to political 
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freedom of action in ideological terms, where ‘they react most strongly against an over-
dominant leadership, which is the antithesis to their individualistic and inclusive philosophy 
[making the party] often the most unwieldy of the three party groups (Leach, 2006, p.134), it 
is still the case that Liberal Democrats do operate in the same manner as other groups with 
‘regular meetings to discuss policies, agree on decisions and develop a common line on 
issues‟ (Leach, 2006, p.134). Despite appearing to be potentially some of the least cohesive of 
the groups, especially given studies such as Copus (1999a) which reported the willingness of 
Liberal Democrats to break rank, the levels of the likelihood of dissent are quantitatively 
similar to the other individualists; the Conservative party. Both Copus (1999a) and Leach 
(2006) are careful not to overstate the freedom from constraint for Liberal Democrat 
councillors. As Copus (1999a) argued, the difference between the approaches to cohesion that 
the parties take is easily summarised: 
 
‘...a Labour councillor will openly expound the virtues of loyalty to the group [whilst] 
the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats focus on their perceived freedom from the 
party that enables them to accept, and offer to their group, their loyalty.‟  
(Copus, 1999a, p. 320) 
 
The Association of Liberal Democrat Councillors (ALDC) publishes a wide range of 
materials for the operation of groups. Most notable amongst the publications in relation to 
party cohesion is a document entitled Effective Group Management. The publication provides 
advice about the operation of the group and a copy of model standing orders that should, with 
amendments allowed, be used by groups. In relation to group meetings, the document states 
their purpose to the group as a mechanism to unite councillors on issues: 
 
123 
 
„The purpose of group meetings should usually be to discuss particular issues and 
reach a view on them. [...] Done well they can lead to a better organised and more 
united group, done badly they can make a poor situation worse!‟ 
(ALDC, 2007, p. 1) 
 
The model standing orders also have a section on expectations of group loyalty. The sub-
section heading itself is footnoted with an explanation of why there is even a section on 
loyalty included: 
 
„Some people maintain that Liberal Democracy means there should not be group 
discipline and group lines – this is simply not the case. If we are to operate effectively 
on the council to achieve our aims, there has to be group loyalty and group 
discipline. Every candidate who comes for approval should be asked to agree to these 
standing orders.‟ 
(ALDC, 2007, p.12) 
 
This explanation is unambiguous that loyalty serves a purpose in helping to achieve the goals 
of the groups. With the explicit suggestion that prospective candidates should agree to this 
main point as a matter of course, group loyalty is seen as a core obligation. Whilst there is an 
exclusion for explicit whipping in relation to scrutiny committees, quasi-judicial committees 
et al. within the section on group loyalty, there is a similar ‘sidebar’ regulation, in similarity 
to Labour and Conservative rules, that ‘on policy issues fully discussed and agreed by the 
group, members are asked to support the group‟ (ALDC, 2007, p.11). Those who disagree 
with a policy line taken by the group at a meeting are expected to ‘inform the group leader or 
group whip in advance and asked to refrain from speaking or voting against the group 
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position‟ (ALDC, 2007, p.12). Again, the practice of not whipping members on O&S 
committees is explicitly stated, but as a counterpoint to this, to go against the policy line of 
the group within O&S could be seen to be discouraged.  
 
Beyond the loyalty expectations set down by other parties, the ALDC also expressly wish for 
Liberal Democrats who have chair/spokesperson positions in overview and scrutiny (and 
other positions) to report back to the party in group meetings. The guidance suggests that 
when these people are invited to speak, there should be ‘arrangements for 
questions/statements/speeches by Liberal Democrat group members‟ (ALDC, 2007, p.10). 
This feature of reporting back to the group from scrutiny is then immediately followed by the 
recommendation that the ‘group will ensure that members present a united public face on 
matters of concern to Liberal Democrat policy and principles in so far as may be compatible 
with individual conscience‟ (ALDC, 2007, p.10). 
 
Thus despite being viewed as a party with ideological allowances for only ad-hoc cohesion, 
Copus (2004)
1
 surmises that these types of strict standing orders, which go much further than 
those published by the CCA and Labour, ‘somewhat conflict with the Liberal Democrat‟s 
popular image as community politicians and can compromise councillors [...] by their 
requirements for group loyalty‟ (Copus, 2004, p.134). 
 
The Motivation to Change: The Committee-Delegated Executive 
In order to assess ‘change’ in group behaviour, it is necessary to assess the institutional 
environment which parties inhabited before the introduction of the Act. This system was a 
‘monistic “government by committee” model’ (Wollmann 2004b, p.153), comprised of a 
                                                            
1 On an earlier version of ALDC guidance. 
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number of deliberative assemblies represented by topic-based committees of councillors. With 
each committee containing councillors who would become specialists in policy areas, the 
‘committee-system’ of decision-making was effectively a delegated executive making 
decisions on behalf of the council. One of the strengths of this lack of singularity of 
leadership was the deliberative nature of councillor subject-specialists sat in judgement of 
policy; ‘it is the committee‟s business to introduce and impose the sense of proportion after 
hearing what science has to say‟ (Finer 1933, p. 223) and was ‘admirable institution for 
collective thinking aloud‟ (Gyford 1976, p.50). However, whilst Stewart (2000) ascribed this 
as positive, he considered it could be negative due to the danger of being ‘caught,’ when the 
arrangements could ‘narrow councillor‟s concerns so that they become advocates for the 
services rather than for the local community‟ (Stewart 2000, p. 45). This narrow focus of the 
committee-system led each committee to be an ‘enshrined silo [where the] committee praised 
[their] own successes, guarded their budgets jealously and resisted loss of powers‟ (Coulson, 
Baddeley & Cade 2010, p.5).  
 
Nonetheless, the committee-system with the group as an actor, especially in authorities with a 
majority group, often gave the arrangements a ‘ritualistic type of role [...] as a course of 
action [had] already been decided upon by the majority group, who will have previously 
discussed the agenda in detail and decided it‟s voting strategy‟ (Gyford, Leach & Game 1989, 
p.195). Given that a role of the (majority) party group was to allocate chairpersonships and 
committee members, whether or not with intra-party democracy, the freedom of the 
committee system to deliberate on the best course of action was dependent on how much the 
majority group was willing to give it.   
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The chair role was thus exceptionally important in the operation of the committee-system and 
a chair and senior officer occupied a „position of power [...] seldom placing matters before the 
committee where the outcome [would be] in doubt‟ (Coulson, Baddeley & Cade 2010, p.4). 
Friend & Jessop (1969) noted that the committee chair provided the link between the group, 
the officials and the implementations of decisions: 
 
„By interpreting the climate of opinion in the majority group, the chairman would 
often be able to guide the chief officer towards the submission of recommendations 
which would be politically acceptable, or at the very least to advise him that certain 
unacceptable solutions should be discarded.‟ 
(Friend & Jessop 1969, p.55)  
 
As ways to exclude opposition contributions, chairs could actively circumvent difficulties by 
„dealing with long agendas in just a few minutes [...] moving items to “confidential agenda” 
[and for] controversial matters, a sub-committee of carefully picked members would be 
created‟ (Coulson, Baddeley & Cade 2010, p.5). Young and Rao (1997) referred to the 
complexity of the two-part committee-system (formal and informal) as ‘providing slow, and 
sometimes tortuous, decision-making‟ (1997, p.226) that was exceptionally inefficient.  
Stewart (1990) argued that the informality of the relationships beclouded and added 
complexity to the decision-making of local government: 
 
„Although committees dominate the formal working of the authority [...] councillors' 
decisions may be made more often in party groups than in committees. Leaders and 
chairs exercise an authority beyond the formal structure.‟ 
(Stewart 1990, p.31) 
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In terms of opposition strategy within the committee-system, despite the rarity of ‘debate at 
council meetings [leading to a] changed course of action‟ (Gyford, Leach & Game 1989, 
p.195), opposition groups often used committees to „play to the gallery, reflecting the fact 
that the local press [were] likely to be present‟ (1989, p.195). Generating electoral capital 
through theatrics was becoming more prevalent and there were reports of „flamboyant 
gestures such as seizing the mace or pre-meditated walk-outs‟ (1989, p.195) for opposition 
groups to express disapproval. 
 
Regardless of the inherent problems of the committee-system, each councillor sat on at least 
one decision-making committee and whether their perspective was noted, acted upon or 
dismissed by chairs, there was a public opportunity for decision-making deliberation. Despite 
the possible informality, there was no lesser democratic control of the committee-system than 
the arrangements introduced in the 2000 Act and allowed the removal of the decision-makers 
from control: „if the political party in control on the council failed to deliver, the voters could 
kick them out‟ (Stoker 2004, p.133) regardless of the presence of any political executive. 
 
The Road to Change: Building Dissatisfaction with the Committee-System 
In 1990 the Audit Commission presented a report which argued that the committee-system 
arrangement provided a significant barrier to effective policy-making and inhibited wider 
strategic policy discussions. It was found that roughly fifty-percent of committee meeting 
time was dedicated to either major or minor operational management, such as day-to-day 
problems (1990, p.7) and councillors often spent up to sixty-percent of their time „attending, 
preparing for and travelling to and from committee meetings‟ (1990. p.6) and up to ten-
percent of their time preparing for these meetings in party groups (1990, p.6). The report 
argued that as councillors spent most of their working time and almost half the time of 
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committee meetings dealing with micro-management that could be delegated to officers, they 
effectively had ‘abandon[ed] their representative roles and become apologists for, rather the 
controllers of, whatever the organisation does‟ (1990, p.8).  Understandably the reason why 
the focus of the councillor was squarely on daily operations could have been primarily due to 
the belief that micro-level decisions needed to be taken because ‘the outcome [was] likely to 
have a major effect on electors and their families, […] or they may [have] felt that their 
political values [were] not being expressed in service delivery‟ (1990, p.6). Councillors may 
have also felt that their representative role of working for their constituents required them to 
‘be seen to influence council decisions at the operational level‟ (1990, p.6). 
 
In a 1991 Department of the Environment consultation paper, it was similarly argued that the 
committee-system was not functioning in an efficient way, as decisions not taken by officers 
were either taken by whole councils or a number of committees and ‘this process was often 
time-consuming, cumbersome […] and in practice, the ability of ordinary members [...], to 
influence decision-making [was] likely to be limited‟ (1991, p.10). The paper provided some 
initial observations of what could be changed in local government: 
 
‘[Promoting] more effective, speedy and business-like decision-making, enhancing 
scrutiny of decisions, increasing the interest taken by the public in local government 
and providing scope for councillors to devote more time to their constituency role.‟ 
(1991, p.10) 
 
Amongst the suggestions of what to change was bringing about a political separation of 
powers, citing examples from France, Italy, areas of Germany, Denmark, Sweden and the 
U.S.A (1991, p. 21-26), all of which had split the decision-makers and those who scrutinise 
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decisions-taken. The paper argued that these structures were more efficient than the 
committee-system and considered that an introduction of an executive would bring about 
more streamlined decision-making. Despite being separated from the main concept of a 
requirement of an executive, the consultation suggested that any developing executive 
function would need checks to counter any ‘abuse of power by majority parties‟ (1991, p.11) 
and would therefore require ‘scrutiny committees, modelled on Parliamentary select 
committees, which would be able to review the activities of an executive‟ (1991, p.17). 
Although mentioned, the idea of ‘scrutiny committees’ was not developed as far as the role of 
the executive, however, it was suggested that these committees could require officers and 
executives to give evidence, in order to scrutinise decision-making.  
 
Due to government priorities at the time and the wholly negative reaction from areas of local 
government which greeted the proposals without ‘overwhelming enthusiasm [...] as the 
formal responses of the local authority associations to the consultation paper indicated little 
support for radical change‟ (Stoker, G & Wollmann, H 1992, p.266), the recommendations 
were shelved in order for a joint working party to be set-up. This joint-working party, instead, 
made recommendations to ‘strengthen the role of the councillor and develop effective 
leadership within local authorities by building on existing developments‟ (Young & Rao, 
1997, p. 227). It was not until the subsequent change in central government control that the 
proposals relating to a separation of powers for local government became more concrete. 
 
The Party of Change: Labour’s Agenda for Local Government 
In the consultation paper Modernising Local Government: Local Democracy and Community 
Leadership (DETR, 1998a), the government intended to change political arrangements in 
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local authorities, subject to individual councils choosing the best option for their area. The 
early ideas explained that the roles of councillors would change: 
 
‘Councils will have political and management structures involving cabinet-style 
governance or directly-elected-mayors with executive responsibilities. Whatever 
structures councils will have chosen, the key executive, representational, and scrutiny 
roles of councillors will be readily distinguishable.‟ 
(1998a, p.6) 
 
The paper argued that councillors would often „feel unable to influence events [with an] 
absence of a real detailed knowledge of the needs and aspirations of the people‟ (1998a, p29) 
given that ‘in most councils it is the political groups, meeting behind closed doors, which 
make the big and significant decisions‟ (1998a, p.29). The government’s answer to this 
problem was a somewhat radical solution, given that some authorities had already tried 
‘innovative ways of involving the public in their decisions, [such as] adapting their committee 
structures‟ (1998a, p.29). The paper also reported that because so few people knew who led 
their council or who was responsible for decision-making within local authorities there was a 
need for an executive leadership that the population would have a ‘direct say‟ (1998a, p.30) 
over. The government articulated three motivations for the splitting of powers; ‘greater 
clarity about who is responsible for decisions; greater clarity about who has taken and should 
be held to account for decisions; and sharper scrutiny of those decisions‟ (1998a, p.30). 
Because decision-making was being taken away from the committee structure and full council 
(in its approval role) and placed in the hands of a select few members of the council, the 
government believed that the changes would ‘shake-up and reinvent‟ (1998a, p.30) local 
government because ‘councils would be less able to operate behind closed doors without 
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debate and review‟ (1998a. p.30). Absurdly, the paper did not acknowledge that giving 
decision-making over to small cabinets on one-party, majority-led councils could easily 
perpetuate these closed-door phenomena. 
 
Understandably, given that the separation of powers was meant to be an adhibition
2
 to 
diminish a councillor ‘[feeling] unable to influence events‟ (1998a, p.29), it seemed 
counterintuitive to suggest that removing the decision-making capacity of the majority of 
councillors would improve a councillor’s belief in her/his own efficacy. However, central 
government’s concern with the committee-system could have been more influenced by the 
domination of the group over decision-making rather than any stronger concerns about role 
confusion and micro-management. In interview, one of the ministers responsible for the 
implementation argued that group decision-making was too opaque: 
 
„...decisions were almost invariably reached in group meeting. In a way that made it 
very difficult to pin down responsibility for particular decisions or their 
implementation. It was really unsatisfactory in all sorts of ways and that had to 
change. So I make no apology for, for the process of reform, I think it was necessary.‟ 
(Nick Raynsford MP, former Minister for Local Government, 8
th
 July 2008) 
 
To this end the consultation paper marketed the idea of backbencher scrutiny committees as a 
model that ‘could be less time-consuming, but more high profile, more effective and therefore 
more rewarding‟ (1998a, p.32) rather than as an difficult corollary of the legislation’s aim of 
removing group control. However in interview with the minister responsible for the 
                                                            
2 An affixion as ‘to apply as a remedy, to administer‟ (OED 2010) 
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introduction of the legislation, the strategic role of local authorities would be firmly planted 
within an executive and everything else was indeed a ‘difficult corollary:’ 
 
„I really did feel that you needed a sort of strategic driving force, which was what the 
cabinet system was supposed to bring... but then that meant you were going to have a 
lot of councillors who weren‟t in the cabinet, and you had to give them a role that was 
meaningful…‟  
(Hilary Armstrong MP, former Minister for Local Government, 9
th
 July 2008) 
 
In effect, the government was taking decision-making away from most councillors, however, 
it could be argued that the government was trying to enable members to correct the ‘the 
absence of a real detailed knowledge of the needs and aspirations of the people‟ (1998a, p.29). 
By allowing councillors to look beyond the group as a leviathan over decision-making, the 
separation confronted groups with a dilemma of evidence vs. group. Through the introduction 
of evidence-based scrutiny the dynamics of intra-group relations could change, thus the 
legislation could confront the primacy of the group: 
 
 „...maybe my experience in the north-east was driving some of this but we used to feel 
that some councillors were losing contact with their wards, with their constituents, 
with what was actually going on. Everything went on in the town hall [...] and I 
wanted them to get out of the meeting culture...‟ 
(Hilary Armstrong MP, former Minister for Local Government, 9
th
 July 2008) 
 
Whilst the removal of the group’s dominance was one of the ways to make decision-making 
more transparent, the plans afoot were reminiscent of Gyford’s (1976) concern that those who 
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argue that local government should not be encumbered by party politics are making ‘what is 
essentially a prescriptive statement that there ought not to be politics in local government‟ 
(1976, p.10). 
 
The subsequent Modern Local Government: In Touch with the People (DETR, 1998b) White 
Paper argued that the committee-system led „to inefficient and opaque decision making [and a 
situation where] significant decisions [were] taken behind closed doors by political groups or 
even a small group of key people within the majority group‟ (1998b, p.18). A considerable 
problem highlighted was that people were often confused as to who was really making the 
decisions at a local level; ‘people identify most readily with an individual, yet there is rarely 
any identifiable figure leading the local community‟ (1998b, p.19). On the grounds of these 
two arguments the government advocated a separation of roles for councillors; of executive 
and backbench. The White Paper gave authorities three options
3
 for political management 
arrangements; a cabinet and leader model, a directly-elected mayor and cabinet or a directly-
elected mayor with a council manager, the latter two requiring popular support in a 
referendum. The document argued that each of these would have the following advantages; 
efficiency, transparency and accountability. The new arrangements would be more efficient 
because a small executive could ‘quickly, responsively and accurately meet the needs and 
aspirations of the community‟ (1998b, p.19), the arrangements would also improve 
transparency because ‘it would be clear to the public who is responsible for decisions‟ (1998b, 
p.19), and the changes would also improve accountability because they would ‘enable people 
to measure the executive's actions against the policies on which it was elected‟ (1998b, p.19).  
 
                                                            
3 Excepting small district councils (< 85,000 pop.) and ‘alternative arrangements’ option 
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In 1999, the draft Bill, Local Leadership, Local Choice (DETR, 1999) stated that ‘in all new 
forms of local governance – a council must set up one or more overview and scrutiny 
committee‟ (1999, para 3.15) with ‘the same political balance as the full council [and] the 
same rules for public access as currently apply to committees‟ (1999, para 3.15). The 
committees would be required to „consider and investigate broad policy issues […] consider 
budget plans […] provide advice to the executive […] and review decisions taken by the 
executive and how it is implementing policy‟ (1999, para 3.19). To fulfil these tasks, the paper 
indicated that it would be ‘helpful for some overview and scrutiny committees to be chaired 
by members of its minority parties‟ (1999, para 3.17). As a result of these new committees, 
councils would be ‘able to address cross-cutting issues [and] make a key input to the policy 
development process‟ (1999, para 3.20). The following Local Government Act 2000 put these 
proposals into action and provided the necessary legislation for the executive and scrutiny 
split. Overwhelmingly councils opted for the blended separation of powers that gave the 
authority a cabinet and leader, the nearest possible construction to what had already 
developed in local government, whereas only a small minority of „28 local authorities‟ 
(Stoker, 2004, p. 128) opted to hold referendums to initiate a directly-elected mayoral system, 
most of which subsequently failed to gain popular support leading to only ‘eleven [with] 
support for a mayor‟ (Stoker, 2004, p.128). Large numbers of councillors could have been 
wary of the ‘too many unknown (and conceivably negative) consequences for the members, 
particularly if they did not anticipate being involved in the elected mayor‟s cabinet‟ (Leach, 
2006, p.60). 
 
The subsequent guidance, New Council Constitutions: Guidance to English Authorities 
(DETR, 2000), fleshed out some of the detail of how government expected local overview 
and scrutiny committees to operate. Central to this was the belief that overview and scrutiny 
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was essential to ‘hold decision makers to account‟ (2000, para 3.44) and to do so successfully 
required ‘a change in the way members have traditionally questioned decisions‟ (2000, para 
3.44). The emphasis throughout the guidance was that it should be ‘constructive and not 
merely there either always to oppose the executive or to rubber-stamp the executive‟s 
decisions‟ (2000, para 3.30) and work on ‘cross-cutting [issues] rather than narrow service-
based [issues] about the conduct of local authority‟s business‟ (2000, para 3.21). The 
Secretary of State strongly advised against such activities as using a party whip in relation to 
overview and scrutiny, thus also O&S preparatory group meetings, and reinforced that the 
committees should „seek views from as many communities and interested parties as necessary 
to get a balanced picture of the effects of policy and executive decisions‟ (2000, para 3.40). 
The zeitgeist was that overview and scrutiny was intended to be an evidence-based, rigorous 
new function that looked beyond the typical adversarial politics that often dominated 
authorities. In support of this, the guidance recommended that authorities should strongly 
consider the proposition that committees should be ‘chaired by members outside the majority 
group or by [non-voting] church or parent governor representatives‟ (2000, para 3.30) in 
order that ‘thorough and informed reviews take place‟ (2000, para 3.29). 
 
The Impact of Change: The Consequences of the Legislation 
The introduction of the legislation implied that the behaviour of groups needed to change and 
required a significant shift ‘in political culture and approach for many members‟ (Leach et al. 
2002, p.74). However in subsequent implementation, the O&S function did not necessarily 
evolve into the chimerical vision of the guidance. The House of Commons Transport, Local 
Government and the Regions Select Committee investigated the early impact and found that 
despite being introduced to counteract ‘closed-door’ group decision-making, the new 
structures had seen decisions ‘continue to be made in private and [were] merely [being] 
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“rubber stamped” or justified in public‟ (House of Commons, 2002a, p.13). Evidence 
provided by groups argued that majority party non-executive members were not being as 
thorough in their role as others: 
  
‘Administration group members do not truly see their role as holding the executive to 
account at select committee meetings, rather as one of defending cabinet members, 
decisions and stopping the opposition groups from embarrassing their administration.’ 
 (Essex County Council Labour Group, LGA 35, House of Commons, 2002b) 
 
Other evidence to the committee from the LGA Liberal Democrat group reported that scrutiny 
was often being used ‘as an opportunity to embarrass the administration or to raise issues 
that they can use for political campaigning purposes‟ (2002b) and in some places there was a 
‘fear of retribution [which was] preventing some non-executive members of […] ruling 
groups from carrying out an effective scrutiny role‟ (2002b). Furthermore it was reported that 
one of the reasons that the separation of powers was not working effectively was due to the 
small number of members: 
 
‘Local authorities have far less members than the House of Commons, [...] Personal 
relationships between local authority members are much closer than in the House of 
Commons, making it more uncomfortable for members to challenge the executive.’ 
(House of Commons, 2002b) 
 
Significantly, evidence commented on the availability of opportunities for political debate 
being numerous at central government level (opposition days, debates et al.) meaning that 
politics may, to some extent, be less evident in select committees, whereas in local 
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government, there were limited opportunities for the councillor’s own political expression; 
hence the political may enter the fora in other ways. One of the arenas of holding to account 
the national government was Parliament, whereas in local government, ‘full council’ had not 
been developed in the legislation as a route for ‘holding to account.’  
 
Research published by OPDM soon after the publication of the select committee report, 
reinforced some of the findings relating to the group’s difficult relationship with the new 
executive/scrutiny split. The research found that although there was ‘little obvious evidence of 
a whip being imposed on O&S members for any of the parties‟ (ODPM, 2002, p.74), they 
received comments such as; 
 
‘We don‟t have a whip in scrutiny, but the chief whip attends scrutiny meetings and 
reports back to the group on what people have done.’ 
(OPDM, 2002, p.74) 
 
The ODPM report discovered that during the introduction and development of O&S, two 
distinct roles had been identified; that of policy development and scrutinising the executive. 
Whilst the first of these roles had been judged to be relatively successful, as committees 
meetings were ‘freer and more flexible than [previous] committees‟ (2002, p.75) and didn’t 
require voting procedures, the second of these roles; of holding an executive to account 
proved to be more difficult. The idea of councillors of the same group criticising their own 
colleagues in public had created an accountability impasse, where scrutiny was still occurring 
in a concealed way. Whilst majority party non-executives may have been scrutinising the 
actions of their colleagues ‘with real vigour and robustness‟ (2002, p.76) this was happening 
behind closed doors. Due to this lack of public scrutiny, the Act was not fulfilling its intention 
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to make decision-making transparent as there was still a great ‘temptation to revert to a strict 
adherence to group policy and to group cohesion‟ (2002, p.76). It was summarised that 
members needed to find a balance between ‘open, public deliberation in O&S settings, whilst 
maintaining a clear party identity and cohesive party approach to the conduct of council 
affairs‟ (2002, p.74). 
 
The ELGNCE team, conducting research for ODPM in 2003/2004 discovered that some 
groups were using a whip in relation to overview and scrutiny (ELGNCE 2004, p.50). Thirty-
five percent of respondents also reported that pre-scrutiny party group meetings were held 
before committees (2004, p.50). Party group influence was also affecting the ‘call-in’ 
procedure granted to overview and scrutiny, which was often used relating to ‘the adversarial 
competition between political parties‟ (2004, p.9) and was used to ‘create publicity and make 
political points‟ (2004, p.9). Further to this, in authorities with a large majority, it was found 
that loyalties ‘made the process of challenge to the executive problematic and difficult to 
sustain‟ (2004, p.10). Ashworth (2003a) discovered that ‘group affiliation was evident 
throughout meetings, often from the outset, with many members still choosing to sit and 
operate in [party] groups‟ (2003a, p.20). 
 
However, the research in this area had not focused on some of the supposed successes of 
overview and scrutiny in areas such as policy development, external and health scrutiny. 
There had been examples that demonstrated groups realising the benefits of scrutiny (CfPS 
2004, 2006, 2007). However, intra-party loyalty and inter-party distrust could have stunted 
the development of the function. As Copus (1999) prophesised, councillors may have viewed 
the introduced function ‘at odds’ with their conception of party membership and feared that 
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by disobeying orders it was ‘at best disloyal to the party, and at worst a betrayal of the group 
and the individual's beliefs sustaining his or her party membership‟ (1999, p.320).  
 
Summary 
From the advent of more intense politicisation along with the development of rules regulating 
group cohesion, party groups within authorities demonstrate that they possess and achieve 
goals through appropriate organisation. In similarity to state-level parties, collectivity and 
cohesion have been and continue to be valued by the major parties in local government as 
they are by the parties at a state-level.  In the development of the legislation, there was a clear 
signal from above that decision-making needed to become more transparent and accountable 
and to do so it required fundamental change in the operations of ‘closed-door’ party groups. 
However, early examination of the introduction of political executives had begun to unravel 
the consequences of the legislation. Where central government expected evidence-based 
deliberation and rigorous cross-party review, there were initial indications that councillors 
were experiencing fear of group retribution, rubber-stamping and whipping. Crucially, some 
groups were using overview and scrutiny as a new arena for political competition. The next 
chapter thus assesses the usefulness of the academic literature on the consequences of the 
legislation and seeks to draw out the gaps in the literature which make the understanding of 
the results of the legislation, relating to party groups, unsatisfactory. 
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Chapter Five: O&S Literature Review & Thesis Research Methods 
Quantitative Research into Effects of the Local Government Act 2000 
In the research conducted on the operation of party politics in English local government since 
the introduction of the Act, a small amount of an already minutissimic
1
 literature has focused 
on quantitative studies; with the rest devoted to case study research in early piloting and 
usually highly rated, self-selected, potentially officer-dominated authorities (Cole, 2001, 
Snape & Dobbs, 2003, Sandford, 2006, Hopkins, 2007). One of the largest and most well 
known attempts at a quantitative analysis of the implementation of the act was commissioned 
in the 2002-2005 project: Evaluating Local Governance: New Constitutions and Ethics 
(ELGNCE) a five-year research project, instigated by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.  
 
The project began with an initial 2002 census, which was repeated in 2006, and was 
conducted with ‘all English local authority chief executives, posing questions about the 
organisation of the local constitutions […] and the arrangements for scrutiny’ (2002, p.8). 
Whilst the response rate was high; 75% of English local authorities, the nature of the 
questions within the survey raised serious questions about the validity of the initial research. 
For example, the research asked questions to chief executives about how the new 
arrangements had worked in relation to overview and scrutiny such as ‘are party pre-meetings 
held prior to committees?’ and ‘are decisions subject to party whip?’ (2002, p.88). Whilst 
chief executives would invariably be in contact with the members of an authority, it is not 
their role to be involved in the operation or organisation of groups, thus asking questions 
about whether group meetings took place before overview and scrutiny committee meetings 
may have been ineffectual. The results from the 2002 census showed that over 16% did not 
know whether group meetings were held. Further to this, asking chief executives about groups 
                                                            
1 Meaning ‘extremely minute; tiny’ (OED 2010) 
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applying a whip to issues in overview and scrutiny was clearly only applicable to a small 
number of chief executives who were either allowed into group meetings, which are usually 
restricted to group members or party members alone, or received ad hoc information from 
attendees or leaders, who would be under no obligation to divulge such information. In 
relation to whipping, the results from the 2002 census showed that 30% of chief executives 
did not know whether whipping took place in overview and scrutiny. To then conclude that 
‘scrutiny […] appears too dominated by party politics […] and in one in ten councils the 
practice of whipping in scrutiny committees was openly admitted’ (2002, p.70) on the basis of 
chief executives’ partial information or assumptions seemed hasty and myopic. 
 
In the subsequent sample survey conducted by ELGNCE both in 2003 and 2005, whilst 
questions were more appropriately directed towards members rather than chief executives, a 
more serious issue of question design, equally problematic in the census, made eliciting any 
firm conclusions from the research difficult. For example, in the sample survey the following 
question was used; ‘35a Are party meetings held prior to overview and scrutiny committees?’ 
(2006, p.90). In this instance, whilst it is useful to understand whether groups are gathering 
before overview and scrutiny, the question on its own does not press for what purpose the 
meetings are held. In any given response, a member may have reported a pre-O&S group 
meeting but this may have been because it was a general meeting, a way to remind members 
what is on the agenda or as an arena to discuss other business. Rather than eliciting the answer 
that the research was looking for; that pre-O&S group meetings may be taking place to cajole 
a consensus on an item, the question merely asks whether the party had met prior to the 
meeting with no consideration for content.  
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In the subsequent question, the sample survey asks respondents the following ‘35b If so, are 
party whips applied?’ (2006, p.91). In this case, the questionnaire design had made this 
question conditional on a positive answer in the previous question which meant that the 
research took the stance that if there were no group meetings there could be no whipping. 
Whilst arguably the majority of whipping of O&S could take place in pre-O&S group 
meetings, whipping and group meetings are independent incidences and the whipping of 
members does not necessarily entail the pre-requisite of a group meeting before a committee. 
Interestingly, the questioning in the census prior and subsequent to the sample surveys did not 
assume that whipping was conditional on the occurrence of group meetings.  
 
More significantly for the research, the concept of whipping in both the sample and census 
survey was defined in a very narrow way, especially given the conclusions in the research. 
For example, whipping may be mostly thought of in a Westminster-sense where members are 
instructed to vote in a certain way by a whip and there are various levels of seriousness with 
which to take the instruction; such as the mandatory three-line-whip. Whilst whipping can be 
thought of as an explicit instruction, as at Westminster, there is also an implicit whip, where 
members are simply expected to fall in line with instructions rather than being given an 
ultimatum to do so. Taking a consensus in a pre-O&S group meeting and agreeing to stick to 
this within the public sphere of the committee is a form of implicit, rather than explicit, whip 
and the rudimentary classification of a ‘whip’ could not have given a clear picture of group 
involvement within O&S.  
 
In combination with the census and sample quantitative research, the ELGNCE project also 
undertook supplementary qualitative research in the form of groups of case studies which 
more readily influenced the conclusions in their final evaluation report (ELGNCE, 2007). Yet 
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in conclusions throughout the project,
2
 far more emphasis was put on the results of questions 
where both the design and methods used were fundamentally flawed. As an attempt at a 
longitudinal continuation of the research, the Centre for Public Scrutiny (Ewbank, 2007), an 
advocate of overview and scrutiny, undertook a small scale replication of some of the 
quantitative research used within the ELGNCE project. Ewbank (2007) found that whilst the 
nominal results remained quite similar to that which was found three years previous, 
councillors responding to the study had indeed misunderstood the nature of some questions. 
However in the replication of the ELGNCE research, the survey provided qualitative probes 
for respondents to explain their answers and thus discover how respondents were interpreting 
the questions. One notable flaw was the respondents’ response to the replicated ELGNCE 
question of ‘Are party meetings held prior to overview and scrutiny committees, and are party 
whips applied?’ (2004, p.113). Whilst some councillors may have answered on behalf of their 
own party, a significant number of respondents answered the question positively on behalf of 
other parties – ‘I believe the [X] do. I imagine that they do this in order to decide the issues in 
advance’ (Ewbank, 2007, p.5), ‘I suspect that this may happen but I have no direct evidence’ 
(Ewbank, 2007, p.5) or ‘only the majority party apply whips. Reasons include saving face [or] 
preventing items getting to scrutiny’ (Ewbank, 2007, p.6). Whilst the numbers of reported 
comments indicating the respondent had answered (or estimated) on behalf of their authority 
rather than on the basis of their own party’s behaviour may not have constituted all of the 
responses generated, it was clear that the ELGNCE and thus the replication questions were 
not generating accurate responses to match their original intention. This error of asking about 
behaviour in local authorities and receiving responses on behalf of a whole council meant the 
overbroad research undertaken by ELGNCE and CfPS had a limited application when 
answering how parties had responded to the change. 
                                                            
2 In reports and issue papers 
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A more systematic quantitative examination of the group’s relationship with overview and 
scrutiny was provided by Ashworth’s (2003b) study of Welsh authorities subject to the same 
legislation. Using a five-point framework looking at ‘successful scrutiny’ (2003b, p.6) rather 
than the party relationship alone, the presence of ‘one-party dominance’ (2003b, p.6) in the 
operation of the O&S function was understandably seen to have a negative impact on the 
possibility of attaining the legislation’s intention. Variables that made up the party 
relationship category included chairs being appointed from the opposition, the system of 
nominating chairs of the O&S committees, the balance and composition of each committee, 
the utilisation of a whip to control members and the involvement of those outside the 
authority (2003b, p.6, Table 1).  
 
Questions relating to the variables appeared more clearly defined than the ELGNCE study; 
including a thorough examination of how chairs and members of O&S were appointed. For 
example, results showed that for both members and chairpersonships, almost three-quarters 
were appointed by their own party group (2003b, p.11). It was also clear from the research 
that almost all appointments to O&S in Wales were through the means of the group or its 
leadership. Other questions about the group’s relationship with O&S were considerably 
vaguer and open to interpretation; for example, Ashworth (2003b) echoes the lack of 
specificity of the ELGNCE research by asking ‘Is the party whip applied to scrutiny 
operations?’ (2003b, p.11), again failing to acknowledge the complexity of the construction 
of whipping as a term and not personalising the question to the respondent’s own party. 
Another less important question used to evaluate one-party dominance was asking 
respondents whether ‘non-councillors [had] been appointed to scrutiny committees’ (2003b, 
p.11) which as a question within the variable has, perhaps, less to do with the group and more 
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to do with officer involvement in the function. However, the quantitative work conducted 
with Welsh local authorities by Ashworth was more systematic than that of ELGNCE and the 
formulation of a larger variable of party domination broken down into sub-questions was a 
more appropriate approach.  
 
Qualitative Research into Effects of the Local Government Act 2000 
The research already undertaken on O&S since the Act has been primarily based around a 
limited number of case studies. Whilst this is certainly not an inherently unsatisfactory route 
to take; the focus of research has been almost exclusively on a small number of cases. The 
research undertaken for this thesis involves in-depth case studies as part of a mixed methods 
approach and it is necessary to look at the conduct of these examples to understand the 
explanatory value and limits of this method of research. 
 
One of the first case study approaches to the impact of the legislation was conducted by Cole 
(2001) who selected Devon County as the focus of the research. The case preference was an 
information-oriented selection based on the idea that Devon ‘had an obvious commitment to 
the modernising agenda’ (2001, p.20) and ‘established a reputation as an innovative 
authority [...] with a reputation for openness’ (2001, p.20). In this sense, Devon was a 
strategic choice of a critical case where the purpose was ‘to see whether scrutiny could 
become effective given favourable circumstances’ (2001, p.20). This is the case study 
selection idea that ‘if [the hypothesis] is not valid in this case, then it applies to no cases’ 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.230). The practical element of the case study involved interviewing 52 out 
of the 54 councillors of the council using semi-structured interviews relating to five groups of 
questioning and whether they supported the changes. These questioning groups included: 
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‘...the decision-making process, the availability of information about the council, the 
impact and operation of the scrutiny committees and the proposition that the changes 
gave members more time to represent their electoral division.’ 
(2001, p.25) 
 
The conclusions of the study were confirmatory of hypotheses about the result of the 
separation of powers such as the strength of the party group as an impediment to effective 
scrutiny, information not being easily accessible, councillors feeling excluded from the 
decision-making process, the split between scrutiny and policy overview being problematic 
and a fewer opportunities for councillors to represent their constituents. 
 
However, there are some issues with this single-case study format and about how it reached 
its conclusions. Firstly, the basis of selecting a case as a ‘critical case’ was somewhat flawed 
when Devon was chosen as one of the most likely to succeed authorities on the basis of the 
somewhat arbitrary, mostly officer-focused, judgements of an external agency. With hindsight, 
some authorities around the country did make scrutiny ‘succeed’ and Devon had clearly not 
managed to do so based on this evidence; thus drawing out any conclusions about the 
situations in other authorities would be invalid. A more elementary point would be that local 
government and its functions are highly variegated and a study of a county council may not 
have much explanatory value in respect to scrutiny’s success at other authorities. Secondly, 
the specific questioning groups used in the semi-structured interviews were somewhat skewed 
to the aims of the researcher. For example, the questioning groups may have led councillors, 
who were probably hostile to the changes, to acquiesce with the interviewer about the flaws. 
The fundamental problem was that the question groups were based on identifiable problems 
which might have then confirmed their existence rather than exploring the details of their 
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operation. A more thorough approach would have required a less structured interview process 
based on actual events, in order that councillors did not serve as mere confirmation of 
estimations. The third issue with this case study is that the researcher attempts to classify 
respondents as either ‘supporters, sceptics and opponents’ (2001, p.25) of change. Whilst 
typologies are helpful in some instances, the classificatory system adopted here seems to add 
nothing to the research; where the dominant majority group supported the changes and the 
opposition opposed. Thus using a classificatory system instead of the clearer explanation was 
unnecessary. 
 
Whilst the Cole (2001) study wasn’t intended to develop theory but simply test prior 
hypotheses in an early adopting authority, an investigation conducted by Sandford (2006) 
took a comparative approach of the operation of O&S across three English county councils.  
The research aimed to accomplish ‘a qualitative understanding of the nature of the scrutiny 
process across different local authorities’ (2006, 935). Whilst part of a wider study of nine 
local authorities, the first major problem with the qualitative research was the method of case 
selection. The Sandford (2006) research sent letters to each English authority to ask whether 
they would be willing to ‘participate in the research (at no financial cost to them)’ (2006, p. 
935). Given that this method of case selection results in self-selection, there would have been 
a high probability that the cases chosen would have officers or members who were very 
interested in the development of scrutiny or had taken a ‘strong lead in establishing [the] 
political management structures’ (2006, p.935). Though, understandably, Sandford 
acknowledged that willingness was based on self-selectors having an interest ‘in creative 
thinking [...] to make the scrutiny function work well’ (2006, p.935). Thus despite the interest 
shown towards the research, the authorities could either have been successful in the 
implementation of O&S or required additional guidance with no associated cost. Either way, 
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the respective officers and members will have been particularly invested in improving 
scrutiny in order to accept the invitation.  
 
From a research design perspective, self-selection is not an adequate strategy for 
incorporating case studies into a research project. It would have been more appropriate to 
select cases by either, at the very worst, a random / stratified sample or, at best, based on 
information known about potential cases. Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that information-orientated 
selection results in a deeper insight than that of random or stratified samples as; 
 
‘...atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information because they activate more 
actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studies. [...] From both an 
understanding-orientated and an action-orientated perspective, it is often more 
important to clarify the deeper causes behind a given problem [...] than describing 
symptoms of the problem and how frequently they occur.’ 
(2006, p.229) 
 
Another concern with the research was that the researchers focused on interviewing officers 
and members that were suggested to them by the ‘lead scrutiny officer’ (2006, p.935). Whilst 
the use of snowball sampling is useful in difficult research arenas such as intravenous drug 
users or attendees at a political protest where respondents are unknown, the use of snowball 
sampling in authorities, where the positions of employees and members are known or 
obtainable, is perhaps less useful. The result of sampling in this way is that respondents could 
give a certain depiction of the work, focusing on key individuals who could verify and 
provide confirmatory responses. Erickson (1979) argues that snowball sampling in this way 
can lead to ‘bias [...] introduced through the demands that the snowball procedure makes on 
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the respondents’ (1979, p.28) which in this case could reflect a need for the officer to provide 
information on suitable respondents who would agree about the situation in the authority. 
From a wider perspective of what the research aimed to attain, the research focuses on three 
of the case studies; Kent, Durham and Cornwall taken from nine case studies. Given that the 
research intention was to assess the scrutiny function ‘across different local authorities’ (2006, 
935), it seems unusual for the researcher to then focus only on three county councils, which, 
as upper-tier organisations, are a small fraction of local government. 
 
More significantly, the content of the research, assessing how the ‘cultures’ shaped the 
function in authorities, is separated into topics: structures, officer support, call-ins and asking 
questions. Whilst these topics would certainly gain an insight as to how the culture of local 
government had affected O&S, they are limited in scope. For example, additional relevant 
topics could have included the setting of the O&S work programme, the nomination of 
positions in the function, the number of meetings, party group meetings and the influence of 
O&S on the work of the authority. The limited scope may have led the researcher to support 
other research by concluding that ‘scrutiny had both maintained important elements of the old 
committee system [...] and [had] evolved dialectically with the local political culture’ (2006, 
p.941) on the basis of limited case study research. 
 
One of the more in-depth studies of the topic and the antithetical research to this project was 
conducted by Hopkins (2007), in a mainly qualitative doctoral research project on how 
majority party groups affect O&S (rather than the aim of this project, which is assessing the 
impact of O&S on parties.). The case-study selection was relatively unproblematic apart from 
its geographic scope (which was restricted by the funding) but which also led the researcher to 
interview members within the same authority at which the researcher was employed. Whilst 
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this made the research process much easier in practice, the researcher acknowledged the 
difficulties associated with a council officer conducting a study with members of the same 
authority: 
 
‘...the elected members might be wary of participating [...] since someone whom they 
work alongside within [O&S] would then know their views on the process.’  
(2007, p. 109) 
 
However this problem was only a difficulty in one case study of a wider investigation. More 
concerning was the method with which respondents were selected for interviewing. Despite 
the phenomenological approach to the research and the aim to ‘capture the process of 
interpretation’ (2007, p.84), the element of selecting cases to interview on the principle that 
they would give ‘rich information’ (2007, p.112) and ‘hold strong opinions’ (2007, p.122) 
could have undermined the research. For example, members were only selected to take part 
on the basis of likelihood that they would provide strong opinions about the topic, yet without 
pre-interviewing the respondents beforehand it is difficult to claim that those without alleged 
‘strong opinions’ do not actually have ‘strong opinions’ on the topic and vice versa. Thus 
selection could focus on vocal dissenters or respondents who more regularly express their 
views. Worse still, the inherent snowballing of the sample when potentially discovering who 
had strong opinions could lead to a ‘bias towards more cooperative subjects’ (Erickson, 1979, 
p. 283) which would have a negative impact on the roundedness of the data. 
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Research Project: A Mixed-Methods Approach 
Within this empirical work, solely relying on quantitative research or exclusively by means of 
qualitative work would not have given a complete understanding of the set of problems under 
consideration, especially in such an extensive piece of research. In combining the two 
approaches in mixed-methods research, entirely compatible with a rational-choice 
institutionalist approach, this thesis aims to gather as much data as feasibly achievable to 
confidently give representative conclusions about group behaviour (through quantitative work) 
and models of the possible behaviour of groups (through quantitative and qualitative work.) 
Through this use of methodological triangulation or ‘the use of different data collection 
strategies using Quan and Qual sources in the same study’ (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, 
p.237), the research aims to combine the benefits of both approaches which gives the benefit 
of more clarity about the thesis research questions.  
 
Quantitative research into the impact of O&S on the Party Group 
Unlike the studies previously conducted, this research focuses on the reaction of the group 
given the new institutional consideration of overview and scrutiny. Hypothesising that 
variables relating to organisational complexity, the centralisation of power and the 
distribution of power will have changed in a certain direction as a result of the Local 
Government Act 2000; it is necessary to quantitatively examine whether this has been the 
case. Through means of a sample survey of party councillors involved in overview and 
scrutiny, easily measured variables such as the frequency of group meetings, the frequency of 
control over councillor communication and occurrences of punitive discipline can be 
discovered. 
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Questionnaire Design: Variable-Orientated Approach 
One of the most important aspects of this research was the design of the quantitative survey 
research to be undertaken. Without well-constructed, relevant questioning in the questionnaire 
format, the results obtained, regardless of the response rate or representativeness of the 
sample, could have been immaterial for the wider research into group behaviour since the 
separation of powers. The questions within the councillor survey related to the amended 
selection of Harmel, Janda, Tan & Yeo’s (1995) variables of party change which have been 
previously highlighted as the focus of this research. Of these, the survey examined party 
group meetings, preclusory discipline, the cohibition of individual councillor communication, 
the administration of castigative discipline and the allocation of positions. The variables 
relating to the pervasiveness of the organisations and the centralisation of policy formulation 
were not suited to quantitative analysis in this way. Each of these variables relate to sets of 
questions within the survey; though these sets do not run concurrently within the 
questionnaire and some questions straddle more than one variable. The final survey sent to 
councillors is presented as APPENDIX A. 
 
V1: Local party group meetings 
There were two questions within the questionnaire associated with this variable. The first, 
Q3.1, asked respondents whether they had attended group meetings which exclusively dealt 
with agendas of forthcoming overview and scrutiny committee meetings. Respondents chose 
from ordinal levels from ‘all of the time’ to ‘on one occasion’ or answered in the negative 
‘never.’ This question sought to assess the frequency of group meetings relating specifically 
to overview and scrutiny committees; regardless of whether they were held immediately prior 
to committees. 
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Q3.2 asked respondents if any regular group meetings devoted a portion of time to the agenda 
of subsequent overview and scrutiny committees. This question gave respondents a number of 
time allocations from ‘up to 5 minutes’ to ‘up to about an hour and over’ reflecting how long 
the group spoke about upcoming O&S agendas. The question sought to assess amounts of 
organisational focus there was prior to scrutiny committees (i.e. potentially gaining a group 
consensus and / or subsequently agreeing a party line) in respect to how the groups 
approached overview and scrutiny. 
 
The third question, a routed / branch question, relating to this variable was Q4.1 which asked 
respondents, who had served before the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000, 
whether they had experienced more or fewer group meetings since the introduction. This 
question sought to discover whether party groups had intensified or relaxed the number of 
meetings pre- and post- the Act.  
 
V4: Preclusory Discipline  
 Q3.3 & Q.3.4 asked respondents if they had ever received informal pressure (Q3.3) from 
their group leader(s) or party whips about things under consideration by O&S committees or 
an explicit whip (Q3.4) about issues under consideration. Respondents chose from ordinal 
levels as in Q3.1 or answered in the negative. These questions sought to split the previously 
monolithic conception of whipping (ELGNCE 2002, 2006, 2007 and Ashworth 2003) into 
two separate categories; that of informal pressure, as evidence of implicit whipping and 
definite explicit whipping. 
 
Branch questions (Q4.4a) and (Q4.4b) offered respondents a chance to judge the 
organisational control that the party group had had over its members under both the 
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committee system and the newer political arrangements. The question offered a Likert scale 
of agreement from 1 (meaning absolutely no control) through to 7 (meaning absolute 
complete control.) The reason for a seven point scale was firstly, to increase the amount of 
cognitive effort required in answering and secondly, to provide a scale with sufficient options; 
as previous research has showed that ‘where a multi scale with more response options was 
administered, respondents did use more response options’ (Dawes, 2007, p.75). 
 
V5: Cohibition of individual councillor communication 
Q3.5 asked respondents if they had ever been briefed by their group about conduct in O&S 
committees. The options included different occasions in a closed question format such as ‘Yes, 
when the system was first introduced’ or ‘Yes, when elections were due’ or ‘No, never’ with 
an open response for specifying another occasion. This question sought to examine the 
possibility of any group controls over O&S in relation to various points in time, rather than as 
a continuous expression of a party group controlling communication (e.g. constant whipping). 
For example, the group may have briefed candidates about O&S and the party’s own 
expectations of behaviour within the function and then this issue would have been dealt with 
and would not have needed to be broached again. 
 
Another set of questions dealt with the relationship between the group and councillor 
communication; relating specifically to whether councillors criticised decisions made by their 
party group in a public sphere (Q3.7) and private sphere (Q3.8). Whilst criticising decisions 
made by the group within the confines of the group (Q3.8) is less significant to this study, the 
question provided a comparator to whether councillors criticised group decisions in a public 
sphere (Q3.7). By contrasting the difference, one could establish whether restraint was used in 
public.  
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The branch question relating to this variable (Q4.2) asked respondents, who had served both 
before and after the Act, whether they had felt more or less comfortable in criticising their 
own party leadership in public since the legislation’s introduction. This question sought to 
ascertain whether members who had served as a councillor before the Act had noticed any 
change in the tolerance of the group relating to how, and if, councillors criticised their own 
party in public. 
 
V6: Administration of Castigative Discipline 
It was important to quantitatively measure the occurrence of the administration of castigative 
discipline with individual councillors; used in relation to speaking in public and overview and 
scrutiny conditions. Q3.6 asked respondents whether they had ever been disciplined as a 
result of their actions in O&S committees. The response set was closed-ended and gave 
respondents a number of options of when this might have happened to them; such as ‘Yes, 
when the subject was controversial’ or ‘Yes, when the press / public were going to be there’ in 
addition to ‘No, never.’ The question also gave respondents a chance to elaborate if they could 
not choose an appropriate answer. The subsequent branch question, Q3.61, asked respondents 
who had experienced discipline in Q3.6 what was the nature and extent of the party discipline; 
again using a series of closed-ended responses which covered the possibilities. Responses 
offered for Q3.61 were staged by level of severity and included options such as ‘Received an 
informal warning from the party’ or ‘Removed from an appointment’ or ‘None of these 
options.’ Q3.61 was replicated in Q3.71 which asked what type of castigative discipline had 
been used in response to general public criticism (not just within overview and scrutiny) 
which had been aired by respondents in Q3.7 (see previous variable). 
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The branch question Q4.3, for respondents who had served before the Act, asked whether 
they believed there had been more or less (castigative) discipline used to control members of 
their party. This question sought to discover the respondent’s relative calculations of 
castigative discipline used by their own party in their authority both post- and pre- the Act.  
 
V7: Allocation of Positions 
Questions about the allocation of positions in overview and scrutiny formed section two of the 
questionnaire. Q2.1, Q2.2 and Q2.3 asked respondents how many O&S committees they 
personally sat on, how many of these were chaired by the majority party and how many of 
these were chaired by the opposition. This group of questions aimed to assess the proportion 
of committee chairpersonships that were taken by majority parties alone in comparison to 
opposition parties. The second set of questions asked whether respondents were chairs or 
vice-chairs of their committees (Q2.4) and if so, how they achieved that position (Q2.5). 
These questions sought to assess how groups influenced the helms of the overview O&S 
committees; whether by nominating chairs from their party alone, from full council or by 
committee.  
 
Natural Loyalty 
The final section of the survey along with two questions in section three were designed to be 
very distinct from the rest of the survey and gave six different hypothetical statements in the 
form of quotations to ascertain the natural loyalty inherent within the blended separation of 
powers to provide confirmation that groups might have needed to act. One statement 
corresponded to the legislation’s intention and the other five statements related to Strøm’s 
(1990) policy, office or votes trade-off and asked the respondent whether they agreed or 
disagreed with each course of action using a Likert-scale of agreement beneath each. The 
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question offered a scale of agreement from 1 (meaning the respondent completely disagrees) 
through to 7 (meaning the respondent completely agrees.)  
 
Whilst it was difficult to accurately portray the motivation for each of Strøm’s goals and that 
of the legislation’s intention in a single hypothetical councillor action, the statements in these 
questions related to a simplified situation, purposely exaggerated with extremes for clarity, 
which corresponded to each goal or motivation. For example, Q5.11 indicated Strøm’s vote-
seeking goal in a local government setting:  
 
‘If there is a problem in my ward that has been caused by a decision made by my own 
party, I would contact my group leader(s) to express my serious concern and try and 
work out a solution. There’s no point giving the opposition ammunition by opening up 
such a simple thing to wider debate!’ 
 
The example above highlighted a councillor’s proactive role of internalising of issues that 
could be effectively dealt with by officers or the council as a whole. The concept that the 
councillor would turn towards the group when faced with a problem for fear of future 
electoral competition indicated that the councillor would have acted in a vote-seeking or vote-
maximising manner. In this manner, the research aimed to assess how relevant Strøm’s 
national party theory could be to local groups. Q5.12 gave a statement relating to the 
legislation’s intention of more accountable local government, willing to work cross-party to 
achieve scrutiny of decisions and falling outside the scope of Strøm’s party goal trade-offs: 
 
‘If one of my constituents contacted me about a problem that they had encountered 
and it seemed like a sensible topic for an overview and scrutiny investigation, I would 
try and raise the item in overview and scrutiny first rather than taking it to my party.’  
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This question sought to commit respondents to either agree or disagree on one of the 
fundamental intentions behind the Act; of removing the party group as a leviathanesque 
decision-maker. The hypothetical situation given in Q5.12 was an example of how central 
government had envisaged the implementation of the legislation. Q5.13 and Q5.14 dealt with 
further hypothetical situations for councillors which directly related to Strøm’s policy-seeking 
goal and office-seeking goal respectively. 
 
Q3.9 and Q3.10 gave two similar hypothetical situation statements relating to ‘concerns’ 
rather than intended actions. Q3.9 specifically related to the respondent being concerned 
about censorship: 
 
‘I would be concerned about the consequences of criticising my own party in public; 
in relation to my position within my local party group.’ 
 
This question examined the concern for careerist self-censorship and sought to understand 
the motivations behind the reluctance to criticise group decisions in public. Q3.10 similarly 
sought to understand whether respondents were sufficiently concerned to prevent them from 
criticising their party for the reason of vote-maintenance at elections. Q3.9 and Q3.10 also 
served as confirmation of respondent reluctance to operate in public without any regard for 
the group. 
 
Questionnaire Screening: Councillor Profiles 
The first section of the survey dealt with the profiles of individual councillors, their party 
(Q1.3), their type of council (Q1.2), the political balance of their authority (Q1.8) and the 
context of their party group with this (Q1.5, Q1.6). The first section gave respondents an 
opportunity to correct any mistakes in sample collection, subsequently self-screen out of the 
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research and provide the independent variables for statistical testing. Due to the five month 
length of the survey research process, councillor profiles inevitably changed and the inclusion 
of prefatory screening questions enabled the research to be updated with councillor 
information that could otherwise have jeopardised the quality of the survey responses. 
 
Questionnaire Methods 
The sampling frame for the survey used in this research included councillors in English 
authorities, operating under the cabinet and leader model or alternative arrangements, who 
were members of at least one overview and scrutiny committee at the time the sample was 
constituted. There were requirements that the population from which the sample would be 
selected should only include elected members who represented one of the three main parties 
(Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat) for the sake of substantive comparative analysis 
and a further requirement that they should not be group leaders or whips
3
 who principally 
made the decisions that the questionnaire sought to discover. The clear definitions of within 
and outside the sampling frame is given in Table 5.1 below. 
 
                                                            
3 Whilst it was the initial intention to screen out party group whips from the study, public information on these 
positions was patchy (due to either informality or being intentionally hidden) and was almost impossible to do in 
an effective way. Group whips are typically subject to the discretion and control of party group leadership(s) – 
thus their inclusion in the sample, however low the number, would not be a problem. 
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At the time of the analysis, a number of new local authorities had been created and a more 
substantial number dismantled as a result of reorganisation. As a result of this, these fifty-
three authorities were removed from the sampling frame due to their recent creation or demise. 
Further exceptions to the frame included two atypical authorities (City of London and Isles of 
Scilly) whose activity or scope fell out of the parameters needed to conduct survey research. 
The only other authorities removed from the sampling frame were those ten
4
 that opted for the 
directly-elected mayor option as offered by legislation. The removal of these mayoral councils 
reflected the unfeasibility of comparative analysis due to the dominance of the cabinet and 
leader model. 
 
Survey Sample & Administration 
From the remaining 332 English local authorities in the sampling frame, a representative 
twenty-percent sample was taken using stratified random sampling in order to purposely 
weight the sample according to populations of English government regions; leaving 67 
authorities in the survey sample as outlined in the table below. This weighting according to 
population of government region combined with a high 20% sample of English local 
                                                            
4 Previously eleven authorities had opted for this arrangement. 
Eligible Councillors  
(Within the sample) 
Ineligible / Screened Councillors  
(Outside Sample) 
Member of at least one overview 
and scrutiny committee 
Member of no overview and scrutiny 
committees 
Member of the Conservative, 
Labour or Liberal Democrat Party 
Member of Small Parties, 
Independents and Resident’s 
Associations 
Not a member of a governing 
cabinet (automatic from first 
characteristic) 
A member of a governing cabinet 
Not a party group leader (or 
deputy) 
A party group leader (or deputy) 
 Table 5.1: Sampling frame eligibility across English local authorities. 
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authorities enabled the sample to be more representative of all experiences across English 
councils; without which the sample would have disproportionately been balanced in favour of 
lower-tier authorities. 
 
 
 
 
The questionnaire was paper-based and delivered via the post primarily due to the relative age 
of respondents in comparison to the rest of the population. Recent research discovered that the 
‘average age of councillors in England is 58.3 years, which is itself a significant increase 
since ten years ago when it was 55.4’ (Councillors Commission, 2007), thus postal surveys 
were used to maximise representativeness and also ensure those without access to the internet 
in rural areas were able to access the research. Whilst the survey was sent via post to 
councillors, an option was given for self-completion on an internet-based questionnaire. This 
multi- return approach proved useful for those unwilling to expend the extra effort of 
returning surveys and enabled automatically generated emails to provide immediate response-
rate increases. Further to these two methods, in order to broaden access to the survey for those 
Local 
Government 
Region 
Population 
as % 
Weighted 
Requirement of 
Local Auths. 
South East of 
England 16% 11 
London 15% 10 
North West 
England 14% 9 
East of England 11% 7 
West Midlands 11% 7 
Yorkshire & the 
Humber 10% 7 
South West 10% 7 
East Midlands 8% 6 
North East 5% 3 
England 100% 67 
 Table 5.2: Sample Weights for the Survey 
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with physical difficulties, the research offered respondents an opportunity to conduct their 
survey responses over the telephone, though no respondents had need for this option. 
 
Response Rate 
1684 councillors were eligible to take part, 871 of which responded to the survey, giving an 
extremely high 51.72% response rate despite the context of relatively low returns from 
councillor postal surveys (Ashworth 2003b: 37%). The principal explanation for the unusually 
high response rate was that the questionnaires were given a series of unique reference 
numbers (URNs) to document the progress of completed scripts. Each survey had an URN 
attached; of which the first six digits expressed a council (e.g. 101566 - Chesterfield) and the 
latter two represented the councillor (e.g. 101566/12). On return, either via the post or online, 
the tracking numbers then allowed the removal of the councillor from reminders via post and 
email. Thus non-respondents were easily distinguishable and followed up on an individual 
basis. The method ensured that previous respondents were not given superfluous contact as an 
externality of chasing up non-respondents and also enabled emails to be sent out requesting 
action.  
 
Qualitative research into the impact of O&S on the Party Group 
This research project is specifically about the impact of the separation of powers on the party 
group in English local government and is thus is markedly different from the function-based 
qualitative approaches seen above. Whilst researching the success or failure of the overview 
and scrutiny function has been the primary aim of most studies undertaken in the field thus far, 
this project had the more difficult aim of assessing possible changes to the approaches of 
party groups.  
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Hypothesising that groups will have changed their approach to business, it was crucial to 
supplement the quantitative research reporting on technical considerations, such as group 
meetings, frequency of types of whipping and preclusory / castigative discipline, with a more 
complementary (and confirmatory) approach by understanding how these technical aspects 
exist and how they were given context. Moreover, two of Harmel, Janda, Tan & Yeo’s (1995) 
variables of party change related to practically unquantifiable characteristics of the group 
which needed some form of exploratory investigation. The variable of ‘pervasiveness of 
organisation’ referred to a group’s level of presence in various arenas and the variable of 
‘centralisation of policy formulation’ referred to the amount of discretion given over to 
individual councillors in decision-making. Both of these variables did not lend themselves to 
quantitative analysis, yet required assessment. 
 
Case Study Approach & Design 
The most practical method of qualitative research of the behaviour of groups would be the 
case study. The benefit of a small-N case study approach is that the results of the quantitative 
work can be explored much further. The idea that quantitative research can give broad 
extrapolative theories is misguided without exploring the context of practical application: 
  
‘Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs. 
Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is, therefore, more valuable than the vain 
search for predictive theories and universals.’ 
 (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.224) 
 
Given that the quantitative research in this project was firmly, but purposively, separated into 
classificatory variables which have previously been used to analyse the behaviour of groups, 
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the answers to the research questions are rooted into these blocks and ‘almost the entire 
dialogue of ideas and evidence occurs through variables’ (1992, p.225). To fully understand 
the issues at stake, it was crucial to appreciate the circumstances of how variables were 
applied on the ground: ‘the most advanced form of understanding is achieved when 
researchers place themselves within the context being studied’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.236). 
 
Methods of Case Selection 
Whereas previous case studies in this area have focused on critical cases (Cole, 2001), non-
random self-selection (Sandford, 2006) and geographic and funding convenience selection 
(Hopkins, 2007), the case studies in this project aimed to assess the fundamental research 
questions about the impact of the separation of powers on groups along with an identification 
and explanation of the information unobtainable in survey research. Given the unit of analysis 
under observation (the party group), the three largest English parties that possessed sufficient 
numbers of councillors to be quantitatively researched made the identification of cases for 
examination much easier. For example, a single-case study, whilst potentially providing a 
compelling narrative, would not fulfil the ambition of exploring how each major political 
party has responded to the institutional environment. Due to the fact that each party in one 
authority would be in operating in one role, its behaviour could only be explored and 
evaluated on this position (i.e. a single case study might show Conservatives in administration, 
Labour as largest opposition and LD as fringe opposition.) Along with this understanding that 
there needed to be more than one case study, the selection also required sufficient differences 
on the independent variables which needed to be tested. 
 
The type of case selection that was most relevant to this research was therefore an 
‘information-orientated selection [based on] maximum variation cases’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 
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p.230). Given that this project is looking at the operation of the party group since a change in 
environment (t+X), it was necessary to select cases that were sufficiently different from each 
other to assess the: 
 
‘...significance of various circumstances for case process and outcome (e.g. three to 
four cases that are very different on one dimension: size, form of organisation, 
location, budget.’  
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 230) 
 
In this project the (independent) variables distinguish sufficient differences across authorities 
to enable an overview of party roles in as few as four cases, given that location does not form 
part of the research question but is nonetheless a wise consideration in the heterogeneous 
arena: 
 
 
 
 
As such, four case studies were chosen across the differences (Table 5.3) such as majority 
political party, type of council, the political balance and geographic location. 
 
Political 
Party 
Function / Type of 
Council 
Political Balance Geographic Locations 
Conservative 
Party 
County Council  
(Upper-tier) 
Party Majority 
Administration 
North 
West 
South East 
Labour Party 
District / Borough 
Council  
(Lower-tier) 
Party Minority 
Administration 
(NOC) 
North East South West  
Liberal 
Democrat 
Party 
Unitary / Metropolitan 
Borough Council 
(Single-tier) 
Party Coalition  
(due to NOC)  
Yorkshire 
& Humber 
East 
Midlands 
   London 
West 
Midlands 
   
East of 
England 
 
 Table 5.3: Choices for Case Study Authorities 
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Case Selection 
In choosing the cases in an electoral cycle where Conservative were at their most dominant in 
many years with 9522 councillors to Labour’s 4442 and the Liberal Democrat’s 4083 (figures 
from Edkins, 2010), the selection of appropriate authorities was inherently difficult for a 
project where group behaviour was the focus. Paramount amongst concerns was the ability to 
source councils with substantial Labour and Liberal Democrat majorities or a low numbers of 
Conservatives. Initially it was necessary to remove the sixty-seven councils previously 
included in the survey from the list of potential local authorities, as at best there would be 
research fatigue affecting willingness to cooperate or at worst and more significantly, 
knowledge of the research and its party-focus would have coloured respondent’s views. 
Secondly, it was prudent to remove councils that did not numerically fit the brief about the 
operation of the three main party groups; thus councils with substantial non-mainstream or 
localised parties were removed from the sample. From here, councils were divided by 
function (tier and type) and political balance and subsequently four cases were chosen that 
best gave different circumstances which reflected static situations of political competition for 
each of the three main parties. Geographic location, as the least important consideration, was 
the final concern in selection. Below is the table of cases chosen, with appropriate 
replacement names to identify the councils throughout. Individual councils were contacted 
through officers to check dates of a sufficient number of O&S observations and to confirm 
that other researchers had not recently undertaken substantive research with members. All of 
the chosen authorities met these criteria.
 5,6
 
                                                            
5 During the council year, one Conservative opted to have the whip removed to sit as an independent.  
6 During the council year, one Labour member sadly passed away. A by-election resulted in a Labour member 
taking the seat. 
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Approaching the Variables with Qualitative Research Methods 
In order to have fully evaluated the operation of groups in relation to O&S, it was necessary 
to have an approach that tackled both the visible and invisible dimensions of the behaviour of 
councillors as units of party groups. The visible dimension of the operation of groups was 
researched through observation of councillors working within the meetings of O&S and the 
invisible dimension relating to how councillors approached the work of O&S was 
investigated through semi-structured interviews. In both observing the operation of 
committees and interviewing members involved, it was possible to assess the impact of the 
separation of powers on the group relating to two of the isolated variables that were not suited 
to quantitative assessment, in addition to the quantitatively analysed variables.  
A) Council 
Name in 
Project 
B) Majority 
Party 
C) Composition 
Tot 
Cllrs 
D) Tier / 
Function 
E) 
Geographic 
Location Con 
Cllrs 
Lab 
Cllrs 
LibD 
Cllrs 
Oth 
Cllrs 
Alpha 
District 
Council 
Conservative 35 18 0 1 54 
Lower 
(District) 
North West 
Beta  
County 
Council 
Conservative 41 3 8 5 57 
Upper 
(County) 
West 
Midlands 
Gamma 
Unitary 
Council 
N.O.C  
(Lib Dem 
Minority 
Admin) 
20 10 21 0 51 
Single 
(Unitary) 
South East 
Delta 
Metro 
Borough 
Council 
Labour 23 32 2 6 63 
Single 
(Unitary) 
Yorkshire & 
the Humber 
Totals - 119 63 31 12 225 - - 
 Table 5.4: Case Study Authority Profiles 
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Using the lens of three different roles of overview and scrutiny,
7
 it was possible to assess how 
the party group responded to the institutional change: 
 
1. Pervasiveness of organisation... 
a) ...in relation to the role of holding to account 
Through observation, it was possible to assess how non-executive committees held 
an executive to account. A simple example would be a party divide over an 
administration decision that resulted in a clear division between the groups. In 
isolation, the observation would be irrelevant without discovering the motivations 
behind the split, any decisions taken prior to the event by the groups and the 
context of the topic in council decision-making. As a result, subsequent 
interviewing of the committee’s councillors formed a crucial link by allowing an 
exploration of the proceedings, confirming or disproving the possibly superficial 
observations and providing a greater understanding of the context of what had 
happened. 
 
b) ...in relation to policy development, policy review, pre-policy scrutiny 
In observing O&S committees undertaking policy development, review or pre-
scrutiny, the research established an understanding of whether councillors worked 
together in O&S and whether recommendations from committees were consensus-
based or party-tight. An example would be the evaluation of how councillors 
undertook an O&S investigation into the role of a council service and what 
conclusions they came upon. In-depth interviewing provided a complementary tool 
to investigate how and why councillors worked together (whether chance, 
                                                            
7 Aggregated to reflect ‘types’ of overview and scrutiny reflected in legislation’s intent. 
169 
 
motivation or mandation) and allowed exploration of the reason for topic choice 
(i.e. deliberate avoidance or promotion of a controversial subject.) 
 
c) ...in relation to external scrutiny 
In external O&S committees (whether NHS, partnership-focused or other), 
observing the operation of these committees and their approach to working 
together facilitated an evaluation of how groups might have influenced these, their 
work programmes or their success/failure. An example of an indication of group 
involvement would be an external scrutiny committee being chaired by an 
opposition member when all the inward-looking committees were chaired by the 
administration. Observations benefitted from in-depth interviewing with members 
of external scrutiny committees in identifying such things as why they had been 
chosen for the committee, how successfully the councillors worked together and 
whether they felt that their external-facing role was effective or purposively 
distractive.  
 
2. Centralisation of Policy Formulation 
The research project had initially incorporated the possibility of observations of 
party group meetings to observe whether or not the leadership of the party asserted 
forms of control over policy formulation, with a subsequent expectation that 
councillors would carry through these decisions. However, the barriers to entry to 
observe group meeting proceedings were understandably high and thus being 
accepted to observe such a private chamber of discussion would have been 
asymmetrical across the councils. More significantly, not only would it be difficult 
for the researcher to attend group meetings but the presence of an external 
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observer would almost certainly alter the proceedings due to the nature of the 
closed-door discussions and concerns relating to compliance with the legislation. 
Such observation could have invalidated any data collected and led to distorted 
conclusions. As a solution, the method for assessing the variable of the 
centralisation of policy formulation was solely through in-depth interviews with 
councillors, who were willing to report instances. Interviewing respondents of the 
groups individually led to corroboration. 
 
Considerations in Qualitative Research Methods: Observations
8
 
Whilst observation first gave an insight into how issues filtered through committees with 
‘party’ as a variable it also secondly, gave a perspective of group operation (whether absent or 
present) that could have been imperceptible when interviewing, due to an unawareness or a 
universal proneness to acquiescence with how they perceive their situation would meet any 
legislative requirements. For example, in interview, councillor A might have considered that 
there was no group involvement concerning issue X but the observation provided evidence 
that the group had spoken about X before the committee, sat together in committee and 
pressured the councillors to act on X. Whilst councillor A might have considered that they 
were not explicitly whipped (in their, potentially narrow, interpretation) to conform on the 
issue, the involvement of the group, as a concern for this research, would be discernable. 
 
With similar concern to monitoring group meetings, a researcher’s presence in attending O&S 
meetings might have invalidated the observations. Webb et al. (1966) argues that visible 
                                                            
8 Observation also encompassed the study of available documentation that ran alongside committee meetings, 
including pre-committee information packs (the agenda for the meeting, minutes of previous meetings, 
information on issues under consideration, data on performance), committee-distributed information and the 
post-committee information such as the minutes. These lists are not exhaustive and differ substantially in depth 
and substance across Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Delta Councils. However, the relevance to the operation of party 
groups was low and as such provided references for the research, rather than data. 
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observation as a method has the potential to seriously undermine a whole approach: ‘the 
patently visible observer can produce changes in behaviour that diminish the validity of 
comparisons (1966, p. 113). Even when this is not a physical presence and the subjects still 
know of the research (i.e. recordings/filming), the researcher ‘is still an element with potential 
to bias the production of the critical data substantially’ (Webb et al., 1966, p.113). 
 
However, an important feature of O&S is that the proceedings are always open to the public. 
Whilst the levels of public engagement across authorities varies substantially, despite the 
legislation and guidance pushing authorities to err towards the maximal level of public 
involvement, one thing that was possible for the researcher was attending meetings as a 
member of the public. Whilst specifically not covert research where the method is 
surreptitious, given that O&S meetings were public arenas, officers were informed prior to the 
research and members were subsequently interviewed following meetings, the research 
approach fell under the category of nonreactive observation, which Webb et al. (1966) 
defined as the following: 
 
‘Situations in which the observer has no control over the behaviour or sign in question, 
and plays an unobserved, passive and nonintrusive role in the research situation.’ 
(1966, p.112) 
 
One difficulty in maintaining the ‘unobserved as researcher’ role transpired to be that 
meetings often didn’t have any other members of the public attending; especially at Delta 
Council where the committees took place in rooms without facilities available to witness 
proceedings (e.g. seating). In these infrequent cases, members might have been wary of the 
researcher as either a member of the public, press or an external agency. In each case, these 
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perceptions were assumed to be quite negligible and less destructive than that of explicit 
‘academic researcher’ identification where subject behaviour might have been constrained to 
fit a ‘type’ according to guidelines set down by party, authority or legislation. 
 
Considerations in Qualitative Research Methods: Interviewing 
The second part of the case studies was interviewing councillors about the relationship 
between the group and O&S. The approach taken was to follow up observation of meetings 
with interviews with participants from the observed committee; irrespective of whether they 
had actively participated. Thus it was an aim of the research to discuss what had happened 
before, during and subsequent to the meeting in order to understand the ‘journey’ of O&S 
from the councillor perspective. It was also necessary to understand how councillors 
perceived their role and how their group membership affected their approach to the function. 
 
The most comprehensive way of examining these issues was through the use of non-
standardised semi-structured interviewing where the line of questioning was not fixed across 
respondents but topics, significantly related to the research variables, were discussed in the 
context of nonreactive observations that had taken place with that councillor in attendance. In 
this case, the interviewing followed Patton’s ‘interview guide approach’ (2002, p.343) where 
neither was the interview too loose with ‘different information collected from different people 
with different questions (2002, p.349) nor too fixed where ‘standardised wording of questions 
may constrain and limit naturalness and relevance of questions and answers’ (2002, p.349). 
The chief benefit of the semi-structured interview was that there was flexibility in 
approaching councillors about experiences at their council and with groups, whilst still 
covering the topics relevant to the research and ‘remaining fairly conversational and 
situational’ (2002, p.349). In cases where observation of a committee was impossible, due to 
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cancellation or limited frequency, selections of councillors were interviewed about these 
committees. It was also necessary to interview members who had the external perspective to 
scrutiny such as cabinet members, leaders and (administration) group whips who did not sit 
on O&S. Gaining an insight to external perspectives of O&S, whether from directional (those 
who may control scrutiny) or observational sources (monitoring by the administration), was 
valuable to the research. 
 
Almost all of the interviews taking place were purposively conducted over the telephone 
rather than in a face-to-face setting due to the nature of the relatively sensitive topic of the 
group and the councillor. Given the secrecy of the group in comparison to open committee 
and the need to examine the possibility of a link between the two, it was thought that 
conducting the interviews via telephone with councillors may have given the researcher 
leverage to uncover beliefs about the party and it’s decision-making. It was considered that 
sensitive topics might be more successfully handled in telephone interviews given data in 
sensitive health research: 
 
‘...sensitive information [...] can be obtained effectively via telephone [...] presumably 
because the perceived distance between interviewer and respondent results in the 
latter being more willing to report sensitive information than in more intimate face-
to-face settings.’ 
(Pridemore et al. 2005, p.978 reporting Czaja, 1987) 
 
Whilst some interviews had to be conducted face-to-face by request, most of these were 
deliberately conducted within ‘group rooms’ to replicate the effect of an environment to 
discuss potentially contentious topics. 
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Chapter Six: Quantitative Research Results 
The questionnaire for this research was administered within a five-month period between 
September 18th, 2009 and February 14
th
, 2010. The population of councillors eligible for the 
sample survey was approximately 8420 given the caveats for involvement.
1
 The survey 
sample was constructed via probability sampling but given that the sample was a random 
selection of 20% of councils, not councillors, the population was approximate; however, the 
sample was composed of 1684 councillors, of which 871 or 51.72% returned survey scripts 
through the post or online. This chapter presents the results of the questionnaire through both 
descriptive and inferential statistics; with a view to later provide
2
 (Chapter 8) a connection 
between some of the representative results of this survey and party behaviour of the three 
main parties across English local government.  The responses received by party reflected the 
proportion of the wider English local government distribution of political parties, with a very 
slight under-representation of Labour and over-representation of Liberal Democrats. 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 Councillors of the 332 eligible English authorities, members of at least one O&S committee, members of the 
Labour, Liberal Democrat or Conservative party and members outside of a group leadership (i.e. the principals 
not the agents) 
2 Interpretation of both quantitative and qualitative data will occur in Chapter 8. Minimal analysis of the 
quantitative data will occur alongside the results in order to contextualise the outputs alongside the qualitative 
data. 
  
Frequency 
Sample Survey  
Percent 
Major Party Proportions in English 
Local Government Population  
(based on Edkins, 2010) 
 Conservative 462 53.0 52.76% 
Labour 192 22.0 24.61% 
Liberal Democrat 217 24.9 22.62% 
Total 871 100.0 100% 
 Table 6.1: Survey sample responses by observed and expected % of political party affiliation 
 Observed N Expected N Residual 
Conservative 462 459.6 2.4 
Labour 192 214.4 -22.4 
Liberal Democrat 217 197.0 20.0 
Total 871   
 
 
Test Statistics 
 
Political Party 
Chi-Square 4.370 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. .112 
Table 6.2: One sample chi-square test 
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Running a one sample chi-square test of the responses to the survey according to political 
party, it shows that the observed frequencies of respondents do not deviate from the 
hypothetical, expected number of respondents in a statistically significant way (p = 0.112). 
Thus the responses by party will be expected to fit the population. Where relevant, the 
research measures statistical significance to 95% (p < 0.05) and the sampling error of the 871 
sample is, at its largest, +/- 3.1%.
3
 For the conditional questions in section four, the sub-
sample of long-serving councillors gives a maximum error of +/- 5.3%. 
 
V1: Local Party Group Meetings 
The questionnaire asked three questions relating to group meetings; whether party meetings 
were conducted solely relating to scrutiny, whether regular meetings devoted a portion of 
time to O&S and a question to long-serving councillors about the frequency of group 
meetings today in comparison with before the legislation. Each question factors in the 
relevance of affiliation, the tier of the council, the presence of a majority and incumbent vs. 
opposition respondents. 
 
 
 
This question sought to get a picture of any group meetings that specifically dealt with O&S 
issues rather than any other party topics, thus demonstrating the focus that the party may have 
taken on the group’s role in O&S. 
                                                            
3 This is the „maximum possible variation‟ calculation based on the estimated population of 8420 meeting the 
screen-in criteria and on an assumption of a question split of 50 (which gives the largest sampling error statistic) 
Q3.1 Have you ever attended a party group meeting which exclusively dealt with the 
agendas of forthcoming scrutiny committees or short-life task-and-finish / working group 
meetings? 
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Table 6.3 and Figure 6.1 show that party group meetings specifically relating to upcoming 
O&S meetings took place in around 35% percent of cases (either regularly or occasionally) 
with the reasonable majority of 65% indicating no specific party group meetings that solely 
related to O&S. Following the theoretical assumptions, according to affiliation there were no 
significant differences (where p < 0.05) between political parties with respect to reporting 
more or fewer occurrences of pre-O&S group meetings. Recoding the respondents by 
functional difference (i.e. by tier of respondent), there was no statistical significance (p > 0.05) 
between reports of pre-O&S party group meetings across tiers of council.  Viewing the 
responses through the screening question of the respondent’s authority having a majority 
Table 6.3: Occurrence of party group meetings specifically for O&S 
Fig 6.1: Bar Chart showing of party group meetings specifically for O&S 
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party also showed no statistical significance in the likely propensity of pre-O&S group 
meetings between ‘majority party’ and ‘no overall control or coalition’ councils (p > 0.05). In 
a similar vein, viewing the reports of pre-O&S party group meetings split across incumbent 
and opposition party members
4
 there were no statistically significant differences showing a 
predisposition to group meetings specifically relating to O&S (p > 0.05).  Across the board, 
the results of Q3.1 demonstrated that there were no indications to the likelihood of holding 
pre-O&S group meetings by party affiliation, tier of council, presence of a majority party or 
whether incumbent or in opposition. 
 
 
 
Q3.2 sought to discover any other types of group meetings that could have dealt with O&S 
such as regularly scheduled gatherings. Where respondents may not have experienced specific 
party meetings solely dealing with O&S, they could have experienced group meetings which 
dealt with the topic as part of a wider discussion of party business. Table 6.4 presents the 
frequencies of responses. The results of the question show that approximately 44% of 
respondents reported that regular group meetings devoted a portion of time to the agendas of 
upcoming O&S committees. 
 
                                                            
4 Excluding members from alternative arrangement authorities 
3.2 Do any regular party group meetings devote a portion of time to the agendas of scrutiny 
committees or short-life task-and-finish / working group meetings? 
Table 6.4: Frequencies of reporting devoted time to O&S within regular party group meetings 
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Following the theoretical assumptions relating to the relative insignificance of party affiliation 
(i.e. parties act as parties), the party of the respondent was not statistically significant. 
However the tier of council did show statistical significance differences (p = 0.02). As shown 
below, district / borough respondents reported lengthier devotion to O&S in regular 
party group meetings than upper or single tier authorities. However the strength of 
correlation was low (Cramer’s V=0.096). 
 
 
Whilst the factor of a majority or a minority / coalition did not show any statistical 
significance relating to this question, the ‘incumbency or opposition’ category showed 
significant differences between the predisposition of incumbent party and opposition party 
respondents to have party group meetings which devoted time to O&S. As might be expected 
due to their roles on the council, opposition parties reported a longer amount of time spent 
on O&S in regular party group meetings. However, the correlation was moderately low 
(Cramer’s V=0.164) but statistically significant enough to have not happened by chance (p < 
0.0005). The crosstabulation is presented in table 6.6 below: 
 
Table 6.5: Crosstab of time devoted to O&S in regular party group meetings by tier (Lower/Upper) 
179 
 
 
 
Importantly for this research, looking only at those respondents who reported that they did 
not experience specific party group meetings (as asked in Q3.1), it is possible to then see how 
many of these did, however, experience time devoted to O&S in regular party meetings (as 
asked in Q3.2). Table 6.7 shows an additional 168 councillors who did not report specific 
party group meetings about O&S but did report time devoted to O&S in regular party group 
meetings.  
 
 
 
Combining the additional 168 responses from those who answered negatively to Q3.1 (No  
specific meetings) but positively to Q3.2 (Yes, devoted time) with the 300 responses 
answering Q3.1 positively, resulted in 467 out of 856 (54.6%) respondents reporting that the 
group devoted time to the operation of O&S.  Given that this was a majority of respondents 
from a representative sample, it indicated that the majority of the population of English 
local parties devoted group time to the operation of the function (giving consideration to 
sampling error of 3.1%). Within the ~ 45% of respondents who reported neither specific party 
Table 6.6: Crosstab of time devoted to O&S in party group meetings by incumbency vs. opposition 
  
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes - Devoted Time or Specific 
PGM 
467 54.6 54.6 
No - Devoted Time or Specific 
PGM 
388 45.4 100.0 
Total 855 100.0  
Missing System 16   
Total 871   
 Table 6.7: Respondents either experiencing specific PGM or devoted time in PGM to O&S 
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group meetings nor any devoted time to O&S in regular group meetings, there were some 
unexpected results of the intra-party splits between political parties. For example, 52% of the 
Labour party reported neither Q3.1 nor Q3.2, 47% of the Conservative respondents and only 
35% of Liberal Democrat members. These differences across political parties were 
statistically significant (p = 0.001) and thus proportionally the Liberal Democrat members 
were most likely (65%) to answer in the positive to Q3.1 and Q3.2.  
 
 
 
Q4.1 asked respondents who had served before the introduction of the Local Government Act 
2000 whether they experienced a higher or lower frequency of party group meetings since its 
introduction.  Overwhelmingly, despite the changes brought about by the Act, the respondents 
reported (52%, Table 6.8) that the frequency of party group meetings had stayed the same.  
 
 
 
4.1 Do you think that your own party group conducts more or [fewer] meetings now 
compared to before the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000? 
  
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Considerably more party group 
meetings 
19 5.7 5.7 
Quite a lot more party group 
meetings 
20 6.0 11.7 
A fair amount more party group 
meetings 
55 16.5 28.1 
Exactly the same level of party 
group meetings 
175 52.4 80.5 
A fair amount fewer party group 
meetings 
34 10.2 90.7 
Quite a lot fewer party group 
meetings 
14 4.2 94.9 
Considerably fewer party group 
meetings 
17 5.1 100.0 
Total 334 100.0  
Missing System 537   
Total 871   
 Table 6.8: Q4.1 respondents reporting party group meeting frequency since the LG Act 2000 
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As in Figure 6.2, in terms of reporting either more or fewer party group meetings, more 
respondents answered that there were more party group meetings since the Act (28.2%) rather 
than less group meetings (19.5%). When crosstabulated according to party affiliation, 
differences between the parties were not statistically significant. According to the results of 
Q4.1, group meetings have seemingly either remained at the same frequency or increased in 
frequency in 81% of cases, with relatively few respondents (20%) reporting a decrease in 
frequency. 
 
V4:  Preclusory Discipline 
The questionnaire asked four questions relating to preclusory discipline; two of which were 
addressed to all respondents and two of which were addressed to councillors who had served 
before the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000. The initial two questions to all 
respondents dealt with the deconstruction of the occurrence of whipping as ‘advisory’ 
whipping and ‘explicit’ whipping. The second two conditional questions for long-serving 
councillors addressed the self-reported relative control of the party group both before and 
after the introduction of the legislation. 
Fig 6.2 Q4.1 respondents reporting level of party group meetings since the LG Act 2000 
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This question sought to uncover the organisational discipline of the party in relation to 
whipping that councillors may not have believed had explicitly occurred but was present by 
implication. For example, councillors reporting that they had been advised and informally 
pressured to take a particular course of action to take O&S. 
 
  
From Table 6.9 approximately 24%, or almost 1 in 4 respondents, reported advisory whipping, 
through means of informal pressure, in order for councillors to act in a certain way in O&S 
committees. The modal responses within those that did report advisory whipping reported the 
incidence highest on ‘rare occasions’ followed by ‘occasionally.’ According to political party 
affiliation, as expected, there was no statistical significance between each of the political 
parties in reports of incidences of this form of control. In respect to council tier and whether 
the respondent’s party was incumbent or in opposition, there was no statistical significance 
between these factors in the reporting of advisory whipping. 
 
 
Showing statistical significance (p = 0.027), councils with majority parties tended to report 
more routine advisory whipping but this was contrasted with authorities without a majority 
party who tended to report considerably more ad-hoc, less routine advisory whipping  
3.3 Have you ever received informal pressure from your group leader(s), party whip etc. 
about things under consideration by an O&S committee meeting? (For example, you are 
advised to act as directed) 
Table 6.9: Q3.3 respondents reporting advisory whipping / informal pressure in O&S 
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In relation to Q3.4, where councillors were asked if they were ever subject to an explicit whip 
informing them of an obligation to follow directions from the party, the reports of whipping 
were roughly half of the reports of advisory whipping: 
 
 
Table 6.11 shows that explicit whipping was reported from approximately 12% of 
respondents. There was no statistical significance when parties were added to the data. 
Equally across the tier of council, by majority or NOC and by incumbency versus opposition, 
there were no reports of statistical significance (p < 0.05) which could explain differences in 
incidences of explicit whipping according to these factors. 
 
Table 6.10: Q3.3 respondents report advisory whipping in O&S by majority presence 
3.4 Have you ever been subject to an explicit party whip about issues under consideration 
in O&S? (For example, you are told to act as directed) 
Table 6.11: Q3.4 respondents reporting explicit whipping / formal pressure in O&S 
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From both Q3.3 and Q3.4 it was possible to total the number of respondents who had either 
encountered an advisory or an explicit whip at any point, in relation to O&S. Table 6.12 
shows that 26% of respondents had either experienced an advisory or explicit whip in 
relation to O&S. There were no statistical significant associations for the whipping aggregate 
when factoring in party, incumbency, majority parties or tier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q4.4 was a conditional question to councillors who had experience on authorities before the 
introduction of the constitutional changes and asked respondents to self-report how much 
‘control’ or preclusory organisation that respondents had experienced both under the 
committee-system and under the new arrangements. The results for these two questions are 
presented visually in the Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4. 
 
The mean level of agreement for each question was extremely close between 4.4a (4.52) and 
4.4b (4.31), showing the mean agreement for party control over the committee system to be 
higher (0.21) than the mean relating to party control over O&S. However the difference 
between the means was tested using a paired sample T-Test and demonstrated that the 
difference between the means was statistically significant (p = 0.001) and unlikely to have 
Table 6.12: Respondents either experiencing advisory or explicit whips in relation to O&S 
4.4 On a scale of 1 to 7, how much control do you think your own party has over its 
members under both the old committee system and the modern arrangements? [The scale 
runs from 1 meaning absolutely no control and 7 meaning absolute complete control] 
4.4a - Before the Local Government Act 2000: ‘The Committee System’ 
4.4b - Subsequent to the Local Government Act 2000: ‘O&S’ 
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happened by chance. Nonetheless the difference between the levels of agreement was very 
small and both questions were negatively skewed (4.4a -0.223 & 4.4b -0.229) meaning the 
responses were both more clustered towards higher levels of agreement and both questions 
resulted in a negative kurtosis (4.4a -0.358 & 4.4b -0.377) indicating relatively flat peaks. 
 
 Fig 6.3: Histogram relating to Q4.4a 
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In assessing the means for each party, it was possible to assess whether the responses varied 
by the political affiliation of the respondents.  
 
 
In a statistical significance test (one-way ANOVA) comparing the means, the political party 
served as an indicator only for question Q4.4a (p < 0.0005) but not Q4.4b (p = 0.172). Thus it 
was found that Labour respondents reported that the party group had had more control over 
the old committee system (5.12) than Conservative and Liberal Democrat respondents had 
Fig 6.4: Histogram relating to Q4.4b 
Table 6.13: Q4.4a and Q4.4b means by political party 
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believed had been the case (4.49 and 4.06 respectively), which was statistically significant 
and likely to hold in the population.  
 
However, in relation to Q4.4b, the party did not have a statistically significant association 
with the responses; all parties reported party control relatively equally. The Liberal Democrat 
respondents provided a mean that was exactly the same in both Q4.4a and Q4.4b, indicating 
no change. Both Labour and Conservative respondents reported a higher mean level of 
agreement that the party group had more control over the committee system than under O&S. 
In the Conservative case, this 0.1 agreement difference was almost negligible in contrast to 
the larger 0.67 difference in means reported by Labour. Thus Labour councillors had felt 
less controlled by the party (but still positively controlled) since the legislation. In relation 
to other independent variables which could be used to assess the results of Q4.4a and Q4.4b, 
only the tier of government can be static over time, given that incumbency and the presence of 
a majority party refer only to the present situation. However, testing by tier is fraught with 
difficulty, given that county and district councillors may have served before the Act in either 
tier or a different tier from which they would be answering the questionnaire at the time. 
 
V1 & V4: Combining the variables to test for association 
Whilst there were few statistically significant associations across V1 and V4 when testing 
responses by independent variables (such as party, tier, majority or incumbency) reports of 
party group meetings relating to O&S and whipping (either advisory or explicit) were 
aggregated to create a variable where any of these party tools were reported to have occurred. 
In combining the incidences of party group meetings (either specific or devoted time) and 
whipping (advisory and explicit) into dichotomous variables, where positive responses to 
Q3.1 and Q3.2 were computed to formulate a new aggregate variable of party group meetings 
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and Q3.3 and Q3.4 were computed to formulate a new aggregate variable of whipping, it was 
possible to discover the frequency of respondents that report both no party group meetings 
together with no form of whipping.  
 
 
Table 6.14 shows that 62% of all respondents had either experienced specific party group 
meetings relating to O&S, devotion to O&S in regular group meetings, advisory whipping or 
explicit whipping from the party group about O&S. Consequently 38% of all respondents had 
not received any of these from their group. Subsequently breaking this down into a new 
variable of a dichotomy where respondents either a) had reported either party group 
meetings or whips in contrast to b) those that had not experienced either and then using 
the group as the independent variable, the differences between the political party groups were 
statistically significant (p = 0.05). This is demonstrated in Table 6.15 below: 
 
 
 
 
Whilst it was statistically significant that Liberal Democrat members reported a higher 
number of party group meetings or whipping in contrast to both of the other parties (68% to 
56% Labour and 61% Conservative), this could have been affected by the propensity of 
Liberal Democrats to be serving in opposition and thus devoting more PGM time to O&S. 
Table 6.14: Crosstab of Party Group Meetings Aggregate with Whipping Aggregate 
Table 6.15: Crosstab of „Party Group Meetings and Whipping Aggregate‟ with Party Group 
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However when aggregating these instruments, party differences did appear; the group most 
likely to report fewest O&S-related PGMs or whipping was Labour. This result was entirely 
unexpected, given Labour’s previously reported dominance over group cohesion and 
mandation (Young & Davies 1990) and given the party’s traditional corporatist approach 
(Copus & Leach 2004). In respect to the tier of the council and the presence of a majority at 
the authority, there were no statistically significant associations. However, when factoring in 
incumbency vs. opposition, there was a statistically significant relationship that indicated that 
the tools of O&S-related PGMs and whipping were more likely to occur for opposition 
respondents (p = 0.001). 
 
V5: Cohibition of individual councillor communication 
Within V5, four questions were asked that related either to direct party attempts to ensure 
councillor communication was controlled in relation to criticism in public or how comfortable 
councillors perceived themselves to be when discussing decisions made by their own group in 
both public and private arena. 
 
 
 
The first question related to whether the groups briefed their members about their conduct in 
O&S committee meetings. The question allowed for multiple selections as the options were 
not mutually exclusive. In total, 858 respondents answered this question (13 missing) and of 
these, 211 respondents (25%) reported that they were briefed (providing 294 selections) and 
647 reported that they had not been briefed (75%). Frequency table 6.16 shows the selections 
of those who had reported that they had been briefed about their conduct in O&S.  
3.5 Have you ever been briefed by your local party group leader(s) about the way to conduct 
yourself in O&S committees? (Multiple selections permitted) 
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The results showed that the most frequent occasion for a group briefing was when the issue 
under discussion in O&S was controversial (40%). The second most frequent instance of 
briefing was when O&S was first introduced (39%) followed by when the candidate was first 
standing for election (30%). The other options provided substantially fewer positive responses 
and were all beneath 10% of the 25% who said that they had been briefed in some way. In 
terms of approaches of the individual political parties, the following table summarises the 
differences by group: 
 
 
 
Table 6.17 shows that there is little difference in the reports of briefings across parties except 
a comparatively higher number of Liberal Democrats reporting that they were briefed on 
  Responses 
Percent of Cases   N Percent 
  Briefed when System Introduced 83 28.2% 39.3% 
Briefed when Criticise Local Party During OS 14 4.8% 6.6% 
Briefed when Issue Controversial 84 28.6% 39.8% 
Briefed when Elections Due 9 3.1% 4.3% 
Briefed when First Standing for Election 64 21.8% 30.3% 
Briefed when Press or Public to attend 17 5.8% 8.1% 
Briefed when I agree with Other Parties 9 3.1% 4.3% 
Briefed when I rebel against Decisions from Own Party 14 4.8% 6.6% 
Total 294 100.0% 139.3% 
 Table 6.16: Selections (multiples permitted) of those answering positively to Q3.5 
 
 Conservative Labour 
Liberal 
Democrat 
Total 
 
  Briefed when System Introduced Count 44 20 19 83 
% within polparty 37.0% 39.2% 46.3%  
Briefed when Criticise Local Party 
During OS 
Count 8 4 2 14 
% within polparty 6.7% 7.8% 4.9%  
Briefed when Issue Controversial Count 47 20 17 84 
% within polparty 39.5% 39.2% 41.5%  
Briefed when Elections Due Count 4 3 2 9 
% within polparty 3.4% 5.9% 4.9%  
Briefed when First Standing for 
Election 
Count 38 15 11 64 
% within polparty 31.9% 29.4% 26.8%  
Briefed when Press or Public to 
attend 
Count 10 5 2 17 
% within polparty 8.4% 9.8% 4.9%  
Briefed when I agree with Other 
Parties 
Count 6 2 1 9 
% within polparty 5.0% 3.9% 2.4%  
Briefed when I rebel against 
Decisions from Own Party 
Count 12 1 1 14 
% within polparty 10.1% 2.0% 2.4%  
Total Count 119 51 41 211 
% of Party respondents (in total)  25.75% 26.56% 18.89% Av: 24.59% 
 Table 6.17: Respondents answering positively to Q3.5 by political party group 
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conduct in O&S when the system was first introduced and a higher number of Conservatives 
reporting briefing when they rebelled against decisions from their own party. In party totals, 
25.75% of Conservative members reporting party briefings, 26.56% of Labour and only 18.89% 
of Liberal Democrats. 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3.7 and Q3.8 sought to discover whether respondents had criticised their group’s decisions 
in two different spheres; public (such as O&S, full council et al.) and private (group meetings 
et al.). The question gave respondents the same ordinal rank of options
5
 to allow for 
comparability between Q3.7 and Q3.8.  From figure 6.5, it is clear that the majority (approx. 
75%) of respondents had not criticised the decisions made by their party in any public sphere, 
in contrast to figure 6.6 which showed that the majority of respondents (approx 65%) had 
criticised the decisions made by their party in private. 
                                                            
5 As Q3.1, Q3.3, Q3.4 
3.7 Since the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000, have you ever criticised the 
decisions made by your party in any public sphere; such as O&S, full council or directly to 
the local, regional or national press? 
3.8 Since the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000, have you ever criticised the 
decisions made by your party in any private sphere; such as in group or coalition meetings, 
the local party meetings, national party conferences et al.? 
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Unsurprisingly, from the distinction between the two, it was clear that respondents typically 
preferred to reserve any criticism about the group to the confines of the private sphere of the 
group rather than in public. However the fundamental difference between the two implied that 
there would be externalities prompting this type of dichotomy between the two, such as a fear 
Fig 6.5: Bar chart showing responses to Q3.7, where respondents criticise the party group in public 
Fig 6.6: Bar chart showing responses to Q3.8, where respondents criticise the party group in private 
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of losing elections, fear of losing position within the party or being disciplined by the group 
which could be confirmed through other questioning in the survey. This question specifically 
measured respondent‟s actions rather than party group orders. In looking at the responses 
to these questions through the lens of political party group, the affiliation was not statistically 
significant when looking at the response to Q3.7 (public criticism) (p > 0.05) or in relation to 
Q3.8 (private criticism) (p > 0.05). 
 
 
 
Furthermore, in respect to viewing Q3.7 and Q3.8 through the lens of the tier of the council, 
the presence of a majority party or whether incumbent or opposition party, the results for all 
of these relationships were statistically insignificant with Q3.7 or Q3.8 (all p > 0.05). 
However when testing public criticism with whether the respondent was a chair of an O&S 
committee, there was a statistically significant relationship (Table 6.18) that indicated that 
chairs were more willing to criticise their party group in public (p < 0.039). However, 
when only factoring in chairs from the majority party, a surprisingly high 69% of chairs 
reported that they had never criticised the decisions made by their party in public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.18: Public Criticism (Q3.7) according to chair vs. non-chair 
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Question 4.2 was a conditional question posed to councillors who had served before the Local 
Government Act 2000 and sought to discover the comparative level of comfort experienced 
by respondents since the introduction of the legislation. The results of this question, presented 
in table 6.19 and figure 6.7, showed that the vast majority of respondents (76%) believed that 
they experienced the same level of comfort subsequent to the Act as they did before its 
introduction. 
 
 
 
 
4.2 How much more or less comfortable do you feel criticising your own party leadership in 
O&S conditions or in a public arena since the introduction of the Local Government Act 
2000? 
  Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Considerably more comfortable 7 2.1 2.1 
Quite a lot more comfortable 4 1.2 3.3 
A fair amount more comfortable 25 7.6 10.9 
Exactly the same level of comfort 252 76.4 87.3 
A fair amount less comfortable 14 4.2 91.5 
Quite a lot less comfortable 8 2.4 93.9 
Considerably less comfortable 20 6.1 100.0 
Total 330 100.0  
 System Missing   541   
Total 871   
 Table 6.19: Q4.2 respondents reporting comfort since introduction of LG Act 2000  
Fig 6.7: Q4.2 respondents reporting level of comfort in criticising party leadership since the Act 
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However the remaining 24% of respondents who either perceived more comfort or less 
comfort since the introduction of the Act did not demonstrate a discernable pattern in the 
distribution. To explain these differences, the party serves as an exploratory tool as seen in 
table 6.20 below: 
 
 
 
Adding party as an independent variable showed a statistically significant association (p = 
0.029), visibly evident in table 6.20, in the tendency for Labour members to feel more 
comfortable to criticise their party group since the Act (20% of Labour in contrast to 10% of 
Conservatives and 4.2% of Liberal Democrats). Similarly, Conservative members reported 
that they felt less comfortable in criticising their party group since the Act, in comparison to 
the other parties (16% of Conservatives in contrast to 13% of Labour and 7.5% of Liberal 
Democrats.) Liberal Democrats were significantly more likely to report that the level of 
comfort had stayed the same, reflecting the unusually mirrored means in Table 6.13 in 
relation to Q4.4a and Q4.4b. 
 
   Political Party 
Total 
   
Conservative Labour 
Liberal 
Democrat 
 Considerably more comfortable Count 1 4 2 7 
% within Political Party .7% 4.7% 2.1% 2.1% 
Quite a lot more comfortable Count 2 2 0 4 
% within Political Party 1.3% 2.4% .0% 1.2% 
A fair amount more comfortable Count 12 11 2 25 
% within Political Party 8.0% 12.9% 2.1% 7.6% 
Exactly the same level of 
comfort 
Count 111 57 84 252 
% within Political Party 74.0% 67.1% 88.4% 76.4% 
A fair amount less comfortable Count 10 3 1 14 
% within Political Party 6.7% 3.5% 1.1% 4.2% 
Quite a lot less comfortable Count 3 2 3 8 
% within Political Party 2.0% 2.4% 3.2% 2.4% 
Considerably less comfortable Count 11 6 3 20 
% within Political Party 7.3% 7.1% 3.2% 6.1% 
Total Count 150 85 95 330 
% within Political Party 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Table 6.20: Q4.2 respondents reporting comfort since introduction of LG Act 2000 by party group 
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V1 & V4 with V5: Combining the variables to test for association 
Using the responses to Q3.7, when asking respondents if they had ever criticised their party 
group in public, it was thought useful to factor in whether group meetings or whipping (V1 & 
V4) had led to a lower frequency of public criticism (V5) (due to strong party group control). 
However the association did not result in a statistically significant relationship (p = 0.133). 
 
 
V6: Administration of Castigative Discipline 
The variable looking at the administration of castigative discipline had four questions in the 
questionnaire. Q3.6 asked respondents if they have been, and at what point, disciplined by 
their group in relation to their actions in O&S. Q3.61 followed up Q3.6 by asking respondents 
who answered ‘yes’ to this, how, if at all, they were punished by their group. Similarly, Q3.71 
followed up Q3.7 (see V5) which had asked whether councillors had ever criticised their 
group in public and the subsequent conditional Q3.71 asked what type of punishment, if any, 
they had received as a result of the criticism.  There was also a question for councillors who 
had served before the Act, which asked a comparative question about the level of discipline 
used both before and subsequent to the legislation. 
 
 
Table 6.21: Q3.7 responses with V1/V4 aggregate relating to party group meetings or whipping. 
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The first question was specifically in relation to O&S and any direct consequences of 
criticising one’s party group in this arena alone. Q3.6 offered respondents multiple selections 
from the same list of options as used in Q3.5 (see V5). Out of the 861 respondents who 
answered this question (10 missing), 23 (2.67%) unique respondents answered that they had 
been disciplined as a result of their actions in O&S and 838 (97.32%) answered that they had 
never been disciplined in relation to the function. Because of the small percentage, the sample 
error at this level would be 1%, meaning the inference for applicability within the population 
could be from 1.67% to 3.67%. The 23 respondents who did report castigative discipline gave 
35 responses to this question. Table 6.22 gives the frequency table of these responses. 
 
 
 
The highest frequency of discipline occurred when the ‘issue was controversial’ and ‘when 
the respondent agreed with other parties’ which individually represented 30.4% (7 responses 
each) of the total positive responses to Q3.6. These reasons were closely followed by ‘when 
the councillor rebelled against decisions from their own party’ (26.1%) and ‘disciplined for 
another reason’ (26.1%). Out of these 23 respondents reporting discipline as a direct result of 
action in O&S, the approximate proportion of Conservative respondents was much higher (3.9% 
3.6 Have you ever been disciplined by your local party group leader(s) in relation to your 
actions in O&S committees? (Multiple selections permitted) 
  Responses 
Percent of 
Cases   N Percent 
 Disciplined when System Introduced 3 8.6% 13.0% 
Disciplined when Criticise Local Party 
During OS 
3 8.6% 13.0% 
Disciplined when Issue Controversial 7 20.0% 30.4% 
Disciplined when Elections Due 3 8.6% 13.0% 
Disciplined when I agree with Other 
Parties 
7 20.0% 30.4% 
Disciplined when I rebel against 
Decisions from Own Party 
6 17.1% 26.1% 
Disciplined other reason 6 17.1% 26.1% 
Total 35 100.0% 152.2% 
 Table 6.22: Selections (multiples permitted) of those answering positively to Q3.6 
198 
 
(s.e range 2.7 to 5.1%) than Labour (1.6% (s.e range 0.8 to 2.4%) and Liberal Democrat (0.92% 
(s.e range 0.32 to 1.52%) respondents, given the 2.67% average figure. 
 
Due to the low N of respondents to this question, no extensive comparative assessment can be 
made into the differences between the occasions when respondents were disciplined in 
relation to O&S, other than that Conservative respondents were disciplined proportionately 
twice as much as Labour respondents and more than four times as much as Liberal Democrat 
respondents in this sample, in all probability indicative of Conservative-majority dominance 
at the time of the survey research resulting in more tight, majority-protective discipline.  
 
 
 
Q3.61 sought to discover what type of discipline was used in relation to Q3.6 where 
respondents reported that they had been disciplined as a result of something they had done in 
O&S. The scale allowed for multiple choices and gave an ordinal ranking of options from 
receiving an informal warning from the party through to suspension / expulsion from the 
party group. Of the 23 respondents reporting castigative discipline, the following table details 
the outcomes of their cases: 
 
3.61 Only if yes to the previous question (3.6), what was the nature and extent of the party 
discipline? (Multiple selections permitted) 
Table 6.23: Type of discipline used on respondents reporting castigative discipline in Q3.6 
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Of the 23 respondents eligible, 21 responses provided evidence which showed that the 
majority of those subject to discipline as a direct result of actions in O&S were given an 
informal warning from the party group (54.5%). Five respondents (22.7%) reported that they 
were not reappointed to their role as a direct consequence of their action against the party and 
another two respondents (9.1%) were actually suspended from the party group itself as a 
direct result of their action in O&S settings. Whilst the two suspensions were experienced by 
Conservatives, due to the low numbers statistical evidence cannot be provided to state that 
this was a predominantly Conservative experience. Moreover, given that respondents had had 
to self-report the connection (X  Y), little information can be gleaned from whether the 
actions in O&S were unequivocally connected to suspensions or removals. For example, 
deviant behaviour may have been common and punishment might have been the result of a 
councillor’s wider deviance across all council functions (i.e. routinely disobeying the party).  
 
 
 
Q3.71 asked the same question as Q3.61 but was conditional on answering Q3.7 positively. 
Thus because Q3.7 was an alternatively worded question which included O&S in addition to 
other public arenas, the number of respondents answering Q3.71 was much higher (202 
compared to 21). The scale allowed for the same multiple choices and gave the same ordinal 
ranking of options. Of the 209 who reported that they had criticised the party in public, 202 
answered the follow-up question (7 missing) giving 204 responses. The tables below detail 
the outcomes of councillor’s public criticism of the party group. 
 
 
3.71 Only if yes to the previous question (3.7); as a result of your criticism which of the 
following subsequently occurred? (Multiple selections permitted) 
Table 6.24: Missing data for Q3.71 
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The large majority of respondents who criticised the decisions made by their party in a public 
sphere were not directly punished (80%) as a result of this / these action(s). However 11.9% 
of respondents who criticised their party group’s decisions in a public arena were given an 
informal warning by the party, 5% of respondents were not reappointed to the role that they 
were serving in and 1% (s.e range ~ 0.4 - 1.6%) of respondents were immediately removed 
from their role as a direct consequence of their actions. Again, the survey relied on the 
respondent expressing their estimation that this was a causal link (i.e. My action X led to 
outcome Y). In terms of party affiliation, Labour and Conservative respondents were much 
more likely to be punished for public criticism of the group’s decisions (28.6% of Labour, 
20.9% of Conservatives) whereas the use of punishment was much lower for Liberal 
Democrats (4.7%). 
 
 
 
Q4.3 asked respondents, conditional on whether they had served before the Act, whether they 
believed that group discipline had grown higher or lower since the introduction. This question 
straddled both V4 and V6 as it covered both preclusory and castigative discipline for a 
comparative perspective.  
Table 6.25: Type of discipline used on respondents reporting castigative discipline as a result of Q3.7 
4.3 How much more or less discipline has been used to control members of your party since 
the introduction of the Local Government Act in 2000? (Not just yourself) 
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From table 6.26, it was clear that over three-quarters of respondents reported that there was 
the same level of discipline used to control members now than there was before the legislation. 
On either side of this agreement, exactly 11.1% of respondents reported that there was more 
discipline since the Act combined with exactly 11.1% of respondents reporting that there was 
less discipline since the Act.  
 
When factoring in the group as an associated factor, there was a statistically significant 
difference (p= 0.018) between the party groups. As seen in table 6.27, only the Conservatives 
reported more discipline (13.2%) rather than less discipline since the Act (6%) in direct 
  
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Considerably more discipline 2 .6 .6 
Quite a lot more discipline 14 4.2 4.8 
A fair amount more discipline 21 6.3 11.2 
Exactly the same level of 
discipline 
257 77.6 88.8 
A fair amount less discipline 11 3.3 92.1 
Quite a lot less discipline 9 2.7 94.9 
Considerably less discipline 17 5.1 100.0 
Total 331 100.0  
Missing System 540   
Total 871   
 Table 6.26: Q4.3 respondents reporting level of discipline since introduction of LG Act 2000 
Fig 6.8: Q4.3 respondents reporting level of discipline since the LG Act 2000 
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contrast with the inverse within Labour, who reported less discipline (21.4%) over more 
discipline since the Act (10.7). The Liberal Democrats were relatively more balanced and 
reported more discipline (8.3%) in a similar proportion to less discipline (10.4%). Given that 
the results were statistically significant, the population would have been likely to report 
similar patterns. 
 
  
 
 
V7: Allocation of Positions 
 
Within the variable looking at the allocation of positions within the O&S function, there were 
two question groups that related to firstly, how many chairs were from the majority or 
opposition parties and secondly, how chairs and vice-chairs received these positions in O&S. 
 
 
 
 
   Political Party 
Total 
   
Conservative Labour 
Liberal 
Democrat 
 Considerably more 
discipline 
Count 1 0 1 2 
% within Political Party .7% .0% 1.0% .6% 
Quite a lot more 
discipline 
Count 7 6 1 14 
% within Political Party 4.6% 7.1% 1.0% 4.2% 
A fair amount more 
discipline 
Count 12 3 6 21 
% within Political Party 7.9% 3.6% 6.3% 6.3% 
Exactly the same level 
of discipline 
Count 122 57 78 257 
% within Political Party 80.8% 67.9% 81.3% 77.6% 
A fair amount less 
discipline 
Count 5 3 3 11 
% within Political Party 3.3% 3.6% 3.1% 3.3% 
Quite a lot less 
discipline 
Count 1 6 2 9 
% within Political Party .7% 7.1% 2.1% 2.7% 
Considerably less 
discipline 
Count 3 9 5 17 
% within Political Party 2.0% 10.7% 5.2% 5.1% 
Total Count 151 84 96 331 
% within Political Party 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 Table 6.27: Q4.3 respondents reporting discipline since introduction of LG Act 2000 by political party 
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Q2.1 provided a screening question to ensure that the totals for Q2.2 and Q2.3 totalled to 
create the figure for Q2.1. Where these differences appeared, manual verification through a 
trace-back to the council itself was undertaken to translate these occurrences and strengthen 
the quality of the data and allow for computations (i.e. % of Q2.1). The table shows the means 
of the questions answered in Q2.1, Q2.2 and Q2.3. 
 
 
 
From the initial univariate analysis, each respondent, on average, sat (arithmetically, rather 
than physically) on 2.18 committees, of which 1.48 were chaired by the majority party 
(approx 68%) and 0.74 were chaired by opposition parties (approx 34%).
6
 As a separately 
computed percentage of how many committees the individual respondent sat on (Q2.2 or 
Q2.3 divided by Q2.1 multiplied by 100), the percentage of respondents reporting that ALL 
their chairs were taken by the majority party was 56.8%. 
                                                            
6 Numbers do not total 100% because of some asymmetric missing data  
2.1 How many O&S committees, working groups and/or task-and-finish groups do you 
currently sit on? (Circle as appropriate) 
2.2 How many of your O&S committees, working groups and/or task-and-finish groups 
(that you personally sit on) are currently chaired by a majority party on the council? (Circle 
as appropriate) 
2.3 How many of your O&S committees, working groups and/or task-and-finish groups 
(that you personally sit on) are currently chaired by opposition parties (who are not part of 
an executive) on the council? (Circle as appropriate) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2.1 How many ... do you 
currently sit on? 
864 0 6 2.18 1.278 
2.2 How many ...chaired by a 
majority party on the council? 
858 0 6 1.48 1.336 
2.3 How many ... chaired by 
opposition parties on the 
council? 
861 0 6 .74 1.092 
Valid N (listwise) 857     
 Table 6.28: Descriptive statistics of Q2.1, Q2.2 and Q2.3 
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In contrast, the proportion of chairs held by the opposition party across the respondents was 
much lower, as demonstrated in table 6.30 and figure 6.10, where over half the respondents 
(58.2%)
7
 reported that none of their committees were chaired by opposition parties. 
 
                                                            
7 ‘None‟ & ‘all opp / maj chair’ numbers do not match  because of asymmetric missing data 
Table 6.29: Committees chaired by the majority party as a percentage of total committees 
Fig 6.9: Histogram of committees chaired by the majority party as a % of total committees 
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An important association to run with these questions was according to the political party 
and whether the group was incumbent and thus decided the committee allocations. The 
following table shows the means of the number of committees chaired by the majority party 
or opposition party according to the incumbent political party. 
 
Table 6.30: Committees chaired by the opposition party as a percentage of total committees 
Fig 6.10: Histogram of committees chaired by the majority party as a % of total committees 
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From table 6.31, where the Conservative party was the incumbent, 74% of O&S committees 
were chaired by Conservatives and 26% were chaired by opposition parties. Slightly higher 
was where Labour were incumbent and 81% of chairs were allocated to Labour and 19% were 
allocated to the opposition. Although not showing the opposite relationship, the Liberal 
Democrats in administration kept 58% chairs for the Liberal Democrat group and gave 42% 
for opposition parties, showing a much less pronounced division than the other two parties. 
To test the statistical significance for the population, the following one-way ANOVA was 
undertaken. In both cases, there was statistical significance (p < 0.05) which indicated that 
allocation of chairs was associated with the incumbent political party. 
  
 
 
In both Q2.2 and Q2.3, there was a statistically significant association, as demonstrated below, 
showing that the Liberal Democrats, when incumbent, gave significantly more 
chairpersonships of O&S committees to opposition parties. Regardless of the affiliation 
Table 6.31: Comparing the means of committee chairpersonships according to incumbent party 
Table 6.32: One-way ANOVA of committee chairpersonships according to incumbent party 
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differences, all three parties gave the majority of chairs to the incumbent party. From Table 
6.34 (2
nd 
below), incumbent Labour groups were statistically significantly less likely than 
Liberal Democrats to give chairs of O&S to the opposition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q2.5 asked those who had identified as a chair or vice-chair how they had achieved that 
position. Of the 338 respondents who reported this, 337 respondents answered this question 
giving 386 responses: 
 
 
Table 6.33: Post-hoc (Tukey‟s-b) majority committee chairpersonships by incumbent political party 
Table 6.34: Post-hoc (Tukey‟s-b) opposition committee chairpersonships by incumbent political party 
2.5 If you are a chair or vice-chair, how did you obtain the position? (Multiple choices 
permitted) 
Table 6.35: Route to chair or vice-chair of an O&S committee 
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From table 6.35, the majority of respondents (75%) reported that they were nominated by 
their own party for the position. A number of respondents who selected that they had been 
nominated by their own party also chose the option of ‘nominated by full council’ as a 
supplementary option, which could have been interpreted as being nominated by the party and 
subsequently verified in a formal council setting. Another popular route of nomination was 
being nominated by a scrutiny committee (18.4% in total). In these cases, respondents were 
more likely to be elected as a chair/ vice-chair by a committee dominated by the majority 
group. Only 3.6% of respondents reported that their nomination came specifically from 
another party other than their own (i.e. possibly opposition chairs chosen specifically by a 
majority party). According to affiliation, both Conservative and Labour respondents were 
equally as likely to be nominated by their own party with over three-quarters of respondents 
reporting that their own group had made the decision. In contrast, although the majority of 
Liberal Democrats were nominated by their own party, the proportion was around 10% lower, 
with a respectively higher proportion being nominated by other parties (5.5%) or the scrutiny 
committees themselves (21.9%). 
 
 
 
Through viewing the results through the incumbent respondents alone (table 6.37), it became 
clear that there was very little nomination by any other party when the party was incumbent. 
Table 6.36: Route to chair or vice-chair of an O&S committee according to party 
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By selecting only the respondents who were from incumbent political parties, the routes for 
nomination to chair positions appeared to change. In the table below, the significant 
difference was that Liberal Democrat chairs in Liberal Democrat authorities were more 
strongly controlled by their Liberal Democrat party (84.8%). Given the previous table, this 
indicated that Liberal Democrats were most likely to be chosen by Labour or Conservative 
majority groups as chairs selected from an opposition (see previous table, LDs more likely to 
be nominated by other parties (5.5%) or the scrutiny committees themselves (21.9%). 
  
 
Natural Loyalty in the Blended Separation of Powers 
The questionnaire results have thus far focused on the actions of the party groups and the 
controls it has put in place, such as party group meetings (Q3.1, Q3.2) advisory and 
explicit whipping (Q3.3, Q3.4), briefing candidates (Q3.5), punishing transgressors (Q3.6, 
Q3.61, Q3.71), allocating committee chairs (Q2.1, Q2.2, Q2.3) and nominating candidates 
(Q2.5). As such, the remaining questions (Q3.9, Q3.10 and Q5.11, Q5.12, Q5.13, Q5.14) 
focused on whether councillors might have had concerns about their behaviour (in relation to 
the group) and whether they would act on these. Thus the survey section asked respondents a 
series of proxy questions about fears and actions to examine the potential impact on O&S.  
Table 6.37: Route to chair or vice-chair of an O&S committee according to party (Incumbents only) 
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Q3.9 and Q3.10 related to a councillor’s fear of consequences relating to public criticism 
affecting the councillor’s position with the party or the results of a subsequent election. The 
final section of the survey (Q5.11 through Q5.14) provided a sequence of hypothetical 
scenarios which respondents could either agree or disagree upon. 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3.9 sought to address a councillor’s regard for office-seeking within the party and whether 
the objective of achieving higher office was a factor in maintaining discipline and following 
group regulations. Respondents were expected to grade the statement according to a Likert 
scale running from 1 through 7, where 7 indicated the strongest agreement with the 
proposition. The results of the question are presented in the table below. 
 
 
 
The mean result for this question was relatively high (4.04) but the variance and standard 
deviation were also quite high. The skewness of the result was negative, indicating a slight 
cluster towards the higher end of agreement to this statement but the negative kurtosis implied 
a flat distribution across all possible responses. The histogram of results is presented below in 
figure 6.11: 
3.9 On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means strongly disagree and 7 means strongly agree 
(circle your choice as appropriate), how much do you agree or disagree with this statement:  
“I would be concerned about the consequences of criticising my own party in public; 
in relation to my position within my local party group.” 
Table 6.38: Descriptive statistics for Q3.9 
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In reference to an association with party, the means for each group were markedly different; 
showing a much higher mean from Labour respondents in comparison to Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat respondents. 
  
 
 
When testing for significance using a one-way ANOVA, it was found that these differences 
were statistically significant and showed that Labour councillors were much more likely to 
agree with this statement more strongly than respondents from the other parties (p = 0.013). 
  
 
Fig 6.11: Histogram of responses to Q3.9 indicating level of agreement 
Table 6.39: Means of levels of agreement to the statement in Q3.9 by political party  
Table 6.40: ANOVA: Comparing means of political party groups to Q3.9 
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Whilst there were no statistical significant relationships when testing incumbency vs. 
opposition, the presence of a majority or whether the respondent held a chair / vice-chair, 
there was a statistically significant relationship when testing with council tier. As shown in 
the tables below, the agreement from respondents in upper or single tier authorities was 
significantly higher (p = 0.013) than that of the lower tier respondents. Thus factors that could 
increase a councillor’s fear of losing their position in the party as a result of criticising the 
party in public included serving in an upper or single tier authority and being a Labour party 
councillor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3.10 sought to address a councillor’s concern for vote-seeking and whether the objective of 
the party winning elections was a factor in maintaining discipline and following group rules. 
Respondents were expected to grade the statement according to the same Likert scale. 
Table 6.41: Tukey‟s-b post-hoc test of significance 
 TIER N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
3.9  Lower Tier 358 3.83 2.054 .109 
Upper Tier or Single Tier 493 4.19 2.112 .095 
 Table 6.42: Means of level of agreement across tiers for Q3.9 
Table 6.43: T-test for significance of different means according to tier for Q3.9 
3.10 On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means strongly disagree and 7 means strongly agree 
(circle your choice as appropriate), how much do you agree or disagree with this statement:  
 “I would be concerned about the consequences of criticising my own party in public; 
in relation to my party‟s chances at the next election.” 
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The mean for this question was higher
8
 than the mean for the preceding question (4.63) with a 
similar variance and standard deviation but a higher negative value of skewness, representing 
a clustering towards the higher end of the agreement scale. The kurtosis also indicated a less 
flat distribution across all responses in contrast to Q3.9. The histogram of results is presented 
below: 
  
 
 
In reference to an association with party, the means for each were relatively clustered but 
showed that Labour respondents feared the consequences of public criticism in relation to 
elections most strongly, with Liberal Democrat respondents fearing the consequences the least.  
                                                            
8 Using a paired-samples t-test, the difference in the means for 3.9 and 3.10 was statistically significant to p < 
0.0005. 
Table 6.44: Descriptive statistics for Q3.10 
Fig 6.12: Histogram of responses to Q3.10 indicating level of agreement 
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In tandem with the results of the previous question, when testing for significance using a one-
way ANOVA, it was found that there was a statistically significant difference between Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats; with Labour again more likely to agree that they would be 
concerned about criticising their party group in relation to upcoming elections (p = 0.044). 
 
 
 
 
 
Whilst there were no statistically significant associations when testing for whether the 
respondent was a chair / vice-chair or whether the authority had a majority party or not, there 
were statistically significant relationships with whether the respondent was part of an 
incumbent party or in opposition and by the tier of the council. Table 6.48 and 6.49 (below) 
show that the mean for Q3.10 was statistically significantly higher in upper tier or single tier 
respondents (p = 0.019). 
 
 
 
1.3 Political Party Mean N Std. Deviation 
Conservative 4.57 451 2.065 
Labour 4.95 187 2.098 
Liberal Democrat 4.47 214 1.932 
Total 4.63 852 2.045 
 Table 6.45: Means of levels of agreement to the statement in Q3.9 by political party  
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 26.117 2 13.058 3.139 .044 
Within Groups 3532.160 849 4.160   
Total 3558.277 851    
 Table 6.46: ANOVA: Comparing means of political party groups to Q3.10 
1.3 Political Party N 
Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 2 
Liberal Democrat 214 4.47  
Conservative 451 4.57 4.57 
Labour 187  4.95 
 Table 6.47: Tukey‟s-b post-hoc test of significance 
 
TIER N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
3.10 “I would be concerned 
about the conqs of crit my own 
party in public;  in relation to 
my party's chances at the next 
elec" 
Lower Tier 358 4.44 2.018 .107 
Upper Tier or Single Tier 494 4.77 2.055 .092 
 Table 6.48: Means of level of agreement across tiers for Q3.10 
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Similarly, table 6.50 and 6.51 (below) show that the mean for Q3.10 was statistically 
significantly higher from respondents who were part of opposition parties (4.96) than 
respondents in incumbent parties (4.52) (p = 0.004). Thus serving in an upper or single tier 
authority, being a Labour or Conservative councillor or being in opposition appeared to 
increase the concern for protecting electoral ambitions when considering action. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
  
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
3.10 “I would be concerned 
about the conqs of crit my 
own party in public;  in 
relation to my party's 
chances at the next elec" 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.157 .692 -2.350 850 .019 -.333 .142 -.611 -.055 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
  
-2.357 777.
175 
.019 -.333 .141 -.610 -.056 
 Table 6.49: T-test for significance of different means according to tier for Q3.10 
 
Incumbent or Opposition N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
3.10: “I would be concerned 
about the conqs of crit my own 
party in public;  in relation to 
my party's chances at the next 
elec" 
Incumbency 527 4.52 2.110 .092 
Opposition 266 4.95 1.911 .117 
 Table 6.50: Means of level of agreement across incumbency and opposition for Q3.10 
  Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
  
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Diff 
Std. Error 
Diff Lower Upper 
3.10 “I would be concerned 
about the conqs of crit my 
own party in public;  in 
relation to my party's 
chances at the next elec" 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
9.799 .002 -2.779 791 .006 -.427 .154 -.729 -.125 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
  
-2.871 580.798 .004 -.427 .149 -.720 -.135 
 Table 6.51: T-test for significance of different means according to incumbency / opposition for Q3.10 
216 
 
 
 
 
 
Within section five of the questionnaire there were four statements relating to hypothetical 
actions that were feasible for all councillors operating in local government. Q5.11 related to a 
statement about a councillor acting in a vote-seeking capacity and taking an issue to the party, 
rather than to officers, to O&S or any other formal council outlets. 
 
 
 
Results showed that respondents generally agreed to a very high level about this action, 
indicating their strong agreement with vote-seeking as a responsibility of the individual 
councillor. The mean was 6.20 and the standard deviation and variance were low. The data 
was negatively skewed showing that the majority of responses were clustered at the high end 
of agreement, along with a high kurtosis indicating that the data was peaked at the highest 
level of agreement. 
5.1 Please rank how much you agree with the following statements using the scale from 
1-7 – where 1 means you completely disagree with the statement and 7 means you 
completely agree with the statement. 
5.11 “If there is a problem in my ward that has been caused by a decision made by my own 
party, I would contact my group leader(s) to express my serious concern and try and work out 
a solution. There‟s no point giving the opposition ammunition by opening up such a simple 
thing to wider debate!” 
 
 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
5.11 
Statement  
854 6 1 7 6.20 .044 1.291 1.666 -2.134 .084 4.789 .167 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
854 
           
Table 6.52: Descriptive statistics for Q5.11 
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Factoring in the party as an element, the highest level of agreement with the hypothetical 
vote-seeking action came from Conservatives (6.27) and the lowest from Liberal Democrats 
(6.09). However a one-way ANOVA showed that there was no significance relating to the 
party, demonstrating that all parties were equally as likely to rank agreement with the vote-
seeking statement very highly. Testing the significance of council tier, incumbency vs. 
opposition, presence of a majority party and chair / non-chair respondents also resulted in no 
statistically significant relationships that could form associations with the level of agreement 
to the statement. The responses to the question indicated that all respondents were equally as 
likely to very strongly agree with this vote-seeking course of action. 
 
 
 
Fig 6.13: Histogram of responses to Q5.11 indicating level of agreement 
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Q5.12 posited a statement which generally corresponded to one of the legislation’s intentions 
of encouraging councillors to take O&S-relevant concerns to appropriate committees which 
had a remit to cover the issues involved, rather than taking issues to the party for possible 
political capital. 
 
 
 
There was a much wider distribution of agreement to this statement, with the arithmetic mean 
at 4 with a high standard deviation and variance. The data was negatively skewed implying a 
very slight clustering round the higher levels of agreement but the kurtosis was negative and 
implied a flat distribution of responses. 
 
 
5.12 “If one of my ward constituents contacted me about a problem that they had encountered 
and it seemed like a sensible topic for an O&S investigation, I would try and raise the item in 
O&S first rather than taking it to my party.” 
 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
5.12  
Statement 
853 6 1 7 4.00 .073 2.124 4.509 -.027 .084 -1.359 .167 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
853 
           
 Table 6.53: Descriptive statistics for Q5.12 
 Fig 6.14: Histogram of responses to Q5.12 indicating level of agreement 
219 
 
Looking at the responses to Q5.12 through the lens of the party, Conservatives appeared the 
most likely to agree with this statement most strongly (4.03) but only to a marginal extent, as 
the Liberal Democrat party had only a slightly lower level of agreement (3.94). 
 
 
When testing the significance of the differences between the means, it was found that there 
was no statistical significance showing the party as an association. Equally, when testing the 
importance of council tier, incumbency vs. opposition, presence of a majority party or chair / 
non-chair respondents, there were no statistically significant relationships which affected the 
responses to the statement.  The responses to the question indicated that all respondents were 
equally as likely to agree or disagree with the statement of the legislation’s intention. 
 
 
 
 
Q5.13 related to a policy-seeking councillor seeking to deliver policy through compliance 
with the party. The statement, like the others, was purposively exaggerative to provoke 
respondents to factor in both sides of the statement’s intention; both delivering policy for the 
councillor but through the means of remaining well-liked within the group. 
 
 
 
1.3 Political Party Mean N Std. Deviation 
Conservative 4.03 451 2.141 
Labour 3.99 189 2.192 
Liberal Democrat 3.94 213 2.032 
Total 4.00 853 2.124 
 Table 6.54: Means of levels of agreement to the statement in Q5.12 by political party  
5.13 “My aim as a councillor is to make a difference to the lives of people by feeding into the 
policy process with my ward residents in mind. If I am unpopular in the party group it makes 
„making a difference‟ much harder.” 
 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
5.13 
Statement 
848 6 1 7 4.60 .061 1.779 3.166 -.469 .084 -.606 .168 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
848 
           
 Table 6.55: Descriptive statistics for Q5.13 
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The mean for Q5.13 (4.60) was higher than the mean for Q5.12 (4.00) but not as high as the 
vote-seeking statement in Q5.11 (6.20). The negative skewness indicated that the responses 
were slightly skewed towards the higher levels of agreement but the negative kurtosis 
demonstrated that the distribution of responses was relatively flat. 
 
 
 
When factoring in party with Q5.13, Conservative and Labour respondents reported higher 
levels of agreement to this statement than the Liberal Democrats, as displayed in the table 
below: 
 
 
When testing for the significance of differences between each party, it was found that there 
was a significant difference between the means of the Labour and Conservative respondents 
Fig 6.15: Histogram of responses to Q5.13 indicating level of agreement 
1.3 Political Party Mean N Std. Deviation 
Conservative 4.78 450 1.773 
Labour 4.63 186 1.859 
Liberal Democrat 4.19 212 1.659 
Total 4.60 848 1.779 
 Table 6.56: Means of levels of agreement to the statement in Q5.13 by political party  
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and the Liberal Democrats. From table 6.58 (below), it was clear that the Liberal Democrat’s 
level of agreement to Q5.13 was significantly lower. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When testing according to the respondent’s council tier, incumbency vs. opposition, presence 
of a majority party or whether a chair / not a chair, there were no statistically significant 
relationships. The only statistically significant relationship showed that Liberal Democrat 
respondents were less likely to agree to remain pliant with the rest of the party group for the 
purpose of delivering policy. 
 
 
 
The final statement in section five related to councillor compliance with the party for office-
seeking purposes and achieving a position of influence for individual ends. The statement 
reflected respondents being willing to sacrifice individuality in the short-term (through loyalty 
to the group) for a broader range of influence in the long-term. 
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 50.603 2 25.302 8.126 .000 
Within Groups 2631.076 845 3.114   
Total 2681.679 847    
 Table 6.57: ANOVA: Comparing means of political party groups to Q5.13 
1.3 Political Party N 
Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 2 
Liberal Democrat 212 4.19  
Labour 186  4.63 
Conservative 450  4.78 
 Table 6.58: Tukey‟s-b table for Q5.13 by political party 
5.14 “It is reasonable to be expected to fall in line when it comes to agreeing with what the 
party asks me to do. If I am loyal to our cause I am more likely to get into a position of 
influence. With this wider area of influence, I can make life better for my constituents by 
having some control over the authority‟s work programme.” 
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The mean of all levels of agreement was 4.28 with a reasonably high standard deviation and 
variance. The mean was higher than that of Q5.12 but not Q5.13 or Q5.11. The responses 
were negatively skewed demonstrating a clustering around the higher levels of agreement 
whilst the kurtosis illustrated that the data was relatively flat in distribution. 
 
 
 
When factoring in party as a factor, table 6.60 shows that Conservatives were the most likely 
to indicate the highest levels of agreement with the statement through a mean of 4.40 in 
contrast to Labour (4.18) and the Liberal Democrats (4.10). 
 
 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
5.14 
Statement 
849 6 1 7 4.28 .060 1.751 3.065 -.236 .084 -.801 .168 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
849 
           
 Table 6.59: Descriptive statistics for Q5.14 
Fig 6.16: Histogram of responses to Q5.14 indicating level of agreement 
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However, when testing for the significance of the differences in the means from each political 
party group, these differences were not statistically significant, thus indicating that the party 
was not a factor in the level of agreement. In factoring in whether the respondent was a chair / 
vice-chair, the presence of a majority, incumbency vs. opposition and the tier of the council, 
there were no statistical significant relationships that could determine the proclivity to agree 
with this statement. 
 
Brief Summary of Quantitative Data 
The quantitative data reveals some significant results relating to party group involvement in 
O&S, including strong signs that groups were using instruments to influence the outcomes of 
the work of committees. For example, 35% of respondents reported pre-O&S group meetings, 
44% reported time devotion to O&S issues in group meetings and showed that a majority of 
local government (~ 55%) used group meetings to discuss the operation of the function. 
Whipping was also prevalent, with 26% of respondents reporting either advisory or explicit 
whipping in relation to their actions in O&S. Taken together, 62% of respondents had 
experienced at least one of these modes of group action on O&S. Respondents were also 
cohibited through briefings (25%), unlikely to speak against the group in public (Q3.7, Q3.8) 
and a minority of councillors reported castigative discipline in relation to O&S work (2.67%). 
Groups also played major protective roles in the structure of O&S, ensuring committee chair 
allocations and nominations to chair positions were tightly group-led. 
 
1.3 Political Party Mean N Std. Deviation 
Conservative 4.40 451 1.762 
Labour 4.18 187 1.865 
Liberal Democrat 4.10 211 1.603 
Total 4.28 849 1.751 
 Table 6.60: Means of levels of agreement to the statement in Q5.14 by political party 
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However, quantitative data can only report the incidences of these occurrences without the 
benefit of the context of application and thus any intimation that group involvement in O&S 
has been for the express purpose of defending group ambitions would be wholly premature. 
The subsequent chapter explores the qualitative work in case study authorities which 
contextualise the variables under scrutiny in the quantitative survey research. 
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Chapter Seven: Qualitative case study research 
Case study fieldwork 
The case study research took place over a four month period. The observation element of the 
research took place between February 4
th
 and May 18
th
 2010 and involved nineteen O&S 
committee observations at four authorities across England. Interviewing sixty members from 
within these councils, including all group leaders, took place between February 12
th
 and June 
22
nd
 2010. All contributions to the research were provided on condition of anonymity and as 
such the council name, location, characteristics, names and specific titles of members are 
concealed throughout. However, each study is given a profile to provide a milieu to the data 
collected at each authority. 
 
7.1 Alpha District Council 
Profile 
Alpha Council covers a significant area in the North West of England. In the council year 
under research, the Conservatives were the majority, holding 65% of seats with a Labour 
opposition holding 33% along with an independent (2%) who had defected from the 
Conservatives. Elections take place in thirds each year, thus the elections to Alpha are held in 
three in every four years across the ward, with the county elections in the fourth. In terms of 
decision-making, the council adopted the cabinet and leader model when changes occurred in 
2000.  In respect to the history of the council’s composition, the authority had followed 
national trends in terms of the declining popularity of the central Labour party’s incumbency. 
In 1998, Labour had a majority of 10, declining to 7 in 2000 and thereafter the Conservatives 
took control and consolidated to a peak of a majority of 16 when this research was undertaken. 
The Liberal Democrats, whilst only contesting seats in more recent years, had not been able to 
achieve a seat in this authority. Relating to O&S during the year under observation, there were 
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three committees formed to scrutinise various aspects of the council and organisations outside 
the authority. The committee responsible for the work programmes of scrutiny, post-hoc 
scrutiny and holding to account the executive was referred to as the executive O&S, the 
policy development and review committee was known as the corporate O&S and a committee 
focused on external agencies was entitled the environmental O&S. Each of these committees 
were formed of eighteen members in proportion to the council’s composition. Both the 
inward-facing committees dealing with pre- and post-hoc- scrutiny were chaired by the 
majority party, whilst the more outward-facing scrutiny committee was chaired by a member 
of the Labour opposition. 
 
Research data 
The following data from Alpha was collected from fifteen semi-structured interviews with 
members from both the majority and opposition and observations from three O&S meetings.
1
 
The format of the qualitative analysis will be through the seven variables assessing party 
behaviour. 
 
V1: Local party group meetings 
Pre-Overview and Scrutiny Party Group Meetings  
When enquiring as to the possibility of group meetings which could be used as a way to 
formulate party perspective before overview and scrutiny, the controlling group at Alpha were 
very upfront in interviews, though less so during observation, about the need for party 
                                                            
1 References to individual councillors are in the following format for all councils within this thesis: 
AD001C, with the preceding letters indicating the authority (e.g. Alpha District), the number 
indicating the chronological order of collection (001 - 015) and the suffixed letter indicating the 
affiliation of the respondent (C = Conservative, L = Labour, LD = Liberal Democrat, LI = Liberal, IN 
= Independent). Brief code backgrounds are given in Appendix B. 
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meetings prior to overview and scrutiny committees. A majority group committee chair stated 
that the pre-meetings took place primarily for disseminating information: 
 
„Each group has, sort of, a pre-meeting. [...] I suppose, a briefing, because you know 
yourself from the papers, you know, there‟s an awful lot of paper that goes into them. 
[...] The pre-meeting is really just to pass on that briefing to the other councillors. I 
suppose to give them the ability to actually participate if they wanted to. [...] The 
cabinet members could [be there] and are there, yes.‟ 
 AD001C 
 
When questioned about the relative silence of the majority party in overview and scrutiny 
committee meetings, the leader of the majority group argued that pre-meetings were a way of 
addressing backbench councillor concerns in private rather than public: 
 
„If people have a strong view, then I would expect those people to, within my own 
group, [...] to have shared that with me. [...] To suddenly find that you‟re being shot at 
by your own kind (I don‟t mind being shot at by the Labour group, I expect that and 
that‟s fair game), [but] to be shot at by your own colleague, I would at least expect it 
to be canvassed first.‟ 
AD004C 
 
A majority party chair also dealt with the silence of administration members in overview and 
scrutiny with reference to pre-meetings of the group as a route for intra-party scrutiny rather 
than inter-party scrutiny. 
 
„You find the Conservative councillors very quiet because they already know we have 
discussions about different aspects of policy within the council and you‟re already 
aware and you don‟t ask the questions, because you‟ve got the answer.‟ 
AD006C 
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An independent councillor who had defected from the majority party but had also sat on a 
scrutiny committee under both labels claimed that Conservative group pre-meetings prior to 
overview and scrutiny were a way of solidifying a group line on issues raised in scrutiny. 
There was a specific reference to this happening in the executive overview and scrutiny 
committee, which was an arena primarily used to hold the cabinet to account: 
 
„Certainly on the executive overview and scrutiny, as I‟ve said, the sort of attitude on 
the Conservative side is that, well, this is being discussed at group meetings, it‟s being 
discussed in caucus [immediately prior to the meeting] and that‟s what was agreed, so, 
sort of, don‟t go against it.‟ 
AD005IN 
 
The concerns raised by the independent councillor were echoed by a Labour opposition 
councillor on the same committee: 
 
„They have a caucus meeting and then when they have the caucus meeting; they are 
told by the cabinet members, “don‟t speak!”‟ 
AD002L 
 
However, the majority of comments about the use of pre-meetings of the group before 
overview and scrutiny indicated that it was the executive O&S where the majority group 
typically held caucuses beforehand: 
 
„We have pre-meetings to ensure you‟re all singing from the same hymn sheet but 
[corporate scrutiny] doesn‟t seem to have that. [...] There are no specific meetings 
where I‟m given guidelines by my leader to say we must go this way.‟ 
AD006C 
 
229 
 
 „On the external especially, there‟s no politics to it at all because we as a group 
[meaning committee] decide on what subjects we‟re going to have next.’ 
AD0014C 
 
Concerning the Labour opposition, it was seen as unlikely that pre-meetings would be held 
prior to the executive O&S because of the numbers involved: 
 
„I think there are only four members there, but what you do tend to find is its either 
[Cllr Name] or [Cllr Leader] who are doing the talking anyway, so you know, whether 
there‟s such a need for a pre-meeting, I‟m not so sure.‟ 
AD001C 
 
This supposition that the two members, the opposition leader and a senior opposition 
councillor, led the discussion for their party without need for a pre-meeting, bore out in 
interviews with the members who sat on the executive O&S: 
 
„We certainly don‟t seek to rehearse every line, kind of thing. You know, myself and 
[Cllr Name] are confident and competent enough to just go in and set out the case on 
the basis of the call-in. [...] I think your view will have been of largely myself and [Cllr 
Name] carrying executive overview and scrutiny and certainly that was the case.‟ 
AD003L 
 
Elsewhere on the other committees, other Labour members reported that pre-meetings do not 
occur because of a technicality rather than some ideological objection: 
 
„We don‟t tend to hold a meeting prior to the committee, but normally that‟s because 
it‟s been discussed in the full group meeting beforehand anyway.‟ 
AD009L 
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Time Devoted to O&S in Regular Party Group Meetings 
Whilst respondents had reported that ‘caucuses’ took place only in one party, in specific 
circumstances, the occurrence of devoting time to agreeing O&S issues beforehand in regular 
group meetings was common across both parties. The leader of the council claimed that this 
was unavoidable due to a need to include his group in decision-making and thus bring 
scrutiny into the group rather than allow it out into the ‘point scoring’ of the public arena: 
 
„You have got the views of the political group before it even comes on the agenda. So 
it‟s not a true „overview and scrutiny‟ of documents and policies which have been 
unseen before they come onto the public arena. They‟ve actually been discussed and 
seen and homed in, [...] because clearly you don‟t want to deliver a policy which is 
unacceptable to your own group. [...] The scrutiny of cabinet decisions has already 
taken place within the group agenda process. [...] Criticisms, observations, directions, 
focus, important issues, yes. I mean our meetings are not necessarily docile but that is 
where the scrutiny is taking place.’ 
AD004C 
 
In the administration group there was broad support for the party to continue to operate in this 
manner. As one member attested, the reason for discussing scrutiny issues within the confines 
of groups was to ensure that councillors had a suitable enfranchisement opportunity in 
decision-making and assured that any questions and criticisms as a result of disagreements 
were internalised to protect the public image of the party: 
 
„You‟ve already had a group meeting to determine what the cabinet policy should be 
[...] it‟s already been debated, I wouldn‟t say in full, but a decision of the ruling group 
has been taken on how those decisions should be made. [...] [Thus in scrutiny] you‟ve 
got the press sitting there and if there are sensitivities, you probably don‟t want to put 
them into the public domain. If you were asking for a different route to be taken, 
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then you wouldn‟t want to be seen. I suppose our members, the majority group 
members, don‟t want to be seen attacking their colleagues on cabinet.‟ 
AD007C 
 
Similarly the Labour opposition devoted time in their regular group meetings to deal with 
issues under consideration in O&S. It was recognised that time devoted to O&S in group 
meetings was to prevent damage to the party due to the possibility of public disunity. 
Furthermore, as their size on O&S was different from the administration, councillors 
mentioned that the group was an ideal place for a relatively small opposition to formulate a 
party line, to ensure the opposition was united together and subsequently more powerful in 
O&S. 
 
„If you‟ve got [...] particular arguments that you wish to make, then you‟d raise those 
in the discussion that you would have with the group. As a matter of courtesy, you‟d 
normally run them by the Labour leadership. Ultimately, parties work in a way that 
you don‟t want to embarrass your party and cause trouble, unless you‟re set out on 
that course. [...] You‟d look to have a unified voice on a particular issue, just in terms 
of your effectiveness in the debate. If you are disparate, then it weakens your ability 
to get anything through, to make the case within the overview and scrutiny 
committee.‟ 
AD009L 
 
Opposition councillors made reference to devoting time to O&S in party meetings and how 
the group translated its discussions at group meetings into action at O&S. There was also a 
specific reference to opposition group meetings being a place to generate questions in order to 
be delivered at committee. As a result, a councillor implied that it was almost rare to have 
spontaneous debate in the (corporate) O&S committee.   
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„It‟s quite organised. It‟s structured. We set an agenda, we look back at the previous 
meeting and then we take it from there. The leader will deal with issues that have 
come to light, then we‟ll highlight stuff that‟s appeared on agendas or is in the 
forward plan. [...] We hold our meetings on a Monday night and then we‟ll talk about 
upcoming scrutiny [...]. So we get our thoughts together, you know what I mean? You 
know what you are going to say, but sometimes you might say something else if 
something comes from the other side, but there‟s not a lot coming from the other side!‟ 
AD010L 
 
„There is a discussion about what we are going to call-in, what is relevant to call-in, 
post- the cabinet meeting and then perhaps a little bit more detail on what we are 
going to say and how we are going to say it.‟ 
AD003L 
 
Another Labour councillor was more pragmatic and less discreet about the nature of the 
regular party group meetings devoted to scrutiny as a tool to formulate a ‘point-scoring’ 
attack against the administration: ‘we will discuss... and think about „scoring‟ and whatever‟ 
(AD008L). 
 
Thus the regular group meetings of both parties dealt with scrutiny in a controlled way. For 
the majority party, the time devoted to O&S was part of the group’s process to pre-empt 
dissatisfaction with cabinet decisions and thus public discourse on the outcomes. The non-
executives within the group were readily involved in some cabinet decision-making before 
decisions were made and subsequently were allowed to scrutinise the actual decisions made, 
on condition that this was within the confines of the group. The discussion of upcoming O&S 
issues in private allowed members to ‘have a go [...] point their views out where they think 
that the cabinet is going wrong‟ (AD014C) but automatically precluded this from happening 
in public. As for the opposition, group meetings were designed for strategising and planning 
actions in the public meeting. Councillors reported that public questioning in overview and 
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scrutiny was often preordained and the party meeting offered a chance for members to discuss 
how to best score ‘political points’ in the arena. 
 
V2: Pervasiveness of organisation 
Holding to account 
At Alpha the ‘executive O&S’ was a committee specifically nominated for the ‘holding to 
account’ role of overview and scrutiny. At an observation, the proceedings were found to be 
fractious and confrontational throughout. The committee met in the main chamber of the 
council, each party taking the wing of the room that they typically took at full council and the 
leader and cabinet were in attendance; sitting without distinction (amongst committee 
members) on their party’s benches. The bulk of the meeting was a series of exchanges 
between two senior opposition councillors and the majority party chair. At times throughout 
the meeting the chair refused to recognise contributions from opposition councillors: 
 
[After multiple concerns raised by two opposition councillors] „On that basis I would 
suggest that the movement is that we have no concerns about the decision of cabinet, 
I'll take that to be the mood of this meeting.‟ 
 
[After opposition councillors raised issue for a 2
nd
 time] „It‟s been taken on board. We 
don't have to rescind, we're not looking to change or to go back to cabinet. 
 
„I'll take it that the mood of this committee is that we have no concerns to take back to 
cabinet.‟ [Silence from committee] 
Taken from Alpha Exec O&S Thursday 4
th
 February 2010 [0:26:40 – 0:27:30] 
 
Further context to the above extract from the committee observation was that no majority 
party committee members had commented upon the discussion. Ten from eleven majority 
party members did not make a verbal contribution during the 1h35m meeting. The 
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Conservative approach to being ‘held to account’ in public was pragmatic due to the history 
of these meetings: 
 
„...they use O&S as a bit of an opportunity to take pot shots at the ruling group. [...] 
You tend to find that most of our side, if there are call-in items, won‟t participate. [...] 
They‟re trying to make political points and [...], at this sort of time, with both local 
elections pending and possibly a national election, you tend to get a bit more of that 
[...] because it is a bit of point scoring. [...] You get Labour making points and they 
get reported and then that gets to a wider audience in the run up to an election.‟ 
AD001C 
 
Other councillors argued that this type of behaviour at this particular committee was not just 
restricted to times near elections and it was more of a majority party decision that this 
committee would not fulfil its intended role to hold to account the leader and cabinet in public: 
 
„Although officially there is no whip in overview and scrutiny, they are reminded quite 
gently that all the things that have gone to overview and scrutiny, they‟ve actually 
agreed to in caucus and group meetings, so therefore, although there‟s not actually a 
„whip,‟ I think the whip is there in the background.‟ 
AD005IN 
 
The reason that the opposition members believed that the committee would never be an 
adequate vehicle to ‘hold to account’ was that the leader and cabinet were present for all 
meetings of the executive O&S committee, with or without being called to give evidence: 
 
‘If we want you [cabinet / leader] to attend, then we‟ll call you to the meeting and you 
should only be allowed to talk on that one item. What the Tories did, they amended the 
constitution to say that it is at the Chairman‟s discretion whether the fellow could be 
allowed to speak.‟ 
AD002L 
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„When you go into [O&S] meetings with the cabinet and shadow cabinet, that‟s when 
the political allegiances come out. “Well, we‟re the ruling group. You can say what 
you like but at the end of the day it‟s going to go through.”‟ 
AD010L 
 
It had become accepted that the ‘holding to account’ role of O&S was not possible on a cross-
party basis, thus the meetings of this committee were often only based around one theme; the 
opposition using the time in public to fiercely and theatrically criticise the majority party.  
 
„O&S is treated as an environment in which the Labour opposition will come and, 
well, depending on which view you take, come and provide trenchant criticism or 
appropriate criticism or “come and have a go” kind of thing. [...] If I‟m honest Mark, 
a lot of it is a political tussle. [...] I think “why do we bother?” because it is not 
proper overview and scrutiny.‟ 
AD003L 
 
„...it genuinely is a kind of tribal event that doesn‟t really produce anything and I 
don‟t believe, is, in any way, shape or form, effective.‟ 
AD009L 
 
Whilst the Conservatives remained silent in committee, whether through implicit whipping 
reported by the Conservative defector above, or the presence of their leader / cabinet, it was 
clear that the number of call-ins from the opposition (at least one per meeting) was seen as 
competitive behaviour as ‘they wanted to try and make political gain [...] They don‟t really 
think they are going to overturn the decision‟ (AD007C) Thus backbencher malaise observed 
and reported within the committee could have been purposive silence to rebuke the frivolous 
or ‘political grandstanding‟ (AD012C) points made by the opposition. 
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Policy development, review & pre-scrutiny 
Councillors were more positive about policy development, review and pre-scrutiny. However 
each group claimed that the other tried to overshadow the evidence-based work of O&S. For 
example, a Conservative chair argued that the leader of the opposition, who did not sit on his 
committee, tried to influence the committee from outside: 
 
„When [X] was coming in, he was coming in with things that weren‟t evidence based, 
but they were still within the recommendations [...] but slightly adrift, because he 
hadn‟t had the benefit of the evidence we had had.‟ 
AD006C 
 
Equally, the Labour opposition felt that the Conservatives retained control over the O&S 
because they discussed and decided issues away from the committees: 
 
‘[We] pick topics for scrutiny and when we put topics up, there is a veto because it‟s 
too politically sensitive for them to scrutinise it! [...] I put the item forward for a topic 
for scrutiny to investigate neighbourhood management [...] The Conservatives 
wouldn‟t have that. They said what we‟ll do is we‟ll investigate neighbourhood 
management, but neighbourhood management [and] financial implications.‟ 
AD002L 
 
Within the committee’s work on neighbourhood management, the Conservative group made it 
clear that the work of the committee was secondary when it was the party group that would 
decide on more concrete recommendations: 
 
‘[Location X] is the name that comes to our mind at the moment, but the Conservative 
group will decide that. That will be a decision by the group, based on our 
recommendations.‟ 
AD006C 
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Away from the controversial issues councillors were positive about the working style of the 
policy O&S committees (whether development, review or pre-scrutiny) and most of the 
methods for formulating work programmes: 
 
„...we go through a system of marking it up. That‟s just done with the chair and vice-
chair and the Labour. They have a system and we go through it and we choose from 
that. [...] Anybody is allowed to put forward a subject that can be discussed and so as 
far as I can see, it works quite well really, but it just depends on what subjects are put 
forward.‟ 
AD013C 
 
Alpha officers, with knowledge of the confrontational style of O&S, had also encouraged 
members to attempt innovative practice to work across group mandates. In order to base 
output on evidence, the committee formed a workshop in one O&S committee where the 
meeting split into two multi-party groups: 
 
„You sit around in two groups and you come up with different aspects of it and you 
come up with what you can try, what you can‟t try. When you put them together at the 
end, [they] do finish up very similar and they become the recommendations. [...] When 
the two groups broke up, I ran one group and instead of the vice-chair running the 
other one, [...] I gave it to [Labour X], who is a completely different political animal 
to me and we still came up with the same recommendations, which is quite interesting 
really.‟ 
 AD006C 
 
External scrutiny 
The outward facing O&S committee at Alpha was named the environmental O&S but had 
previously been called the ‘external O&S’ without a change in remit. Most of the interviewed 
councillors argued that this was the least group-controlled committee because, as a Labour 
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councillor attested, ‘[councillors] know the political pressure is off and the whip is not there. 
It‟s a little bit different, isn‟t it? You can have a bit of a free hand‟ (AD010L). The committee 
was chaired by Labour but their leader felt that this was pacification rather than any 
reasonable commitment to genuine O&S: 
 
„Environmental O&S has been largely emasculated and its fairly pointless anyway, 
which is why they are quite happy to hand it over, you know? [...] I probably don‟t 
give that one as much attention as I should because nothing ever happens because of 
it or through it. [...] the topics that the [committee] cover are irrelevant to the core 
functioning of the council.‟ 
AD003L (Group Leader) 
 
„...its lip service [...] and done so in a manner that basically means that there is little 
or no political cost to the controlling Conservative group.‟ 
AD009L 
 
A majority party member was surprisingly pragmatic about the reasons for the 
administration’s decision to formulate the committee and its remit: 
 
‘It used to be external because it meant you could only look at stuff that wasn‟t really 
the council, therefore it‟s very difficult to embarrass anybody, so they went and did 
things on the back of Jamie Oliver (!) [..] Sent off to do something that they couldn‟t 
cause any trouble with! [...] You know that scrutiny committee was just to keep, 
essentially, a few councillors happy and look at nice, touchy, feely things outside. I 
don‟t believe it was ever taken seriously.‟ 
AD007C 
 
Other councillors stated their enjoyment of this committee was down to the fact that there was 
no proactive control over their behaviour as in the internal scrutiny committees: 
 
239 
 
„I felt a little bit better without the threat of a whip [...] I‟m not saying everyone 
agreed with each other but it was a more relaxed debate.‟ 
 AD010L 
 
„There‟s no interference by any external people [...] The portfolio holders [...] only 
see it after we have finished with it. They can‟t do much about it at all really, it goes 
through. [...] There is definitely no party whip.‟ 
AD014C 
 
However not all councillors were free of group control, even on the outward facing committee, 
as a Labour councillor was reprimanded by the leader for not following a group member in 
the committee. 
 
„I did get told off after one scrutiny committee, because one of the Labour councillors 
turned up and he had a motion on the agenda that he wanted to talk about and he 
expected, because he was Labour, my backing. But I was not aware of what he was 
talking about, so I couldn‟t feel I could support him...‟ 
AD015L 
 
V3: Centralisation of policy formulation 
Councillors of both groups at Alpha highlighted that a number of decisions were often taken 
by their respective leaderships, both with and without discussion, followed by an expectation 
that these decisions would be held and promoted at O&S level: 
 
„The group leader needs to get the agreement of the group for the issues to go onto the 
agenda but there will have been a discussion within the group anyway, but more often 
than not, it is driven by the leadership.‟ 
AD009L 
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„There are several decisions that the group has, sort of, taken, or the cabinet has taken. 
Because normally the cabinet takes a decision or decides what the line is, [and] takes 
that to group.‟ 
AD007C 
 
A Labour councillor argued that the risks were greater for the majority party, so the leadership 
cadre took active steps to centralise control of discourse in public: 
 
„Ultimately I‟d imagine from the Conservative point of view, that they look at it as if, 
because the risk is greater to them, for one of their backbenchers to say something out 
of line, to “not fit” with the cabinet view or cabinet policy is much greater. I think 
that because of that control within a small cohort of cabinet members, it therefore 
limits the scope of debates and the ability of other councillors and certainly 
Conservative backbenchers to engage in those debates. It‟s almost the strategy of 
“Say as little as possible. Get in, get out and leave it at that.” [...] Within the 
Conservatives, there is a view that it‟s not the role and the position of backbenchers to 
actively scrutinise the policy of the council, but actually prop up the decisions of 
cabinet.‟ 
 AD009L 
 
Whilst some majority party backbenchers didn’t mind that the leadership made some 
decisions and expected support, some councillors disliked the way in which group meetings 
finalised debate on issues before O&S investigations: 
 
„I‟ll be honest with you, because quite a lot of the things, by the time they come down 
to you, even to scrutiny sometimes, the decision has already been made...‟ 
 AD014C  
 
„A lot of it is guided by the cabinet and by the “select” number of people, you know, 
who tend to carry the meetings.‟ 
AD005IN (defector)  
241 
 
 
Equally for the Labour opposition, there was some disquiet in the ranks relating to the 
leadership dominating decisions on issues that carry an expectation of being followed in 
public: 
„I‟ve only been a councillor for two years, so you tend to be given the cold shoulder by 
the older members who “know it all,” who have been there and done it all, you know? 
“What do you know?” you know?‟ 
AD010L 
 
V4: Preclusory discipline 
Given the preceding it is not unsurprising that councillors reported that they were advised to 
act in a certain way at O&S committees. Specifically in relation to the two inward-facing 
committees, councillors reported that the Conservatives were bound by decisions, though 
Conservative respondents themselves stopped short of regarding it as ‘explicit’ whipping: 
 
„[At county council scrutiny] ...it just gives you the opportunity to ask... you know? 
You don‟t seem quite as bound about asking questions [as in Alpha].‟ 
AD007C 
 
„You‟re expected to follow the group decision. [...] Although there‟s no official whip, 
the whip is there in the background. I think it‟s probably the same for Labour as well.‟ 
AD005IN (defector) 
 
According to an opposition respondent, preclusory discipline in the form of whipping in O&S 
and other council functions led the Conservative defector to leave his group and sit as an 
independent: 
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„The reason for coming out of [Conservative group], was that he felt [...] he couldn‟t 
fight for his constituents because of the rules of the party, the whip, they didn‟t give 
him that freedom.‟ 
AD002L 
 
Labour councillors were keen to imply that Conservatives were more explicitly and routinely 
whipped at the two internal committees: 
 
 „They take a very strong party whip [...] about overview and scrutiny.‟ AD002L 
„The whip is used at scrutiny, unfortunately!‟ AD010L 
 
For the Labour opposition, respondents were more open to reporting advisory and explicit 
whipping as a strategy of unification within overview and scrutiny, reporting whipping as 
‘light touch:’ 
„Even though a lot of these committees, you‟re not supposed to have the whip on you,  
I think a lot of people do feel as though they have to go with it.‟ 
AD015L 
 
„Both [group] meetings are fairly „light touch,‟ you know? They‟re generally discussed 
at full group and by and large, it‟s yes, fine, go with it, you know?‟ 
AD002L (Group Leader) 
 
V5: Cohibition of councillor communication 
One of the most noticeable aspects of observations of O&s at Alpha was the presence of the 
cabinet members and the leader, sitting indiscriminately within the non-executive committee 
members on the two O&S committees observed. Observations of the committees 
demonstrated that the cabinet often made the only contributions from the majority party in the 
committee. According to respondents, this happened regularly and the executive were 
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proportionately much more vocal than the Conservative non-executives who formed the 
committees: 
 
„In a way, if there is something which covers their field, then they are probably there 
to answer any questions. As to why they are all there, I don‟t know!‟ 
AD005IN 
 
This phenomenon was replicated by the Labour opposition, with their leader attending 
committees that he was not a member thereof and making contributions: 
 
‘The Labour leader who was sat just in front of you [...] he‟s permitted to come along 
to any meeting and put forward different things. They have a more open gambit than 
we have [...] it can get more fiery because it‟s more like a council meeting.’ 
AD006C 
 
Essentially, respondents saw this practice as restrictive in the committees and it was seen as a 
situation that led to fewer inputs from regular members and more self-censorship. This was 
true of the Conservative group, when one member raised the issue of patronage and member 
allowances in conjunction with cabinet involvement in backbench activity: 
 
„...hence the reason why a lot of them sit on their hands for some of the things, 
because it‟s seen as solidarity with the ruling group. There isn‟t a real distinction 
between the cabinet and the rest of the group. [...] You‟re still constrained as a group. 
If you thought you‟d got a career within the council, the position of leader carries 
huge patronage in the way the councillors get paid these days. There are significant 
amounts of money that go with it all. [...] There are some people who derive a 
significant part of their income from, especially some of the people on pensions [...] 
they are probably looking over their shoulder at that, before being seen to criticise!‟ 
AD007C 
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Whilst AD007C expressed a view that councillors would be metaphorically and literally 
looking over their shoulders as a result of executive intervention within O&S, there were two 
respondents seen to be exceptions to this self-censorship and were able to transgress authority 
on the basis of their seniority within the Conservatives: 
 
„If I feel that something‟s not right, [...] at the meetings, I actually say so: that I don‟t 
feel this is the way we should be going. [...] Perhaps I‟m one of the few? But when you 
get over 21, like I am (!), you couldn‟t care less what people think, you have a 
tendency to say it as you see it.‟ 
 AD014C 
 
V6: Administration of castigative discipline 
Regarding castigative discipline there had been little use in any form against councillors 
except the informal warnings experienced by some members such as AD015L for the 
infraction referred to above. However, administration respondents were aware that such a 
healthy majority could mean that the threat of punishment for speaking against the group 
would be more likely: 
 
„If you‟ve got a little majority, then if somebody speaks out, they‟re likely to get away 
with it because you can‟t afford to lose. But if not, all you‟re losing is a vote for your 
group. If you have got a stonking majority and people mess around, then you‟re 
disciplined a lot more.‟ 
AD007C 
 
Given previous comments about the dangers of ‘disparity weakening your ability [as a group]’ 
(AD009L), group meetings with light whips and the presence of cabinet and leaders at 
overview and scrutiny, it would not be unexpected that councillors might have feared 
castigative discipline and thus become more malleable to group wishes. The Labour group 
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admitted that discipline had been used in the past, but not recently, however could be used 
where councillors did not follow orders relating to public disagreement with the party. Other 
councillors believed that the general failure of O&S was due to the Conservatives’ fear of 
discipline from the presence of the leadership at each meeting: 
 
„Due process says that you shouldn‟t have a cabinet member there in scrutiny because 
it‟s intimidatory [for the majority party non-executives].‟ 
AD002L 
 
V7: Allocation of positions 
At Alpha, the council leader made all of the appointments with a verification occurring at full 
council. The leader expected member nominations to be followed with little self-selection: 
 
„That is one of the responsibilities of me as leader to decide who is the chairman and 
vice-chairman and I also choose the committee members. The full council [...] have to 
vote on those chairmen and vice-chairmen, and of course they follow the political 
desires.‟ 
AD004C 
 
Whilst the Conservatives could have allocated all chairpersonships to the majority group, the 
leader decided to allocate the chair of the environmental committee to the opposition. As 
highlighted above, whilst some Labour members were pleased with the allocation, it was seen 
as the least worst option for the Conservatives to hand them control of this committee: 
 
„...there is no political significance to that. It‟s looking at external issues that [...] will 
not have any financial or resource implications on the council or a requirement for 
the council or the cabinet to pick up any of the recommendations of that particular 
committee, so again, for me, it‟s a lip service...‟ 
AD009L 
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As for the nominations to the individual committees, there was group control in nominating 
regular members according to experience, with the most senior councillors being place on the 
regarded ‘most important’ O&S committee: 
 
‘[Executive] is the „senior‟ overview and scrutiny committee, as such, perhaps the 
slightly more experienced members might be on that, compared with some of the other 
ones, where they may be cutting their teeth a little bit more.‟ 
AD004C (Leader) 
 
„When the Conservative leader is picking his executive O&S committee, he‟s picking 
the ones that he know will stick to the party line, you know what I mean? And the ones 
that don‟t will get put on other committees, less important ones.‟ 
AD010L 
 
For both groups, seniority was also the keyword for appointments to the chair roles of O&S 
committees. For example the Labour nominations for chairs of O&S had tended to be ‘those 
more senior councillors, who at one time or another may have been leader of the group [...] 
or a more senior member of the group‟ (AD009L). According to the Conservative defector, 
the method for choosing majority party chairs was often on the basis of who had previously 
been on the cabinet; 
 
„The chairmanship is possibly a reward or compensation, because actually the 
chairman and vice-chairman of the executive overview and scrutiny are ex-cabinet 
members and they were given them as compensation for leaving the cabinet.‟ 
AD005IN  
 
In respect to the executive O&S, which both parties referred to as the most significant, 
respondents reported that the appointment of who would chair the meetings was clear cut: 
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„...he lost a cabinet position last year and so they needed to keep him sweet because 
he‟s a bit of a high flyer in the Conservative group.‟ 
AD002L 
 
„...they found him a position in which he can a) keep his reputation intact and b) 
operate „effectively‟ for them.‟ 
AD003L 
 
However, the chair had a different perspective, indicating that whilst the role was given to 
him as a softener by the majority party group, it wasn’t the same as being on the cabinet: 
 
„I got kicked off the cabinet when they were changing leader, so I wouldn‟t say I was 
best buddies with the current leader of the council! 
AD007C 
 
Nevertheless, in observation, the chair of the executive O&S, whilst undoubtedly having one 
of the most difficult roles, was especially aggressive and dismissive of the opposition, at one 
point repeatedly shouting for opposition members to ‘shut up.’ Opposition councillors were 
aware that this was not the chair’s fault and as a member of the majority party, rather than as a 
chair of O&S, was actually doing a good job: 
 
[In reference to ‘Shut up!] „I‟m not blaming [X] particularly for that because it‟s all 
part of the culture, the culture of adversarialism within O&S. [...] To what extent he‟s 
been put into the chair of exec O&S because he is prepared to do that... [The chair] is 
either particularly good or bad at it depending on which way you look at it!‟ 
AD003L (Group Leader) 
 
Brief Alpha Summary 
From the data collected at Alpha, it was clear that there was substantial group involvement in 
the operation of O&S, which involved pulling most of the levers available to the parties for 
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the purposes of protecting the goals of the groups. Using group meetings, advisory and 
explicit whipping, strong control over allocations/nominations and restricting councillor 
communication, both parties operated in such a way to acknowledge the dangers of the public 
arena of O&S and thus the possible electoral costs of leaving O&S untended by group 
involvement. Almost seen as an extension of full council, committees meetings provided an 
opportunity for party theatrics thought to be required to maintain party strategy (pre-ordained 
questioning) and cohesion (co-ordinated silence) in an arena where the public and press often 
attended. With the Conservative majority looking to protect their electoral interests through 
co-ordinated action, the Labour opposition reciprocated with equally tactical group 
involvement in the function. 
 
7.2 Beta County Council 
Profile 
Beta County is a large authority located in the West Midlands and is responsible for the 
upper-tier functions of its constituent councils which lie within its borders.  In the council 
year in which this research was undertaken, 72% of seats were taken by Conservatives, 14% 
seats by Liberal Democrats, 5% of seats taken by Labour and 9% taken by other parties or 
independents. Given the composition, the county council represents one of the stronger local 
government strongholds for the Conservative party.  The council elects the whole council in 
four year cycles, the last such election occurring in 2009. Since 1973, the council has only 
either possessed a Conservative majority or reverted to a situation of no overall control. The 
strength of each party has often risen and waned according to either national politics (rise of 
Labour pre-1997) or emergence of local issues (residents associations, single-issue 
associations), but incontrovertibly the authority has seen comparatively high numbers of 
Conservatives even at the times of the lowliest popularity for its national party. At the time of 
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this research, the Conservatives had reached peaked at a majority of 25 at the council and this 
represented one of Beta’s healthiest majorities in recent history. 
 
With respect to O&S, there were six committees formed to scrutinise various aspects of the 
council and beyond. Five of the six scrutiny chairpersonships were allocated to the majority 
party, whilst the largest opposition chaired the overarching Overview and Scrutiny 
Performance Board (OSPB) which steered the work programmes of all of the other scrutiny 
committees. This board was also responsible for the process of call-ins of decisions and at 
least two members of this co-ordinating committee were required to initiate a call-in. The 
other scrutiny committees, each formed of eight members, were topic-divided into adult care, 
children, the environment and economy, health and resources and were able to initiate time-
limited task groups. 
 
Research data 
The following data from Beta presented in this analysis was collected from fifteen semi-
structured interviews with members at the authority from both the majority and opposition 
party and observations from five O&S committee meetings. 
 
V1: Local party group meetings 
Pre-Overview and Scrutiny Party Group Meetings 
At Beta Council, respondents of both major parties (Conservative and Liberal Democrat) 
reported that pre-O&S group meetings took place in very specific instances. For example, the 
overarching O&S commissioning committee, responsible for organising the entire programme 
of scrutiny at Beta, was comprised of six Conservative members (five of whom chaired 
individual scrutiny committees) and two Liberal Democrats; one of whom had the only 
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opposition chair. Given the importance of this committee’s role to oversee the function of 
O&S at Beta, the operation was often contentious enough to require group meetings: 
 
„It is clear now that the group of six who I am working with are talking before 
meetings and on one occasion, during the meeting and we suspended the meeting and 
they had to do a group meeting and then they came back in and decided what they 
wanted to do... which was very unnerving!‟ 
BC004LD 
 
The Conservatives on this committee also took the unusual step of post-overview and scrutiny 
group meetings to discuss, in private, the implications of the proceedings of the committee: 
 
„They went to see [Leader] after the meeting and said “Bloody [X] he‟s not doing as 
he‟s told. We‟re in charge, not him!” And that made for a very difficult pre-
Christmas period and I wondered after Christmas whether the Tories might actually 
take the chairmanship off me and give it to one of them...‟ 
BC004LD 
 
„They all ran off and tried to get him reviewed. Oh yes! They ran to the leader and 
said they wanted him removed because he was challenging things. He was wanting to 
challenge the administration and they‟re not prepared to have that done.‟ 
 BC009LI 
 
Equally on the Liberal Democrat side, Conservative respondents reported that the opposition 
also held pre-O&S group meetings in order to present a united case for wanting topics to be 
looked at within the function: 
 
„There were some of his [Lib Dem] senior colleagues there, well briefed to say we 
ought to do this and we ought to do that and I thought “where are they coming from?” 
you know? There were things that they knew about, they were more experienced; there 
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were several of us who were pretty new round there. We had made a lot of suggestions, 
a lot of those suggestions got pushed to one side [...] and you think, hang on, well I‟m 
doing this now because so-and-so suggested, but that person‟s not on my committee, 
[...] Because there was a forceful presentation by somebody who was aware in 
advance that they [had] had an opportunity and played their cards well, and you then 
think, we‟ve been stitched up here!‟ 
BC011C 
 
Time Devoted to O&S in Regular Party Group Meetings 
In the broader sense of devoting time to O&S in regular group meetings, both major parties 
acknowledged the need and thus experience of this occurrence. For the Conservative 
respondents it was pragmatism to ensure that scrutiny did not descend into point scoring 
through controlling O&S in some way: ‘If there are issues that could have a political impact, 
then yes, it is discussed at group meetings‟ (BC003C). The main concern for the majority 
group was whether the scrutiny would be ‘suitable’ for public debate: 
 
‘We‟re not looking to undermine our own people and if we find there are gaps where 
there shouldn‟t be we might draw it to their attention [...] so they have an opportunity 
before it goes public to look into it and put it right‟ 
BC006C 
 
The Conservative leader was practical about the need for some time devoted to O&S in group 
meetings: 
 
„I do think that you‟ve got a number of very extroverted personalities who always 
aspire to be chairmen and usually end up being chairman [...] and they‟ve always got 
their own view of things. I think what happens here is everything is kept under 
control by group meetings, which are always unanimously supported and defended.‟ 
BC013C 
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The Liberal Democrat chair of the overarching O&S committee felt that this type of group 
block on O&S was unhelpful and predetermined the outcome of any investigations: 
 
„We‟ve got this kind of impotent arrangement, where the controlling group have 
decided that they want to control scrutiny and clearly talk about it and have meetings 
about it and you just wonder within their group meetings of 41 councillors... [...] the 
cabinet will be there, they will be saying to the group what they‟re going to do and it‟s 
all pretty much a done deal.‟ 
BC004LD (Chair of O&S) 
 
Equally, the Liberal Democrats, along with a Liberal councillor, also met in regular party 
group meetings and devoted time to discuss O&S issues. Respondents reported that group 
meetings often involved strategy relating to the majority party individuals involved: 
 
„If we talk about scrutiny in group, it‟s simply to do with, what shall we say? 
Personalities and interactions(!) [...] Because [X] is the scrutiny chair, I make a 
point of letting him talk to us, because he has access to a lot more information than 
the rest of us do about how things are going.‟ 
 BC010LD 
 
V2: Pervasiveness of organisation 
Holding to account 
Each O&S panel at Beta is topic-based and responsible for holding to account decision-
makers within their subject. Across committees, there was concern as to the majority group’s 
willingness to hold their colleagues to account: 
 
„There‟s an immaturity amongst members of the controlling group that means that 
they‟re not confident or able or willing to offer any critique of the administration. [...] 
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They clearly feel under some pressure to ensure that there are no unforeseen hiccups 
as a result of scrutiny. [...] They are so nervous about anything that could be 
misconstrued as even a mild critique of something the cabinet is looking at.‟  
BC004LD 
 
Conservative members almost agreed that, at the very least, there was some fear about the 
potential interpretation of their actions as a councillor in overview and scrutiny: 
 
„I think there‟s a pressure [...] to toe the party line. Not say things out of step in public, 
and, you know, that‟s not so much pressure, it‟s the odd comment and you know you 
don‟t want to embarrass. [...] There were a couple of things on that [issue] that we 
should have got right and I didn‟t feel the least bit inhibited and at that point you think 
“Oh, God! This will be in the papers!” 
BC011C 
 
This type of restraint was picked up by other opposition councillors who believed it was much 
more widespread across all Conservative members in O&S settings: 
 
„An awful lot of them simply will not question their leadership, will never challenge. 
The leadership says “That is what we are doing,” therefore it‟s right.‟ 
BC009LI 
 
In a wider strategic sense, Conservatives were willing to block opposition calls into looking at 
things that could potentially embarrass the administration by agreeing amongst each other to 
block intentions of other parties: 
 
„[Conservative vice-chair of OSPB] has been quite aware of where things are maybe 
not going the way he wanted and the rest of us fall into line.‟ 
BC011C 
 
254 
 
This type of block on O&S holding the executive to account led opposition members to 
comment on the ‘wall of silence‟ (BC004LD) greeting opposition members in committee, 
where majority members blocked items that could have potentially caused embarrassment:  
 
„We were looking at the downturn in the performance of the revenues and benefits 
department [...] where the three component councils had being doing rather well [...] 
but there was a massive downturn [and] some really quite scandalous things not 
getting done at all and the Conservative line on this is, well, it‟s all down to the local 
economy, putting pressure on Revs and Bens. The truth is that that is a component 
part, but there are other factors too, like the change in ICT [...] reduction of staff [...] 
changing work practices [...] and the moment you start to explore these other things, 
you‟re greeted with a great big “that‟s political stuff!” so the only bit of truth on the 
table is it‟s all down to the economic downturn. [...] Actually, it is, in part, down to 
that, but there are other key factors within our control that are contributing [...] and 
the moment you try to have that debate and just look at the evidence, they close 
ranks and they say “next business.”‟ 
BC004LD 
 
Policy development, review & pre-scrutiny 
Councillors of both major parties at Beta were broadly positive about policy development, 
review and pre-decision scrutiny in most areas. The existence of task groups and pre-decision 
scrutiny raised respondent’s hopes that the rest of the scrutiny function could do much better 
away from group lines: 
 
„...the evidence is strong enough for nobody to be able to wriggle out of the 
conclusions, which is why I like task groups, so you don‟t end up in the same sort of 
arguments, because if you‟ve got a really solid piece of work, the conclusions are 
unavoidable.‟ 
BC010LD 
 
255 
 
Working together on pre-scrutiny and task groups indicated to members that these types of 
O&S were ‘much less in the hands of the administration‟ (BC009LI). However even with 
policy development there were still group blocks in the function, such as the majority 
chairmanships’ topic selections: 
 
„They want to have a little look here and a little look there and then they go off in one 
direction, have half a meeting or something and then “Oh no!” we don‟t want to go 
there any more, let‟s go somewhere completely different...‟ 
BC004LD 
 
The reasons for the group control over O&S recently, including policy development, was 
purportedly due to the Conservative group suffering as a result of a previous injury from the 
function and had become wary as to its dangers: 
 
„It came after that review of outdoor education centres, which ironically, we were 
holding up as good practice, but I think it was on the back of that, that they said no, 
bugger this, I‟m not doing this again. They basically took charge of it [after this 
instance.] So it‟s funny that one hand, they make the case that actually, this is good 
scrutiny practice here, you know, new evidence was found and “da, de, da, de, da” 
but it was that, that actually was the straw that broke the camel‟s back. So they‟re not 
going through that again, thank you very much! [...]Labour and Liberal Democrats 
both claimed that they‟d saved the education centres through scrutiny and probably 
the Tories didn‟t like that very much [...] so that was the end of that!‟ 
BC004LD 
 
Fundamentally, the mindset of some non-executive Conservatives was that it was the majority 
party’s role (on the backbenches) to either accept or reject opposition party proposals within 
O&S, rather than deliberate: 
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„So long as we discuss it with them in a sensible rationale, we don‟t seem to be having 
lots of problems. In fact, I would say we‟ve taken on board some of the things that they 
have suggested because we‟ve thought they were better!‟ 
BC006C 
 
 
External scrutiny 
In relation to external scrutiny, this role of O&S was predominantly carried out in the health 
committee. In terms of group involvement, there was little, if any, interference. Respondents 
argued that this was because they all had a vested interest in scrutinising the organisations of 
the NHS rather than each other: 
 
„I laid out my stall in the beginning and said this was an apolitical panel, we‟re here 
to serve our residents [...] we are there to service everyone.‟ 
BC002C 
 
Despite viewing ‘apolitical’ as the antonym for group involvement, rather than councillors 
acting on their own views but not directed by their party, it became clear that external scrutiny 
was undertaken without considerable direct or indirect group intervention. 
 
V3: Centralisation of policy formulation 
In respect to the leadership of the groups at Beta, the majority leader was clear that in scrutiny, 
there was definitely an element of centralisation of decision-making with an expectation that 
decisions would be followed in committees: 
 
„We all try singing from the same hymn sheet and it doesn‟t always follow. You might 
call it scrutiny; I call it “just being difficult.” [...] What policies I agree, I‟ve put 
them to them and if we agree that, we stick to that. We don‟t have any dissension 
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actually, so what we‟ve got is a few individual members from time to time, banging on 
about things they are interested in, but there‟s nothing really serious.‟ 
BC013C (Group Leader) 
 
Similarly, the leader believed that anything coming back from scrutiny that didn’t fit with the 
agreement of the cabinet was quite easily dismissed, from a decision-making point of view: 
  
„If they are doing a scrutiny about bus travel, as an example, they‟ll come up with 
recommendations and we think it‟s a bit over the top and the way we get out of that is 
to say, “these recommendations will be considered but ultimately the decision will be 
the hands of the cabinet member and the cabinet.” That‟s how we get out of it really.‟ 
BC013C (Group Leader) 
 
Backbench majority members recognised this ‘when the needs must, the devil drives‟ 
(BC015C) description of decision-making and thus the role of O&S at the council. 
Respondents suggested that as the council had such a large majority, it naturally followed that 
things must be driven almost exclusively from the top: 
 
„I think the type of influence it has to have as no overall control to massive overall 
control is very different because one is very much challenged and the other one is very 
much working with the administration.‟ 
BC003C 
 
Given the small number of the Liberal Democrats, the level of centralisation of policy 
formulation was relatively indistinguishable as the group only just had enough councillors to 
shadow the directorates at Beta. 
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V4: Preclusory Discipline 
The elements of preclusory discipline at Beta were quite subtle and related to organisational 
discipline in group meetings that led to lines within O&S. Specifically in three cases where 
both the majority and opposition took discipline especially seriously, such as when they 
looked at which issues should be added to the work programme: 
 
„...whether it‟s decided whether it‟s something suitable to go to scrutiny, then there 
might be some discussion then...[in group meetings]‟ 
BC007C 
 
„[In reference to Liberal Democrats as guests at OSPB] they [had] had an opportunity 
and played their cards well, and you then think, we‟ve been stitched up here!‟ 
BC011C 
 
More clear ‘whipping’ of a line in the Liberal Democrats involved reporting back to the group 
in order to formulate a party line to adhere to across the organisation: 
 
„We all take back information [from O&S] and discuss what our stance is.‟ 
BC001LD 
 
The highest level of group involvement in terms of routine organisational discipline at Beta 
was the line formed by the majority party chairs of all topic-based O&S committees. The 
overall chair of the O&S function at Beta reported that meetings of the majority group 
occurred both before and after committee to ensure the proceedings were going in favour of 
the majority party. On the occasions where the events did not go their way, the majority party 
vice-chair of the board indicated to the chairs of the individual committees to solidify their 
reaction to the situation: ‘the rest of us fall into line‟ (BC011C). 
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V5: Cohibition of individual councillor communication 
In terms of restrictions on councillors at Beta scrutiny, there were certain aspects of public 
deliberation that were restricted for majority members. For example, the vice-chair of the 
main O&S board was from the majority and took an active role in quashing the possibility of 
fully open discussion: 
 
„I think scrutiny has the ability to be political and there are possibilities that the 
opposition may wish to score political points or make political tackle out of scrutiny 
activities and one of [my] jobs is to make sure that doesn‟t happen, so if there are 
issues that could have a political impact, then yes, it is discussed...‟ 
BC003C 
 
This type of group control might have led to members to act with more care in questioning 
officers or executive members at committees: 
 
„Sometimes there is a feeling that, “well I shouldn‟t ask that question because it might 
embarrass the administration” whereas actually, in a way, as a cabinet member, you 
would prefer them to ask questions.‟ 
BC007C 
 
Highlighted by the council leader, there was little broad-ranging open scrutiny in public at 
Beta because intra-party scrutiny was much preferred: 
 
„With an authority like ours [...] some scrutiny goes on, but it‟s all subsumed under 
the control of the executive.‟ 
BC013C 
 
From an opposition perspective the cohibition of majority councillors in O&S was the nail in 
the coffin for the legislation’s intention for O&S: 
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„The board [OSPB], having interrogated officers for a few hours, decided that it had 
nothing to say to the cabinet about the budget recently, which I find hugely 
embarrassing. Similarly there was no comment made about the new corporate plan [...] 
My vice-chair decided that the best way forward at the end of the meeting was to offer 
no comment on these things, which was utterly bizarre because some of the things we 
would have said would have been very complimentary! [...] As far as I‟m concerned, 
we have elections every four years and for a short period in the lead up and after, 
there‟s a bit of politics at play, but then things should settle down for the three and a 
half years in between. [..] That‟s what happened in the past sometimes, but that‟s not 
being allowed to happen at the moment.‟ 
BC004LD 
 
In relation to the work programmes, the chair of the overarching O&S argued that because of 
group obstructionism to O&S, the topics under scrutiny were relatively anodyne since the 
Conservatives had taken control of the function: 
 
„Scrutiny is there for you to, you know, there are no “no go” areas. You can really 
make a difference [...] but it‟s as dull as dishwater at the moment. [...] In the middle of 
the last administration, [the Leader] decided, his Conservative group decided they 
wanted to take control of scrutiny and it was that decision at that point [which] was 
the end of a period where the council had been regarded as a good practitioner. [...] 
The moment the controlling group take control of scrutiny, are you really going to get 
that healthy dynamic that offers the challenge? 
BC004LD 
 
The opposition Liberal Democrats had a different approach to the cohibition of their members 
in O&S, primarily due to the size of their group but also due to the wider council composition 
(as they had spoken about attempting clearer group strategy but found it unlikely to work): 
 
‘[Lib Dem group lines in O&S] No, it‟s just going to be a red rag at the bull at the 
moment, Let‟s, as individual members of the Lib Dem group, make sure that we‟re 
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contributing properly to scrutiny. [...] [The Lib Dem Leader] said “shall we?” and I 
said, no, we‟re not in a position at the moment where we can do that.‟ 
BC004LD 
 
V6: Administration of castigative discipline 
In interviews there was little concern with the prospect of castigative discipline as a result of 
members breaching group control in O&S. No respondent reported that controls were of such 
stringency that disobeying the group in O&S would lead to punitive action against the culprit. 
One majority party respondent highlighted that it wouldn’t necessarily be a serious problem 
(depending on the issue) but subtly highlighted that self-censorship was normal: 
 
„I suppose if you are naive enough to think that you are there to do a job and not 
worry too much about embarrassment caused to your colleagues, then no, there‟s not 
a problem. If you want to take a slightly more sophisticated view, then you will 
probably try to hedge round the subject and maybe steer people away from something 
where you have perceived a weakness.‟ 
BC011C 
 
V7: Allocation of positions 
At Beta, all of the chairs of the themed O&S committees were taken by the majority with the 
exception of the co-ordinating committee, which was chaired by the opposition. All the chair 
appointments were made by the council leader, with no self-selection, with the exception of 
the Liberal Democrat chair (chosen by the group): ‘obviously the group sorts out between 
itself who wants what most‟ (BC010LD). The Conservative leader reported that his decision 
about the administration scrutiny chairs was centralised due a prior decision by the group to 
allow this to happen, but the leader did so on a meritocratic basis rather than loyalty: 
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„They are allocated by me. [...] We always give the chairman of [overall] scrutiny to 
the opposition and it‟s up to them to choose who shall be that, but the other chairmen 
of scrutiny groups are all Conservatives. They are all in my control. [...] I seek to put 
people into position with the talent to do the job. Whatever views they have are 
irrelevant to me, [...] it‟s whether they can act as a chairperson and whether they‟ll 
drive it forward.‟ 
BC013C 
 
The Liberal Democrat chair of the OSPB was especially disappointed with the allocation of 
majority chairs of panels, as the members chosen by the executive had served in an unusual 
prior role. The respondent indicated that Conservative chairs might have been ‘groomed’ for 
their positions: 
 
„The people who have ended up on Scrutiny Board at the moment are councillors who 
had previously had some executive role. [...] They had been “assistant advisors” or 
“advisors to cabinet members,” which carried a special responsibility allowance [...] 
but no-one understood what they did and those posts have now been abandoned and 
purely by chance (!) [...] have now appeared on the scrutiny board.‟ 
BC004LD 
 
„...I was a sidekick to a portfolio holder in Adult Community Services before, so I feel 
a little bit like I'm gamekeeper doing poacher work.‟ 
BC014C 
 
More worrying to the Liberal Democrat chair of O&S was the laxity with which the members 
had operated in the roles, reporting that the Conservative chairs generally disregarded the 
work of the function: 
 
„He was expecting a cabinet post [...] and he didn‟t get it [...] so he ended up vice-
chairing scrutiny and for four months he didn‟t really come along to any meetings and 
was just upset. [...] The board meeting last week, [...] one lady went within five 
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minutes of starting the meeting, one didn‟t turn up at all and one turned up an hour 
and a half late. [...] They are paid very good money to sit on that scrutiny board [...] 
that had been in their diaries for five months. [...] I‟m sorry but that is awful!‟ 
BC004LD 
 
Other respondents reported that this malaise was evident across the themed-committees 
beyond the co-ordinating board: 
 
„There are some that either don‟t have the motor or don‟t seem to know why they are 
there and I suppose that‟s the disadvantage of political appointment, rather than “best 
for the job” appointment.‟ 
 BC010LD 
 
In respect to the quality of the chair appointments to the O&S committees, the leader of the 
council acknowledged (and perhaps contradicted his previous ‘meritocratic’ suggestion) that 
they may have not, in retrospect, have been the best candidates for the roles: 
 
„Some of them are really busy in their own lives and they‟re not as motivated as they 
ought to be really. Because they are not making policy decisions that the cabinet are 
doing, they are not the executive in other words.‟ 
BC013C 
 
At the very end of the interview, the council leader almost surmised that appointing these 
positions could indeed have been strategic, rather than meritocratic. For example, knowingly 
appointing poor chairs who wouldn’t be as critical as ‘good’ chairs: 
 
„Some are good at it, some aren‟t.  Those that are good at it tend to be more critical 
than the others. [Laughter]‟ 
BC013C 
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Brief Beta Summary 
At Beta it was clear that despite being comparatively politically uncompetitive, the levels of 
group control were remarkably strong. The majority group controlled topic selection to a large 
extent through a tightly controlled co-ordinating committee which shaped the work 
programmes of O&S. Through the use of pre-, mid- and post-OSPB group meetings, majority 
chairs were effectively constrained by the group. Wider party meetings were also used as a 
way for the majority group to subsume criticism and avoid public disunity. Likewise the 
Liberal Democrat opposition, despite their small size, aimed to corral lines on policy through 
reporting back to group and agreeing stances and meeting as a group to discuss strategy to 
achieve their goals. Despite the levels of group control used to fulfil party ambitions by both 
groups, the display of involvement was more subtle than at Alpha and through observations 
alone, it would have been difficult to assess the extent of organisational interference. 
 
7.3 Gamma Unitary Council 
Profile 
Gamma Council covers an urban area in South East England with over 200,000 residents. 
Seen by observers as a prosperous and thriving area, Gamma faces challenges unlike most 
other provincial urban centres. In the council year within which this research was undertaken, 
there was a Liberal Democrat minority administration (41% of seats), the Conservatives had 
one councillor fewer (39%) and Labour held the remaining 20%. The council elects by thirds 
and in recent history had a consistently Labour majority up until 2000 when the council fell to 
no overall control. Between 2002 and 2006, the council had a Liberal Democrat majority 
which was lost from 2006 when the Liberal Democrats lost their majority yet remained the 
largest party. Through to the time this research was conducted the authority has remained in 
no overall control with a minority Liberal Democrat administration. The change in 
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composition towards the time of research showed a steady trend towards the Conservatives 
and during fieldwork the Liberal Democrats were only the largest party by one seat. 
 
Relating to O&S, there were seven committees formed to scrutinise various aspects of the 
council and wider service provision. The overarching co-ordinating body at the authority was 
the O&S management committee which commissioned items for the work programmes of all 
other committees. The OSMC was chaired by a member of the main opposition and was 
comprised of five members. A committee was also organised to deal specifically with call-ins, 
chaired by a member of the main opposition group, though no meetings of this committee had 
been held in the year under observation. The remaining five scrutiny committees, comprised 
of ten members, were theme-based around children, health, crime, economy and growth. 
 
Research data 
The following data from Gamma presented in this analysis was collected from fifteen semi-
structured interviews with members at the authority from both the majority and opposition 
parties and observations from five O&S committee meetings at the authority. 
 
V1: Local party group meetings 
Pre-Overview and Scrutiny Party Group Meetings 
At Gamma, respondents reported that only the largest party (Liberal Democrats) held group 
meetings prior to O&S sessions. This was primarily to ensure that topics of discussion were 
controlled by the group through the councillors of each committee: 
 
„We get together a few minutes before the committee basically to see, first of all, 
whether we are all there [...] and secondly, to see whether there are any glaringly 
266 
 
obvious things that we must pick up or things that perhaps we ought to be avoiding, 
rather than anything else.‟ 
GU001LD 
 
„We come out of the group rooms beforehand, to go into the chamber [...] we will have 
come together and it‟s really a matter of sitting down together.‟ 
GU007LD 
 
This practice of pre-meetings before scrutiny was reported to be to the detriment of the 
committee as respondents reported that things could have been decided by the wider group 
prior to the committees: 
 
„Do you know that they‟re often late arriving at the committee because they have been 
in a group meeting beforehand?‟ [...] The Lib Dems certainly seem to be in their 
group, with them, before they come into the meeting.‟ 
GU008C 
 
In respect to the Conservative party, ‘pre-meetings’ did not take place, though in observation, 
councillors from the Conservatives tended to meet in their group room before meetings. 
However this informality was distinct from the arrangement of the Liberal Democrats before 
committees. In respect to Labour, due to the number of councillors on each committee, pre-
meetings did not take place, simply because they would usually only have one (or two) 
members with the group leader typically being one of these. 
 
Time Devoted to O&S in Regular Party Group Meetings 
Devoting time to O&S issues was a commonality across all groups at Gamma, but the 
intentions of doing so were slightly different for each. For the Liberal Democrats the purpose 
of the group meetings was to hammer out lines on issues in private rather than public, to 
ensure that conflict stayed behind closed doors rather than in the committee: 
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„If you sit in our group meetings and hear the fairly robust discussions that go on [...], 
whether they are on the select committee or not, if we are not happy with what the 
cabinet member is doing, rest assured, we will let them know in no uncertain terms 
and we do have some fairly lively debates within our group about what constitutes Lib 
Dem policy and what does not. [...] I can‟t think of a single situation in which there 
has been a glaring conflict between the cabinet members and the backbenchers at a 
select committee. [...] I don‟t know of anyone in our group who would have a problem 
and say, well, I don‟t support this [in select committee] and I‟m not going to go along 
with it.‟ 
GU006LD 
 
The regular Liberal Democrat meetings took place twice a month, with one dedicated to the 
day-to-day management of running the council and the other devoted to policy issues, such as 
those under discussion in overview and scrutiny: 
 
„...the other one [group meeting] is mostly restricted around policy discussions and we 
could be looking at policies from right across the council but we‟ll bring those policy 
issues there and we‟ll probably have a presentation from a cabinet member and then 
we‟ll have a thorough group debate on it, so in that regard, I suppose it feeds into 
scrutiny.‟ 
GU006LD 
 
For the opposition parties, raising O&S as a discussion at group meetings was dependent on 
the significance of the issues under consideration and was less formal: 
 
‘[O&S] is something that is discussed especially if there are important things coming 
up or if they are of significant importance to certain areas. For instance, if we get 
something coming up on the Partnerships and Growth [O&S] [...] if there is 
something important to discuss, we will discuss it at group meetings.‟ 
GU009C 
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However the group leader of the Conservatives was keen to point out that the meetings, whilst 
discussing O&S, would not necessarily be used to strike an explicit line amongst members, 
but ‘assist’ members through discussion: 
 
„“If there are things that worry you, come back and let‟s discuss it in group.” I don‟t 
send people into a group meeting with „that‟s the way.‟ We don‟t sit in here and 
huddle before scrutiny and agree a planned attack of what we are going to say.‟ 
GU003C (Group Leader) 
 
As for the Labour group, O&S was discussed in group meetings but only with reference to 
policy under discussion and mandation: 
 
„...what we tend to do is cover a couple of policy items to a meeting and then for 
broader items or matters of particular concern...‟ 
GU002L (Group Leader) 
 
V2: Pervasiveness of organisation 
Holding to account 
The role of holding the administration to account within O&S was unusual at Gamma. Given 
that the authority had a minority administration where it was often necessary to take a 
consensual approach to decision-making, there was a understanding that the executive were 
undertaking decisions with some prior consent from the other parties, thus ensuring scrutiny 
could be destructive to all parties involved ; 
 
„If I take the special collection item again, no party would have wanted to have been 
seen to be a party that wanted that to be examined, not because they were looking at it 
in budgetary terms, but simply because they knew the press headline that would 
follows. They‟d be afraid that they‟d get a headline. “At a council committee last night, 
the “Whatever” party proposed or considered or suggested that this controversial 
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charge should be introduced or investigated.” So I think it is that fear of bad publicity 
has driven scrutiny towards a certain blandness.‟ 
GU010LD (Leader of council &Lib Dem group leader) 
 
The vested interests in some decisions or at least the airing of grievances from the opposition 
parties at the time of decision-making was a relatively new development at Gamma, as the 
new Liberal Democrat leader had a more conciliatory approach to decision-making: 
 
‘[X], I think, in his style, recognised it was much better to give the opposition their say 
at cabinet meetings and quite often [in the past] call-ins were there because the 
opposition got so frustrated with [Y] who would not listen to the arguments. Well, she 
wouldn‟t even allow the argument to be put, never mind when it was put. [Y] very 
arrogantly just continued with the decision, until the opposition just simply said, either 
listen to us or, you know, have a debate now, or we‟ll call-in and she never got the 
message.‟ 
GU008C 
 
As a result of the new leader’s pre-emptive assuagement approach to the opposition parties’ 
influence on decision-making, the ‘holding to account’ role of O&S may have become less 
prevalent in committees because of the collective responsibility of some decisions: 
 
„I didn‟t feel we were doing anything of particular note, you know? [..] We had people 
coming and telling us what was happening and we said “oh, yes, that‟s lovely, isn‟t it?” 
[...] I certainly didn‟t feel that we were really getting into something and finding out if 
it was working and if it was being done in the right way or even if it should be done at 
all, do you know what I mean?‟ 
GU013L 
 
„...it‟s imparting information and there is no real scrutiny and no real outcome, it‟s 
just: “how wonderful are you?”‟ 
GU001LD   
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In respect to the Liberal Democrat backbenchers and their role in holding their colleagues to 
account, there was admittance that this was only necessary in specific circumstances where 
there were limited options for alternative recourse: 
 
„From my own group, we try to list very simple, say six or eight promises to the public, 
the electorate. [...] If there is any possibility of eroding any of those promises without 
good cause [...] we‟ve got to be open and honest about it. [...] Our instinct is to 
support the cabinet member, the decision made, because we know the basis upon 
which it was made and what out promises were, therefore we have a duty to assist it 
[...] Within that [O&S] framework, when it comes to things like important issues, like 
what we promised the electorate, then that‟s all carved in stone. If it‟s “we need to 
win X more seats in the election” we forget differences and we all pull like mad. 
GU015LD 
 
Policy development, review & pre-scrutiny 
Respondents at Gamma adopted a broadly sanguine perspective about policy development, 
review and pre-scrutiny at the authority. In particular, the leader of the council reported that 
pre-scrutiny was an area that the O&S function was good at performing: 
 
„Where I think it has worked better are first of all, when they get things before the 
executive have taken them over [pre-scrutiny]. In other words, at a very, very early 
stage, when they can be moulded, if you like, into a policy paper. [...] The problem is 
that by the time you get to something that has already been agreed by the cabinet or is 
about to be agreed, the parties are beginning to talk lines.‟ 
GU010LD 
 
The other O&S areas which respondents did not consider to be susceptible to excessive group 
involvement were task groups, which offered space for councillors to debate evidence: 
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„...it was three councillors, [one] from each party. [...] There was an ease amongst 
members about how it was working out and whether we were on the right tracks and 
when the three of us sat around the table [...] we disagreed with some of the findings 
unanimously, agreed with some of the findings unanimously and said, this is 
absolutely the right thing.‟ 
GU001LD 
 
„...we‟ve learnt to be much more thorough and avoid ideological arguments around 
developing recommendations to cabinet and where good evidence-based 
recommendations have been presented, they have almost all, without exception, been 
accepted.‟ 
GU011C 
 
However, away from pre-scrutiny and task groups, policy development and review tended to 
be more strictly controlled by the groups, either in controlling councillor communication via 
group input or deliberate thematic evasion to prevent embarrassment: 
 
„Obviously there is a group / party policy on issues. For example, we would not be 
best pleased with a spokesperson [in O&S] who advocated 5,000 services without 
bringing it through the group. That‟s sort of a major policy. If there was an item on 
the agenda that clearly challenged our policy or where we didn‟t have one, we would 
expect that to be raised at a group meeting and we would expect the group to form a 
view and then we would expect our representatives to follow policy broadly. [...]  We 
don‟t whip in any sense, we‟re not allowed to by national rules anyhow, so we 
wouldn‟t whip at an O&S meeting but we would expect!‟ 
GU002L (Group Leader) 
 
‘I think there is a tendency on the part of all parties to go for less controversial items 
and not least because of the press.‟ 
GU010LD (Council Leader) 
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External Scrutiny 
The topic of external scrutiny was only raised by respondents in relation to the health 
committee. Overwhelmingly when referring to examples of successful scrutiny devoid of 
group involvement, it was this committee that was used as an example: 
 
„I think it has worked surprisingly well. I think [X] said something about health 
scrutiny seeming to work better than most. Whether it‟s because we‟re not being 
political really at all, because mostly the health people, not always, but they are 
mostly outside political boundaries.‟ 
GU005L (Chair, Health O&S) 
 
However the chair of the health O&S committee was quick to point out that the work of the 
committee was in essence, partially controlled by the more group-controlled O&S 
management committee, which directed its work programme from above: 
 
„We have to go to the overview and scrutiny management committee, who may say, 
you know “don‟t do that one.” [...] They don‟t usually get heavy handed. [...] I don‟t 
decide on the [topic]. It‟s not quite the same as it used to be, that the chair “owned” 
the agenda, but they don‟t really, it‟s a joint thing.‟ 
GU005L 
 
V3: Centralisation of policy formulation 
In observations at most O&S committees attended, the typical situation was that all three 
group leaders were often present, either as regular members of the committee (Conservative, 
Labour), as substitutions for their party (Conservative, Labour) or monitoring proceedings (all 
parties.)  At times throughout the committee proceedings, group leaders would actively halt 
discussions and request that the topic under consideration was held off in order to be spoken 
about elsewhere: 
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„I do think that, talking as the three group leaders [...] that would be the most 
appropriate way forward...‟ (GU003C) 
 
„Can I just say, as a member of the committee, I actually find this a little bit difficult 
because carrying on talking [outside] as three group leaders? “Let‟s talk as the three 
leaders?” This is a committee; it‟s not the three leaders!” (GU001LD) 
Taken from Gamma OSMC Wednesday 10
th
 March 2010, [2:20:20 – 2:21:01] 
 
This situation was also common across the other committees and one of the leaders would 
often interject with a request that the subject could be dealt with in private. The council leader 
argued that these private meetings were a way of controlling the public debate: 
 
„I have certainly convened meetings in my office of all three parties. It‟s become 
known as a kind of neutral meeting place [...] because the big thing we‟ve all been 
trying to avoid is not so much the press in this particular case, it‟s the executive 
scrutiny, as we call it. That is the call-in procedure. [We have a] mechanism of having 
“offline” meetings whenever there [is] a problem.‟ 
GU010LD (Council Leader) 
 
The opposition leaders were also in favour of moving O&S issues into a private space when 
topics could be ‘better’ dealt with inside the smaller group of leaders: 
 
‘[informal leader meetings] work well and I think that has got a lot more to do with 
the personalities of the group leaders and [Leader]‟s openness to work together, as 
opposed to when [Former Leader] was in charge.‟ 
GU003C (Conservative Group Leader) 
 
‘The three spokespeople of the three parties meet to plan the agendas and then we 
expect our spokespeople to bring significant items to our attention [as a group]‟ 
GU002L (Labour Group Leader) 
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As a result of the private leader meetings away from O&S, there was a corollary of sidelining 
the committees as vehicles of deliberation. Respondents highlighted the consequent problems 
as results of the ‘offline’ meetings: 
 
„It was a desire of the three leaders to try and be the “problem solving.” That meant 
they went to a lot more committees than they would have done, had the system been 
functioning properly. One of the things it did do, is it meant that people who were 
supposed to be doing the scrutiny then allowed: “Oh well, my leader can sort it out.” 
So it allowed them to not do their job as effectively as they should have done.‟ 
GU012L 
 
Beyond backbencher concerns over the disenfranchisement of scrutiny roles, some 
respondents argued that these private meetings were pragmatic and ensured that all parties 
were protected from the public: 
 
„Things can be, not shortcutted, but brought to a resolution more quickly if they do 
meet and talk and get the feeling of the group and do it that way, rather than do it in 
the public, when everybody is on their own little platform and hobby horse and hoping 
the press are there and watching them, you know? [...] As far as [Labour Leader] is 
concerned, I feel that he‟s made a pretty good fist of representing the views of the 
Labour party.‟ 
 GU013L 
 
However private meetings of the group leaders about O&S led the proceedings of committees 
to be dominated by the possibility that things should not be under discussion at all and 
rendering the process anodynous and lacking in substance: 
 
„All members are quickly aware if there is a political dimension coming in [...] ...we 
very quickly, you know, “across the table nods” and we understand each other.‟ 
GU015LD 
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V4: Preclusory discipline 
Forms of organisational preclusory discipline within the O&S function at Gamma were 
evident across two parties (LD and Labour) but utilised in different ways. For the Liberal 
Democrats, given the previously highlighted group pre-meetings before O&S to discern 
‘things that perhaps we ought to be avoiding, rather than anything else‟ (GU001LD) the 
group played a clear precautionary role of controlling O&S in public.  This was evident across 
some topics raised in O&S where Liberal Democrat backbenchers effectively toed a group 
line by remaining quiet when their cabinet colleague’s decision was under scrutiny: 
 
„The administration wanted to install [X] and the public and everybody else was very 
much in favour of the fact that it shouldn‟t be that [...] I think it was fairly obvious 
what was going to happen. The members of the [Lib Dem] group stayed pretty quiet. 
One of them spoke out, but she‟s fairly outspoken anyway, but the rest of them stayed 
pretty quiet in what they were doing.‟ 
GU009C 
 
For Labour, preclusory discipline was a matter of disseminating the policy of the group and 
expecting this to be followed through in aspects of O&S, but without explicit mandation: 
 
„It would be quite likely that the group will have agreed [on the policy]. The 10 of us 
have a broad understanding of what our policy is and it would be quite strange 
actually if that didn‟t impinge on the meeting, but we don‟t send our spokespeople 
committee representatives to meetings saying, thou shalt vote this way or thou shalt 
vote that way.‟ 
GU002L 
 
The Conservatives tended not to report formal preclusory discipline for most issues in relation 
to O&S but did mention an ‘advisory’ perspective on important issues but with no direct 
compulsion to follow: 
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„...if there's something important to discuss [in O&S], then obviously, we will discuss 
it at group meetings, but it‟s not, you know, there are no group lines taken, there's no, 
you must say this, you mustn‟t say this.‟ 
GU009C 
 
A respondent highlighted that one of the most important factors in O&S with respect to the 
group behaviour was the importance of the issue and thus interest in the topic from the media: 
 
„...there is a very, very strong influence if the press are there, because [councillors] 
will stand up to try and score points, you know, because once the press goes, you see a 
different attitude.‟ 
GU007LD 
 
V5: Cohibition of councillor communication 
Across the five observations at Gamma, all group leaders were in attendance at each, whether 
as part of the committee or in attendance (sitting behind the committee.) Respondents 
reported that this was typical of all groups throughout the year: 
 
„The current leader attends all scrutiny meetings, more or less, even if it is for part of 
the time, just to gauge the temperature, but the previous leader did not and there is no 
requirement for them to do so. What [Leader] does is actually arrive with a pile of 
papers and instead of working in his office, actually works in the committee, so that he 
can hear what is going on.‟ 
GU001LD 
 
„The group leaders like to keep fairly closely in touch with what‟s happening, not 
necessarily to sit as a sub. Sometimes they sit in the audience, sit on the sidelines and I 
think that it‟s right that the group leader should have a clear feel for what‟s going on.‟ 
GU004C 
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The reported reason for this, according to one leader, was not to answer questions (as reported 
at Alpha) but to support their group. In observations, this was generally borne out apart from 
incidences where group leaders would actively partake in the meeting and suggest taking 
issues to a private leader meeting (see V3). 
 
‘[LD Leader] attends a good lot of scrutiny meetings and has done ever since he 
started and actually, so do I, as leader of the opposition. I sit on none, I sub on a good 
number. [...] I‟ll often just turn up to have a look to see what is going on. I think it‟s 
fundamental to hear what people are saying and then be able to support our groups.‟ 
GU003C (Group Leader) 
 
The Liberal Democrat leader gave more pragmatic reasons for viewing overview and scrutiny 
as an important enough arena to require attendance from group leaders: 
 
„I think it‟s across all of the groups, because we are all very conscious of how we look 
in the press and the press hasn‟t really taken the point that this is a forum in which 
people can speak free of party discipline and so its, you know, you can get bad 
headlines. “Council committee proposes [X],” the press doesn‟t realise that in fact 
that particular council committee doesn‟t actually have any power.‟ 
GU010LD (Leader of Council) 
 
The consequence of the presence of all the group leaders at O&S was a sense of cohibition by 
proxy, given some members believed that it had an impact on what could and could not be 
under discussion and what areas of criticism should either be allowed or focused on: 
 
„I get the feeling that there are many Lib Dem councillors who have not felt that they 
are able to say what they want. I think maybe, because it was their leader that they 
were talking about so it‟s more difficult, isn‟t it? For them “to be allowed,” in 
inverted commas, to do that.‟ 
GU013L 
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„I do get a feeling that a lot of the [councillors], especially the Lib Dems, are toeing 
the party line‟ 
GU008C 
 
„There are some people there [...] no matter what happens, will never criticise one of 
their colleagues, no matter how in need they are of a criticism.‟ 
GU009C 
 
Some members reported that the consequence was that there were issues that needed to be 
completely avoided and carefully managed in O&S to prevent the gift of electoral ammunition 
for the opposition: 
 
„Anything that you say in scrutiny, if you are daft enough to say something like, or a 
senior member like me to say “Well, actually, car parking charges should double in 
central [Gamma].” Well that could be picked up and put into somebody‟s leaflet, as 
the Lib Dems want to double the car parking charges and so you need to be a bit more 
careful about one‟s pronouncements.‟ 
GU001LD 
 
V6: Administration of castigative discipline 
The administration of castigative discipline was a topic mentioned in respect to the authority 
but not typically in relation to O&S. Due to the knife-edge balance of the authority, 
leaderships of the respective parties took a pragmatic stance towards punishment as there had 
been some recent history of councillors resigning party whips to sit as independents: 
 
„If you start over-disciplining people, they might say “I don‟t need to take any notice 
of you, I‟m going to become an independent, so what are you going to do about it?” If 
you are 21 to 20 and you lose one, you will upset the balance and that works for the 
others as well.‟ GU001LD 
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Unusually clear in relation to the other case authorities, the largest party at Gamma had two 
distinct factions whose membership ebb and flow dictated the choice of leader from one year 
to another. These factions often had different approaches in respect to inter-party relationships 
as evidenced from discussions of the approaches of the current leader and former leader above. 
For example, the self-titled, geographically eponymous, ‘Epsilon Mafia’ faction could have 
been more likely to command respect than the group itself, even if that which the ‘mafia’ 
might have been demanding was loyalty to the wider party group: 
 
„Any telling off comes from me! [...] You might have a quiet word, oh you know, “I 
think you might kind of watch it.” Of course the ultimate weapon is to say to 
somebody “you do realise that if you carry on like this, you won‟t be reselected to 
stand for this seat again.” 
GU001LD (Leader of faction: “Epsilon Mafia”) 
 
Despite this schism in the Liberal Democrat group, the party as a whole typically stayed loyal 
to the wider party in committee (rather than reverting to factionalism in public) but 
administration of castigative discipline, if/when occurring, might have been more likely to 
informally come from the faction leaders relating to appropriate behaviour in O&S: 
 
„The [Epsilon Mafia] have continued to influence those backbenchers that would like 
to be back on cabinet and so on, so I think there is a little bit of backwards pressure 
and all the rest of it.‟ 
GU004C 
 
V7: Allocation of positions 
Due to no overall control, the decision about the allocations of chairs to each group was not 
decided by the leader of the largest group. Instead, the leader of the Liberal Democrats met in 
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private with the leader of Labour to discuss which chairs should be allocated to which party 
and which individuals should be chosen; referred to by respondents as ‘horse-trading‟ 
(GU006LD) with ‘sabre-rattling‟ (GU007LD). In this way the nominations were likely to be 
accepted because of the numerical advantage in council: 
 
„The actual meeting is certainly not a discoverable meeting, it‟s a very private meeting 
between the two leaders really. [...]  It is sometimes said that so-and-so would be an 
unacceptable candidate and so-and-so wouldn‟t and if you got two of those, you can 
usually meet some sort of conclusion.‟ 
GU002L 
 
In the previous year, the opposition took all of the chairs of O&S, however, because of the 
Labour and Liberal Democrat agreement and the arrangement effectively excluding the 
Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats obtained two chairs from the deal and Labour were 
awarded two chairs, proportionately more than their share if the committee chairs had been 
allocated according to proportion on the council. The result (2 LD chairs, 2 Labour chairs and 
2 Conservative chairs)
2
 was seen as a deal that reduced disquiet amongst Liberal Democrat 
backbenchers at being excluded in the previous year and a success for Labour which had 
retained their chairs despite losing seats. Conservatives did not think that the allocations were 
fair due to an O&S committee being invented for the purposes of allocations: 
 
„The administration did a deal with the Labour group and added an additional 
committee that partly wasn‟t really necessary, but really to share the chairs out [with] 
the support of the Labour group [...] and the administration would get some 
additional chairs. [...] There was too much “hand in glove” between the caucus of 
movers and shakers in the administration and those who became chairs of select 
                                                            
2 For clarity, respondents only perceived of six committees and chairs instead of seven (as the official number) 
since the executive scrutiny committee had essentially served as a nominal committee in the past and would only 
meet on an exceptional basis. 
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committees.[...] There was a “done deal” behind the scenes to add this additional 
committee and if you like, get some support for voting for who would be chairs.‟ 
GU004C 
 
Another Labour respondent saw the opportunity as a way to prevent certain individuals 
getting an important position and ensure those that did get the position were the right ‘group’ 
candidates: 
 
...it‟s a mixture of who can we force to do it and how do we stop one or two people 
doing it. [...] It‟s about stopping individuals and promoting certain individuals, rather 
than about which is the best talent to...‟ 
GU012L 
 
The deal certainly raised eyebrows in relation to granting the Liberal Democrat backbenchers 
the chair of the ‘most important’ committee at the time for Gamma: 
 
„Especially the growth area, which is probably one of the most important things for 
Gamma. I don‟t think there was anybody who was happy with having chairs of those 
committees coming from the administration group, you know? There were a lot of 
people who felt scepticism. However it was a deal that was done.‟ 
GU009C 
 
In terms of deciding the nominations for groups to put forward as candidates for chairs, the 
Liberal Democrats held ‘internal elections‟ (GU015LD) before the private meeting, Labour 
had two candidates in mind for the meeting (retaining roles) and the Conservatives had no real 
choice, thus the two leaders chose a chair who offered his services: ‘he was sort of 
volunteering for that and we couldn‟t see anyone better' (GU002L). In terms of regular 
members of the committees of O&S, there was a similarity across each party group that self-
selection took priority over group appointments: 
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„The group leader and the deputy leader decide which committees people do, but 
there‟s always, you know, what would you like to do, where are your interests?‟ 
GU009C 
 
Regardless of committee nominations, one issue that was raised by respondents and noted in 
observations was the number of regular substitutions within each committee. These typically 
involved group leaders (Labour / Conservative), who would otherwise have been monitoring 
proceedings, stepping in on behalf of one of their members: 
 
„...there tends to be quite a movement of who turns up, you know? [...] There never 
seems to be a consistent membership!‟ 
GU008C 
 
Brief Gamma Summary 
From the evidence provided at Gamma, there were strong signals of group control over the 
function of O&S. Whilst using the expected levers of party involvement to constrain the 
operation of the function individually (group meetings, light whipping, centralisation of 
policy formulation), the elements of group control (offline meetings, negotiations to prevent 
call-ins and press attention) bordered on collusion to prevent embarrassment for all parties 
because of the collective investment in decision-making. Ultimately, due to the nature of 
inter-party collaboration, O&S was equally as constrained by all the groups as it was by the 
individual groups. 
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7.4 Delta Metropolitan Borough Council 
Profile 
Delta Council is a large authority in the Yorkshire and the Humber region with a population 
of over 300,000. At the time of the fieldwork, the authority had a Labour majority of one (51% 
of all seats) with the Conservatives as the main opposition (37%), along with 3% of seats 
taken by Liberal Democrats and 10% by independents.  Since 1973 until beyond the end of 
the fieldwork Delta has always had a Labour majority. At the time of the research Labour’s 
majority on the council was the smallest that it had been across this period. Before the local 
elections taking place in 2000, the Labour majority at Delta stood at 57 (63 councillors – 60 
Labour, 3 Conservative), whilst ten years later had fallen to a majority of 1. Whilst elections 
at Delta have typically occurred by thirds, boundary changes in 2004 meant that the whole 
district came up for election, which ultimately cleaved the huge majority.  
 
In relation to O&S arrangements, Delta operated five themed scrutiny committees that 
broadly shadowed the goals of the community strategy. These committees covered the topics 
of crime, economy, learning, liveability and social care / health. The authority also had a 
chair’s liaison group which met with cabinet to discuss work programmes. Apart from the 
liaison group, each thematic committee consisted of ten members of the council along with a 
number of co-opted members (from two to five) recruited to sit alongside members. In terms 
of the allocation of chairpersonships, the majority party took two chairs and allocated one 
chair to each of the three groups of the opposition (Conservative, Liberal Democrat and 
Independent). 
 
 
 
284 
 
Research data 
The following data from Delta Metropolitan Borough presented in this analysis was collected 
from fifteen semi-structured interviews with members at the authority from both the majority 
and opposition parties and observations from six O&S committee meetings. 
 
V1: Local party group meetings 
Pre-Overview and Scrutiny Party Group Meetings  
Respondents from the majority group indicated that there had never been pre-meetings of the 
groups before O&S committees in order to formulate a group perspective or to check 
attendance, provide information nor brief the members: 
 
„...to do what you said, we‟d have to have had a pre-Labour group meeting whereby 
people would be instructed which way they can vote and that‟s never happened in my 
time.‟ 
DM003L 
 
„I‟ve never been asked to hear anything first [from the group]‟ DM010L 
 
Equally from the Conservative opposition side, there was a strong indication that pre-
meetings, with an intention to organise a party perspective, never took place before scrutiny, 
as respondents often didn’t know how many of their colleagues sat on the committee: 
 
„I can‟t remember how many of mine [there are] There‟s certainly a minimum of two 
Conservatives certainly [on the committee]. I just can‟t remember off the top of my 
head, you know?‟ 
DM001C 
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Observations at all six committees attended at Delta Metro corroborated the evidence 
provided in interview as committee members would arrive at the council buildings and 
immediately enter the rooms where committees would be taking place. 
 
Time Devoted to O&S in Regular Party Group Meetings 
In respect to a devotion of time in regular party group meetings to the issues undertaken in 
overview and scrutiny, respondents from the majority group reported that overview and 
scrutiny often formed part of the agenda but was often not discussed unless there was an 
important issue at stake: 
 
 „It is down as the agenda. It isn‟t something that gets discussed on a regular basis.‟ 
 DM010L 
 
When O&S issues were discussed at meetings of the majority group, it was reported to be 
happenstance rather than any intentional pre-emptive discussion that upcoming issues in 
overview and scrutiny were being addressed by the group. Thus respondents reported that the 
group meetings did not routinely address items on upcoming O&S: 
  
„You may or may not be aware that it is a scrutiny issue. A typical example might be 
that we are doing a PFI for a waste recycling plant, so obviously that could come up 
at the Labour group meeting but it could also be a regular agenda item on scrutiny.‟ 
DM003L 
 
Similarly on the opposition side, whilst O&S may have been raised on the agenda of regular 
group meetings, unless the issues under discussion at O&S were of particular importance to 
the council: ‘scrutiny will never, ever get a mention, unless there is some relevance‟ 
(DM001C). 
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V2: Pervasiveness of organisation 
Holding to account 
The role of holding to account within O&S at Delta Metro was reportedly subject to forms of 
group control by both major parties. According to Conservative respondents, there was a 
sense that majority members were reluctant to constructively criticise their colleagues: 
 
„I will say the vast majority of them don‟t criticise. [...] A lot of the Labour members 
turn up to get their signature on the attendance record and just sit there looking at 
their watch, you know, when it is going to finish. Some of them leave half way through! 
I‟ve seen it happen! They come in, sign the papers, stay half an hour and I think 
“why?”‟ 
DM006C 
 
In some respects this was borne out in observations, with proportionately more discussion 
originating from the opposition parties and co-opted membership. Labour respondents 
themselves reported that this was sometimes the case: 
 
 „I‟ve been on here long enough, so I know what questions to ask and what not to ask!‟ 
 DM008L 
 
 „I just think that a lot of the work is already done [coming] in scrutiny.‟ 
 DM011L 
 
Aside from the possibility of implicit organisational control by the group and self-censorship, 
there had also been active use of a whip in O&S relating to calling in decisions. However, not 
all Labour non-executives were as keen to remain silent when criticising the group. In relation 
to an issue about school term times, some Labour members exploited the party’s slim 
majority to actively go against a party whip and join a cross-party call-in: 
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‘Some could argue that I've got a cushion. [...] Well, for an example, [...] on the 
Education one and the term times and I suppose you could say I was against the party 
whip, but…there was a principle there, so… 
DM015L 
 
„The fact that it was made by the same party [...] they were more of an embarrassment 
really because obviously, you don‟t like calling in decisions made by your own party.‟ 
DM009L 
 
More generally the majority group whip on ‘not joining cross-party call-ins’ was upheld when 
the issues were perhaps less controversial: 
 
„When you call in a decision [...] you‟ll find the elected member from the controlling 
group will not join in that call-in.‟ 
 DM005C (An O&S Chair) 
 
Equally on the Conservative side, the group demonstrated that it had wanted to control 
deliberation and topics of scrutiny. In the example under observation, the Conservative 
members had initiated a call-in of a decision to spend resources on a project. The decision to 
call-in the policy went to a vote and the committee split across the two party lines: 
 
„The decision to call it in did not come from those three members [on the committee.] 
I think the decision actually came from the leadership of that party.‟ 
DM009L 
 
Whilst acknowledging the futility of call-ins as an instrument of ‘holding to account,’ the 
group leader of the Conservatives saw the value of the group-motivated call-in as a way to 
highlight that O&S was firmly controlled by the majority group to a great extent: 
 
288 
 
„Call-ins are not call-ins. They are just a chance for scrutiny to reaffirm [cabinet]‟s 
decisions. [...] I don‟t think scrutiny operates in an impartial and effective way.‟ 
 DM013C (Leader of the Conservative group) 
 
More significantly, there was a concern that the majority party had set the constitution of the 
authority with a mind to prevent adequate time and deliberation to scrutinise decisions taken. 
Respondents highlighted that a short turnaround time from the point of decision to get in a 
call-in was far too quick to offer a chance for deliberation on the decisions taken: 
 
„You‟ve got five days to get another committee meeting together, you know? It‟s a bit 
difficult, it‟s fairly impossible! I think it‟s been made difficult to the point where you 
think “Well what‟s the point?”‟ 
DM005C 
 
More generally, respondents of all groups saw the holding to account role especially difficult 
given the group blocks which stunted cross-party working. Conservative respondents were 
keen to report that the scrutiny element of O&S was essentially a ‘box-ticking exercise‟ 
(DM006C & DM007C) and Labour respondents supported these conclusions citing the 
impotence of the function and lack of any genuine commitment to O&S from the majority 
group (and Conservative opposition), which simply led O&S members to ‘just be there to 
rubberstamp things‟ (DM015L). In terms of cabinet attendance to give evidence at 
committees, a Liberal Democrat chair of an O&S committee was especially concerned with 
the attitude of the executive members in relation to O&S: 
 
„Portfolio holder could always find an excuse, why not? But in the end, I didn‟t bother 
tackling her, we could do without her. [...]  I would have liked her to come and be in 
scrutiny. We just gave up asking her...‟ 
DM012LD 
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Policy development, policy review and pre-scrutiny 
Almost all of the respondents were broadly impressed with the nature of policy development 
and review at Delta. The council leader mentioned that this role of scrutiny was the members’ 
favoured type and tended to form a large proportion of the work of O&S relative to the 
‘holding to account’ role of call-ins at other councils: 
 
„I think scrutiny in [Delta] has gone down the road of policy development. Other 
councils have gone for „call-in‟ far more and I think getting the right balance is 
obviously the aim and we still need to achieve that.‟ 
DM002L 
 
The majority of councillors reported that groups had not attempted to control the deliberative 
process in O&S in such a way as to taint the evidence collection and conclusions from 
meetings and thus proved a success: 
 
„You are just one big family, as I put it. There is no „you and us.‟ We‟re all here to do 
a job and we do the job together.‟ 
DM008L 
 
Other respondents were more circumspect about the alleged party-group free environment of 
policy development and wondered whether the ‘success’ of the role was due to the anodynous 
topic selection: ‘there are some things that get discussed at scrutiny [that] aren‟t that 
significant‟ (DM013C), ‘it‟s basically just a talking shop [going] over the same old issues‟ 
(DM015L). In observation, given a comparative perspective of the other case studies, these 
claims were substantiated to a large extent when the issues under discussion related to micro-
management of services and tangential diversions from some co-opted members. To highlight 
the extent of this situation, the council leader attended an O&S committee with an instruction 
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directed at the committee that there should be a ‘big view picture on your agenda‟ (Delta 
Liveability Tuesday 16th Feb 2010, [0:33:46]) because ‘it‟s not going to change the world 
having a chit chat about footpaths‟ ([0:33:38]). Incidentally, the leader then proceeded to 
recommend to the committee that pre-scrutiny of issues provided by the executive or holding 
to account external partners were the solutions. 
 
External scrutiny 
External scrutiny at Delta tended to be reported to work without group controls over members 
and topic selection. A number of respondents commented on the good work that was done 
when engaging with agencies and organisations outside the council: 
 
‘[Through scrutiny] we‟ve got partnership working, joined-up working now with anti-
social behaviour between the council, police and the Delta Housing.‟ 
DM001C 
 
Respondents also reported that these were probably the most successful committees, in terms 
of outcomes, across the O&S function at Delta: 
 
‘[Health and Crime] I think just those two that I‟ve mentioned get quite a bit of 
attention. I would say probably the Health and Social Care [Committee] gets more 
things done, yes.‟ 
DM014L 
 
However, some members were concerned about the focus of committees such as the Health 
and Social Care committee, which appeared to prefer looking at things outside the council 
rather than the services provided by the council. One respondent argued that this could have 
been a strategy of the majority group, as it had been chaired by a member of the 
administration party: 
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„We perhaps don‟t scrutinise enough, we don‟t go into enough depth [on] up-to-date 
issues. [...] The odd little things that we do get involved in, like the name of the 
hospital [...] it‟s not dealing with why there have been so many cancelled operations. 
[...] I certainly don‟t think that it has been set up by the ruling group with the 
intention of unravelling any problems. [It] looks at things in a fairly superficial way 
and that‟s the interpretation where you are being kind to people! [...] You see that 
there's more on the NHS than there is on the council‟s own service and to my mind, 
that‟s wrong. We‟re more responsible for Social Services than we are for the NHS.‟ 
DM004C 
 
V3: Centralisation of policy formulation 
Councillors from both major parties at Delta reported that the group took a leading role in the 
operation of the call-in function, making decisions on its use and restricting the ability of the 
component councillors to make up their own mind about the issues under scrutiny: 
 
„...we, as the opposition, have called in two or three decisions recently and you know, 
the Labour representation on scrutiny is obviously greater than ours and the call-ins 
just get kicked out.‟ 
DM013C (Group Leader) 
 
Whilst the Conservatives went ahead with the centrally organised call-in of a recent issue, the 
call-in of another issue became cross-party because of the centralisation of policy formulation 
in the majority Labour group. Respondents commented that most of the majority group were 
ignored when the cabinet made the decision: 
 
„...the group itself voiced concerns [...] we did air those views but I think the cabinet 
took the view “Okay, you‟ve heard the views but it‟s down at the end there.” There 
was a difference of opinion rather than one being right or wrong and they took the 
view that “We made this decision and we can‟t see any reason to change it.”‟ 
DM009L 
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„There was a clear, massive indication to the main status quo and it was just 
overridden, so that made me step back and think, well realistically what is the point of 
all this? [We] debated it strongly in the group [but] they totally ignore it, to be quite 
honest.‟ 
DM015L 
 
There was a belief reported by a majority party backbencher that this attitude towards the 
wider Labour group was common and that the centralisation of decision-making was well 
entrenched in the Labour group at Delta: 
 
„Basically the power is in the inner cabinet with the leader. [...] I was always told that 
politics, the Labour group will decide. “We‟ll patronise, we‟ll put people on scrutiny, 
but any major decisions will be made by the group,” though I don‟t believe that. I 
believe it is made by the inner cabinet.‟ 
DM015L 
 
The opposition group leader sustained this accusation of a centrally-controlled Labour group 
operation with reference to the history of the council, having a majority group which had at 
one time constituted almost all the members of the council: 
 
„History is important.  We‟ve grown considerably [...] and so we‟re now putting up 
proper opposition than that before and they don‟t like it. [...] They have had 36 years 
of control and they have pretty much done what they want. Part of the history that is 
relevant is that they have gone from 60 out of 63 councillors to now having 33, so they 
have lost a lot of their power / voice. [...] Any attempt through any means, be it 
scrutiny or whatever, to challenge their decisions, is not liked.‟ 
DM013C (Conservative group leader) 
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V4: Preclusory discipline 
Excepting the preclusory discipline used to rally members of the majority and the opposition 
at call-ins, where there was a more explicit whip in relation to actions, there was scant 
evidence to suggest that councillors were told how to act or behave within O&S committees 
more generally. Respondents were keen to express that group interference would not impinge 
on O&S: 
 
„I‟ve heard Labour councillors be as critical of a department as you would expect an 
opposition member to be, if they have felt that the service wasn‟t performing 
adequately.‟ 
DM004C 
 
Whilst the Conservative leader understood that preclusory discipline did not actively occur 
with respect to members of committees being told how to act, he believed that certain issues 
were actively encouraged to be ‘off-limits’ to scrutiny and thus the issues, rather than the 
councillors themselves, were whipped: 
 
„There is a, conspiracy is the wrong word, but there is a whip, if you like, given on 
scrutiny issues and on other issues as well. I‟m sure that there is a bit of party line 
toed [in relation to Labour.]  
DM013C 
 
V5: Cohibition of councillor communication 
In O&S settings, there was little active cohibition of councillor communication with no pre-
group meetings, little devotion to organising issues within scrutiny unless they were important 
and few pre-arranged call-ins. On the Conservative side, the leader expressed that his group 
were free to go about business in whatever way they felt was the most appropriate: 
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„My group are free and easy to talk about what they want in scrutiny. [...] Absolutely, 
there are no messages given from me or from the leadership of my group on scrutiny. 
There is only one other group really, Labour, but I know that‟s not the [same] case.‟ 
DM013C 
 
However in interviews, Labour members reported that they had not been constrained in the 
O&S environment and were free to speak about group policies: 
 
„We‟re allowed to say what we think and how we feel about it and you know, 
[permission] doesn‟t have any concept at all!‟ 
DM014L 
 
The chief concerns raised in relation to cohibition of member communications in O&S were 
more related to topic selection, with the chair’s liaison group providing the grounds for the 
opposition group leader to conclude that O&S was neutralised in this way: 
  
„We have regular meetings between cabinet and scrutiny so we make sure that the 
work programmes are relevant to what the council is trying to achieve.‟ 
DM002L (Council Leader) 
 
„...you wouldn‟t get some of the blocks that occur now, where the chairs clearly know 
what is going on in the cabinet and act accordingly...‟ 
DM013C (Group Leader) 
 
These claims from the Conservative leader were substantiated to some extent when 
respondents reported that topic selection could be difficult, especially relating to issues that 
the majority party did not want to be discussed at O&S: 
 
„I think it is very difficult to get a topic put on the programme that the chair of the 
committee isn‟t happy to go on the programme. I think she does control it fairly 
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strictly, you know? [...] I don‟t think she‟s being completely awkward, but she has 
areas that she feels are appropriate to pursue and she will pursue them, but it is not 
always easy to get something that I would call “contentious” high on the agenda.‟ 
DM004C 
 
In relation to the cohibition of Conservative councillors, there was little, if any, control over 
members of the committees or chairs. For example, a Conservative respondent reported that 
she had wanted to use O&S for political capital for the group but the Conservative chair of the 
committee had blocked this outright: 
 
„Even though [X] is the same political persuasion as me, she has said from the word 
go, when I mentioned it “No, I‟m apolitical, I am the chair, I cannot take your side or 
agree or disagree because it‟s a political point.”‟ 
DM006C 
 
V6: Administration of castigative discipline 
In relation to punishing councillors for going against the group in O&S, this was reported to 
be an extremely unlikely occurrence because of the ‘freedom’ that both groups had granted in 
the arena. With reference to the Labour group, respondents argued that it would be highly 
unusual to punish councillors for their actions in O&S. 
 
„He‟s a brill man and he understands, you know, as do other cabinet members, that we 
are all adults, we don‟t always agree.‟ 
DM011L 
 
Another Labour respondent was more pragmatic and believed that the reason that the majority 
group were reluctant to be excessively heavy handed with councillors who disobeyed party 
orders, was due to the balance on the council: 
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I: Yes, but the party group didn‟t punish you as a result of that? 
R: No. 
I: No? 
R: I think when you're the majority of one they have to be a little bit careful!‟ 
DM015L 
 
V7: Allocation of positions 
The allocation of O&S posts at Delta was primarily conducted by the leader of the council 
and the chief whip, including the decision to give the opposition some chairs with some 
‘discussion between the parties beforehand‟ (DM002L). The leader of the council had to 
actively encourage the majority party that it was necessary to give the opposition some chairs 
of scrutiny: ‘I strongly recommended to the controlling group that the opposition should have 
the majority of chairs, so they have three and we have two‟ (DM002L). The actual process for 
allocating chairs to the individual committees was reported to be at the control of the majority 
group leader and whip specifically: 
 
„It‟s at the behest of the leader. The leader decides who gets which paid positions. So 
scrutiny chairs are paid positions, they get an allowance. [...] Now it‟s a difficult one 
because as the leader I‟m sure he‟s got people to appease, he‟s got people to please 
and satisfy i.e. members in his group who want extra money. [...] Clearly, cabinet are 
making decisions and if they are being scrutinised [...] by one of their own... turkey‟s 
aren‟t going to vote for Christmas, are they?‟ 
DM013C (Conservative group leader) 
 
Some councillors reported that this process of leader / whip appointment did lead to some 
‘political’ appointments of chairs who would protect the majority party group: 
 
„Two of the chairs and one deputy chair were given for political reasons [...] I 
suppose at the end of the day, if you are only in it by one, which Labour is, you‟re 
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going to try and protect yourself, aren‟t you? I suppose if it was the other way, we‟d 
do the same!‟ 
DM006C 
 
A Liberal Democrat opposition O&S chair believed that topic selection had been her downfall 
in the eyes of the administration, due to her insistence that a topic should be deliberated upon 
in an O&S setting: 
 
R: And to be perfectly honest, I think that‟s one of the reasons why I'm not chair this 
year, because it was unpopular... 
I: It was unpopular to look at that issue? 
R: It was unpopular to talk about that issue. 
I: Yes.  Do you find that with the councillors on the committee, they thought that 
it was unpopular as well and…? 
R: No, not the councillors, not those that took part in scrutiny. 
I: Not the ones in Scrutiny? 
R: Higher up the ranking...!‟ 
DM012LD 
 
In relation to group involvement in the actual committee member allocations, the leaders and 
whips (of all parties) were responsible for allocating members to committees: 
 
„You can‟t just pick and choose where you go. [...] [It’s] done mainly by group leaders 
from all parties and their whips and then obviously people are placed, wherever 
possible, where their skills lie.‟ 
DM011L 
 
Brief Delta Summary 
Despite being the most numerically competitive authority of all the case studies, Delta 
confounded theoretical expectations through reporting few levers of group control over O&S. 
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With an absence of pre-O&S meetings to organise the operation of the councillors in O&S 
and only focusing on important scrutiny issues in regular group meetings, the parties at Delta, 
unlike at Alpha, Beta and Gamma, were not excessively concerned about the day-to-day 
operation of the function. Despite elements of topic control and diversionary tactics from the 
majority group, the operation of the function was relatively free of direct interference. 
However, one aspect of overview and scrutiny where groups maintained complete control 
related to the call-in function, where groups whipped, organised and mandated councillors to 
operate along party lines in order to protect ambitions in the last resort. 
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Chapter Eight: Data Analysis 
The eighth chapter of the thesis evaluates the empirical data presented in the preceding 
chapters. Firstly, assessed by variable and secondly, by case summaries of the data. The 
chapter then presents potential models of behaviour of party groups since the introduction of 
the Act. 
 
Natural Loyalty in the ‘Blended Separation of Powers’ 
Firstly it is necessary to interpret the outcomes of the quantitative data relating to how 
councillors believed that they „naturally‟ operated within the institutional environment of a 
blended separation of powers, beyond direct control. Generally there was strong agreement 
amongst councillors of all parties that they would operate in a group vote-seeking / protecting 
way (Q5.11) and relatively strong agreement that they would fear the consequences of 
criticising the group in public in relation to the group‟s electoral ambitions (Q3.10). Similarly 
there was strong agreement from Labour and Conservative councillors that they would remain 
compliant with the group for the purposes of having a better chance of impacting policy 
(Q5.13). When considering careerist concerns in the blended separation of powers, there was 
moderate agreement from councillors of all groups that they would be willing to be loyal for 
the purposes of furthering their sphere of influence (Q5.14), whilst Labour councillors, 
specifically, tended to strongly agree that they would have concerns for their position within 
their group should they criticised the party in public (Q3.9). 
 
Whilst Labour councillors were statistically significantly more likely to operate in a more 
cohesive manner in the blended separation of powers without the need for direct group control 
(Q3.9, Q3.10, Q5.13) and this was reflected by the statistical significance of less whipping 
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and O&S-specific group meetings, the wider tendency for automatic group cohesion on the 
basis of careerist concerns, wanting to remain popular in the group and through a fear of the 
group‟s electoral ambitions was common across all parties. These results demonstrated that 
the parliamentary structure naturally encouraged politicians to operate in a way compatible 
with maintaining the collective benefits (Chapter Three). In other words, councillors 
recognised that the successes of the group had a direct impact on their own abilities. 
 
However the research also found that across all parties there was, at least, some strong belief 
that councillors would act in the way mandated within the legislation (Q5.12) and thus violate 
the natural cohesion with O&S. Whilst there were no statistical indicators which signalled a 
propensity of a particular type of councillor to be more likely to follow the legislation and act 
against the group, the very presence of councillors agreeing to and willing to act in this 
manner would have been the reason why parties may have needed to counteract the potential 
impact of introduction of O&S. Whilst there are no hypotheses relating to these questions, 
they provide strong confirmation of the expected cohesion in a parliamentary blended 
separation of powers (Q3.9, Q3.10, Q5.11, Q5.13, Q5.14) whilst also demonstrating that 
councillors could operate against the best interests of the party (Q5.12), which, in turn, allows 
us to envisage that it would be reasonable for groups to have attempted to mitigate public 
O&S undertaken by councillors.   
 
V1: Local Party Group Meetings 
From the survey, the question relating to group meetings taking place before O&S specifically 
related to meetings which dealt exclusively with the agenda of a subsequent O&S committee. 
Whilst the question was „righting the wrongs‟ of previous quantitative research (ELGNCE, 
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2002, 2006), the results of the study do not confirm that the meetings were necessarily held to 
formulate a group perspective. Instead the question was exceptionally specific about the group 
having an exclusive focus on the O&S agenda.   
 
In this study, it was found that 35%
1
 of respondents experienced pre-O&S party group 
meetings. Whilst these meetings did not occur for the majority of respondents, the results 
were significantly different enough from zero to have not to have happened by chance. There 
were no statistically significant relationships with any other factor such as political party, tier, 
presence of a majority or incumbency vs. opposition. In relation to devoting time to O&S 
issues in regular party group meetings (distinct from ones preceding O&S), 44% of 
respondents reported that at least some time was devoted. Again, whilst not being able to 
identify the topic of discussions, it was clear that a substantial amount of time was devoted to 
the function when the whole group was present. Whilst parties and the presence of a majority 
party were not associated with the practice, the tier of the council and incumbency vs. 
opposition showed statistical significance. In the case of incumbency vs. opposition, it came 
as no surprise that the opposition devoted more time to O&S due to the fact that the 
function would be a larger part of their work. However, with respect to tier, there was a 
significant propensity for lower tier councils to devote more time to O&S in group meetings, 
perhaps due to the fewer council functions at this sub-national tier.  
 
In terms of the change in the number of group meetings since the Act, the majority of 
respondents considered that the frequency had either stayed the same or increased in number 
                                                            
1 32 – 38% with a 3% sampling error (95% confidence interval) 
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(80.6%
2
), with no statistical significance indicating an association, showing evidence of, at 
the least, a maintenance of group activity over time. 
 
In combining devotion to O&S in group meetings and specific party meetings relating to O&S, 
it was found that the majority of respondents (54.6%
3
) reported that they had experienced at 
least one of these occurrences in relation to O&S and this majority would hold, given the 
sampling error, amongst the population. To highlight this data as possible evidence of group 
control in the wider population of English local government, the use of group meetings within 
the case study authorities as „tools of group control‟ demonstrated that they were used in a 
number of ways, but with the foremost commonality of preventing damage to the party 
goals: 
 
1) Firstly, group meetings were used as a private way to dissolve the potency of 
criticism of majority (or minority administration) party groups within O&S in 
order to avert the cost of questioning, which could have consequences for the party 
goals (Gamma LD, Alpha Conservative & Beta Conservative). This was 
predominantly when the function was looking to perform the role of holding to 
account. The content of meeting was often to remind councillors of their obligations to 
what they had agreed previously on as a group, precluding the possibility of 
spontaneous debate in public. 
 
2) Secondly meetings were used to ensure that the topics covered in committee were 
tightly controlled by the groups to prevent criticism on specific items (Beta 
                                                            
2 76.4 – 84.8% with a 4.2% sampling error (95% confidence interval) 
3 51.5 – 57.7% with a 3.1% sampling error (95% confidence interval) 
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Conservative) or ensure that there was a light shone on specific items (Beta LD). 
This was typically when deciding topics for policy development, review and pre-
scrutiny role of the function. The most concrete examples of this were the bizarre mid-
committee and post-committee meetings ensuring that O&S wasn‟t destructive to the 
majority group at Beta  
 
3) Thirdly, group meetings were used as a chamber of deliberation of group perspective 
in order to formulate what group line should be carried on issue X in O&S 
(Gamma Labour & Gamma LD). Gamma Labour would formulate a line to take to 
O&S on the basis of the meeting and Gamma LD would often reconcile the factions in 
the group before agreeing a line for the public arena. 
 
4) Fourthly, group meetings were used as a place where the opposition group would 
generate lines of questioning attack for O&S, specifically with the intention of 
highlighting administration ineptitude (Alpha Labour). For example, Alpha Labour‟s 
primary concern was to ensure the group had prepared sufficient points to use against 
the majority group. There was also an element of group meetings being used as a 
method of discussing strategy in committees (Beta LD). 
 
In all nine cases of party group meetings
4
 relating to O&S in the case studies, the instrument 
was used as either in defence/attack or as a way to collectively ensure that the O&S member(s) 
followed a line. Both of these reasons ensured that the party‟s objectives were protected. 
However, the most intensive use of the group meeting related to holding to account the 
administration. In these situations meetings became an important way for majority and 
                                                            
4 Alpha Conservatives (Pre + Regular) Alpha Labour (Regular) Beta Conservatives (Pre + Regular) Beta Liberal 
Democrat (Regular) Gamma Liberal Democrat (Pre + Regular) Gamma Labour (Regular) 
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opposition parties to formulate strategy and tactics to protect the goals of the party. Similarly 
meetings were used as a method for „agenda control‟ of O&S, specifically relating to things 
that the majority party would have liked to avoid or the opposition would have preferred to 
have been scrutinised. 
 
Significantly, the role of a group meeting as a method to formulate party perspective as a 
hypothesis was strongest in Alpha, the only lower-tier council. Unusually, the most 
numerically competitive authority; Delta, theoretically the most likely to follow objectives 
more intensively, reported a complete absence of group meetings to a method to control 
group behaviour in O&S. Pre-O&S group meetings were completely unheard of and most 
members found the concept utterly foreign. 
 
V2: Pervasiveness of Organisation 
In terms of holding to account, all case study authorities reported powerful and all-
encompassing group control over this particular role. In terms of majority parties, members 
were often mandated to remain quiet, in contrast with opposition parties who were often 
encouraged to push a collective group line. In effect, holding to account an executive was an 
intrinsically tribal affair across all four case study authorities. The range of behaviour relating 
to this role varied in severity across the councils in the following ways, starting with the most 
severe group control: 
 
1) At Alpha and Beta, the majority groups were not involved with the holding to account 
role of O&S. At Alpha this was much more explicit group action that prevented 
members from participating (whipped silence, ‘senior-members-only’ restriction 
305 
 
et al.), for the purpose of protecting the party. At Beta, the majority group control was 
more subtle: preventing or restricting what types of things could be held to 
account across all O&S leading to „walls of silence’ from the majority group when 
dealing with issues that were not acceptable. 
 
2) At Gamma, the holding to account role was affected by the condition of no-overall-
control and a leader who had allowed input from the other parties in decision-making. 
The holding to account role was thus mutually destructive to all parties and often took 
place very sparingly within O&S committees. Where it did occur, it was reported 
that all of the groups almost ensured that it was fundamentally conditional on 
low press or public interest, in order to prevent any possible damage to reputations. 
 
3) At Delta, the holding to account role was almost non-existent apart from the 
instrument of O&S „call-in.‟ In this regard, strict group controls were in place to 
arrange the utilisation of a ‘call-in’ (Delta Conservative) and defend and vote 
against (Delta Labour). 
 
With respect to the rudimentary „holding to account‟ role served by the instrument of the 
„call-in‟ function, most opposition groups within each of the case study authorities arranged to 
use the tool as „the group,‟ rather than as „councillors on the committee,‟ as had been the 
intention of the legislation. Equally, in defiance of opposition call-ins, the reciprocal approach 
was majority group members being prevented from joining these call-ins. The resultant ad-
hoc call-in deliberation committees were thus strictly controlled on party lines and majority 
group members would vote the proposal down. This was most evident in Delta and Alpha, 
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whereas at Gamma, call-ins were avoided in private discussion and at Beta, opposition 
efforts were seen as inexorably futile and thus not attempted. 
 
Invariably the recent call-ins (Alpha / Delta only) at the case study authorities (excepting one 
education call-in at Delta) were clearly demarcated by party group and were used as 
weapons of the opposition against the majority group to either receive attention in public 
arena or reinforce the point that these administrations were responsible for those decisions. 
Opposition groups were thus acting in this way to generate political capital and hence 
continue to meet their objectives by going against the intention of the, supposedly committee-
initiated, call-in function. Initiating and following through a call-in this way allowed the 
group to make the decision rather than the councillors within O&S. 
 
In relation to policy development, policy review and pre-scrutiny, the case study 
respondents were adamant that there was less party involvement in certain aspects of these 
roles, but were equally keen to report that some groups did retain control of direction. There 
were two main roles for parties relating to these functions of O&S: 
 
1) The party group would seek to actively control the topics covered, both as majority 
and opposition, in order to direct committees to scrutinise what they thought was the 
best option for the group to deliver on its objectives. For majority groups, this was 
towards anodynous topics and away from potentially damaging areas (Beta 
Conservatives) or using a veto for controversial topics (Alpha Conservatives). For 
opposition parties, activity involved steering the topics covered towards group ends 
(Alpha Labour.) 
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2) The party group also acted as a constraint on councillor’s policy discussions, where 
the group would take a role in ensuring the representative delivered the „right‟ policies 
in O&S committees, instead of permitting councillors to form conclusions based on 
any evidence provided (Gamma Labour).  
 
In relation to policy development, review and pre-scrutiny, there were instances where the 
groups were noticeably absent; firstly, small task groups (Beta, Gamma) looking at single 
issues and secondly, pre-scrutiny of issues (Gamma) before executive decisions. However, 
even these roles had been subject to group control in relation to initial topic selection (such as 
Beta Conservatives). 
 
As expected, the external scrutiny role of O&S received much less group involvement at all 
authorities. As one opposition councillor put it „there is little or no political cost to the 
controlling group‟ thus the group do not get actively involved in directing the topic choices in 
O&S.  Because it was „difficult to embarrass‟ anyone for political capital, there was more 
freedom for councillors to follow the intention of the legislation. However there were some 
concerns that enforcing external scrutiny instead of internal scrutiny was an active tactic used 
by a majority party to divert attention. For example, this was reported on the health and social 
care committee at Delta, where the majority chair agreed a work programme which was 
focused on health rather than social services, which was a substantial function at Delta. 
Equally, the opposition health chair at Gamma reported that her work programme was 
directed by the more actively group-controlled co-ordinating committee, which decided her 
work programme from above. However, given the research supposition that the party would 
be concerned with meeting its objectives and thus focus attention on what will impede its 
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objectives, the evidence that there was little to no group involvement in external scrutiny goes 
some way to demonstrate these types of theoretical assumptions. 
 
V3: Centralisation of Policy Formulation 
The centralisation of policy formulation was very clear in each of the parties at each of the 
local authorities (bar Beta LD, due to size). All the reasons for this were predominantly 
related to goal-satisficing efficiency; there were two approaches to how this would happen: 
 
1) Party leaders across groups (Alpha Lab/Con, Beta Conservative, Delta Lab/Con) took 
primary control over policy formulation without delegating much (if any – Alpha 
Conservative / Delta Labour) responsibility for policy to non-executives in either 
private group or public O&S settings. Respondents reported that everything was 
driven by a „small cohort of the cabinet‟ or senior members who „know it all and use it 
to their advantage.‟ However the „principal‟ non-executives were keen to express how 
pragmatic (and positive) it was to allow so much „agent‟ control. As a Beta 
Conservative commented: „when needs must, the devil drives.‟ This was an admission 
of the practical need for central control: „when leaders sacrifice organisational power 
or policy influence, myopic and electorally inefficient party behaviour follows’ (Strøm, 
1990, p. 578). 
 
2) The second type of centralisation of policy formulation was atypical amongst the case 
studies but followed the theoretical assumptions particularly cleanly. At Gamma, the 
impact of no-overall-control led to collusion amongst the group leaders to prevent 
public embarrassment and thwart possible damage to their goals. In this case, the 
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leaders colluded to take away issues from O&S to be negotiated amongst the leaders 
of the groups in private. Having these „offline meetings’ effectively took O&S issues 
(mid-meeting) to be discussed in private and agreed by the leaders of the groups, 
without input from either their own group councillors or O&S. Councillors, again, 
understood the pragmatic argument that it was better for everyone if the leaders took 
away issues rather than leaving it to open committees: „things can be brought to a 
resolution more quickly. Rather than doing it in public, where everybody is on their 
own little platform and hobby horse and hoping the press are there and watching them, 
you know?‟ Inevitably this had led to O&S meetings with „nods of heads’ indicating 
issues to be resolved behind closed-doors. 
 
V4: Preclusory Discipline 
The survey for this research broke organisational „whipping‟ into „advisory‟ and „explicit‟ and 
discovered that more than 1 in 10 respondents
5
 had been explicitly mandated to follow group 
instructions and almost 1 in 4
6
 respondents had been „informally pressured‟ or advised to act 
as directed by the group in O&S.  
 
In terms of statistical significance of any associations, it was found that the presence of a 
majority led to the most routine advisory whipping and the lack of a majority led to the most 
„occasional or ad-hoc‟ advisory whipping. In interpreting these results, it could be argued that 
councils with a majority party might be more likely to routinely direct O&S councillors to 
defend their group positions (i.e. always whipping to defend the majority, or constantly 
whipping the opposition to attack the majority party). For the occasional or ad-hoc whipping, 
                                                            
5 9.9– 13.9% with a 2.0% sampling error (95% confidence interval) 
6 20.8 – 26.2% with a 2.7% sampling error (95% confidence interval) 
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the propensity for this to occur in authorities with no-overall-control could be interpreted as 
lightly whipping O&S only in cases where the issues were fundamental to goals (i.e. divisive 
controversial issues.)  In respect to explicit whipping, there were no statistically significant 
indicators which illuminated any propensities for this practice. The 12% who reported explicit 
whipping demonstrated that this practice was not bound to structure, tier, competition or 
certain affiliations of party groups. 
 
Combining the incidences of both advisory and explicit whipping, around 26% of respondents 
had reported one of either of these practices. The combined dichotomous variable showed no 
significant factors which affected the propensity for whipping. Whilst not a large percentage 
of the sample,
7
 whipping was reported in O&S more clearly than in any previous quantitative 
study of O&S because of the specific definitions of whipping in the circumstances of O&S.
8
 
When combining group meetings and whipping into one dichotomous variable (V1 & V4), it 
was found that a majority of respondents 62%
9
 had experienced at least one of these 
group instruments in relation to the operation of O&S, with Liberal Democrats most 
likely to experience these (perhaps relating to the propensity of opposition groups to report 
O&S group discussion; see V1) and unexpectedly, Labour were least likely (perhaps 
reflecting automatically-generated loyalty; see ‘Natural Loyalty’). 
 
From the question to long-serving councillors about the level of group control in relation to 
organisational discipline both before and after the Act, each group reported only a small 
                                                            
7 Or population ~ 23.1 – 28.7% with 2.8% sampling error (95% confidence interval) 
8 Prior to this study, whipping is likely to have been significantly underreported. 
9 58.6 – 64.8% with a 3.1% sampling error (95% confidence interval) 
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difference between the two, with only the Labour respondents reporting that the level of 
control had dropped slightly. 
 
In terms of the qualitative data from the case studies, it was clear that preclusory discipline 
was in operation across all the groups for various roles of O&S and in all of these experiences, 
the party were looking to protect their goals. In relation to advisory whipping, there were 
three aims for its use: 
 
1) Advisory whipping occurred in Alpha Labour within the „holding to account‟ arena of 
the executive O&S committee. In this manner, councillors were organised and advised 
to come up with questions and points to raise in the public committee which would 
best attack the opposition. Whilst this practice was not explicit whipping: „I think a lot 
of people do feel as though they have to go with it,‟ the group played an active role 
in the organisation of tactics. 
 
2) The second aim of advisory whipping in the case study authorities was the group 
intention of commandeering the work programmes of O&S. This occurred with 
the Beta LD who had reportedly organised the presence of their members on a panel to 
make suggestions for topics of O&S work programmes for the purposes of achieving a 
group goal. 
 
3) The third aim of advisory whipping related to informing councillors of the groups’ 
position on policy and encouraging the councillor, as a delegate, to represent the 
views of the whole group in the committee. This was the experience within Gamma 
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Labour, who did this to ensure that the group was represented rather than the 
individual in O&S settings: „we don’t whip [...] we expect!‟ 
 
In terms of explicit whipping, whilst the practice was not as prevalent as advisory whipping, 
there were still occurrences where it appeared to be happening regularly, especially in relation 
to two roles in O&S, in a manner to control the outcomes for their own benefit: 
 
1) The role of holding to account was the most likely function of O&S to be 
subjected to explicit group whips. For Delta Labour and Conservative groups the 
practice was only in relation to whipping call-ins, both in organising (Conservative) 
and retaliating against a call-in (Labour). The resultant whip in an ad-hoc committee 
to hear the case resulted in bloc votes for and against and ended without deliberation. 
Beyond call-ins, the Alpha Conservative group used explicit whipping to silence 
majority party members prior to the holding to account function of the executive O&S 
committee. 
 
2) The second noted role of explicit whipping related to the control of topic selection 
for O&S work programmes. Both Beta Conservative and possibly the Gamma 
Liberal Democrats used an explicit whip to control the proceedings of committees in 
such a way to avoid topics which would be detrimental to the group. For example, 
Beta Conservatives „falling into line‟ on the co-ordinating board and the Gamma 
Liberal Democrat group seeking to prevent topics that they „ought to avoid.‟ 
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V5: Cohibition of Councillor Communication 
In terms of cohibiting communication, groups were active in preventing individuals from 
criticising the party in public to protect the goals of the group. For example, 25%
10
 of 
respondents reported that they had been briefed how to conduct themselves in O&S settings. 
Of these briefings, the most common times that this occurred was when the issues were 
controversial (40%), when the system was first introduced (39%) and when the candidate was 
first elected (30%.) Whilst not knowing the precise content of the briefings, due to the limits 
of the survey research, it was clear that some parties unequivocally gave group instructions to 
councillors on how they should behave „according to the party‟ in O&S, especially given that 
the most common time for these briefings related to when issues were controversial. 
 
In relation to questions about whether the respondent had criticised the decisions made by 
their party group in public and private, the difference between the two questions was 
significant. More than 75%
11
 of respondents had not criticised the group in public in contrast 
to 65%
12
 of respondents who did criticise the group in private. This difference, whilst it 
cannot be proved that explicit group action mandated this silence, demonstrated that 
councillors were effectively constrained by either themselves (in terms of group loyalty) or 
their group (in terms of group discipline) in the public arenas of local government. It was 
found that chairs of O&S committees were statistically significantly slightly more likely to 
criticise their group in public in comparison to regular members, but the difference was not 
large and a surprisingly high 69% of O&S chairs, who were non-executives of an 
                                                            
10 21.89 – 27.29% with a 2.7% sampling error (95% confidence interval) 
11 72.9 – 78.3% with a 2.7% sampling error (95% confidence interval) 
12 61.8 – 67.8% with a 3% sampling error (95% confidence interval) 
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incumbent party, reported that they had never criticised the decisions made by their 
group in public. 
 
In terms of the case studies, the cohibition of councillor communication was more readily 
observed.  In particular, at both Alpha and Gamma, all of the group leaders attended almost 
all O&S meetings (With Alpha Conservatives – the cabinet would also attend), to monitor the 
proceedings of the committee. It was noted that this was the reason why councillors were 
silent in committee, as the executive carried a „huge patronage (Alpha Conservatives)‟ and 
members derived living costs from roles and thus might have been unwilling to criticise the 
group in front of their senior colleagues. This presence was reportedly „intimidating’ but also 
replicated on the Alpha Labour side. At Gamma, the same experience was evident and group 
leaders were a constant presence at O&S, typically because there was a „concern of how we 
look[ed] in the press‟ (Gamma LD). The presence of leadership reportedly constrained the 
contributions from members of all groups in O&S. Whilst the leaders attending the 
committees would have cohibited members of the committees from deviating from group 
lines, the reasons given by the leaderships were surprisingly pragmatic: „you can get bad 
headlines (Gamma LD).‟  
 
In terms of regular members at Beta and Delta, there was little active cohibition of 
communication in O&S but there was a commonality of restricting the communication of the 
chairs. At Beta, the cohibition was mostly restricted to the majority group chairs of the 
committee (Beta Conservatives), who were restrained when topics were politically sensitive. 
This was especially evident when the group of chairs on the co-ordinating committee took 
pre-O&S, mid-O&S and post-O&S group meetings during an O&S committee. Delta 
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committee members from the groups were much less actively constrained in O&S than at 
Alpha, Beta or Gamma, but there was a sense from respondents that majority chairs (Delta 
Labour) were ensuring that work programmes were relatively uncontroversial.  
 
V6: Administration of Castigative Discipline 
Relating to castigative discipline, the survey data showed that punishing councillors as a 
result of their actions did take place but undoubtedly not to a great extent. For example, only 
2.67%
13
 of councillors were punished by their group as a direct result of their actions in O&S. 
Whilst statistical tests could not be run on the multiple choice question format, even with 
sampling errors factored in, the propensity for Conservative respondents to be most likely to 
be punished was evident (3.9%) in comparison to Labour (1.6%) and Liberal Democrat 
respondents (0.92%). This association would be unlikely to be related to the Conservatives 
being more likely to discipline; instead this would indicate that majority parties, in which role 
the Conservatives dominated across local government, were more likely to punish deviance in 
O&S for the purposes of defending the party. Whilst it was expected that castigative 
discipline would be low, the evidence that it could be used in some cases (1 in 40 respondents) 
provided some confirmation that the threat of its utilisation was actively put into practice 
in a few, presumably serious, cases. 
 
The outcomes of these reports predominantly resulted in informal warnings from the group 
but discipline was taken to its extreme in two cases where members were suspended as a 
result of their actions against the group in O&S. Whilst the more serious punishments (above 
informal warnings) made up only 1% of the total sample, severe punishment had been a 
                                                            
13 1.67 – 3.67% with a 1% sampling error (95% confidence interval) 
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possibility for going against the group in O&S. However, this conclusion should be tempered 
with the limits of the survey research, which asked respondents to self-report this discipline 
(i.e. being removed from a role due to behaviour in O&S may have incorporated wider 
reasons.) From the more open question about castigative discipline, as a result of broader 
public criticism, 20% of respondents were punished as a direct result of their actions, with the 
majority of these councillors receiving post-hoc informal warnings that this was unacceptable 
to the group. These figures did show that the group was willing to punish in some cases, 
however lightly, councillors who breached the line of the group. Presumably the reason for 
this would be to remind councillors of their obligation and ensuring compliance in the future. 
However where this line was drawn would be indecipherable from the survey data.  
 
In terms of castigative discipline at the case studies, there was no commonality in approach to 
the use of punishment as a means to coerce group cohesion. At Beta, neither party reported 
that this was an issue at O&S. However at the other three authorities, there were some 
indications that it would be used as a threat, if not necessarily always used in practice. In 
terms of application, an opposition Alpha Labour respondent reported that a warning was 
given when she did not support a group colleague in O&S. In this case, the party looked for 
group support on an agenda item which they had intentionally raised to either achieve their 
goal of embarrassing the executive or delivering policy through O&S. The failure of the 
councillor to support this was punishable with an informal warning that support should be 
given in future. At Gamma, the Epsilon faction leader of the Liberal Democrats was adamant 
that informal warnings would (and do) come from her, specifically as a senior member, in 
cases of deviance and intimated that threats of candidate deselection could be used to corral 
allegiance to the party in serious cases. At Delta, one majority party member knowingly used 
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the knife-edge balance as a route to justify public criticism of the group in public, fully 
understanding that the party could not seriously punish him, as to do so would cost the group 
its incumbency.  
 
V7: Allocation of Positions 
From the survey, it was clear that the majority of O&S chairpersonships were allocated by the 
majority party to the administration party. Almost 60% of chairpersonships were allocated in 
this way but with significant differences across political parties. For example, incumbent 
Conservative and Labour parties allocated at least three-quarters of chairs to their own party, 
in contrast to the Liberal Democrats who allocated 58% to their own party when incumbent. 
Labour were the only party to significantly offer fewer chairs to opposition parties when in 
control of local authorities. However, it was clear that there were groups, even Labour, who 
offered chairs to the opposition, surely at odds with achieving the goals of the party. 
 
In relation to how individuals were chosen to be chairs, the overwhelming route to 
nomination was via the group with verification at full council. Other routes of nomination 
were effectively through the committees themselves, though it would be important to state 
that these would have been dominated by the majority or largest party at the authority. When 
factoring in affiliation, when Liberal Democrats were incumbent, there was a significant 
increase in Liberal Democrat chairs being nominated by their group, indirectly highlighting 
that individual Liberal Democrats, when in opposition, might have been specifically picked 
by Lab/Con majority parties to chair O&S committees.  
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Relating to committee allocations at the case studies, it was found that the quantitative data 
was almost impossible to untangle due to the complexity of the variable in practice. For 
example, all of the authorities allocated at least one chair of an O&S committee to the 
opposition, which naturally implied that they had followed elements of the original legislation. 
However, the reasons for this often directly related to the control of the group over O&S. For 
example, the Alpha chairpersonship given to the opposition was allocated in order to occupy 
them with external scrutiny and „something that they couldn’t cause any trouble with!‟ Whilst 
Beta Conservatives gave Beta LD the chair of the overarching co-ordinating committee of 
scrutiny, the setup of the committee meant that his hands were effectively bound by the 
rigorous discipline of his members (the Conservative chairs of all committees.) At Delta, a 
Liberal Democrat chair was reportedly not reappointed to the role because Delta Labour had 
felt that she had raised issues that were unpalatable. Furthermore, at Gamma, allocations were 
a result of private negotiations between two groups out of the three who, between them, had a 
numerical majority to push through their decisions. It was reported that they looked to be 
„stopping individuals and promoting certain individuals, rather than about [selecting] the best 
talent’ and inventing committees to ensure that certain people within the two groups were 
given roles. Within this allocation meeting, they nominated all the candidates for each of the 
committees, taking the responsibility away from the Conservatives in order to decide their 
own candidate. 
 
In terms of intra-party nomination of candidates for roles, Alpha reported that the majority 
party executive O&S chair was a strategic nomination to keep the councillor „sweet [...] 
because he is a high flyer’ and operate „effectively‟ in a defensive role for them since leaving 
the cabinet. There were also reports that the Beta Conservative chairs were chosen solely by 
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the leader, rather than the group, after all serving as assistant cabinet members, which Beta 
LDs believed „groomed‟ them for protecting the group in O&S. Further to this, the leader of 
Beta Conservatives implied that the chairs might have been chosen in the knowledge they 
were not the best candidates for the role because „those that are good at it tend to be more 
critical than the others.‟ Delta Labour were also reported to have made strategic nominations 
from their party, in order to protect the group, but this was not widely reported. 
 
In relation to nominating ordinary members of the committees, there were three groups that 
appeared to control who appeared on which committee through a system of allocation rather 
than self-selection. In this way, these groups wanted to protect the party from certain 
members of their own group (e.g. loose cannons). This was most evident with the Alpha 
Conservatives, who only chose the most trusted, senior members (to serve silently) on the 
executive O&S committee. A weaker example was at Delta Labour, whose leader and chief 
whip allocated all committee positions for O&S but it was difficult to see any extraordinary 
group motivation beyond the efficiency of doing it this way.  Unique to Gamma, leaders of 
the groups substituted for regular members of the group in almost every committee 
observation (apart from leader who attended to „oversee‟ proceedings), which indicated strong 
concern over the public discussions and essentially leaving matters to non-executive members.  
 
Effectively the quantitative research on this variable was only a very partial reflection of 
group activity within allocating O&S positions and nominating members. However the case 
studies provided useful illustrations of how groups allocated chairpersonships and how 
councillors were nominated for chairs and committees: whilst superficially appearing open 
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and legislatively-compliant, groups often subtly controlled how much freedom was given 
whilst doing this. 
 
Case Study Summaries 
Below are two tables which systematise the different levers of control over O&S used by 
groups in the case studies and in what instances the parties used these instruments in relation 
to the function. The first table (8.1) presents brief detail on how groups controlled members 
and the second table (8.2) presents a summary of the intensity of group control in each case 
study, relating to each variable. 
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Party Groups in O&S Alpha  
District 
Beta  
County 
Gamma 
Unitary 
Delta 
Metro 
V1a Pre-O&S Party Group 
Meetings  
Yes (Majority) 
No (Opposition) 
Yes (Majority) 
Possible (Opposition) 
Yes (Largest Party) 
No (Opposition) 
No 
V1b Exclusive Time 
Devotion to O&S in 
Group Meeting 
Yes (Both Parties) Yes (Both Parties) Yes (All Parties) 
Yes (Both – but only if 
important issue) 
V2a Holding to Account Protective (Majority):  
Explicit group action 
preventing members from 
participating 
 
Attacking (Opposition): 
Group action to collectively 
arrange group line of 
holding to account.  
Protective (Majority):  
Preventing or 
restricting what types 
of things could be held 
to account across all 
overview and scrutiny 
Collusive & Protective:  
All of the three groups 
ensured that it was 
conditional on low 
press or public interest 
Protective (Majority) 
& Aggressive 
(Opposition):  
Group control of call-
in function. 
V2b Policy Development, 
Review & Pre-Scrutiny Majority: Veto 
controversial topics 
Opposition: Steering the 
topics for group ends 
Majority: Scrutiny 
diverted from 
controversial topics 
Opposition: Pre-
ordained, group-
agreed suggestions for 
work programme 
Labour Opposition: 
Constraint on 
councillor’s own policy 
dev contributions 
No clear group roles 
V2c External Scrutiny 
No No No 
Majority: Directing 
O&S towards external 
rather than internal 
(Possible) 
V3  Centralisation of 
Policy Formulation Yes (both majority and 
opposition) 
Yes (only majority 
party) 
Yes - Collusive 
centralisation to three 
leaders 
Yes (majority) 
 
Opposition: More 
related to call-in 
function. 
V4 Preclusory Discipline 
Advisory (Opposition) 
Explicit (Majority) 
Advisory (Opposition) 
Explicit (Majority) 
Advisory 
 (Lab opposition) 
Explicit  
(LD minority admin) 
Explicit (for both) but 
only in relation to 
‘call-n’ function 
V5 Cohibition of 
Councillor 
Communication 
Majority: Cabinet & Leader 
Attend Scrutiny 
Committees 
 
Opposition: Leader attends 
scrutiny and interjects 
Majority: Only in 
relation to Chairs 
All parties cohibit 
members: Collusion 
amongst leaders to 
enforce 
No – though possible 
with Majority chairs 
V6 Administration of 
Castigative Discipline Informal Warnings None 
Informal Warnings; 
Threats of Deselection 
None 
V7 Allocation of Positions Allocation: Majority gave 
opposition the External 
chair for group diversion 
 
Nomination (Chairs): 
Majority group gave Exec 
chair role to operate 
‘effectively’ for the group. 
 
Nomination (members): 
Centrally allocated for 
‘right people’ 
Allocation: All 
overview and scrutiny 
chairs (bar co-
ordination committee) 
given to former 
cabinet advisors. 
 
Nomination (Chairs): 
Suggestion of group 
leader intentionally 
giving roles to ‘poor 
quality’ chairs 
 
Allocation: Collusive 
between Two Parties 
(Largest and Smallest) 
to benefit these two 
parties alone. Support 
given by Labour. 
 
Nomination 
(members): Leaders 
substituted regular 
members regularly 
Allocation: Removal of 
specific chairs when 
topic selections prove 
difficult for the 
Majority Party 
 
Nomination 
(members): Centrally 
allocated members, 
though with choice if 
disagreed. 
 Table 8.1: Types of Party Group Prevalence Across Case Study Authorities 
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Proximate Total Control of Alpha and Gamma: Why so dominant? 
It was clear that the greatest group control over the O&S function was within Alpha and 
Gamma councils (Table 8.1 & 8.2).  However, both Alpha and Gamma were not as 
intensively competitive, in electoral terms, as Delta, where the knife-edge majority could have 
been lost with a shift of one councillor. The assumptions that competitiveness could intensify 
the need to achieve party objectives and thus lead to more intensive protective behaviour did 
not occur in Delta. An explanation for this could be that both Alpha and Gamma were almost 
indicative of Downsian vote-maximising situations where the control of the authority could 
effectively change hands over a relatively short space of time (though between three parties in 
at Gamma.) For example, Alpha and Gamma had recently gone through a changing of hands 
(Labour had, in recent times, been the majority party at both) and whilst electoral 
competitiveness was not as arithmetically intense as in Delta, the history of Delta involved a 
procession of incredibly strong Labour majorities since reorganisation in the 1970s. In both 
Alpha and Gamma, the competitiveness was almost dictated by the possibility of change 
Party Control in O&S Alpha  
District 
Beta  
County 
Gamma 
Unitary 
Delta 
Metro 
V1a Pre-O&S Party Group 
Meetings  High (M) High (M) High (M) None 
V1b Exclusive Time 
Devotion to O&S in 
Group Meeting 
High High High Low 
V2a Holding to Account High High (M) High Moderate 
V2b Policy Development, 
Review & Pre-Scrutiny High High Moderate (O) None 
V2c External Scrutiny Low None None Moderate (M) 
V3  Centralisation of 
Policy Formulation High High (M) High Moderate 
V4 Preclusory Discipline High  High High Low 
V5 Cohibition of 
Councillor 
Communication 
High Moderate High Low 
V6 Administration of 
Castigative Discipline Low None Low (M) None 
V7 Allocation of Positions High High (M) High Moderate 
(M) denoting Majority Party / Minority Admin  
(O) denoting Opposition Party 
Table 8.2: Levels of Party Group Control over O&S 
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because authority control had changed within memory of all councillors. Essentially the 
groups fitted Roemer‟s description of the vote-seeking model; „opportunistic politics […] of 
competing candidates’ (Roemer, 2001, p.27) and therefore group control was very high; it 
would make rational sense for both parties (of similar support) to vote-maximise and thus 
constrain councillor activity to meet their goals.  
 
However, the methods of group control between the two were diametrically different. At 
Alpha there was proactive restraint and visible cohibition of councillors within both groups on 
O&S along with group meetings to mandate silence or encourage attacks, whipping to 
maintain lines and threats of discipline in case of deviance. At Gamma the group control was 
much more subtle, possibly reflecting the substantial functions of single-tier councils (and 
thus more media / public attention), and involved collusion in rendering O&S into a less 
dangerous proposition for all parties. For example, leaders attending, substituting and cutting 
off O&S committees for discussions behind closed-doors and ensuring that „bad press‟ was 
avoided by collusive agreement between the groups. Even the dichotomously split factions of 
the minority LD administration worked together as a team to ensure that all of the groups 
were protected from the possible dangers of public O&S. Despite these two different 
approaches, the parties at these two authorities saw O&S as a dangerous (majority and 
Gamma groups) or profitable (Alpha Labour) public arena which needed to be controlled 
by the group in order to protect their electoral ambitions. 
 
On the one side, inter-party relations at Alpha council were sour (doubtless due to ideological 
distance between Labour & Conservatives) and the possibility of colluding to prevent O&S 
was unthinkable, therefore the groups had to use (but inevitably manipulate) O&S in such 
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way to as appear to give the impression of acting according to the legislation. On the other 
side, the „no overall control‟ at Gamma and the three electorally competitive groups saw the 
function as something which could be transformed into, to use Ashworth‟s (2003b) 
expression, a „toothless tiger‟ for all concerned, in such a way to neutralise the threat for the 
competing groups who would prefer to move electoral competition to elections or elsewhere. 
For both Alpha and Gamma, whilst the methods were dissimilar the outcomes were the same, 
a strong group day-to-day control over O&S which allowed the parties to dictate how much 
the function was allowed to interfere with their quests for securing votes. O&S was 
essentially a risk for the groups of both councils and there were two distinct routes for 
protection; fight or hide. 
 
Numeric vs. Non-Numeric Electoral Competition: Why the Beta / Delta Disparity? 
Beta represented the least competitive environment amongst the cases but reported strong 
group control over the O&S function in comparison to Delta, where the majority group could 
have lost its majority on one seat. Beta controlled the topics and direction of scrutiny subtly, 
without a great deal of councillor cohibition, through the allocation of chairs to ensure group 
interests would not suffer as a result of O&S. Hence given the group control in such an 
electorally uncompetitive environment as Beta, why were the groups at Delta not equally or 
moreso concerned with the operation of O&S given the authority‟s intense electoral 
competitiveness? 
 
As one reason already stated above, Delta had a long history of Labour majorities and the 
superficial level of competitiveness engendered in the arithmetic proximity to losing a 
majority could have almost been disregarded as a possibility (i.e. “It would be unthinkable to 
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not be Labour”) However this does not explain why the Delta Conservative opposition did not 
utilise O&S to their advantage (beyond whipped call-ins) and actively take steps to control 
topics, seek collective lines and aim to deliver group ambitions through embarrassing the 
majority through O&S (as Alpha Labour). In this manner the opposition effectively permitted 
O&S to operate in the way which they had reported that the majority supposedly controlled it. 
An example of the Conservative reluctance was evident in day-to-day operation: „I am the 
chair, I cannot take your side or agree or disagree because it is a political point (as reported 
to DC006C).‟ In effect, the opposition only used group control to whip the initiation and 
support of call-ins.  
 
One major difference between the two authorities that could explain the seemingly opposite 
relationship to the theoretical assumptions about competitiveness (Copus & Leach, 2004 & 
Strøm, 1990) was that O&S was seen as a dangerous risk to leave untended at Beta but not so 
at Delta. At Delta, O&S committees tended to focus on micro-management of uncontroversial 
topics such as allotments management (Liveability O&S) or narrating stories of particular 
incidences of anti-social behaviour (Crime O&S) driven, at times, by elderly co-opted 
members desires to talk about minor and heuristic examples. At one of the committees the 
council leader argued, in an address to O&S, that the function should be looking at wider, 
strategic policy and having less „chit chat about footpaths.‟ The levels of discussion at Delta, 
often more akin to a coffee-morning than a council, almost precluded the presence of the 
public and press, as the type of work would never elicit sufficient interest to warrant their 
presence. Further to this, the committees took place in small rooms without chairs and 
throughout observations there had never been any public or press attendance (bar the call-in 
committee.) 
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In this respect, whilst it was difficult to draw the link between the majority party and the 
committee‟s anodyne topics of micro-management (i.e. was this an intentional strategy?), it 
was evident that the opposition knew there was very little political capital to be made, or were 
unwilling to expend the effort, in attempting to control O&S. It could be hypothesised that 
due to the Conservatives never having been such a large group capable of winning a majority, 
it might have been plausible that they were organisationally weak through the inexperience of 
operating as such a large group. Either explanation goes some way to explaining the often 
inane „chit-chat‟ proceedings of the O&S committees. However when the stakes were high, at 
the time when the press and public were interested in outcomes (call-ins), the groups took 
strict control of proceedings and acted as a stringent filter of last resort. 
 
To provide some element of confirmation of the evaluation of Delta, Beta groups, operating 
within one of the safest majorities across England, were more directly involved in the day-to-
day operation of O&S, potentially in relation to the important issues covered within O&S that 
were relevant to the press and public. At observations of Beta, there were rows of seats for 
officers, press and the public to attend. At times there was often no room to take a seat, due to 
the sheer interest generated by the topics. As an arena of public deliberation there was clearly 
much more at stake and thus the majority group and opposition, at the least, attempted to 
corral work programmes to their favour within O&S.  
 
Thus for both Beta and Delta party groups, there were elements of group control at opposite 
ends of the competitiveness spectrum, which indicated, at the least, that groups were 
concerned that some forms of public overview and scrutiny would be damaging to party goals. 
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Modelling Group Behaviour 
Whilst not harbouring „an ambition to come up with a universal theory of [local] politics’ 
(Green & Shapiro, 1994, p.202-203), as often besets some state-level rational choice 
institutionalists, there is evidence to at least formulate some typologies for how some party 
groups have adapted to the institutional environment of the blended separation of powers in 
local government, relating back to some of the policy, office, vote motivations of groups 
(Strøm, 1990). These models are intended to be useful ways to view the behaviour of party 
groups, specifically within the case studies, that could have some wider application across 
local government. The following table (8.3) provides details of these types along with 
descriptions of operation and potential likely applications. Clearly these models of behaviour 
relate to the case studies under research, thus may only be a fraction of the types of strategic 
behaviour within English local government.  
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Type Perspective  Possible Group 
Actions Taken  
Description Potential Application 
Group as 
Cohibitor 
 
(Alpha) 
O&S is threat to 
party goals 
Predominantly V5 
 
(also: V1, V2a,b,c,V3, 
V4,V5,V6,V7) 
Where the group acts as cohibitor, the 
overview and scrutiny function is 
ostensibly run as the legislation intended, 
but with the group acting as a absolute 
constraint on individual councillor 
contribution to the function in order to 
deliver or protect the party’s ambitions. 
This role runs across all roles of overview 
and scrutiny and micro-manages 
councillor contributions to open 
committee sessions. Evidence collection, 
deliberation and cross-party working is 
superficial unless stringently controlled by 
officers.  
 
Authorities with vote-
maximising conditions 
such as 2, 3 party 
councils with relatively 
equal support and a 
damaging history of non-
co-operation. 
 
Role might be more 
typical in adversarial / 
intensively combative 
councils. 
Group as 
Conspirator  
 
(Gamma) 
O&S is threat to 
party goals 
Predominantly V3 
 
(also: V1, V2a,b, 
V4,V5,V6,V7) 
When the group acts as a conspirator, the 
overview and scrutiny function is 
effectively an intended pretence, set up to 
replicate conditions of O&S but with the 
compliance of individual party groups, 
with reasoning that this will protect their 
goals within this arena. 
 
Ultimately the freedom of individual O&S 
committees is dependent on the 
agreement of the party leaders. The 
‘agents’ of the party take effective 
centralised control over agendas / work 
programmes and seek to actively hold 
back ‘real’ O&S for a resolution behind 
closed-doors.  
 
Authorities with vote-
maximising conditions, 
such as 2, 3 party 
councils with roughly 
equal chances of winning 
elections. The role would 
only be feasible where 
the history of the council 
has not shown a recent 
history of mistrust or 
adversarialism, thus 
preventing defection 
from the collusive pacts. 
Perhaps typical in 
councils with N.O.C but 
would not be a 
prerequisite. 
  
Group as 
Agenda 
Setter 
 
 
(Beta) 
Some O&S is 
threat to party 
goals 
Predominantly V7 
for V2b (policy) 
 
(also: V1, V2a,b, 
 V3, V4, V5, V7) 
If a group acts as an agenda-setter the 
party seeks to ensure that the group 
retains the control of the O&S function. To 
do this involves allocation of party 
members to roles of influence (majority) 
to provide group pressure (or blocks for 
O&S). Alternatively, the group collectively 
seek to impress a topic direction onto the 
function as a party group rather than as 
individual councillors (opposition) to 
achieve their goals. 
 
Authorities with a large 
majority party seeking to 
maintain office (office-
seeking) at an authority.  
 
For opposition groups, 
this would be a behaviour 
type where the direct 
policy / office impact 
might be sought through 
collectivity within O&S to 
attempt to control the 
agenda. 
 
Group as  
Safety Net 
 
 
(Delta) 
Some O&S is 
threat to party 
goals 
Predominantly V2a 
 
(also: V1b,V2a,c,V3, 
V7) 
If a party group acts as a safety net within 
a local authority, its role is to protect the 
group in times of emergency or where the 
stakes are highest for the protection of 
their goals. This would chiefly relate to 
where O&S was seen as dangerous or 
risky to leave alone; such as ‘holding to 
account’ and the call-in function 
generating public interest which could 
shift the dynamics at the authority. 
Predominantly in 
authorities with little 
functional control and 
thus public interest 
(lower tier) or councils 
with a long-established 
majority / small 
opposition scenario, with 
tightly centralised 
decision-making.  
Party competition, whilst 
superficially evident, may 
be dormant / moribund.   
 Table 8.3: Typologies of Possible Behaviour of Party Groups in English Local Government 
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Chapter Nine: Evaluation of Findings 
The overall weight of the empirical data lends support to some of the postulations made in 
this research in relation to the operation of party groups under the blended separation of 
powers introduced in the Local Government Act 2000. By retaining the single-agency 
constitutional model, where the executive and legislature have a mutual dependence on each 
other, there is a perpetuation of the resolution of the Olsonian (1965) collective action 
dilemma, where the party leader or ‘agent’ had a role in protecting the group goals and 
ambitions. In creating a public deliberative function in this blended separation of powers, 
central government created an operating environment where goals and ambitions could come 
under threat and thus the agent (leader) might need to discipline his or her troops to protect 
objectives. Given that ‘everyone would be better off if there were some way to coerce 
contributions’ (Shepsle, 2006, p.31) to the cause of the party, the legislation effectively 
allowed groups to retain the functional control of their members. 
 
Given that a membership and subsequent election of a candidate rests on the premise that the 
individual shares at least some of the fundamental ambitions of the party, there is a natural 
loyalty present which might need no reinforcement from a leader of a group. The institutional 
environment of the blended separation of powers also created a powerful hierarchal 
relationship between members where individuals could have a tendency to desire ‘legislative 
re-election, climbing the ranks of the party, seeking a party portfolio [...] or policy goals’ 
(Samuels & Shugart, 2006, p.12) and thus be more likely to respect the chain of command 
and agent wishes by ‘binding their hands to the group [...] and investing in the public good 
[of the party brand]’1 (Samuels & Shugart, 2006, p.13). Furthermore, the group provides 
                                                            
1 See Q3.9 /3.10 /5.11/ 5.13/ 5.14 of the survey 
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electoral benefits to politicians that are unattainable to those outside these organisations, thus 
the group supplies ‘collective benefits that would not accrue in their absence’ (Samuels & 
Shugart, 2006, p.12) which automatically generates loyalty to the group as a means to prevent 
exclusion. 
 
However despite all this natural loyalty built into the institutional environment, party loyalty 
was fundamentally put at odds with the introduction of an evidence-based function seeking to 
remove the group as an element of control over individual members. In presenting councillors 
with a dichotomous choice of data vs. group, the O&S function was founded on the principal 
that parties ‘would be less able to operate behind closed doors without debate and review’ 
(DETR, 1998a, p.30). In bringing deliberation out into public view, the function posed a 
threat to the operation of groups through the economic free-rider dilemma, where individual 
members could negatively impact the group instead of protecting the public good of the party 
brand. As discovered in the quantitative work (Q5.12), this was and remains the case, where 
members were able to act against the interests of the group but in tandem with the 
expectations of the legislation. 
 
As such, this research looked to explore the potential party ‘agency’ controls that could arise 
as a result of the free-rider dilemma and the possibility of harming goals through an open 
deliberative arena. The thesis hypothesised that levers were available to party groups, which 
would be pulled in order to preclude deviance and free-riding within overview and scrutiny. 
Party groups would ensure meetings formulated party perspective, dominate the multiplicity 
of roles of the O&S function, centralise the decision-making process within groups for goal-
efficiency, cohibit members in the public arena, whip members on matters of serious 
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consequence, punish deviants who defect from the party and allocate positions according to 
the groups’ interest.  
 
As a result of this research, it was found that most local authority groups did pull on some 
of these levers, some of the time and a majority of English party groups were willing to 
proactively bring their members in O&S under control. However, the incidences of these 
actions were varied across groups and not all parties used all of the levers available to them. 
From the quantitative data, it was clear that groups often refrained from using the most 
serious levers such as explicit whipping and instead held milder and more subtle control over 
topic shaping (controlling the work programme, ‘offline’ meetings, strategy meetings, 
advisory whipping et al.) or allocated positions in their favour (diverting the opposition with 
external scrutiny, ensuring chairs were pliant to party demands, allocating senior members 
who could be trusted with the most important O&S committees et al.) Whilst there were very 
few authorities who pulled on every single lever of control for the protection of the group’s 
ambitions (such as Groups as Cohibitors: Alpha), there remained, even with the least 
involved groups, a desire to control O&S in the last resort (Group as Safety Net: Delta.) 
 
As far as propensities for pulling these levers, very few situational attributes made groups 
more prone to act in one way and not in another, countering both earlier work on O&S (Copus 
& Leach, 2004) but also more general state-level assumptions (Strøm, 1990). Whilst 
competition (ultra-competitive authorities) was theorised to possibly result in more utilisation 
of control mechanisms, given logically heightened desires to protect goals, it was not 
necessarily demonstrated to be the case. As regards the importance of political party 
affiliation, there were only a few minor indicators to differences, such as the Liberal 
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Democrat propensity to share chairpersonships more evenly than the Labour or Conservative 
group, however, Liberal Democrat groups appeared to operate the most stringent whipping 
and group meeting arrangements. The greatest affiliation difference was between both the two 
largest parties Labour / Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, which likely reflected 
Strøm & Muller’s (1999) assertion that centripetal pivot parties would most likely act in 
policy or office-seeking ways as opposed to more ideologically-constrained parties (Labour 
and Conservatives), reflecting their oft malleable position in coalition behaviour (i.e. being 
offered O&S chairs and when incumbent, offering more O&S chairs to opposition parties.) 
Equally, across both incumbent and opposition groups, there were no major differences to 
indicate that these levers were only used defensively by those in control of an administration 
and not offensively by the opposition. 
 
Overwhelmingly local parties acted as political parties; organisations which aggregated 
preferences and sought to protect their cause in the structure to which they had been subjected. 
In terms of the central government’s goals, the Local Government Act 2000 sought to 
increase transparency and reduce ‘opaque decision-making [where] significant decisions were 
taken behind closed doors by political groups or even by a small group of key people within 
the majority group’ (DETR, 1998b, p.18) and reflected a ministerial desire to rid the ‘old 
structures in which decisions were almost invariably reached in group meetings’ (Nick 
Raynsford, MP). Essentially, as Gyford (1976) noted, this type of perspective taken on local 
government was fundamentally prescriptive. The legislation sought to rid local government of 
the dominant party group because it was thought possible to have a disagreement-free, 
evidence-based local government allegedly ‘untainted by problems of political power’ (1976, 
p.9).  However, party groups play vital roles in the resolution of local disagreements in lively 
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policy spaces and the subsequent implementation of the Act providing the option for a 
blended separation of powers instead of compelling a clearly delineated separation of 
powers, which would have likely quelled power of parties, allowed the groups to consolidate 
their roles, rather than encouraging them to stand aside.  
 
It is clear from this research that the Act served to, at the very least, maintain or effectively 
strengthen the role of the party group on local authorities due to the institutional environment 
it created. As Sheple discovered in his research on the U.S Congress, there was a ‘structure-
induced equilibrium [...] All was not flux, final outcomes were not arbitrary’ (Shepsle, 1989, 
p.136-137) and in the implementation of the Local Government Act 2000, the structure-
induced equilibrium was the perpetuation of group dominance, closed-door decision-making 
and a further disenfranchisement of councillors ‘feeling unable to influence events’ (DETR, 
1998a, p.29), who now were not only removed from decision-making but often prevented, 
through their group, from being able to use evidence to hold decision-makers to account. 
 
Evidence for Policy Change? 
Despite the structure-induced equilibrium of party group involvement in O&S, there might 
have been ways to prevent the dominance of the groups within a blended separation of powers 
in such a way to achieve the original intention of an evidence-based function that looked 
beyond the typical adversarial politics. Given that the legislation sought to prevent ‘opaque 
decision making [and a situation where] significant decisions [were] taken behind closed 
doors by political groups’ (DETR 1998b, p.18), central government could have mandated to 
firm up control over the operation of O&S. Whilst likely to have been unpopular, the 
legislation could have mandated for opposition or independent chairs, committees being able 
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to nominate chairs and barring executives from attending committees unless providing 
evidence. However these suggestions suffer from difficulties such as the opposition using 
chair positions strategically, committees dominated by the majority group favouring group-
sponsored candidates and members reporting to an executive on colleague’s behaviour in 
O&S. Furthermore the monetary compensation for chair responsibilities are often part of the 
traditional ‘spoils’ for party groups in local government, thus mandating opposition-chaired 
committees would have been unpopular and possibly distortive for electoral campaigns.  Even 
the Wright Committee recommendations for the improvement of the Commons select 
committees (House of Commons, 2009), such as independent selection panels, could have 
been difficult to implement in local government given the administrative burden.  
 
One recommendation from the Wright Committee which could have resulted in more member 
independence would have been secret ballots for positions of responsibility, due to the 
anonymity and consequent freedom granted to members. Clearer cut as a method to reduce 
group dominance would have been to match the special responsibility allowances of 
executive positions and O&S chairs to avoid careerist concerns inhibiting independence in a 
blended separation of powers. By providing a commensurate remuneration for O&S positions, 
the careerist concerns, as evidenced by Labour in the survey (Q3.9 – fearing no promotion) 
and Conservatives at Alpha (fearing loss of pension), could reduce and enable the possibility 
of public scrutiny, without fear of financial reprisal.  
 
Above all, if the government’s intention was to remove the party group grip on decision-
making in local government, it would have been more appropriate to clearly delineate the 
separation of powers in local government and thus to have legislated to introduce directly-
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elected mayors. In this way, rigorous, evidence-based scrutiny could have taken place without 
fear of the group dominating decision-making, whilst providing an ‘identifiable figure leading 
the local community’ (DETR 1998b, p.19). Given the Madisonian transactional nature of 
decision-making in the directly-elected mayoral option offered in the Local Government Act 
2000, parties would have been forced into intra-party negotiation rather than top-down 
commands and it would have prevented the ‘symbiotic mutual dependence between branches 
of government’ (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p.37) which resulted in close-knit teams of 
politicians colluding on how best to ‘protecting the party reputation [to maintain] the value of 
the party label’ (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, p.35). However, through listening to the lament 
of local government which showed ‘little support for radical change’ (Stoker, G & Wollmann, 
H 1992, p.266), central government, in the introduction of the cabinet, leader and scrutiny 
model served to make local government more, rather than less, prone to domination by party 
groups.  
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Ö zbudun, E (1970) Party cohesion in western democracies: a causal analysis [California: 
Sage] 
 
Paine, T (1987) The Thomas Paine Reader eds. Michael Foot and Isaac Kramnick [London: 
Penguin Classics] 
 
Panebianco, A (1988) Political Parties: Organisation and Power [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press] 
 
Pangle, T (1973) Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on The Spirit of 
Laws [Chicago: University of Chicago Press] 
 
Patton, M, Q (2002) Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods [Thousand Oaks: Sage] 
3
rd
 Edition 
 
Peters, B.G (2005) Institutional Theory in Political Science [London: Continuum] 2
nd
 Edition 
 
Poguntke, T (1987) New politics and party systems: the emergence of a new type of party? 
West European Politics Vol. 10 No. 1 76-88 
 
Polidano, C (2001) An Exocet in a Red Box: Parliamentary Accountability in the Sandline 
Affair Public Administration Vol 79, No 2, 249-275 
 
Power, G (2007) The Politics of Parliamentary Reform: Lessons from the House of Commons 
(2001-2005) Parliamentary Affairs Vol 60, No 3, 492-509 
 
Pridemore, A,W, Damphouse, K,R & Moore, R,K (2005) Obtaining Sensitive Information 
From a Wary Population: A Comparison of Telephone and Face-to-Face Surveys of Welfare 
Recipients in the United States Social Science & Medicine Vol 61, 976-984 
 
Rallings, C & Thrasher, M (1999) An Audit of Local Democracy in Britain: The Evidence 
from Local Elections Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 52 No. 1 58-76 
 
Rallings, C & Thrasher, M (2003) Local Elections in Britain: A Statistical Digest [Plymouth: 
LGC Elections Centre] 
  11 
 
Reif, K & Schmitt, H (1980) Nine second-order national elections: A conceptual framework 
for the analysis of European election results European Journal of Political Research Vol. 8 
No.1 3-44 
 
Riker, W.H (1962) The Theory of Political Coalitions [New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press] 
 
Robertson, D (1976) A Theory of Party Competition [London: John Wiley & Sons] 
 
Roemer, J.E (2001) Political Competition: Theory and Applications [London: Harvard 
University Press] 
 
Rose, R (1974) The Problems of Party Government [London: Macmillan] 
 
Rose, R & McAllister, I (1986) Voters Begin to Choose: From Closed-Class to Open 
Elections in Britain [London: Sage] 
 
Russell, M & Benton, M (2009) Assessing the Policy Impact of Parliament: Methodological 
Challenges and Possible Future Approaches Paper for PSA Legislative Studies Specialist 
Group Conference, 24 June 2009, UCL 
 
Samuels, D & Shugart, M (2006) Presidents, Prime Ministers and Parties: A Neo-
Madisonian Theory of Party Organization and Behavior Paper presented at the American 
Political Science Association 2006 Meeting in Philadelphia 
 
Samuels, D & Shugart, M (2010) Presidents, Prime Ministers and Parties: How the 
Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior [New York: Cambridge 
University Press] 
 
Sartori, G (2005) Parties and Party Systems (1976) [Essex: ECPR Classics] 
 
Sandford, M (2006) Westminster Executive meets Local Government Culture: Overview and 
Scrutiny in Three English County Councils Environment and Planning C: Government and 
Policy Vol 24, 929-946 
 
Sarlvik, B & Crewe, I (1983) Decade of Dealignment [Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press] 
 
Scarborough, E (1986) The British Electorate Twenty Years On: Electoral Change and 
Election Surveys British Journal of Political Science Vol.17 No.2 219-246 
 
Scarrow, H (1967) The Function of Political Parties: a critique of the literature and the 
approach The Journal of Politics Vol. 29 No. 4 770-790 
 
Shaffer, W, R (1991) Interparty Spatial Relationships in Norwegian Storting Roll Call Votes 
Scandinavian Political Studies Vol 14, No 1, 59-84 
 
  12 
Seyd, P & Whiteley, P (2004) British Political Parties: An Overview Party Politics Vol. 10 
No.4 355-366 
 
Shepsle, K.A (1979) Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting 
Models American Journal of Political Science Vol 23, No 1, 23-59 
 
Shepsle, K.A & Weingast, B (1981) Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice 
Public Choice Vol 37, No 3, 503-519 
 
Shepsle, K.A (1989) Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach 
Journal of Theoretical Politics Vol 1, No 2, 131-147 
 
Shepsle, K.A (2006) „Rational Choice Institutionalism‟ in Rhodes, Binder & Rockman (eds) 
The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions [New York: Oxford University Press] 
 
Skelcher, C (2000) Changing Images of the State: Overloaded, Hollowed-Out, Congested 
Public Policy and Administration Vol. 15 No. 3 3-19 
 
Snape, S & Dobbs, L (2003) The Scrutineer: The Impact of Overview and Scrutiny on 
Councillor Roles Public Policy and Administration Vol 18, No 1, 46-62 
 
Sprinchorn, E (1965) Ibsen Letters and Speeches [London: MacGibbon & Kee] 
 
Stewart, J (1990) The Role of Councillors in the Management of the Authority Local 
Government Studies Vol. 16 No.4 25-37 
 
Stewart, J (2000) The Nature of British Local Government [Basingstoke: Macmillan] 
 
Stoker, G & Wolman, G (1992) Drawing Lessons from the U.S Experience: An Elected 
Mayor for British Local Government Public Administration Vol 2, 241-267 
 
Stoker, G (2004) Transforming Local Governance: From Thatcherism to New Labour 
[Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan] 
 
Stoker, G (2006) Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work [Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan]  
 
Stoker, G (2010) „The Rise of Political Disenchantment‟ in Hay, C (eds.) New Directions in 
Political Science [Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan] 
 
Strøm, K (1984) Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of 
Nonwinning Cabinet Solutions Comparative Political Studies Vol 17, No 2, 199-227 
 
Strøm, K (1990) A Behavioural Theory of Competitive Political Parties American Journal of 
Political Science Vol 34, No 2, 565-598 
 
Strøm, K & Müller, W (1999) Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western 
Europe Make Hard Decisions [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press] 
 
  13 
Svåsand, L, Strøm, K (1997) Political Parties in Norway: Facing the Challenges of a New 
Society in Svåsand, L, Strøm, K (eds) Challenges to Political Parties: The Case of Norway 
[Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press] 
 
Svåsand, L, Strøm, K & Rasch, B, E (1997) Change and Adaptation in Party Organisation in 
Svåsand, L, Strøm, K (eds) Challenges to Political Parties: The Case of Norway [Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press] 
 
Teddlie, C & Tashakkori, A (2009) Foundations of Mixed Methods Research [Los Angeles: 
Sage] 
 
Webb, EJ, Campbell, D, Schwartz, R,D, Sechrest, L (1966) Unobtrusive Measures: 
Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences [Chicago: Rand McNally] 
 
Webb, EJ, Campbell, D, Schwartz, R,D, Sechrest, L (2000) Unobtrusive Measures [Thousand 
Oaks: Sage] Later Edition 
 
Webb, P (2000) The Modern British Party System [London: Sage] 
 
Weir, S & Beetham, D (1999) Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain [London: 
Routledge] 
 
Widdicombe, D (Chair) (1986a) Committee of Inquiry into the Conduct of Local Authority 
Business Research Volume I: The Political Organisation of Local Authorities Cm.9798 
[London: HMSO] 
 
Widdicombe, D (Chair) (1986b) Committee of Inquiry into the Conduct of Local Authority 
Business Research Volume IV: Aspects of Local Democracy Cm.9801 [London: HMSO] 
 
Wilks-Heeg, S (2010) A Slow and Painful Death? Political Parties and Local Democracy in 
Two Northern Towns Local Government Studies Vol. 36 No. 3 381-399 
 
Wilson, J.Q (1986) ‘Political Parties and the Separation of Powers’ in Goldman & Kaufman 
(eds) Separation of Powers – Does it Still Work? [Washington D.C: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research] 
 
Wilson, D & Game, C (2006) Local Government in the United Kingdom [Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan] 4
th 
Edition 
 
Whiteley, P, Seyd, P & Richardson, J (1994) True Blues: The Politics of Conservative Party 
Membership [New York: Oxford University Press] 
 
Wolinetz, S, B (2002) “Beyond the Catch-all Party: Approaches to the Study of Parties and 
Party Organisation in Contemporary Democracies” in Gunther, R, Montero, J.R & Linz, J.J 
(eds) Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges [Oxford: Oxford University Press] 
 
Wollmann, H (2004a) Local Government Reforms in Great Britain, Sweden, Germany and 
France: Between Multi-Function and Single-Purpose Organisations Local Government 
Studies Vol 30 No 4, 639-665 
  14 
 
Wollmann, H (2004b) Urban Leadership in German Local Politics: The Rise, Role and 
Performance of the Directly Elected, Chief Executive, Mayor International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research Vol 28, No 1, 150-165 
 
Wollmann, H (2005) The Directly-Elected Executive Mayor in German Local Government in 
Berg, R & Rao, N (eds) Transforming Local Political Leadership [London: Palgrave]  
 
Young, K (1975) Local Politics and the Rise of the Party [Leicester: Leicester University 
Press] 
 
Young, K & Davies, E.M (1990) The Politics of Local Government Since Widdicombe [York: 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation] 
 
Young, J & Rao, N (1997) Local Government since 1945 [Oxford: Blackwell] 
Appendix A: Copy of Questionnaire Sent to Overview and Scrutiny Councillors 
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Overview and Scrutiny Councillors: 10 Years On 
Instructions: 
 
 
 Please try to be as accurate as you can and remember that there are no right or wrong answers. 
 If you serve on more than one council please answer the questions from the perspective of the 
council to which this survey was addressed. 
 All responses are strictly confidential and you will not be identified personally. Responses will be 
looked at, used for the research and destroyed on completion of the study. 
 Please try to answer every question – even if you think it is not relevant – because there should be an 
option for you to tick even if that question does not apply in your circumstances. (This does not apply to 
Section 4 – as you may not have served before the Local Government Act 2000) 
 
 
Please return the completed survey in the self-addressed envelope.  
Alternatively, you can fill in the survey online at   
 
 
Section One: Your Councillor Profile 
 
1.1 Are you a member of an overview and scrutiny committee, task group, working group or O&S sub-
committee? 
[     ]  Yes 
[     ] No – I’m part of an executive or I only serve on regulatory or other non-O&S committees 
 
1.2 Is the council to which you received the letter a: 
[     ] Shire District / Borough [     ] Unitary   [     ] London Borough 
[     ] Shire County   [     ] Metropolitan Borough 
 
1.3 Are you a member of a political party? If so, please select the appropriate option. 
[     ] Conservative 
[     ] Labour 
[     ] Liberal Democrat 
[     ] None of the above 
 
1.4 Are you...? 
[     ] The leader / deputy leader of your party group or the party group whip 
[     ] None of the above 
 
1.5 Do members of your party hold all the cabinet posts in your council? 
[     ] Yes 
[     ] No 
[     ] Not applicable – we use the alternative arrangements (modified committee system) 
 
1.6 Do members of your party hold any cabinet posts (as part of a coalition) in your council? 
[     ] Yes, we form the whole Executive 
[     ] Yes, the Executive includes councillors from more than one party, including ours. 
[     ] No, we are totally a party of opposition – holding no cabinet portfolio 
[     ] Not applicable – we use the alternative arrangements (modified committee system) 
 
1.7 Have you been a councillor before the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000? 
[     ] Yes – I have been a councillor prior to the Local Government Act 2000 
[     ] No – I have served as a councillor only under the Local Government Act 2000 
 
1.8 Does your authority have a majority party? 
[     ] Yes – there is a party with a majority and they are in control of the authority 
[     ] No – we have a minority administration / hung council / no overall control 
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Section Two: Yourself and Overview and Scrutiny 
 
2.1 How many overview and scrutiny committees, working groups and/or task-and-finish groups do you 
currently sit on? (Circle as appropriate) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6+ 
 
2.2 How many of your overview and scrutiny committees, working groups and/or task-and-finish groups 
(that you personally sit on) are currently chaired by a majority party on the council? (Circle as 
appropriate) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6+ 
 
2.3 How many of your overview and scrutiny committees, working groups and/or task-and-finish groups 
(that you personally sit on) are currently chaired by opposition parties (who are not part of an executive) 
on the council? (Circle as appropriate) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6+ 
 
2.4 Do you currently have a chair position on an overview and scrutiny committee, a working group 
and/or a task-and-finish group? 
 
[     ] Yes, I’m a chair 
[     ] Yes, I’m a vice-chair 
[     ] No 
 
2.5 If you are a chair or vice-chair, how did you obtain the position? (Multiple choices permitted) 
 
[     ] Nomination from own party group 
[     ] Nomination from other party group 
[     ] Nomination from full council (election with other members) 
[     ] Nomination from a scrutiny committee that IS dominated by the majority party 
[     ] Nomination from a scrutiny committee that is NOT dominated by the majority party 
[     ] Not applicable – I am not a chair or vice-chair 
[     ] Other method (please specify) 
 
 
Section Three: Operating within Overview and Scrutiny 
 
3.1 Have you ever attended a party group meeting which exclusively dealt with agendas of forthcoming 
scrutiny committees or short-life task-and-finish / working group meetings? 
 
[     ] Yes, all of the time 
[     ] Yes, some of the time 
[     ] Yes, occasionally  
[     ] Yes, on rare occasions 
[     ] Yes, on one occasion 
[     ] No, never 
 
3.2 Do any regular party group meetings devote a portion of time to the agendas of scrutiny committees 
or short-life task-and-finish / working group meetings? 
 
[     ] Yes – up to about 5 minutes 
[     ] Yes – up to about 15 minutes 
[     ] Yes – up to about 30 minutes 
[     ] Yes – up to about an hour or over 
[     ] No – no time is ever devoted to this in regular party group meetings 
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3.3 Have you ever received informal pressure from your group leader(s), party whip etc. about things 
under consideration by an overview and scrutiny committee meeting? (For example, you are advised to 
act as directed) 
 
[     ] Yes, all of the time 
[     ] Yes, some of the time 
[     ] Yes, occasionally  
[     ] Yes, on rare occasions 
[     ] Yes, on one occasion 
[     ] No, never 
 
3.4 Have you ever been subject to an explicit party whip about issues under consideration in overview 
and scrutiny? (For example, you are told to act as directed) 
 
[     ] Yes, all of the time 
[     ] Yes, some of the time 
[     ] Yes, occasionally  
[     ] Yes, on rare occasions 
[     ] Yes, on one occasion 
[     ] No, never 
 
3.5 Have you ever been briefed by your local party group leader(s) about the way to conduct yourself in 
overview and scrutiny committees? (Multiple selections permitted) 
 
[     ] Yes, when the system was first introduced 
[     ] Yes, when I criticise the executive or local party during O&S 
[     ] Yes, when the subject was controversial 
[     ] Yes, when elections were due 
[     ] Yes, when I first stood for election 
[     ] Yes, when the press / public were going to be there 
[     ] Yes, when I agree with other parties 
[     ] Yes, when I rebel against decisions made by my party in public 
[     ] Yes, other reason (please specify) 
[     ] No, never 
 
3.6 Have you ever been disciplined by your local party group leader(s) in relation to your actions in 
overview and scrutiny committees? (Multiple selections permitted) 
 
[     ] Yes, when the system was first introduced 
[     ] Yes, when I criticise the executive or local party during O&S 
[     ] Yes, when the subject was controversial 
[     ] Yes, when elections were due 
[     ] Yes, when I first stood for election 
[     ] Yes, when the press / public were going to be there 
[     ] Yes, when I agree with other parties 
[     ] Yes, when I rebel against decisions made by my party in public 
[     ] Yes, other reason (please specify) 
[     ] No, never 
 
3.61 Only if yes to the previous question (3.06), what was the nature and extent of the party 
discipline? (Multiple selections permitted) 
[     ]  Received a informal warning from the party 
[     ]  Received a formal warning from the party 
[     ]  Not reappointed to an existing role (such as a committee or policy post et al.) 
[     ]  Removed from an appointment (such as a committee or policy post et al.) 
[     ]  A failure to be recommended as a candidate at a subsequent election 
[     ]  Suspended from the party group (i.e. the removal of the whip) 
 [     ] None of these options from any part of the party 
[     ]  Another form of punishment (please specify) 
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3.7 Since the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000, have you ever criticised the decisions made 
by your party in any public sphere; such as overview and scrutiny, full council or directly to the local, 
regional or national press? 
 
[     ] Yes, all of the time 
[     ] Yes, some of the time 
[     ] Yes, occasionally  
[     ] Yes, on rare occasions 
[     ] Yes, on one occasion 
[     ] No, never 
 
3.71 Only if yes to the previous question (3.07); as a result of your criticism which of the following 
subsequently occurred? (Multiple selections permitted) 
 
[     ]  Received a informal warning from the party 
[     ]  Received a formal warning from the party 
[     ]  Not reappointed to an existing role (such as a committee or policy post et al.) 
[     ]  Removed from an appointment (such as a committee or policy post et al.) 
[     ]  A failure to be recommended as a candidate at a subsequent election 
[     ]  Suspended from the party group (i.e. the removal of the whip) 
 [     ] None of these options from any part of the party 
[     ]  Another form of punishment (please specify) 
 
3.8 Since the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000, have you ever criticised the decisions made 
by your party in any private sphere; such as in group or coalition meetings, the local party meetings, 
national party conferences et al.? 
 
[     ] Yes, all of the time 
[     ] Yes, some of the time 
[     ] Yes, occasionally  
[     ] Yes, on rare occasions 
[     ] Yes, on one occasion 
[     ] No, never 
 
3.9 On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means strongly disagree and 7 means strongly agree (circle your choice as 
appropriate), how much do you agree or disagree with this statement:  
 
“I would be concerned about the consequences of criticising my own party in public; 
in relation to my position within my local party group.” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 means you completely disagree and 7 means you completely agree.  
 
3.10 On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means strongly disagree and 7 means strongly agree (circle your choice 
as appropriate), how much do you agree or disagree with this statement:  
 
“I would be concerned about the consequences of criticising my own party in public; 
in relation to my party’s chances at the next election.” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 means you completely disagree and 7 means you completely agree.  
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Section Four: The Change towards Overview and Scrutiny 
 
 
Relevance Note:  
 
 
If you have not served as a councillor before the introduction of  
the Local Government Act 2000, please skip to Section 5 and tick this box [     ] 
 
 
4.1 Do you think that your own party group conducts more or less meetings now compared to before the 
introduction of the Local Government Act 2000?  
 
[     ] Considerably more party group meetings since the Act  
[     ] Quite a lot more party group meetings since the Act  
[     ] A fair amount more party group meetings since the Act  
[     ] Exactly the same amount of party group meetings since the Act 
[     ] A fair amount less party group meetings since the Act  
[     ] Quite a lot less party group meetings since the Act  
[     ] Considerably less party group meetings since the Act 
 
4.2 How much more or less comfortable do you feel criticising your own party leadership in overview 
and scrutiny conditions or in a public arena since the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000? 
 
[     ] Considerably more comfortable to criticise my own party leadership since the Act 
[     ] Quite a lot more comfortable to criticise my own party leadership since the Act 
[     ] A fair amount more comfortable to criticise my own party leadership since the Act 
[     ] Exactly the same level of comfort since the Act 
[     ] A fair amount less comfortable to criticise my own party leadership since the Act 
[     ] Quite a lot less comfortable to criticise my own party leadership since the Act 
[     ] Considerably less comfortable to criticise my own party leadership since the Act 
 
4.3 How much more or less discipline has been used to control members of your party since the 
introduction of the Local Government Act in 2000? (Not just yourself) 
 
[     ] Considerably more discipline of party members 
[     ] Quite a lot more discipline of party members 
[     ] A fair amount more discipline of party members 
[     ] Exactly the same level of discipline of party members 
[     ] A fair amount less discipline of party members 
[     ] Quite a lot less discipline of party members 
[     ] Considerably less discipline of party members 
 
4.4 On a scale of 1 to 7, how much control do you think your own party has over its members under both 
the old committee system and the modern arrangements? (Please circle the appropriate selection) 
 
4.4a - Before the Local Government Act 2000: ‘The Committee System’ 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The scale runs from 1 meaning absolutely no control and 7 meaning absolute complete control 
 
4.4b - Subsequent to the Local Government Act 2000: ‘Overview and Scrutiny’ 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The scale runs from 1 meaning absolutely no control and 7 meaning absolute complete control 
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Section Five: Final considerations in relation to your non-executive role in council 
  
This section is relevant to all respondents 
 
The final section of the study is a series of fictional statements with which you may either agree or disagree 
with. We aim to discover what course of action you might have taken if a situation were to be presented to you. 
Please continue to answer these questions as honestly as you can, as there are certainly no right or wrong 
answers and your answers are completely confidential. Even if you think these situations may never arise in 
your particular circumstances, please take a moment to consider what you would be most likely to do. 
 
5.1 Please rank how much you agree with the following statements using the scale from 1-7 – where 1 
means you completely disagree with the statement and 7 means you completely agree with the 
statement. 
 
5.11 “If there is a problem in my ward that has been caused by a decision made by my own 
party, I would contact my group leader(s) to express my serious concern and try and work out a 
solution. There‟s no point giving the opposition ammunition by opening up such a simple thing 
to wider debate!” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 means you completely disagree and 7 means you completely agree. 
 
5.12 “If one of my ward constituents contacted me about a problem that they had encountered 
and it seemed like a sensible topic for an overview and scrutiny investigation, I would try and 
raise the item in overview and scrutiny first rather than taking it to my party.” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 means you completely disagree and 7 means you completely agree. 
 
5.13 “My aim as a councillor is to make a difference to the lives of people by feeding into the 
policy process with my ward residents in mind. If I am unpopular in the party group it makes 
„making a difference‟ much harder.” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 means you completely disagree and 7 means you completely agree. 
 
5.14 “It is reasonable to be expected to fall in line when it comes to agreeing with what the 
party asks me to do. If I am loyal to our cause I am more likely to get into a position of 
influence. With this wider area of influence, I can make life better for my constituents by having 
some control over the authority‟s work programme.” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 means you completely disagree and 7 means you completely agree. 
 
 
YOU HAVE REACHED THE END OF THE SURVEY 
 
Please can you post the completed survey using the enclosed envelope and pre-paid, pre-addressed sticker. 
You do not need to attach a stamp as postage is paid. 
 
Sincere thanks for your time in completing the study. If you have any questions regarding the completion 
of this survey or just have more information for the research, please contact mxe760@bham.ac.uk with 
the details of your information or query.  Many thanks for your help. 
 
Mark Ewbank, Institute of Local Government Studies (INLOGOV) 
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List of interviews: 
Ministerial interviews:  
Rt. Hon. Hilary Armstrong, Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top,  
9
th
 July 2008, House of Commons  
 
Rt. Hon. Nick Raynsford MP,  
8
th
 July 2008, Portcullis House 
 
Rt. Hon. Michael Ray Dibdin Heseltine, Baron Heseltine,  
10
th
 December 2009, via telephone 
 
Correspondence: 
Lisa Nandy MP, Member for Wigan,  
4
th
 November 2010, via written correspondence 
 
Other Interviews: 
Member, Høyre Party, Bergen City Council,  
27
th
 May 2009, Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen 
 
Local Government Schedule of Interviews: 
# Council Code Biographic Detail Date 
1 Alpha   AD001C Conservative councillor with chair or vice-chair 12/02/2010 
2 Alpha   AD002L Senior Labour councillor 13/02/2010 
3 Alpha   AD003L Group Leader (Labour) 17/02/2010 
4 Alpha   AD004C Group & Council Leader (Conservative) 18/02/2010 
5 Alpha   AD005IN Independent councillor 23/02/2010 
6 Alpha   AD006C Conservative councillor with chair or vice-chair 08/03/2010 
7 Alpha   AD007C Conservative councillor with chair or vice-chair 08/03/2010 
8 Alpha   AD008L Labour councillor 15/04/2010 
9 Alpha   AD009L Labour councillor 12/05/2010 
10 Alpha   AD010L Labour councillor 13/05/2010 
11 Alpha   AD011C Conservative councillor 17/05/2010 
12 Alpha   AD012C Conservative councillor 25/05/2010 
13 Alpha   AD013C Conservative councillor with chair or vice-chair 27/05/2010 
14 Alpha   AD014C Conservative councillor 27/05/2010 
15 Alpha   AD015L Labour councillor 01/06/2010 
16 Beta   BC001LD Lib Democrat councillor with chair or vice-chair 13/02/2010 
17 Beta   BC002C Conservative councillor with chair or vice-chair 25/02/2010 
18 Beta   BC003C Conservative councillor with chair or vice-chair 04/03/2010 
19 Beta   BC004LD Lib Democrat councillor with chair or vice-chair 08/03/2010 
20 Beta   BC005LD Liberal Democrat councillor 11/03/2010 
21 Beta   BC006C Conservative councillor 17/05/2010 
22 Beta   BC007C Conservative councillor 25/05/2010 
23 Beta   BC008IN Independent councillor 26/05/2010 
24 Beta   BC009LI Liberal councillor 28/05/2010 
25 Beta   BC010LD Group Leader (Liberal Democrat) 02/06/2010 
26 Beta   BC011C Conservative councillor with chair or vice-chair 08/06/2010 
27 Beta   BC012C Conservative councillor with chair or vice-chair 08/06/2010 
28 Beta   BC013C Group & Council Leader (Conservative) 09/06/2010 
29 Beta   BC014C Conservative councillor with chair or vice-chair 15/06/2010 
30 Beta   BC015C Conservative councillor with chair or vice-chair 15/06/2010 
31 Gamma   GU001LD Senior Liberal Democrat councillor 18/02/2010 
32 Gamma   GU002L Group Leader (Labour) 22/02/2010 
33 Gamma   GU003C Group Leader (Conservative) *25/02/2010 
34 Gamma   GU004C Conservative councillor 01/03/2010 
35 Gamma   GU005L Labour councillor with chair or vice-chair 02/03/2010 
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36 Gamma   GU006LD Liberal Democrat councillor 02/03/2010 
37 Gamma   GU007LD Liberal Democrat councillor 08/03/2010 
38 Gamma   GU008C Conservative councillor with chair or vice-chair 28/04/2010 
39 Gamma   GU009C Conservative councillor 15/05/2010 
40 Gamma   GU010LD Group & Council Leader (Liberal Democrat) 17/05/2010 
41 Gamma   GU011C Conservative councillor with chair or vice-chair 26/05/2010 
42 Gamma   GU012L Labour councillor 28/05/2010 
43 Gamma   GU013L Labour councillor 01/06/2010 
44 Gamma   GU014LD Lib Democrat councillor with chair or vice-chair 01/06/2010 
45 Gamma   GU015LD Liberal Democrat councillor 02/06/2010 
46 Delta   DM001C Conservative councillor 02/03/2010 
47 Delta   DM002L Group & Council Leader (Labour) 10/03/2010 
48 Delta   DM003L Labour councillor 10/03/2010 
49 Delta   DM004C Conservative councillor *19/04/2010 
50 Delta   DM005C Conservative councillor with chair or vice-chair *19/04/2010 
51 Delta   DM006C Conservative councillor *19/04/2010 
52 Delta   DM007C Conservative councillor *19/04/2010 
53 Delta   DM008L Labour councillor *19/04/2010 
54 Delta   DM009L Labour councillor 22/04/2010 
55 Delta   DM010L Labour councillor 22/04/2010 
56 Delta   DM011L Labour councillor 13/05/2010 
57 Delta   DM012LD Lib Democrat councillor with chair or vice-chair 26/05/2010 
58 Delta   DM013C Group Leader (Conservative) 03/06/2010 
59 Delta   DM014L Labour councillor 09/06/2010 
60 Delta   DM015L Labour councillor 22/06/2010 
     
* – Asterisk indicates the interview was conducted face-to-face. All other Local Government 
interviews conducted via telephone. 
 
List of Overview & Scrutiny Observations 
# Council Title (abstracted / abridged) Date 
1 Alpha District Executive O&S Thursday 4
th
 February 2010 
2 Alpha District Corporate O&S Wednesday 3
rd
 March 2010 
3 Alpha District Corporate (Crime & Disorder) O&S Thursday 4th March 2010 
4 Beta County Health O&S Wednesday 10
th
 February 2010 
5 Beta County O&S Performance Board Thursday 25
th
 February 2010 
6 Beta County Environment and Economy O&S Thursday 4
th
 March 
7 Beta County Health O&S Wednesday 10
th
 March 2010 
8 Beta County Social Care O&S Task Group Tuesday 18
th
 May 2010 
9 Gamma Unitary O&S Management Committee Wednesday 10
th
 February 2010 
10 Gamma Unitary Children & Young People O&S Wednesday 24
th
 February 2010 
11 Gamma Unitary Health O&S Thursday 25
th
 February 2010 
12 Gamma Unitary O&S Management Committee Wednesday 10
th
 March 2010 
13 Gamma Unitary Partners & Growth O&S Tuesday 6
th
 April 2010 
14 Delta Metro Crime and Community O&S Monday 15
th
 February 2010 
15 Delta Metro Liveability O&S Tuesday 16
th
 February 2010 
16 Delta Metro Health & Social O&S Thursday 11
th
 March 2010 
17 Delta Metro Liveability O&S Monday 12
th
 April 2010 
18 Delta Metro Crime and Community O&S Monday 19
th
 April 2010 
19 Delta Metro Lifelong Learning O&S Monday 19
th
 April 2010 
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1.1– Screening Question (i.e. Overview and Scrutiny Councillors Only) 
 
1.2 Is the council to which you received the letter a: 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Shire District / Borough 366 42.0 42.0 
Unitary 87 10.0 52.0 
London Borough 124 14.2 66.2 
Shire County 115 13.2 79.4 
Metropolitan Borough 179 20.6 100.0 
Total 871 100.0  
 
1.3 Are you a member of a political party? If so, please select the appropriate option: 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Conservative 462 53.0 53.0 
Labour 192 22.0 75.1 
Liberal Democrat 217 24.9 100.0 
Total 871 100.0  
 
1.4– Screening Question (i.e. Leader / Not Leader Only) 
 
1.5 Do members of your party hold all the cabinet posts in your council? 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 475 54.5 54.5 
No 343 39.4 93.9 
Alternative Arrangements 53 6.1 100.0 
Total 871 100.0  
 
1.6 Do members of your party hold any cabinet posts (as part of a coalition) in your council? 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes - Whole Executive 454 52.1 52.1 
Yes - Executive includes 
Cllrs from more than 1 party 
(including ours) 
86 9.9 62.0 
No - Totally Party of 
Opposition 
271 31.1 93.1 
Not Applicable - Alternative 
Arrangements 
60 6.9 100.0 
Total 871 100.0  
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1.7 - Have you been a councillor before the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000? 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes - Councillor Before 
LG2000 
344 39.5 39.5 
No - Councillor After 
LG2000 
527 60.5 100.0 
Total 871 100.0  
1.8 - Does your authority have a majority party? 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 715 82.1 82.1 
No 156 17.9 100.0 
Total 871 100.0  
 
2.1 How many overview and scrutiny committees, working groups and/or task-
and-finish groups do you currently sit on? 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0 14 1.6 1.6 
1 288 33.3 35.0 
2 298 34.5 69.4 
3 136 15.7 85.2 
4 77 8.9 94.1 
5 24 2.8 96.9 
6 27 3.1 100.0 
Total 864 100.0  
Missing System 7   
Total 871   
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2.2 How many of your overview and scrutiny committees, working groups 
and/or task-and-finish groups (that you personally sit on) are currently 
chaired by a majority party on the council? 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0 235 27.4 27.4 
1 245 28.6 55.9 
2 219 25.5 81.5 
3 87 10.1 91.6 
4 48 5.6 97.2 
5 12 1.4 98.6 
6 12 1.4 100.0 
Total 858 100.0  
Missing System 13   
Total 871   
 
2.3 How many of your overview and scrutiny committees, working groups 
and/or task-and-finish groups (that you personally sit on) are currently 
chaired by opposition parties (who are not part of an executive) on the 
council? 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0 463 53.8 53.8 
1 258 30.0 83.7 
2 90 10.5 94.2 
3 21 2.4 96.6 
4 13 1.5 98.1 
5 8 .9 99.1 
6 8 .9 100.0 
Total 861 100.0  
Missing System 10   
Total 871   
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2.4 Do you currently have a chair position on an overview and scrutiny committee, a working group and/or a 
task-and-finish group? 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes - Chair 216 24.9 24.9 
Yes - Vice Chair 122 14.1 39.0 
No 529 61.0 100.0 
Total 867 100.0  
Missing System 4   
Total 871   
 
2.5 - If you are a chair or vice-chair, how did you obtain the position? (Multiple choices permitted) 
 
Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
PartyNoms
a
 Nominated by Own Party 260 28.4% 30.0% 
Nominated by Other Party 12 1.3% 1.4% 
Nominated by Full Council 59 6.4% 6.8% 
Nominated by Scrutiny 
Committee Dominated by 
Majority Party 
51 5.6% 5.9% 
Nominated by Scrutiny 
Committee Not Dominated 
by Majority Party 
13 1.4% 1.5% 
Not a Chair or Vice-Chair 
of Overview and Scrutiny 
521 56.9% 60.2% 
Total 916 100.0% 105.8% 
 
3.1 - Have you ever attended a party group meeting which exclusively dealt with agendas of forthcoming 
scrutiny committees or short-life task-and-finish / working group meetings? 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes, all of the time 74 8.6 8.6 
Yes, some of the time 76 8.8 17.4 
Yes, occasionally 72 8.4 25.8 
Yes, on rare occasions 52 6.0 31.8 
Yes, on one occasion 26 3.0 34.8 
No, never 562 65.2 100.0 
Total 862 100.0  
Missing System 9   
Total 871   
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Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 150 17.2 17.4 17.4 
Yes, Occasionally 150 17.2 17.4 34.8 
No, Never 562 64.5 65.2 100.0 
Total 862 99.0 100.0  
Missing System 9 1.0   
Total 871 100.0   
 
3.2 Do any regular party group meetings devote a portion of time to the agendas of scrutiny committees or 
short-life task-and-finish / working group meetings? 
 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No, no time 476 55.7 55.7 
Yes - 5 mins 103 12.0 67.7 
Yes - 15 mins 140 16.4 84.1 
Yes - 30 mins 94 11.0 95.1 
Yes - 60 mins+ 42 4.9 100.0 
Total 855 100.0  
Missing System 16   
Total 871   
 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No Time Devotion 476 55.7 55.7 
Up to 30 minutes 243 28.4 84.1 
Greater than 30 minutes 136 15.9 100.0 
Total 855 100.0  
Missing System 16   
Total 871   
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3.3 - Have you ever received informal pressure from your group leader(s), party whip etc. about things under 
consideration by an overview and scrutiny committee meeting? (For example, you are advised to act as directed) 
 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes, all of the time 17 2.0 2.0 
Yes, some of the time 35 4.1 6.1 
Yes, occasionally 56 6.5 12.6 
Yes, on rare occasions 72 8.4 21.1 
Yes, on one occasion 21 2.5 23.5 
No, never 654 76.5 100.0 
Total 855 100.0  
Missing System 16   
Total 871   
 
 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 52 6.1 6.1 
Yes, Occasionally 149 17.4 23.5 
No, Never 654 76.5 100.0 
Total 855 100.0  
Missing System 16   
Total 871   
 
3.4 Have you ever been subject to an explicit party whip about issues under consideration in overview and 
scrutiny? (For example, you are told to act as directed) 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes, all of the time 8 .9 .9 
Yes, some of the time 20 2.3 3.3 
Yes, occasionally 27 3.1 6.4 
Yes, on rare occasions 34 4.0 10.3 
Yes, on one occasion 13 1.5 11.9 
No, never 758 88.1 100.0 
Total 860 100.0  
Missing System 11   
Total 871   
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Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 28 3.3 3.3 
Yes, Occasionally 74 8.6 11.9 
No, Never 758 88.1 100.0 
Total 860 100.0  
Missing System 11   
Total 871   
 
3.5 Have you ever been briefed by your local party group leader(s) about the way to conduct yourself 
in overview and scrutiny committees? (Multiple selections permitted) 
 
Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
Briefed Briefed when System 
Introduced 
83 8.8% 9.7% 
Briefed when Criticise Local 
Party During OS 
14 1.5% 1.6% 
Briefed when Issue 
Controversial 
84 8.9% 9.8% 
Briefed when Elections Due 9 1.0% 1.0% 
Briefed when First Standing 
for Election 
64 6.8% 7.5% 
Briefed when Press or 
Public to attend 
17 1.8% 2.0% 
Briefed when I agree with 
Other Parties 
9 1.0% 1.0% 
Briefed when I rebel against 
Decisions from Own Party 
14 1.5% 1.6% 
Not Briefed 647 68.8% 75.4% 
Total 941 100.0% 109.7% 
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3.6 Have you ever been disciplined by your local party group leader(s) in relation to your actions in overview 
and scrutiny committees? (Multiple selections permitted) 
 
Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
DiscOS Disciplined when System 
Introduced 
3 .3% .3% 
Disciplined when Criticise 
Local Party During OS 
3 .3% .3% 
Disciplined when Issue 
Controversial 
7 .8% .8% 
Disciplined when Elections 
Due 
3 .3% .3% 
Disciplined when I agree 
with Other Parties 
7 .8% .8% 
Disciplined when I rebel 
against Decisions from Own 
Party 
6 .7% .7% 
Disciplined other reason 6 .7% .7% 
Not Disciplined 838 96.0% 97.3% 
Total 873 100.0% 101.4% 
 
3.61 Only if yes to the previous question (3.06), what was the nature and extent of the party discipline? 
(Multiple selections permitted) 
 
 
Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
PunishOS Informal Warning 12 32.4% 34.3% 
Not Reappointed to Role 5 13.5% 14.3% 
Removed from Appt / Role 1 2.7% 2.9% 
Failure for Recommendation 
as Candidate 
1 2.7% 2.9% 
Suspended from Party 
Group 
2 5.4% 5.7% 
Not Punished 16 43.2% 45.7% 
Total 37 100.0% 105.7% 
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3.7 Since the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000, have you ever criticised the decisions made by 
your party in any public sphere; such as overview and scrutiny, full council or directly to the local, regional or 
national press? 
 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes, all of the time 2 .2 .2 
Yes, some of the time 22 2.6 2.8 
Yes, occasionally 46 5.4 8.2 
Yes, on rare occasions 102 11.9 20.1 
Yes, on one occasion 37 4.3 24.4 
No, never 647 75.6 100.0 
Total 856 100.0  
Missing System 15   
Total 871   
 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 24 2.8 2.8 
Yes, Occasionally 185 21.6 24.4 
No, Never 647 75.6 100.0 
Total 856 100.0  
Missing System 15   
Total 871   
 
3.71 Only if yes to the previous question (3.07); as a result of your criticism which of the following subsequently 
occurred? (Multiple selections permitted) 
 
Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
PunishPublic Informal Warning 25 11.7% 11.8% 
Formal Warning 5 2.3% 2.4% 
Nor Reappointed to Role 10 4.7% 4.7% 
Removed from Appt / Role 2 .9% .9% 
Not Punished 171 80.3% 81.0% 
Total 213 100.0% 100.9% 
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3.8 Since the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000, have you ever criticised the decisions made by 
your party in any private sphere; such as in group or coalition meetings, the local party meetings, national 
party conferences et al.? 
 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes, all of the time 19 2.2 2.2 
Yes, some of the time 112 13.2 15.4 
Yes, occasionally 187 22.0 37.4 
Yes, on rare occasions 198 23.3 60.6 
Yes, on one occasion 35 4.1 64.7 
No, never 300 35.3 100.0 
Total 851 100.0  
Missing System 20   
Total 871   
 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 131 15.4 15.4 
Yes, Occasionally 420 49.4 64.7 
No, Never 300 35.3 100.0 
Total 851 100.0  
Missing System 20   
Total 871   
 
3.9 On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means strongly disagree and 7 means strongly agree (circle your choice as 
appropriate), how much do you agree or disagree with this statement:  “I would be concerned about the 
consequences of criticising my own party in public; in relation to my position within my local party group.” 
 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 143 16.8 16.8 
2 120 14.1 30.9 
3 83 9.8 40.7 
4 128 15.0 55.7 
5 108 12.7 68.4 
6 130 15.3 83.7 
7 139 16.3 100.0 
Total 851 100.0  
Missing System 20   
Total 871   
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3.10 On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means strongly disagree and 7 means strongly agree (circle your choice as 
appropriate), how much do you agree or disagree with this statement:  “I would be concerned about the 
consequences of criticising my own party in public; in relation to my party‟s chances at the next election.” 
 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 97 11.4 11.4 
2 77 9.0 20.4 
3 82 9.6 30.0 
4 108 12.7 42.7 
5 119 14.0 56.7 
6 161 18.9 75.6 
7 208 24.4 100.0 
Total 852 100.0  
Missing System 19   
Total 871   
 
(Conditional Questions – Section 4) 
4.1 Do you think that your own party group conducts more or [fewer] meetings now compared to before the 
introduction of the Local Government Act 2000?  
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Considerably more party 
group meetings 
19 5.7 5.7 
Quite a lot more party group 
meetings 
20 6.0 11.7 
A fair amount more party 
group meetings 
55 16.5 28.1 
Exactly the same level of 
party group meetings 
175 52.4 80.5 
A fair amount fewer party 
group meetings 
34 10.2 90.7 
Quite a lot fewer party group 
meetings 
14 4.2 94.9 
Considerably fewer party 
group meetings 
17 5.1 100.0 
Total 334 100.0  
Missing System 537   
Total 871   
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4.2 How much more or less comfortable do you feel criticising your own party leadership in overview and 
scrutiny conditions or in a public arena since the introduction of the Local Government Act 2000? 
 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Considerably more 
comfortable 
7 2.1 2.1 
Quite a lot more comfortable 4 1.2 3.3 
A fair amount more 
comfortable 
25 7.6 10.9 
Exactly the same level of 
comfort 
252 76.4 87.3 
A fair amount less 
comfortable 
14 4.2 91.5 
Quite a lot less comfortable 8 2.4 93.9 
Considerably less 
comfortable 
20 6.1 100.0 
Total 330 100.0  
Missing System 541   
Total 871   
 
4.3 How much more or less discipline has been used to control members of your party since the introduction of 
the Local Government Act in 2000? (Not just yourself) 
 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Considerably more 
discipline 
2 .6 .6 
Quite a lot more discipline 14 4.2 4.8 
A fair amount more 
discipline 
21 6.3 11.2 
Exactly the same level of 
discipline 
257 77.6 88.8 
A fair amount less discipline 11 3.3 92.1 
Quite a lot less discipline 9 2.7 94.9 
Considerably less discipline 17 5.1 100.0 
Total 331 100.0  
Missing System 540   
Total 871   
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4.4 On a scale of 1 to 7, how much control do you think your own party has over its members under both the 
old committee system and the modern arrangements? (Please circle the appropriate selection) 
 
4.4a - Before the Local Government Act 2000: „The Committee System‟ 
 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 9 2.7 2.7 
2 25 7.5 10.2 
3 35 10.5 20.8 
4 99 29.8 50.6 
5 76 22.9 73.5 
6 54 16.3 89.8 
7 34 10.2 100.0 
Total 332 100.0  
Missing System 539   
Total 871   
 
4.4b - Subsequent to the Local Government Act 2000: „Overview and Scrutiny‟ 
 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 17 5.1 5.1 
2 28 8.4 13.6 
3 40 12.0 25.6 
4 99 29.8 55.4 
5 74 22.3 77.7 
6 47 14.2 91.9 
7 27 8.1 100.0 
Total 332 100.0  
Missing System 539   
Total 871   
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Section Five 
 
5.11 “If there is a problem in my ward that has been caused by a decision made by my own party, I would 
contact my group leader(s) to express my serious concern and try and work out a solution. There‟s no point 
giving the opposition ammunition by opening up such a simple thing to wider debate!” 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 16 1.9 1.9 
2 14 1.6 3.5 
3 10 1.2 4.7 
4 38 4.4 9.1 
5 89 10.4 19.6 
6 188 22.0 41.6 
7 499 58.4 100.0 
Total 854 100.0  
Missing System 17   
Total 871   
 
5.12 “If one of my ward constituents contacted me about a problem that they had encountered and it seemed 
like a sensible topic for an overview and scrutiny investigation, I would try and raise the item in overview and 
scrutiny first rather than taking it to my party.” 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 155 18.2 18.2 
2 120 14.1 32.2 
3 75 8.8 41.0 
4 132 15.5 56.5 
5 109 12.8 69.3 
6 115 13.5 82.8 
7 147 17.2 100.0 
Total 853 100.0  
Missing System 18   
Total 871   
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5.13 “My aim as a councillor is to make a difference to the lives of people by feeding into the policy process with 
my ward residents in mind. If I am unpopular in the party group it makes „making a difference‟ much harder.” 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 71 8.4 8.4 
2 56 6.6 15.0 
3 71 8.4 23.3 
4 177 20.9 44.2 
5 185 21.8 66.0 
6 145 17.1 83.1 
7 143 16.9 100.0 
Total 848 100.0  
Missing System 23   
Total 871   
 
5.14 “It is reasonable to be expected to fall in line when it comes to agreeing with what the party asks me to do. 
If I am loyal to our cause I am more likely to get into a position of influence. With this wider area of influence, I 
can make life better for my constituents by having some control over the authority‟s work programme.” 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 71 8.4 8.4 
2 91 10.7 19.1 
3 90 10.6 29.7 
4 202 23.8 53.5 
5 166 19.6 73.0 
6 131 15.4 88.5 
7 98 11.5 100.0 
Total 849 100.0  
Missing System 22   
Total 871   
 
Appendix D – List of Associated Papers 
The following papers were presented at academic conferences between 2007 
and 2010. Text within these papers may include direct or amended excerpts 
from this thesis. 
 
Ewbank, M (2010) “Not just something for non-executives to do‟: Party reaction to the 
opening of the „theatre of representation‟ in English Local Government.” Paper Presented at 
the 60th Anniversary Political Studies Association Annual Conference 
Ewbank, M (2009) “Crashing the Party: The separation of powers in local government and 
the role of party groups.” Paper Presented at the 59th Political Studies Association Annual 
Conference 
Ewbank, M (2009) “Direct Democracy a la mode: Party Behaviour in the Landtag of North 
Rhine-Westphalia.” Paper Presented at the 59th Political Studies Association Annual 
Conference 
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Interview Guide  
Standard Guide without specific committee observation references  
 
V1 Party Group Meetings 
 
Frequency (* conditional Q probe – comparative to before legislation) 
Agenda (purposive or accidental / unintentional coverage of O&S) 
Relation to O&S and issues under consideration in O&S (topic linkages – i.e. topic X) 
Group Lines 
- Formed? [* - Leaders (For what purpose? Why necessary?)] 
- Divided? (Is that acceptable?) 
Group Pressure 
- How? 
- Why? 
- Heeded? 
Organisation vs. Briefing 
- Informational? 
- Corralling or deliberating? 
 
V2 Pervasiveness of Party 
 
Control element with any council business [* - Members] 
Control element with O&S [* - Members] 
Comparison between arena (O&S v.s. non-O&S, but also Public vs. Private) 
What is the party place in your (work) on O&S? 
- Precedence 
- Control 
- Neutral 
 
V3 Centralisation  
 
Direction of information flow top-down, self-sourced or officer-assisted? [* - Members] 
- If self-sourced/ officer-assisted – filtered?  
Specific instructions / briefing on policy matters? 
- Party policy vs. evidence-sourced policy? 
Policy discussions – deliberative, informative or instructive? [* - Leaders / Members] 
Hierarchies of information (i.e. group as barrier to information?) [* - Leader specific] 
 
V4 Preclusory Discipline 
 
Organisational discipline – occurrences? [* - Leaders / Members] 
- When? 
- How? 
- Why? 
- Level of intensity? 
- Does councillor heed the organisational control? [* - Leaders & Members] 
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Deconstruction of organisational discipline (hard vs. soft) 
- Mandation 
o Topic-based? Rarity? [* - Leaders probe – why?] 
- Advisory 
o Topic-based? Rarity? [* - Leaders probe – why?] 
 
V5 Cohibition 
 
Prevention of deliberation (freedom of action?) 
Prevention of public deliberation (freedom of action?) 
Reporting of active blocks (in committee, before committee) 
Inhibiting factors blocking O&S? 
Executive monitoring of activities? [* - Leaders probe – why?] 
 
V6 Castigative Discipline 
 
Evidence of occurrence? (within own party) 
Possibility of occurrence? (within own party) 
On occurrence: 
- When? 
- Why? [* - Leaders probe – why?] 
- How? [* - Leaders probe – why?] 
- Level of intensity? 
- Heed instructions as result of threat of CD? 
Legitimate vs. soft threat?  
Fear of executive? 
Fear of punishment? [e.g. promotion, prevention of role allocation (unspoken but probe if 
raised)] 
 
V7 Allocation of Positions 
 
How are positions allocated? [* - both Leaders / Members] 
How [X] allocated? (Context of committee) 
Why [X] allocated? (Context of committee) 
Chair roles (positions of responsibility) [* - Leaders probe – why?] 
Committee roles (why?) [* - Leaders probe – why?] 
Self-selection (role of party as filter?) [* - Leaders probe – why?] 
Allocation of roles to parties [* to Leaders] 
Process of nomination [* to Leaders] 
- How? 
- Why? 
- Member resistance? 
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Observations 
Main themes for each committee: 
 
Pre-commencement  
 
Pre-committee information  
(Agenda, Minutes of Previous Committee, Pre-Committee Reports) 
 
Arrival at committee (Group-based, free-arrival, individual vs. together) 
 
Presence of Observers: 
1. Witnesses (number, type) 
2. Presence of (general) third-parties (observers, stakeholders) 
3. Presence of public 
4. Presence of press 
5. Presence of non-committee councillors (Exec or non-executive? Maj. / Opp. group? 
Leaders of groups? Other political representatives (MPs)? 
 
Seating Arrangements (as Ashworth 2003a & 2003b) 
 
Meeting 
 
Contributions (frequencies of each member) by party group 
Non-contributors (note) by party group 
 
Questioning – following agenda / topic / theme / evidence / witness 
Questioning – tangential / anecdotal 
Questioning – aggressive / agreeable (consensus-building of Qs cross-party) 
 
Chair – behaviour, willingness to incorporate members (monitor frequencies & credence given) 
 
Consensus – where, how, topic (issue under consideration).  
- Evidence-based? (issues agreed upon (see pre-committee information) 
- Group-based? (i.e. seniority consensus with other parties – and other 
councillors falling into line?) 
 
Divisions & Disagreements – party split, member split? 
Divisions & Disagreements – held lines?  
- Agreement forthcoming from party vs. silence from party. 
Divisions & Disagreements – resolved in committee (rather than outside) 
Divisions & Disagreements – does majority line translate to minutes / results of committee 
 
Dissent – any active dissent from committee members at any point? 
Dissent – any active dissent from non-committee members at any point? 
 
External Contributions – executive allowed to speak (attend & contribute or attend alone)? 
- DIRECTIONAL or OBSERVATIONAL? 
External Contributions – public allowed to speak (on agenda / at end)? 
- Councillor interaction with gallery (if applicable) 
 
Close of Meeting – contentious issues – resolved, postponed, agreed-upon before closure? 
